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 Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the responses of the county magistracy to social unrest in a 
period marked by a redefinition of social and governmental relationships. Drawing 
together approaches to governmental and protest histories, it answers calls for more 
detailed analyses of the actions and attitudes of authority through a more thorough 
account of judicial responses to popular protest. The approach adopted here, also 
offers new perspectives on the nature of social relations and governance at this point. 
 
This study privileges the structuring of county government in an analysis of social 
protest. Through two regional case studies, it recognises the autonomy and 
concomitant variation in the infrastructure of local government, and the ways in 
which these distinct governmental arrangements shaped the nature of popular 
resistance. Not only does this approach provide a more nuanced understanding of the 
actions of the authorities, but it posits social conflict as a lens through which to view 
the operation of government. Disorder laid bare many of the inadequacies of a system 
predicated on paternalist authority, but it also exposed the constellation of social 
relationships that underpinned it. 
 
Chapter one reviews the historiographical discussion regarding the form and function 
of the magistracy and differing perspectives on the decline of paternalist governance. 
The two original case studies of Norfolk and Somerset, pursued throughout this 
thesis, are introduced in chapter two, which details their respective structures of 
government. This provides the foundation for a reappraisal of the ‘crisis of 
paternalism’ during the subsistence crises of 1795 and 1800-01, in chapter three, and 
the challenges posed to the magistracy during the Swing disturbances of 1830, 
considered in chapters four and five. By viewing protest through the structures of 
government that mediated social relationships, the full complexity of these 
interactions is revealed and a more nuanced picture of social conflict is made visible. 
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7 
Introduction: protest, social relationships and structures of government 
 
The period 1790-1834 marked a profound change in English society. The experience of 
war, economic crises, and political agitation strained, altered and redefined social 
relationships. According to Edward Thompson, one of the most influential contributors to 
this field, the interests of both ruler and ruled were consolidated, in opposition, in this 
context.1 The ‘particular equilibrium between paternalist authority and the crowd’ - a 
social relationship that secured the rule of the landed class via an accommodation of 
popular culture and expectations, and a shared understanding of mutual obligations - 
collapsed.2 The processes of societal change in this period, and the significance of 
popular collective action in particular, continue to be the subject of much research and 
debate. Following an agenda for the study of social protest set by Thompson, Roger 
Wells and Andrew Charlesworth, much has been accomplished in terms of history from 
below. However, we still lack detailed studies of the responses of authority to popular 
protest.3 This thesis seeks to address this deficit through a study of the magistracy and the 
ways in which they dealt with social protest. Focused on two regional case studies of the 
magistracy in Somerset and Norfolk, it considers how the structures of county 
government shaped the complex, and often contradictory, responses to popular unrest. In 
privileging the institutions and mechanisms of government in the context of protest, this 
approach affords insights into the changing nature of governance and social relationships 
over the turn of the nineteenth century; offering a ‘history from above’ that compliments 
what has been learned from ‘history from below’.4 
 
The paternalist model of eighteenth-century social relationships delineated by Thompson 
in a series of articles from 1971-1978 has underpinned much of the subsequent work on 
social change in this period and the analysis of social protest more broadly. Part of its 
                                                
1 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London: 1963; this ed. Pelican 1968), 12, 
111, 195. 
2 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth-Century’, Past & Present 
50 (1971): 78-9, 129; E. P. Thompson, ‘Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture’, Journal of Social History, 7:4 
(1974): esp. 403 & 405. 
3 K. Navickas, ‘What happened to class? New histories of labour and collective action in Britain’, Social 
History, 36:2 (2011): 193. 
4 To borrow from K. Navickas, op. cit. 203. 
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enduring utility stems from the scope it afforded for popular action and agency.5 As 
Thompson conceived it, paternalism in the eighteenth century was no longer predicated 
on the daily interventions of the gentry in the lives of the poor. Rather, it was a ‘studied 
technique of rule’ made visible in particular acts: ‘in the formalities of the bench; or on 
calculated occasions of popular patronage.’6 The distance between ruler and ruled had 
widened with an increasingly free labour market, the declining influence of the church, 
the absence of the gentry from their estates, and the concomitant growth of a ‘robust 
plebeian culture’.7 Deference was not secured through the minute control of the 
labourers’ living and working conditions or through an extension of policing, but through 
the performance of authority and negotiation. The relationship was reciprocal: the 
‘cultural hegemony’ of the elite was only maintained if they met certain popular 
expectations and fulfilled particular duties. The poor reminded their rulers of their 
obligations through equally calculated acts of plebeian ‘counter-theatre’, most frequently 
(according to Thompson) in direct collective action. The balance of power therefore was 
maintained by this ‘field of force’, each party setting limits on the actions of the other.8  
Thompson sited the collapse of paternalism in the turbulent context of the 1790s. 
The popular disturbances precipitated by inflated prices and failed harvests were met with 
increasing hostility and repression. The example of Revolutionary France and political 
agitation at home recast popular action as potentially insurrectionary, militating against 
paternalist negotiation with the crowd.9 Thus the ability of the poor to assert their 
interests was curtailed, signalling a redefinition of their relationship with authority, and, 
as Thompson argued, their self-identification as a class.  
Roger Wells seized on this context to consider its role in the formation of a ‘‘new’ 
protest culture’ of the rural proletariat. The debate that ensued has continued to shape the 
                                                
5 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth-Century’, Past & Present 
50 (1971): 76-136; idem. ‘Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture’ Journal of Social History, 7:4 (1974): 382-
405; idem. ‘Eighteenth-century English society: class struggle without class?’ Social History, 3:2 (1978): 
133-165; P. King, ‘Edward Thompson’s Contribution to Eighteenth-Century Studies. The Patrician: 
Plebeian Model Re-examined’, Social History, 21:2 (1996): 216 & 218; A. Randall and A. Charlesworth, 
‘The Moral Economy: Riot, Markets and Social Conflict’ in idem. (eds.) Moral Economy and Popular 
Protest: Crowds, Conflict and Authority (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 1-3. 
6 Thompson, ‘Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture’, 387-9. 
7 Ibid, 391 & 395. 
8 Ibid, 399-401; Thompson, ‘Eighteenth-century English society’, 150-1. 
9 Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy’, 129; idem, ‘Eighteenth-century English society’, 165. 
 
 
9 
study of social protest.10 Wells considered the subsistence crisis of 1795 as a watershed in 
social relations. The extension of the poor relief system to subsidise wages increased 
dependence on the parish. Attempts to compel the authorities to make paternalist 
interventions in market and wage regulation by collective action were brutally 
suppressed. Significantly, new volunteer forces, established as a means to resist invasion, 
were deployed as a police force. The strength of the repressive agencies, and subjugation 
by the demands of the relief system, limited the opportunities for rural communities to 
openly protest their condition. Instead, hatred of their oppressors - the farmers, clerics 
and gentlemen who controlled the rates and policed them under the guise of ‘armed 
patriotism’ - was expressed through covert means: ‘ultimately arson and the threatening 
letter.’11 The methods evolved in the 1790s, Wells argued, became the ‘countryman’s 
main weapons in the first half of the nineteenth century’.12 Subsequent outbreaks of riot, 
notably in East Anglia in 1816, and the Swing disturbances of 1830, were overt 
expressions of ‘class war’, but ‘covert social protest’, Wells contended, ‘was certainly 
more enduring’.13 
 Andrew Charlesworth took issue with Wells’ thesis, significantly with his over-
simplification of a ruling class alliance, and the dominance of covert protest.14 According 
to Charlesworth, the relationship between farmers and parish authorities, and the gentry 
and the clergy (significantly in their capacity as magistrates), was not one of 
unquestioned unity. Given the regulation of relief administration by the latter, the poor 
had recourse to them against the decisions of the former. It was in this constellation that 
the paternalist model still held sway. This was evident in popular mass appeals to the 
magistracy in the disturbances of 1816 and 1830. Charlesworth sites the collapse of 
paternalist order in the aftermath of Swing. The extent of unrest was perceived as an act 
of disloyalty on the part of the labourers, and as a justification for the passing of the Poor 
                                                
10 R. Wells, ‘The Development of the English Rural Proletariat and Social Protest, 1700-1850’, The Journal 
of Peasant Studies, 6 (1979): 115-139; C. J. Griffin, Protest, Politics and Work in Rural England, 1700-
1850 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 9-10. 
11 R. Wells, ‘The Development of the English Rural Proletariat and Social Protest’, esp. 125-7. 
12 Ibid, 116. 
13 Ibid, 131. 
14 A. Charlesworth, ‘The Development of the English Rural Proletariat and social protest, 1700-1850: a 
comment’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 8 (1980): 101-111, esp. 104. 
 
 
10 
Law Amendment Act in 1834, facilitating more stringent control of the poor.15 
Countering this assessment, Wells argued that these outbreaks of disturbance were 
exceptional, calling for more local and regional studies to uncover the everyday means of 
popular resistance.16 His own micro-study of Burwash (Sussex), and subsequently south-
eastern England, evidenced the utility of this approach. Rural conflict was revealed as 
‘multidimensional’, underscored by a complex of social relationships, and manifest in a 
range of protest forms.17 
The Wells-Charlesworth debate, and Thompson’s modelling of social 
relationships, continues to influence studies of protest in this period, both in support and 
in contention. The emphasis on local studies has dominated much subsequent work. The 
complexity of social relationships, community formations, and the means of resistance 
already drawn out, has raised questions regarding the utility of organising concepts such 
as urban and rural, and overt and covert protest. Evident in Wells’ study of Swing in the 
Weald, the mixed demographic of the crowd showed grievances shared across different 
occupational communities.18 More recently, Carl Griffin’s work on Swing, and the 
suppression of trade unionism at Tolpuddle in 1834, has emphasised not only the fluidity 
of occupational communities but the formative impact of resistance and its suppression 
over the longer-term and across regions.19  
Likewise, the distinction between types of protest, or the targets of protest has been 
questioned.20 Drawing such artificial distinctions limits our perspective as to the variety 
of means, often used in conjunction, and the different local social contexts that framed 
the form and focus of protest. Again, Griffin, amongst others, has moved the discussion 
on to consider the perception of protest. The power of words, for example, gestures, 
                                                
15 Ibid, 104-6.  
16 R. Wells, ‘Social Conflict and Protest in the English Countryside in the Nineteenth-Century: A 
Rejoinder’, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 8 (1981): 514-530. 
17 Ibid, 524; R. Wells, ‘Social Protest, Class, Conflict and Consciousness in the English Countryside 1700-
1880’ in R. Wells and M. Reed (eds) Class, Conflict and Protest in the English Countryside, 1700-1880 
(London: Frank Cass, 1990), 190-214. 
18 R. Wells, ‘Social Protest, Class, Conflict and Consciousness in the English Countryside’, 162-4. 
19 C. J. Griffin, The Rural War: Captain Swing and the Politics of Protest (Manchester; Manchester 
University Press 2012); idem, ‘The Culture of Combination: solidarities and collective action before 
Tolpuddle’, The Historical Journal, 58:2 (2015): 443-480, esp. 449-52. 
20 A. Charlesworth, ‘An agenda for historical studies of Rural Protest in England, 1750-1850’, Rural 
History, 2:2 (1991): 232-3. 
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symbols and threats could be as potent as more explicit forms of protest in exerting 
pressure and winning concessions.21  
In consequence of the models provided by Thompson, Wells and Charlesworth, and 
the work that has followed, we have a more nuanced understanding of popular protest. 
One area, however, where the studies of social protest in this period have stalled is in a 
detailed assessment of the role of the authorities. Mooted by Charlesworth in 1991, and 
again by Katrina Navickas in a more recent review, the ‘reactions, attitudes and values’ 
of the central and local authorities require more concerted attention.22  
The authorities have certainly not been absent from studies of social protest in this 
period. The pivotal role of the magistracy in Thompson’s paternalist model has continued 
to influence discussion of the relationship between authority and the people. They were 
the most visible manifestation of ‘cultural hegemony’, setting the ‘limits of tolerance’ in 
their administration of the law and the maintenance of order.23 The willingness or 
otherwise of the judiciary to concede to popular demands, particularly in the context of 
riot, has been a consistent feature of the debate regarding the decline of paternalism and 
the concomitant redefinition of social relationships.24 
In his re-examination of Thompson’s paternalist model, Peter King has drawn 
attention to points regarding the nature of authority that need to be developed. Firstly, 
King has questioned the centrality of the law as a means of control. How far, he asks, was 
the state able to control ‘its own public judicial rituals’? Could other sectors of society 
subvert or influence the performance of authority manifest in the courts?25 King also 
criticises the limitations imposed by the bi-polarity of this conception of social 
relationships. Thompson dismissed the ability of the burgeoning middle classes to 
provide any check on the authority of the gentry.26 King, however, has argued that the 
                                                
21 C. J. Griffin, ‘The violent Captain Swing?’ Past & Present, 209 (2010): 149-80, esp. 179-80; idem, 
Protest, Politics and Work in Rural England, 1700-1850, 14. 
22 A. Charlesworth, ‘An agenda for historical studies of Rural Protest’, 235; K. Navickas, ‘What happened 
to class?’ 203. 
23 E. P. Thompson, ‘Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture’, 390. 
24 For example: R. Wells, Wretched Faces (Alan Sutton Publishing 1988, this ed. Breviary Stuff 
Publications, 2011); D. Hay, ‘The state and the market in 1800: Lord Kenyon and Mr Waddington’, Past & 
Present, 162 (1999): 101-162; see also above, Wells-Charlesworth debate and chapter 1.4 histories of the 
magistracy. 
25 P. King, ‘Edward Thompson’s Contribution to Eighteenth-Century Studies,’ 222. 
26 E. P. Thompson, ‘Eighteenth-century English society,’ 142. 
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interests of the propertied were divided, reflected in ‘separate policy priorities’.27 His 
work on the summary courts has highlighted the ability of both the poor, and the 
middling sort, to mobilize the judiciary against one another. These alliances King 
characterises as triangular in form. Judicial hearings he contends, provided ‘a vital arena 
in which social tensions were expressed and social relations reconfigured.’28  
King’s analysis has emphasised the need for a more complex model of social 
relationships, and a reassessment of the role of law within it. Indeed, the questions he has 
posed are all the more pertinent in the context of ‘crisis’ in the 1790s and the first 
decades of the nineteenth century. The triangulation of competing interests between the 
poor, the middling sort and the gentry (frequently acting in their judicial capacity) are 
evident in the administration of relief, in market disturbances, tithe, wage, and rent 
disputes. The question regarding the ability of the state to control its public judicial 
rituals is reflected in contemporary debate over the efficacy and appropriateness of 
judicial responses. Throughout the period, the most marked contest revolved around 
negotiation under duress and the granting of paternalist concessions, either to pre-empt or 
stop popular protests. Both Thompson and Wells have reflected on the difficulty the 
variety of responses poses for analysis.29 Wells, however, set aside this ‘complex of 
contradictions’ as a product of the extraordinary extension of military policing in the 
1790s, choosing to concentrate on the operation of the relief system as the primary means 
of social control.30 
This thesis aims to unravel some of this complexity in judicial responses and the 
nature of social relationships at this point. This can be achieved by adopting some of the 
approaches and arguments of histories of local government. In particular, the work of 
Norma Landau and David Eastwood provide a complimentary framework to support an 
analysis of the magistracy in the context of social protest.31 The changes in local 
                                                
27 P. King, op. cit. 226.. 
28 P. King, ibid, 226; idem, ‘The summary courts and social relations in Eighteenth century England’, Past 
& Present, 183 (2004): 125-172, esp. 127. 
29 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy Reviewed’ in idem. Customs in Common (London: Merlin, 1991, 
this ed. Penguin 1993) 292; Wells, Wretched Faces, 288-9. 
30 Wells, Wretched Faces, 289; see also Chapter three. 
31 N. Landau, The Justices of the Peace 1679-1760 Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984; D. 
Eastwood, Governing Rural England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); idem, Government and Community 
in the English Provinces, 1700-1870 (London: Macmillan Press, 1997). 
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government over the turn of the nineteenth century mirrors the reordering of social 
relationships considered in histories of social protest. ‘If’, Eastwood states, ‘the century 
and a half after 1700 witnessed the apotheosis of English local government…it also 
heralded their slow demise.’32 From the middle of the eighteenth century, the county 
judiciary were given increasing scope to regulate their own institutions and mediate the 
law through the statutory expansion of their powers in both summary and county courts.33 
Their autonomy however was challenged by political, economic, and demographic 
changes taking place at the end of the century. Changes in the composition of the 
judiciary, questions regarding their ‘un-democratic’ character – notably regarding the 
extent of their powers – and their ability to regulate a rapidly increasing population, 
precipitated a remodelling of their relationship with central government and their 
communities. Although Eastwood characterises it as a gradual, ‘sometimes 
imperceptible’ process, nonetheless, by the middle of the nineteenth century, ‘an old 
provincial order passed…reliance on status and symbols yielded to surveillance.’34 
This study, therefore, focuses on the governmental structures administered by the 
county magistracy as a means to analyse the mechanisms of control. If the autonomy of 
the magistracy allowed for the creation of distinct institutions, we must then consider the 
precise arrangement of local government rooted in particular local contexts. Two regional 
studies of two county commissions of the peace form the basis of this analysis. Taking 
the county as the corollary, and in comparison, allows for continuities as well as 
differences to be ‘appreciated and apprehended’; it captures variation within and between 
regions, the rural, urban and suburban, ameliorating the problems of ‘exceptionalism’ that 
micro-studies can generate.35  
The regional courts have been privileged in this analysis, as a locus for social 
relations and policy. The county courts of quarter sessions offered another forum for 
‘triangulation’. The courtroom encompassed and facilitated the interaction (albeit skewed 
in favour of the authorities) between the gentry on the bench, the middling sort in the 
                                                
32 D. Eastwood, Government and Community, 19. 
33 N. Landau, The Justices of the Peace, 238-9; D. Eastwood, Governing Rural England 82, 88-9. 
34 D. Eastwood, Government and Community, 118-9. 
35 C. J. Griffin, Protest, Politics and Work in Rural England, 11, 15-16. 
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grand and petty juries, and the labouring poor.36 The quarter sessions also presented the 
opportunity to shape and promote policy to the county at large. Again, the different social 
constituencies that populated the court were integral to this. Just as the county magistrates 
received direction from the king’s justices at the Assizes, the charges made to the grand 
jury at quarter sessions frequently included statements of policy.37 These vertical 
relationships did not, however, merely signal the imposition of authority from above. As 
Hay has reminded us in his analysis of the pursuit of prosecutions by the judges of the 
King’s Bench: the constitutional autonomy of the judiciary from parliament allowed the 
formation of a ‘judicial politics independent of, or indeed opposed to government policy, 
legislative intent or economic interest’.38 This can be extended to the regional courts. As 
the evidence presented here will show, the discussions in the Grand Jury chamber at 
Assize and quarter sessions presented an opportunity for discussion and debate, and the 
development of policies that opposed and modified central and local directives. 
Other structures of government outside of the county courts also need to be 
considered: the location and availability of justices at petty and summary hearings, 
borough and corporate benches, the nature and extent of policing, all factored in the 
shaping of protest. Crucially, these arrangements were all regionally contingent, and 
largely dependent on voluntary participation. They afforded scope as different points for 
popular access to government, and in their constitution, reflected the possibility for a 
variety of responses. Emulating the excellent work of Norma Landau and Peter King, the 
social composition of government personnel has been pursued here, to address the 
different attitudes and values manifest in the authorities: how they perceived themselves, 
each other, and the communities over which they presided, and more particularly the 
validity of paternalist governance.39 The interactions of these structures must be 
understood to make sense of the complex of judicial reactions to protest, and the nature of 
social relationships in this period. 
 
                                                
36 P. King, ‘Decision Makers and Decision Making in English Criminal Law, 1750-1800, Historical 
Journal, 27:1 (1984): 25-58; idem, Crime, Justice and Discretion in England, 1740-1820 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 258. 
37 Eastwood, Government and Community, 12, 100. 
38 D. Hay, ‘The state and the market in 1800’, 103. 
39 Landau, The Justices of the Peace; King, Crime, Justice and Discretion, 110-22. 
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Chapter one outlines the form and function of the magistracy from the middle of the 
eighteenth century. It also addresses histories of the magistracy and the apparent decline 
of paternalist governance, drawing out the intersections between approaches to histories 
of crime and protest, and government and governance. This provides the 
historiographical and methodological context for the case studies pursued throughout the 
remainder of this thesis.  
Chapter two introduces the two regional cases studies. Although broadly 
comparable as agricultural and maritime counties, the different physical, demographic 
and economic arrangements in Somerset and Norfolk influenced the development of 
different governmental structures in each county. This chapter considers how the county 
commissions of the peace shaped their institutions to meet the needs of their respective 
regions: how the limited membership of the commission marshalled an increasing 
population, how the courts and sessions were reconfigured in this context, and how 
different seats of local power interacted. It also addresses the social composition of the 
magistracy in each county, addressing changes in the membership of the judiciary, and 
the ways in which social status informed the ethos of the county commissions.  
Chapter three concludes part one, exploring how the structures of government in 
each county functioned to counter social protest during the subsistence crises of 1795 and 
1800-01. It also provides the forum to discuss Thompson’s siting of the crisis of 
paternalism at this point and to analyse the exercise of judicial discretion as a central 
tenet of local government more broadly. 
Part two concentrates on the Swing disturbances of 1830 redressing the noted 
deficiency in our understanding of the actions of the authorities during this period of 
unrest. Chapter four outlines the nature of disturbances in each county and how they were 
suppressed. The Norfolk magistracy had to consider the outbreak of unrest in 1830 as 
part of a protracted ‘rural war’. Somerset’s justices, while not faced with disturbance on 
the same scale by any means, were spurred to action by the spectre of Swing. Despite the 
divergent experience of Swing in each county, continuities in the judicial management of 
unrest are evident. The particular context of Somerset emphasises the impact even the 
apprehension of protest had on judicial interactions with their communities. Chapter five 
makes a detailed study of the prosecution of Swing offenders in both counties, 
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emphasising the use of the courts as structures of government: as a means of restoring 
particular social relationships and hierarchies in the aftermath of unrest. 
Finally, reintegrating the two regional studies into a nationally framed study, 
chapter 6 reflects on the utility of the approach employed here. Concentrating on what 
detailed analyses of authority and an understanding of governmental structures 
contributes to our understanding of social protest, and social relationships, by addressing 
the ‘balance of coercion and consent in the governing system, the potential for 
conformity and opposition, and the bases of cohesion’ evident in the ‘age of crisis’.40 
 
A Note on Sources 
 
All studies of social protest must contend with the limitations of the archive. As Roger 
Wells and others have made clear, no single body of evidence gives a comprehensive 
account of popular unrest.41 The local authorities were not always willing, or felt it 
necessary, to report disturbances to the Home Office. Likewise, in the 1790s at least, 
disturbances infrequently resulted in prosecutions, and even then, the charges did not 
always relate clearly to crowd actions.42 Although the press revelled in sensational stories 
of crime and tumult, in particular instances – notably in 1800-01 – some publications 
chose to supress reports of riot for fear of encouraging further unrest.43 More recently, 
Griffin has drawn attention to the limitations of press reporting and the impact that has on 
our understanding of the geography of protest. Not all counties had a developed 
provincial press before the nineteenth century. Where there were regional newspapers, 
the circulation of the press also impacted on the sorts of news that was published. 
Griffin’s process of mapping the south eastern press has shown that news travelled to the 
presses via the same routes through which the papers were distributed, tending to skew 
                                                
40 King, ‘Edward Thompson’s Contribution to Eighteenth-Century Studies., 219. 
41 R. Wells, Wretched Faces, 93-7; C. J. Griffin, ‘Knowable geographies? The reporting of incendiarism in 
the eighteenth- and nineteenth- century English provincial press’, Journal of Historical Geography 32 
(2006): 39. 
42 See Chapter 3.3 and 3.4; Wells, ibid. 277. 
43 Wells, ibid. 97; S. Poole, Scarcity and the Civic Tradition: Market Management in Bristol, 1709-1815.’ 
In Randall, A. and Charlesworth, A. (eds.) Markets, Market Culture and Popular Protest in Eighteenth-
Century Britain and Ireland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1996) 109-12; Griffin, ‘Knowable 
geographies?’ 39, 48-9. 
 
 
17 
news, and the audience for news, towards the urban and consequently leaving the rural 
underrepresented.44 This study is by no means immune to these problems; however 
certain advantages are gained by concentrating on the two particular regional contexts, 
and the actions and attitudes of the authorities. 
Quantitative studies of protest are fraught with difficulty. Although not the focus of 
this thesis, a provisional enumeration of events has been undertaken in order to outline 
the nature of unrest in each county in order to contextualise the actions of the local 
authorities.45 Much of the archival material consulted in this study has been used before; 
but to the Home and War Office correspondence, the records of the centrally 
administered courts, and regional press, a thorough interrogation of the regional court 
archives, as well as evidence from local estate and private papers, has been added. 
Considering Griffin’s caution regarding the geography of protest, the nature of press 
coverage in Somerset and Norfolk should also be addressed. Both counties were home to 
the first provincial newspapers.46 Regional publications were sustained into the 
nineteenth century, so by 1800, there were two Norfolk papers: the Norwich Mercury 
(established 1725) and the Norfolk Chronicle (1761); and three in Somerset: the Bath 
Journal (1742), the Bath Chronicle (1757), and the Bath Herald (1792). Owing to their 
coverage of the period, and their geographical distribution, these publications in 
particular, have been consulted extensively in this study. Despite their apparently urban 
focus, their circulation extended across considerable parts of their respective counties and 
might be considered countywide publications by the 1840s at least.47 Both Chronicles 
purported to represent agricultural interests, so coupled with their circulation, perhaps 
tend to more comprehensive coverage than might be found in other counties.48 Some 
incidents, nevertheless, did not make the local news: here, correspondence from private 
family archives and correspondence between magistrates provides a necessary 
                                                
44 Griffin, ibid. 40, 45 
45 See chapters 3.1 and 4.1. 
46 A. Walker, ‘The Development of the Provincial Press in England, c. 1780-1914,’ Journalism Studies, 7:3 
(2006): 375; Griffin, op. cit. 40. 
47 C. Mitchell, The Newspaper Press Directory (London: C. Mitchell, 1847) Norfolk, 220-1, Somerset, 
149-50, other Somerset based publications were in print before 1834: Taunton Courier (1808) and the Bath 
Gazette (1812) as well as four Bristol based publications before 1800, see 149 and 244; R. Crutwell [editor 
of the Bath Chronicle], The New Bath Guide (Bath: 1799) 80. 
48 Mitchell, op. cit. 220 and 149; Crutwell, op. cit. 80.  
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supplement, including reports of popular unrest that were un- or under- reported in the 
press and Home Office correspondence.49  
In conjunction with the records of the county courts, the press provide an important 
commentary on the actions of the authorities. Both in Norfolk and Somerset, the press 
showed little inclination to openly criticise the actions of the county judiciary. Certainly 
the Norfolk Chronicle and Bath Chronicle were conservative publications aimed at the 
nobility, gentry, and clergy, from whose ranks the magistracy were drawn. The Bath 
Journal and Norwich Mercury were liberal papers, but neither attached themselves to a 
particular interest group.50 Indeed, both Norfolk papers shared a commitment to church 
and state, particularly after the French Revolution.51 Richard Mackenzie Bacon, the 
Mercury’s proprietor from 1794, was openly allied with the county elite as a close 
acquaintance of Edward Lord Suffield (Chairman of the Sessions 1821-32) and as a 
major in the Norwich rifle volunteers.52 The press thus appear as a mouthpiece for the 
local authorities. As Griffin warns us, they form part of an archival record that tends to 
‘replicate the structures of power’.53 This is, however, a particular concern of this thesis, 
and the press therefore offers detailed coverage of public displays of authority. 
As a counterpoint to the limited, albeit useful, perspective of the press, the inner-
workings of the county magistracy have been addressed in detail through the archives of 
the county commissions of the peace and a prosopographical study of their membership. 
Justice’s notebooks and the records of the court of petty sessions provide the most 
detailed accounts of magistrates’ day-to-day dealings with their communities, but 
unfortunately for the historian, their survival is fragmentary; this is regrettably replicated 
in the archives for Norfolk and Somerset. The records of the commission membership 
                                                
49 For example: Mells Manor Muniments: Thomas Horner, papers and correspondence, disturbance at 
Frome, Jan. 1795; SRO: DD/AH 59/12 Stogursey corn disturbance papers 1794-1801; these eventsand their 
lack of coverage in the press has also been discussed in S. Poole, “Popular Politics in Bristol, Somerset and 
Wiltshire, 1791-1805” (PhD thesis, University of Bristol 1992); SRO: Q/JCP/7 Papers and Correspondence 
relating to Justices and the Commission of the Peace, 1830; B. Cozens-Hardy (ed) Mary Hardy’s Diary 
(Norfolk Record Society, 1968). 
50 Mitchell, op. cit. 149-50, 220-1. 
51 D. Chandler, ‘The Athens of England’: Norwich as a Literary Center in the Late Eighteenth Century,’ 
Eighteenth-Century Studies, 43:2 (2010): 184. 
52 ODNB: John Warrack, ‘Bacon, Richard Mackenzie 1776-1844’ (2004); R. M. Bacon, A Memoir of the 
Life of Edward Third Baron Suffield (Norwich: 1838), esp. 149, 410; J. R. Harvey (ed.) Records of the 
Norfolk Yeomanry Cavalry (Norwich: Jarrold and Sons, 1908) 158. 
53 Griffin, Protest, Politics and Work, 11. 
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and quarter sessions, however, are considerably fuller. These have provided the basis for 
a prosopographical and spatial analysis of the form and function of the magistracy in each 
county.54 In mapping the institutional structures of government, and the connections 
between those who administered it, the regionally specific frameworks through which the 
more public displays of authority were mediated can be discerned, facilitating a more 
critical reading of press and Home Office reports.55 The administrative records of the 
Somerset commission in particular, also contain valuable correspondence detailing 
discussions between groups of magistrates.56 Taken together, the records of the 
magistracy reveal the difficulties experienced in policing protest, the differences of 
opinion and tensions that subsisted in this context, and new perspectives on the nature of 
popular resistance. Although there were few recorded instances of crowd action in 
Somerset in 1830, for example, the correspondence sent between justices and the county 
clerk of the peace, affords a rare insight into the perception of popular protest, its causes, 
and scale. The discussions also reveal some of the ‘near misses’, points where the justices 
were in immediate apprehension of disturbance but where none occurred. These 
exchanges bring to the fore some of the ‘omnipresent tensions’ that generated resistance 
in a variety of forms, and which had a direct bearing on the way the magistracy 
responded to protest.57 Indeed, while the account of unrest may remain imperfect,58 the 
approach and evidence adopted here offers a new perspective. 
  
                                                
54 See chapters 1.4 and 2. 
55 See for example chapter 3.2 
56 SRO: Q/JCP/1-7 Papers and Correspondence relating to Justices and the Commission of the Peace, 1801-
1830; Q/C/3/7 Correspondence from Justices Clerks listing local magistrates and frequency of their 
meetings, 1819; Q/C/5 Petty Sessional Divisions 1829-30. 
57 SRO: Q/JCP/7, see chapter 4; Wells, Wretched Faces, 97. 
58 Wells, ibid. 97. 
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Part I, Chapter One  
‘Rulers of the county’: the form and function of the English Magistracy, c. 1790-1835. 
 
The justices of the peace held a pivotal position in eighteenth-century English society. 
These men represented the first and only point of contact with the law in many 
communities. They were also residents within these communities, usually local landed 
gentry or clergymen entered into the county commission of the peace. The 
responsibilities of the county commission of the peace were considerable, and increased 
further over the second half of the eighteenth century, and into the first decades of the 
nineteenth century. They were responsible for the enforcement of the law and the 
maintenance of order, the prosecutions of those in breach of the laws, as well as the 
administration of local government. Much of their power resided in their summary 
jurisdiction: the capacity to try cases, and hear complaints or appeals, and pass judgment 
on them without recourse to a jury or higher authority. 
The men nominated to the commission of the peace were entrusted with such 
authority on the basis of their social status, underpinned by a particular notion of 
traditional governance. The ideal of the gentlemen justice was a paternal figure ‘guiding 
the conduct’ and ensuring the wellbeing of the deferential poor. His wealth and social 
status placed him beyond reproach. In both their judicial and administrative capacities, 
the county judiciary was largely unsupervised by central government or the royal courts, 
allowing them greater autonomy in discharging their duties. As the Webbs entitled them, 
they were the ‘rulers of the county’.59 The period 1790-1835 was the ‘high water mark of 
magisterial authority and discretion’, however, the tumultuous years following the 
cessation of hostilities with France, saw this highly personalized, independent form of 
government fall from favour. By 1835, the discretionary powers of the magistracy had 
been significantly eroded.60 
This introductory chapter will outline the form and function of the magistracy in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, and how they changed over the turn of the 
                                                
59 S. & B. Webb, English Local Government: Volume 1, The Parish and the County. (London: Longmans 
and Co, 1906, this ed. London: Frank Cass and Co. 1963) 319. 
60 P. King, Crime and Law in England, 1740-1840, Remaking justice from the margins, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2006) 65. 
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nineteenth century. The remainder of this chapter will consider the ways in which the role 
of the magistracy has been discussed ‘from below’, and ‘above’, in histories of crime and 
protest, as well as histories of government and governance, in this period. Collectively 
this body of work has pointed to the importance of the justices of the peace as local 
government: the exceptional expansion of their discretionary powers, the development of 
their administrative function, the relationship the magistracy had to central government 
and their role as regulators of the communities over which they presided. 
The themes outlined here, and the methodologies employed to construct these 
histories contribute to the foundation of this thesis. Exploring these themes from the 
existing literature in greater detail provides the historiographical and methodological 
context for the new case studies of the Norfolk and Somerset magistracy, and their 
actions in the context of social unrest, presented in subsequent chapters. It also affords 
the opportunity to question some of the conclusions already posited, and consider some 
of the gaps in our understanding regarding the nature and function of the county 
magistracy at the end of the eighteenth century. 
 
1. The Magistrate and the Commission of the Peace 
 
The magistracy were charged under the commission of the monarch to keep the peace. 
Anxious to secure his ascension to the throne, Edward III appointed loyal noblemen 
across the country to ‘prevent any risings or other disturbances of the peace’ against him. 
In 1360, Edward extended their powers to try felonies, from which point they became 
‘justices’ of the peace.61  
While the ‘commission of the peace’ could be held to encompass all the men 
appointed to serve as magistrates, each justice was entered into the commission of the 
peace for the particular county in which he resided or held property. The jurisdiction of 
the commission was only limited to the territory of the county, and had no definite 
number of justices assigned to it. Separate commissions were also issued for the Ridings, 
                                                
61 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the laws of England, in four books. By Sir William Blackstone, Knt. 
one of the justices of His Majesty's court of common pleas. And with notes and additions by Edward 
Christian, Esq. Barrister at law, and Professor of the Laws of England in the University of Cambridge, vol. 
1, 12th edition (London: A. Strahan and W. Woodfall, 1793-1795). 
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Liberties and some cities and borough towns where provision for a corporate magistracy 
was made according to royal charter62 
The county commission was headed by the Lord Lieutenant. Who, by the 
eighteenth century, also assumed the role of custos rotulorum or keeper of the county 
rolls. The lieutenancy was a prestigious office, usually held by a member of the 
aristocracy. Whilst they were largely inactive in the day-to-day administration of the 
county, they were responsible for commanding the military forces within their 
jurisdiction, and for the selection of entrants in to the commission of the peace, and the 
appointment of clerk to the commission. The Lord Chancellor had the final word 
regarding membership of the commissions. During the first half of the eighteenth century, 
partisan disputes had been played out within the county judiciary, with members of the 
commission being removed or added according to the needs of government and party. 
However, from mid-century, political stability saw central government less interested in 
stuffing the commissions, and the Lord Lieutenants of the counties were left to organize 
membership of the magistracy as they saw fit.63 
Entry in to the commission was limited by property qualification. England’s justices 
were drawn from the nation’s landowners: gentlemen who resided within the counties 
over which they would preside, who assumed the burdens of office voluntarily without 
pecuniary reward. The status of the members of the commission was considered as both a 
peculiarity of English government and as essential to notions of English governance. 
Unlike continental ‘salaried functionaries’, the power of the English gentleman justice 
was derived from both his office and his responsibilities as a community leader. Land 
was the basis of the social and economic order, its possessor, therefore, had power over 
its inhabitants. As David Eastwood has described it, the ‘social authority’ of gentlemen 
‘easily translated into political or magisterial authority.’ His fortune also gave him the 
independence to act without the need to seek financial recompense for his services. The 
magistrate exemplified ‘the practice of self-government’; he was both ‘the guardian and 
representative of English liberties.’64 
                                                
62 S. & B. Webb, The Parish and the County, 319-20. 
63 Ibid, 285 & 322; D. Eastwood, Governing Rural England (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994) 51; N. 
Landau, The Justices of the Peace 1679-1760, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) 236. 
64 Landau, The Justices of the Peace, 1, 152, & 318; Eastwood, Governing Rural England, 13. 
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According to Blackstone, this ideal type was established at the inception of the 
magistracy. It did, however, impose limitations on membership, which raised practical 
problems regarding the availability of the ‘right sort’ of gentlemen. It was acknowledged 
from at least the end of the seventeenth century, that the office of the justice of the peace 
was a burdensome one, causing many gentlemen to enter the commission for the honour, 
but subsequently not to act in a judicial capacity. However, the hostility towards men of 
‘mean degree’ entering the commission, ‘whose poverty made them both covetous and 
contemptible’ was just as persistent. The required property qualifications were 
manipulated periodically from the reign of Richard II through to the end of the eighteenth 
century: either lowered to augment the numbers within the commission, or raised to 
ensure the independent wealth and status of its members.65 
In 1731 the qualification for entry into the county commissions of the peace was 
established as £100 per annum from landed property. This raised the price of 
qualification from the previous Tudor statute that had set it at £20. The new figure of 
£100 ensured that only gentlemen were nominated for membership, but was still low 
enough to encompass considerable numbers of less substantial members of the gentry. 
The changes in the social composition of the commissions of the peace will be considered 
in more detail below; however, the ideal type of the gentlemen magistrate remained as 
the ‘eighteenth-century’s icon of civic virtue and responsibility.’66 
Before considering the duties of the justices of the peace, it is useful to note the 
differences between Borough commissions of the peace and the county commissions – 
the focus of this thesis. Depending on the basis of its charter, a borough might be 
empowered to have its own commission of the peace and its own separate bench of 
magistrates presiding at the borough sessions.67 The justices were appointed by the Lord 
Chancellor on the recommendation of the corporate body. They were not subject to the 
same property qualification but they had to be resident or own a house, or trade, within 
the borough. On the whole, the membership of the borough commission was drawn from 
                                                
65 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws, 352; Webbs, The Parish and the County, 320-325. 
66 Blackstone, Commentaries of the Laws, 352; N. Landau, introduction to idem. (ed.) Law Crime and 
English Society, 1660-1830, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002), 11. 
67 See also chapter 2.3 
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the officers of the corporation, typically the mayor, previous holders of that office, and 
the recorder.68 
 
2. The justices and local government 
 
William Blackstone translated the ‘social authority’ of the gentlemen magistrate into his 
primary function, casting him as a paternal figure, maintaining ‘good order in his 
neighbourhood by punishing the dissolute and idle, by protecting the peaceable and 
industrious, and above all, by healing petty differences and preventing vexatious 
prosecutions.’ However, this parochially focused understanding of their role does not 
encompass the ‘infinite variety of business’ the justices were responsible for.69 
The English magistracy were unique within Europe for having both the powers of 
‘judiciary and intendancy in their hands’. The county commissions of the peace were 
responsible for criminal authority, policing and the administration of local government in 
their locales. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, these functions overlapped: 
administrative and judicial decisions were made through the machinery of the courts, or 
in the informal sessions presided over by one or two justices, based ‘upon the evidence 
and in strict accordance with pre-existing obligations imposed by the law of the land.’70 
By the 1790s and into the first decades of the nineteenth century, judicial and 
administrative business began to be separated out. However, the justices retained control 
of both sectors of local government. 
 
Returning to Blackstone’s description of the paternalist gentleman justice, it was most 
apposite in the context of the magistrates' hearings outside of the formal court of quarter 
sessions. Eighteenth-century justices had increasing powers of summary jurisdiction: the 
capacity to try certain criminal offences, and make certain administrative decisions 
without recourse to a jury in open court. Sitting alone, or in pairs, or increasingly at petty 
sessions, (depending on the demands of the statutes pertaining to the complaints before 
                                                
68 D. Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century (London: Hambledon Press, 1998), 21; 
see also chapter 2.3 
69 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws, 7 & 354. 
70 N. Landau, introduction to idem. Law, Crime and English Society, 10; Webbs, The Parish and the 
County, 281. 
 
 
25 
them) justices would either rule on the cases themselves, or refer them to the county court 
of quarter sessions. These hearings could take place in the home of the magistrate in his 
parlour, or in a room at a local inn or public venue.  
The magistrates had considerable discretion in dealing with many criminal 
complaints. Cases considered to be of a private nature, disputes between neighbours or 
kin, or minor assaults for example, were frequently reconciled through the mediation of 
the magistrate, either with promises of good behaviour, an apology, or small financial 
settlement. In cases pertaining more to the public interest such as petty theft or breaches 
of vagrancy laws, the justices could administer firmer sanctions: imprisonment in the 
House of Correction at hard labour, or public whipping at the hands of the constable. In a 
survey of justices’ notebooks recording summary hearings from across England during 
the eighteenth century, the vast majority of criminal cases heard were settled by the 
individual justice, and frequently with no statutory punishment.71  
The magistrates were not necessarily well versed in the law in order to make these 
decisions. To assist them they might have the opportunity to consult a clerk, who was 
often more educated in legal matters. The scope of magistrates’ discretionary powers and 
their apparent lack of legal experience was a troubling dichotomy to some (as we shall 
see), however, their summary jurisdiction served specific purposes: it prevented petty 
cases clogging up the courts, and allowed local men to regulate their communities. Many 
of the offenses falling within the justices’ purview related to social regulation: breaching 
the Sabbath, tippling, swearing, and vagrancy. Indeed, a magistrate could convict an 
individual for being ‘an incorrigible rogue’.72 
Some administrative matters could also be dealt with by a lone justice or pair of 
magistrates. A significant proportion of these tasks concerned the regulation of the poor 
                                                
71 J. M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986), 
268-9; E. Crittall (ed), The Notebook of William Hunt 1744-49 (Devizes: Wiltshire Record Society 1982); 
R. Paley (ed), Justice in eighteenth-century Hackney: The justicing notebook of Henry Norris and the 
Hackney Petty Sessions Book (1991) 3 August 2005 <http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/report.asp?compid=38816; M. Mcgarvey (ed), The King’s Peace. The notebook of Thomas 
Horner of Mells, 1770-1777 (Frome Society for Local Studies 1997); A. Cirkit (ed), Samuel Whitbread’s 
Notebooks 1810-11, 1813-14 (Ampthill: Bedfordshire Historical Record Society 1971); E. Silverthorne 
(ed), Deposition Book of Richard Wyatt JP, 1767-1776 (Guilford: Surrey Record Society 1978); G. Morgan 
and P. Rushton (eds), The Justicing Notebook of Edmund Tew, Rector of Bolden (Woodbridge: Boydell and 
Brewer 2000). 
72 Critall, Paley, Mcgarvey, op. cit., Webbs, The Parish and the County, 300. 
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law, settlement and bastardy. Justices ruled in complaints made by overseers regarding 
delinquent ratepayers and disorderly claimants. They also heard the appeals of the poor 
seeking to overturn decisions of the parish officers. The regulation of settlement claims 
likewise secured or denied paupers’ claims to relief..73 
Although an extraordinary circumstance to be faced with, the magistracy were also 
charged with suppressing disorder. They were the ‘front-line’ of law enforcement, in a 
period with no professional police force. Phases of protracted social unrest occurred 
throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, and after the end of the French 
Wars in the early nineteenth century. Faced with a crowd, unaided, and with military 
assistance days away, justices were armed with little other than the repressive measures 
encompassed in the Riot Act, and their ‘social authority’ as local magnates, with which to 
pacify the crowd. In responding to the situation a magistrate had to take into account not 
only the immediate consequences of his actions but their long-term repercussions within 
the community; ‘hence the anxiety of the authorities, either to anticipate the event, or to 
cut it short in its early stages, by personal presence, by exhortation and concession.’74 
 
When facing more serious cases of assault or theft, the justices had less discretion. Such 
cases would be referred to the court of quarter sessions once the justices had established 
the validity and strength of the case against the accused. Similarly, administrative matters 
concerning the county at large were reserved for the county court.75  
The county court of quarter sessions was presided over by the justices of the 
county’s commission of the peace. It met four times a year, in January, at Easter, 
Midsummer and in October. The place of meeting was organized by the commission 
itself, and contingent on the needs of each county. In theory, each sitting was for the 
county as a whole, however in many counties the location of the meeting was moved 
                                                
73.See for example, M. Mcgarvey (ed), The King’s Peace. The notebook of Thomas Horner of Mells, 1770-
1777. Poor law and settlement claims constituted the majority of Horner’s workload (14% and 12% 
respectively, exceeding the number of alleged thefts and equalling complaints regarding assault. King’s 
study of the Essex summary courts indicate that almost a quarter of all hearings concerned poor relief. P. 
King, ‘The summary courts and social relations in eighteenth-century England,’ Past & Present, 183 
(2004): 138 &150-1.  
74 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century’, Past & Present, 
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75 Beattie, Crime and the Courts, 273. 
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from one town to another to make the court more accessible to different parts of the 
populace. For example, while in Gloucestershire the quarter sessions were consistently 
held in the county capital, in neighbouring Wiltshire the four meetings of the court were 
each opened in a different town: Devizes, Salisbury, Warminster or Marlborough. 
Choosing to adjourn a sessions could allow even greater mobility: the same meeting 
could be adjourned from one town to be reconvened in another at the same time of year. 
This process was left entirely to the commission, and what it perceived the county’s 
needs to be.76 
The number of justices presiding over the quarter sessions also varied greatly. 
According to the Webb’s survey, typically, only three or four justices would make up the 
bench. However, numbers varied between counties, and sessions, and according to the 
nature and level of business, or socio-political context - for example, an increase in 
personnel on the bench during periods of social unrest.77 The quarter sessions regulated 
all ‘county services’: the maintenance of roads and bridges, and breaches thereof; 
apprenticeships; the poor law and the county rates; licensing of public houses; as well as 
trying criminal cases.78  
Felonies were usually tried at the twice-yearly courts of Assize. The county 
judiciary would often make up the Grand Jury at the Assizes, but they were presided over 
by centrally appointed judges from the crown courts. Over the course of the eighteenth 
century, greater numbers of non-capital felonies were left to be tried at quarter sessions. 
This delegation of responsibilities happened gradually, without consistent direction from 
central government, but was, as John Beattie suggested, an attempt to relieve ‘what 
would have been a growing burden on the Assizes’, especially in areas where the 
population was increasing in the second half of the eighteenth century. The justices at 
quarter sessions did not wield the ultimate sanction of the law – death – but in trying 
some felonies, alongside misdemeanours, they could sentence felons to protracted terms 
of imprisonment and, after 1718, transportation.79 
                                                
76 Webbs, The Parish and the County, 425-430; see also chapter 2.3 
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In both their judicial and administrative capacity, the eighteenth-century English 
magistracy wielded significant power, either through the formal court of quarter sessions 
or in the exercise of discretion at summary hearings. In their administrative role, there 
was little within the county that the judiciary did not manage: they regulated and levied 
the country rates, and controlled their expenditure. They also had considerable scope to 
organize themselves and the institutions through which they operated. As the century 
progressed, their powers and responsibilities increased. Until the overhaul of local 
government in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the magistracy were largely 
unregulated in both their judicial and governmental proceedings by central government.80 
The centrally administered Court of King’s Bench provided the only check on 
magisterial discretion; holding the power to review justices’ decisions and to punish 
magistrates for their actions. Douglas Hay has made a compelling case to show that due 
to a reliance on the county magistracy as the ‘front line’ of law enforcement, the King’s 
Bench tolerated a considerable amount of ignorance and misconduct amongst the county 
Commissions of the Peace.81 Justices could have their summary convictions questioned 
by the removal of the case to Kings Bench by a writ of certiorari, or they could be 
prosecuted under criminal information. In Hay’s study of the Staffordshire magistracy 
between 1740 and 1800, thirteen applications for criminal information against fifteen 
magistrates were made, and eleven proceedings on writs of certiorari were directed 
against eight different justices. In 60 years therefore, 24 cases against Staffordshire 
justices were made. As Hay points out, this is a very small figure considering ‘that there 
were perhaps 10,000 summary convictions and committal proceedings by several 
hundred lay magistrates in the county commissions of the peace’ in this period.82 
Addressing the early nineteenth century, Peter King has established that ‘only just over 
two criminal informations a year were brought against the entire magistracy of England 
and Wales in the 1820s and 1830s.’83 
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The attitude of the King’s Bench towards their lay brethren and the lack of 
prosecutions therein gave the county justices the space to operate unhindered, and 
testified to their significance as autonomous local government. The unwillingness of the 
superior courts to check the operation of the magistracy confirms the importance placed 
on the exercise of judicial discretion in county justices’ criminal and administrative 
proceedings. Their scope to act was critical in making this system of government work. 
This system underwent significant changes at the end of the eighteenth century, and in 
the first half of the nineteenth century. The independence of the county magistrate 
arguably reached its zenith in this period. However, from the end of the Napoleonic wars, 
the context in which this system of government worked was changed, and the form and 
function of the magistracy was eroded, divested of much of its authority and autonomy. 
 
3. The development and decline of the magistracy, c. 1790-1835. 
 
From the middle of the eighteenth century, the duties and responsibilities of the 
magistracy increased significantly. Both at quarter sessions and summary hearings, the 
justices were dealing with growing numbers of criminal complaints, appeals regarding 
poor relief, bastardy, apprenticeships and settlement, as well as being preoccupied by the 
maintenance of county services – the roads, bridges, and county gaols, and in the early 
nineteenth century the county asylums. Legislative changes directed by Robert Peel saw 
more offenses previously tried at the Assizes, transferred to the jurisdiction of the county 
courts.84 Although there was no constitutional precedent for the superiority of the court of 
quarter sessions over other administrative institutions such as the overseers of the poor, or 
the parish vestry, the extension of their supervisory and judicial powers allowed the court 
to assume the superintendence of the county.85 The quarter sessions became the court of 
appeal in most local administrative matters. As De Tocqueville observed ‘almost all 
administrative acts end in judicial forms.’86 
The multiplication of business dealt with by the magistracy led to structural changes 
in local government: the development of regular petty sessions and subordinate 
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magisterial groups, and the gradual, but increasing, separation of judicial and 
administrative functions. The bench at quarter sessions began to delegate responsibilities 
for non-criminal orders to committees of magistrates. When the maintenance and 
management of the county prisons was passed formally to the magistracy in 1823, 
permanent committees were established to remove this burden from the court agenda.87 
Administrative matters that had to remain in sessions were more frequently 
removed from open court and left for discussion at the justices’ dinner. Discussions also 
took place in the Grand Jury chamber: the magistrates would adjourn while the Grand 
Jury deliberated the bills to be tried. In this interval before the cases were heard, the 
justices could convene in private to discuss the government of the county.88 Criminal 
business remained in public in open court, whereas the administration of the county was 
moving into increasingly private meetings of the judiciary. 
The expansion of magistrates’ duties also led to the regularization of summary 
hearings as petty sessions. Petty sessions were monthly or fortnightly meetings of small 
groups of magistrates, usually within the area of the county in which they resided. They 
would meet to hear minor complaints and appeals, and also to execute orders from 
quarter sessions, and to deal with local administrative matters.89 The development of 
petty sessions was uneven. Some counties such as Kent had an established structure by 
the 1780s, whereas Gloucestershire had what the Webbs described as a ‘rudimentary’ 
system of summary hearings. The impetus for their development came from groups of 
justices within the county or with the encouragement of the bench at sessions. After the 
Royal Proclamation against Immorality and Vice in 1787 a concerted effort was made by 
many county commissions to improve the administration of justice ‘through a more 
extensive and better monitored system of petty sessions.’90  
On the whole, the structuring of county government was made by the justices ‘from 
within’, unassisted by central government, and with no obligation to seek its approval. 
Critically, the process of restructuring entailed the separation of the criminal and 
administrative functions of the magistracy, and increasingly, it seemed, county 
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government was conducted in private – over dinner or in the Grand Jury chamber, and at 
petty sessions, without the mediation of a jury. 
 
The pre-eminence of the magistracy and more particularly, the expansion of their 
discretionary powers, did not escape contemporary criticism. In his commentaries on the 
law, Blackstone expressed concern that the summary jurisdiction of the magistracy ‘has 
of late been so far extended, as if a check be not timely given, to threaten the disuse of 
our admirable and truly English trial by jury’. 91 C. D. Brereton writing several decades 
later was more scathing in his critique of the subordinate magistracy and petty sessions:  
‘Business is here disposed of by summary convictions, without course of law, with hearing 
only one side, without precedent, without oath or witnesses or the intervention of a jury, 
without a record or even a reporter…this modern court has no precise boundaries and 
limitations on its power.’92 
 
Such concerns for arbitrary rule were compounded by the activities of those justices who 
abused their office. While few cases were put to the King’s Bench, the ‘trading justices’ 
of the Metropolis were notorious. 
The Middlesex justices allegedly encouraged criminal acts in order to increase their 
business and consequently the ‘fees’ they charged for their services. Much of their poorer 
clientele could not afford to pursue prosecutions in court, but the swift justice of the 
trading magistrates proved a more economical alternative. The corruption of London 
justices was attributed in no small way to the nature of urban life: ‘[i]n places inhabited 
by the scum and dregs of people’ one could not induce a gentleman ‘to take such 
drudgery upon them.’93 Certainly, the lesser status of urban justices led many to suppose 
they were predisposed to corruption. Edmund Burke described the Middlesex justices as 
‘the scum of the earth – carpenters, brickmakers and shoemakers…so ignorant that they 
could scarcely write their names.’94 
These criticisms of the Middlesex justices highlight the perennial issue of the lack 
of active justices of the right social status. The reduction of the property qualification did 
allow gentlemen of lesser status into the commission of the peace in order to bolster their 
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numbers; and by the 1790s, substantial numbers of clergymen were also serving as active 
members of the county commissions.95 The clergy were deemed suitable as men of 
education, more frequently resident in their communities than their lay colleagues, and 
arguably, more ‘conscientious attenders to magisterial duty’. However, the clerical justice 
became the target of popular resentment: in the aggrandisement of his living (financed 
from the tithes) and by allying himself with the interests of government in assuming the 
office of a justice, he was perceived to have distanced himself from the interests of his 
‘flock’.96 Their entry, and poor reputation contributed to the sense that the gentry were 
shying away from their governmental and paternal responsibilities. Whether the changing 
social composition of the magistracy significantly altered the nature of governance in this 
period will be considered in greater detail in the historiographical discussion below. 
In 1792, the Stipendiary Magistrates Act was passed creating salaried justices in the 
Metropolitan area in a bid to stem the tide of corruption. The extension of this innovation 
was limited until the 1830s.97 Until then, central government was largely content to leave 
the magistrates’ discretionary powers in tact. 
 
From the end of the Napoleonic Wars, and most acutely in the 1830s, the discretionary 
powers of the magistracy were gradually eroded. The old system was widely perceived to 
be failing in a tumultuous political and economic context. An increase in recorded crime, 
coupled with rapid expansion of the population, particularly in urban areas, stimulated 
agitation for more effective social regulation and policing. In the context of economic 
depression and political agitation, the efficacy of the magistracy was questioned. 
County expenditure was a key concern amongst ratepayers. The magistracy was 
roundly criticized for its administration of the poor laws, particularly their tendency to 
overrule the decisions of parish vestries and overseers. They also faced censure for their 
failure to maintain county services such as the prisons. The private nature in which they 
conducted local government apparently compounded their maladministration of county 
funds. The attempts of the county justices to regulate the sale of alcohol and licensed 
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premises and their enforcement of the Game Laws contributed to their unpopularity 
amongst poorer sectors of society.98 
From the 1820s, pressure on the county bench to be more openly accountable led to 
the admission of the public, and even the press into meetings in the Grand Jury 
chamber.99 Other relatively minor legislation ate away at the discretionary powers of the 
magistracy: the Gaols Act 1823 placed greater strictures on how the justices should 
manage them, and the Licensing Act 1828 restricted magistrates powers regarding public 
houses and the sale of alcohol.100 Of greater significance was the passing of the Poor Law 
Amendment Act in 1834, and the extension of professional police forces outside of 
London by the end of the same decade. 
From the subsistence crises of the mid 1790s, many benches used the poor relief 
system to supplement the income of poor labourers to give them a living wage. 
Understood as the ‘Speenhamland’ system (after the meeting of Berkshire justices), 
similar schemes had been implemented in Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire (and at least 
considered in some Somerset parishes) five months before, in January 1795. The strain 
this placed on the parish rates exacerbated concerns about increasing county expenditure 
to maintain services.101 The extension of the poor law system, throughout the first 
decades of the nineteenth century, generated conflict within the parish. Citing increasing 
expenditure on relief, overseers and vestrymen manipulated payments to control the poor, 
denying claims to the disorderly, and the apparently deviant. The burden of the rates was 
likewise used to bargain ‘upwards’, using it as a means to limit the payment of tithes and 
increases in rents. The ‘incessant battles’ in the vestries, Roger Wells has argued, ‘turned 
parochial politics into an unremittant frenzy which threatened the very fabric of rural 
communities.’102 
The Poor Law Commissioners attributed the outbreak of unrest in 1830 in no small 
degree to the misguided administration of the system of poor relief. Particular emphasis 
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was placed on the magistracy in their report. Paternalist measures were cast as 
inflammatory, as a ‘perversion of the traditions of reciprocity’: when the authorities 
failed to meet the needs of the labourers ‘they had resorted to discriminating violence in 
order to enforce their supposed rights and the duties of their superiors’. The magistracy, 
along with members of the clergy and farmers, appeared to be cowed into submission but 
also to share in part, the ‘anarchical doctrines’ of the labourers.103 Dunkley has argued 
that Swing showed the ‘resources of the old order …were no longer sufficient to ensure 
the content and obedience that were essential for the maintenance of stability’. It certainly 
called the autonomy of the judiciary into question. As David Eastwood has pointed out, 
from 1817, central government established more professional, and less personal, elements 
within the poor law system.104 The New Poor Law passed in 1834, reached further, 
instigating a centrally controlled system of relief, which denied the pivotal role of the 
magistrate in its administration. 
The Swing disturbances, and other outbreaks of unrest such as the Otmoor Rising in 
Oxfordshire in 1829-35, and anti-poor law protests from 1835, ‘exposed the vulnerability 
of rural property’. Coupled with the increase in recorded crime in the post-war era, 
opposition to professional policing waned. Nonetheless, policing reforms in the 1830s 
were piecemeal, the costs of establishing such forces proving prohibitive. Indeed, the 
primacy of economic concerns was one factor in the magistracy retaining much of their 
power, including summary jurisdiction until Jervis’ Act of 1848. Reform of the 
magistracy was also hindered by the persistence of the idea of self-government: they 
continued to symbolize the counties’ ability to regulate themselves.105 
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4. Histories of the magistracy 
 
From the 1960s discussions of criminal justice have moved away from ‘Whiggish 
perspectives’ which placed the magistracy into a progressivist narrative, seeing the 
decline of their discretionary powers and the centralization of government as part of a 
process of rationalization: the decline of an archaic, irrational and arbitrary system in the 
wake of our modern systems of criminal justice, policing and local administration.106 
Pioneered by historians such as Douglas Hay, Edward Thompson, and John Beattie, their 
work has done much to unpack the rationale within the eighteenth-century criminal 
justice system.107 Their approaches have certainly not been nostalgic, and continue to 
criticize the inequities inherent in the law at this time, but they have deconstructed the 
operation of judicial authority, to show how a nation maintained order without a 
professional police force or advanced civil bureaucracy. In particular, Edward 
Thompson’s delineation of the paternalist model of authority and Douglas Hay’s 
examination of the ‘bloody code’ have emphasised the significance of the law as a 
hegemonic tool.  
Complicity in the rule of law by the landed elite, they argued, was secured by 
calculated acts of judicial terror, but equally, in public displays of mercy. In Thompson’s 
model, the law set the limits of behaviour for both ruler and ruled. This ‘field of force’ 
was framed by customary expectations, statute, and common law; and both the patrician 
rulers and the ‘plebs’ could call on this shared understanding to remind one another of 
their duties and obligations. The law and the judiciary, therefore, played a fundamental 
role not just as agents of repression, but as a locus for social interactions.108  
Histories of local government have also been invaluable in understanding the 
pivotal role of the magistracy in eighteenth-century county administration. Sidney and 
                                                
106 For example Leon Radzinowicz, A History of the English Criminal Law and its administration from 
1750 (London: Steven and Sons, 1968) and to an extent the Webbs, English Local Government from the 
Reformation to the Municipal Corporations Act (Longmans and Co, 1906-1929). 
107 Landau, introduction to idem. (ed) Law, Crime and Society, 4-5; D. Hay, ‘Property, Authority and the 
Criminal Law’, in D. Hay, P. Linebaugh, J. Rule, E. P. Thompson, Albion’s Fatal Tree (Pantheon Books, 
1975, this ed. London: Verso 2011), 17-63; Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England (1986). 
108 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth-Century’, 76-136; idem. 
‘Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture’ Journal of Social History, 7:4 (1974): 382-405; idem. ‘Eighteenth-
century English society: class struggle without class?’ Social History, 3:2 (1978): 133-165; D. Hay, 
‘Property, Authority and the Criminal Law’, 17-63. See also Introduction: protest, social relationships and 
structures of government. 
 
 
36 
Beatrice Webb’s study of English local government remains unparalleled in its detailed 
discussion of county administration prior to 1835. Their work follows much of the Whig 
trajectory of progress and reform; however, implicit within their work are many of the 
ideas regarding the significance of local government in state formation that are more 
explicitly stated and explored in more recent studies.109 David Eastwood’s history of 
English rural government at the end of the eighteenth century draws much from the 
perspective of social historians working on the criminal justice system: he treats 
‘traditional institutions of local government not as fundamentally deficient but rather as 
the products of a particular process of institutional and cultural formation.’110 Eastwood 
also highlights the presumption that the centre had primacy over the periphery. His work, 
amongst others, has emphasized that, prior to 1830, ‘power and authority within the 
English state were… the product of negotiation between the centre and the localities’.111  
Core themes have emerged from these discussions of the magistracy. The use of 
judicial discretion by the magistracy has been contextualised as an integral part of the 
criminal justice system and local government. Addressing it within the rationale of the 
eighteenth-century system, discretion was an important tool for justices as unsalaried, 
voluntary officers of the law. These men had to mediate their administration of the law 
according to local as well as national contexts. In reviewing the role of the magistracy as 
a governmental agency, much has been done to move away from the representation of the 
magistracy as a purely repressive agency, acting at the behest of government. The 
justices, and the commissions of the peace to which they belonged, have been positioned 
as the locus in relations between central government and the people, endowed with 
autonomous agency. The merits and potential problems raised by the discussions of these 
themes will be explored further below. 
 
Published in 1984, Norma Landau’s Justices of the Peace 1679-1760 remains as the only 
monograph dedicated to an analysis of the county magistracy in relation to the 
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commission of the peace – the institution they comprised.112 As Munsche aptly stated, her 
work has done much to move away from the image of the justice of the peace as the 
‘booby squire’, abandoning such stereotypes for ‘the more complex realm of reality.’113 
The study is founded on a wealth of sources regarding the Kent bench over almost a 
century. The greatest strength of Landau’s work is the emphasis placed on the magistracy 
as a whole, embodied in the commission of the peace. 
Landau convincingly argues that as partisan interest in the county commissions 
declined from the middle of the eighteenth century, and government expanded the 
discretionary powers of the justices of the peace, the commissions gained greater 
autonomy. By the end of the century, the Lord Chancellor left decisions regarding the 
membership of the commissions largely to the Lord Lieutenants of the counties. The 
Lords Lieutenants in turn sought the opinions of the existing members of the county 
commission to review recommendations for new entrants.114 Thus, the commissions were 
becoming self-regulating, certainly in terms of their composition. The expansion of 
justices’ summary powers also contributed to the establishment of petty sessions, the 
formation of which was unregulated by central government. By bringing these 
developments to the fore, Landau highlights the significance of the commission as a 
body: the magistracy’s role in building their own institutional frameworks and their 
autonomy from the centre as self-regulating local government.115  
Peter King’s work both compliments and moves on from Landau’s discussion of the 
governmental function of the magistracy, drawing attention to how justice ‘was shaped 
and remade as much from below, within and from the margins as it was from the 
centre.’116 In some of his more recent work he has discussed how the magistracy could be 
selective in their application of initiatives handed down by central government. The 
nature of statutes frequently allowed considerable room for interpretation. Coupled with 
their ability to exercise summary jurisdiction, this allowed the judiciary to shape the 
implementation of the law according to local as well as national concerns. Careful 
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interpretation of the Game Laws, Licensing Acts and Vagrancy legislation for example, 
allowed the local judiciary to regulate their communities, keeping both the respectable as 
well as the ‘idle and disorderly’ inhabitants in check.117 
As well as establishing a ‘system of social remedies’ through their administration of 
the criminal law, the justices at quarter sessions had substantial policy making ability, 
mediating directives from the centre, and disseminating them via the grand juries at 
quarter sessions and the meetings petty sessional courts.118 The administrative functions 
of the court covered poor relief, policing, penal policy and social policy; as King states, 
responsibility ‘lay with magistrates as an agency and quarter sessions as an institution.’119 
He, along with Eastwood, cites the ‘pivotal role’ the county commissions played ‘in the 
realignment of the poor law policies in the 1790s’ as an example of a local judicial 
initiative that shaped national policy.120 
 
The autonomy of the county magistracy as local government was compounded by the 
exercise of judicial discretion, and the fact that their decisions went almost entirely 
unchallenged by a higher authority. The potential for arbitrary rule was not obscured 
from contemporary observers, as we have seen, in particular in relation to summary 
hearings – the court that had ‘no precise boundaries and limitations on its power.’121 
Douglas Hay’s analysis of the Kings Bench exposed the lenity of the courts towards their 
lay brethren, and the lack of prosecutions therein gave the county justices the space to 
operate unhindered. Whilst testifying to their significance as autonomous local 
government, it also provides tacit acknowledgment of the important role of judicial 
discretion in criminal and administrative proceedings, critically, in making this system of 
government work. Implicit within his discussion of the Kings Bench and the county 
magistracy, are echoes of Hay’s discussion of judicial discretion and ruling class 
hegemony in his insightful essay, ‘Property, Authority and the Criminal Law.’122 
Through the careful exercise of their discretionary powers, Hay argued, the judiciary used 
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the law to uphold the interests and dominance of the ‘ruling elites’. Acquiescence to their 
rule was secured through a balance in the administration of the law, between terror and 
mercy meted out by the courts.123 The action, or inaction of the Kings Bench, could be 
seen as part of the system that bolstered this form of control and the ideals underpinning 
it. 
While Hay’s thesis is still compelling and useful, it has been criticized and 
qualified, particularly with regard to popular access to the law. As Eastwood has argued, 
despite the obvious congruence and connection between elite values and the law, this 
does not mean ‘there was no broader consensus in support of the law as an instrumental 
strategy for preserving order, personal security and property.’124 
Work surrounding the actions of the magistracy at petty sessions has imposed 
particular qualifications on Hay’s thesis. Peter King’s research has shown the breadth of 
social groups that accessed the law through the local magistrates. The great variety of 
options available to the justices, enshrined in their summary powers, allowed them to 
offer a range of responses to complainants, be they formal sanctions or informal 
arbitration and settlement. This enabled people from every section of society access to the 
law to settle their disputes and address grievances.125 
Gwenda Morgan and Peter Rushton have also addressed the use of judicial 
discretion in an analysis of the justicing notebook of Edmund Tew of Bolden, a clerical 
justice operating in the north-east of England in the middle of the eighteenth century. 
Their discussion of Tew’s myriad activities emphasised popular access to the law and the 
regulatory function of the magistracy.126 Justices’ notebooks contained a record of their 
summary hearings: cases that were settled out of court through the use of their 
discretionary powers, either individually or in pairs. These notebooks offer an important 
insight into the nature of complaints and offences, and the magistrate’s responses to cases 
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that leave no other record in the formal courts. Thus they provide a glimpse of the 
exercise of judicial discretion, and how their communities experienced the law. 
Unfortunately for the historian, acting magistrates were not obliged to keep such a record 
of their activities and very few have survived. Several of those that remain have been 
edited and published, but Morgan and Rushton’s edition of Tew’s notebook is 
accompanied by detailed analysis of his actions, grounded in, and adding to, the existing 
literature on the magistracy.127 
Morgan and Rushton have used their study of Tew to offer a clearer picture of a 
justice’s function ‘from below’, revealing how and why people accessed the law. Aside 
from dealing with administrative issues such as bastardy, poor law and settlement, the 
majority of the cases brought before Tew concerned personal complaints against 
employers, neighbours and kin.128 Virtually all of the cases he heard were concluded out 
of court, despite the fact that the ‘substance of the accusations’ in many of them were 
‘indistinguishable’ from those tried at the county quarter sessions.129 So Tew’s exercise 
of his discretion was behind the resolution of the majority of cases, be it the imposition of 
fines, promises of good behaviour, reconciliation or a stint in the House of Correction.  
Morgan and Rushton present this data as evidence of the preference in early modern 
communities to solve their problems through ‘semi-private dealings’ before the 
magistrate rather then formal prosecutions in the courts, seeking the restoration of 
‘broken social relations’ as opposed to securing a conviction.130 They have interpreted 
popular access to the law as empowering, to an extent; having access to a ‘source of state 
authority’ the populace were both complicit in the justice system but also had the 
possibility of using the law via the magistrate to their own advantage. As Morgan and 
Rushton conclude, in this limited way, the justice of the peace ‘allowed people to create 
their own social order.’131  
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Morgan and Rushton’s conclusions resonate with Eastwood’s and King’s, and 
coupled with Landau’s earlier work on the commissions of the peace, the magistracy as 
local government can be more accurately defined: judicial discretion allowed the 
magistrate to mediate the integration of central policies on the ground. As Morgan and 
Rushton maintain, ‘ ‘state formation’ operated as much from below as from above, [it 
was] a matter of key people in the communities identifying with the laws and their 
application, and was achieved through the authorities’ responding sensitively to local 
culture’s peculiar characteristics.’132 
Taken collectively, these works on the governmental function of the magistracy – 
be it as individual justices mediating social relations, or the united power of the 
commission – have done much to move away from the stereotypical representations of 
the incompetent country justice or the perception of the county bench merely as 
repressive agents of authority. The importance of the county judiciary as local 
government, as a critical point between centrally administered authority and the people, 
has been brought to the fore. In exploring the use and nature of discretion, it is no longer 
merely the hallmark of an arbitrary system of rule perpetrated by the elite, but an integral 
part of English governance at this time. The discretionary powers of the magistracy 
allowed them to interpret the law to suit both national and local concerns. Whilst this was 
not without its problems or abuses, it complimented social structures reliant on hierarchy 
and deference, structures that relied on a sense of personal connection to maintain order. 
 
Both King and Eastwood have drawn on Thompson’s discussion of the ‘field of force of 
social relations’, all three converging on the concept that the law ‘constituted a 
framework within which social relations and social norms…were negotiated, tested and 
remade.’133 Of more significance to the period of study considered here, is Thompson’s 
thesis regarding the decline of judicial paternalism and the death of the moral economy at 
the end of the eighteenth century. While Thompson focused on this breakdown in the 
context of food riots, the decline of judicial paternalism resonates with debates regarding 
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changes in governmental structures and notions of governance, specifically the erosion of 
judicial discretion and changes in the social composition of the magistracy. 
Thompson’s ‘paternalist model’ defined a specific state of relations between 
authority and the people. The paternalist relationship rested on popular understanding of 
what Thompson described as the ‘moral economy of the poor’: the shared perception of 
‘supposed definite and passionately held, notions of the common-weal.’ The people had a 
particular conception of ‘social norms and obligations’ and ‘proper economic functions’ 
within their community. This concept had to be shared in part by the local ruling elite.134 
Douglas Hay refers to paternalism as an ideologically constructed ‘shared coinage’, one 
that neither magistrate, nor labourer ‘was foolish enough to believe…was not 
conditional’. Rather, both authority and the common people had recourse to the rhetoric 
and performance of paternalism in ensuring their respective interests.135 Consequently, 
the paternalist model provided the framework, and the language, for the interaction of 
authority and the labouring poor. 
By invoking the ‘moral economy’, the labouring poor were empowered and in a 
position to remind the authorities of the ‘proper economic functions’ in times of acute 
subsistence crises, seeking redress, often in intimidating numbers, from legitimate 
sources of authority. Ideally, magistrates would frame their response in paternalist terms: 
acknowledging their obligations as community leaders and the legitimacy of the crowds’ 
grievances, diffusing tumultuous situations and restoring social peace. 
Thompson argued that the moral economy, and the effective use of the paternalist 
model could only function within a ‘particular equilibrium’ of social relations. By the 
1790s, this balance was frustrated by growing faith in the free-market and the rise of 
political economy; no longer were the interventions of magistrates in the operation of the 
market desirable from the perspective of government. The equilibrium was further 
dislodged by war with France, anti-Jacobinism and political radicalism at home. By 1801, 
the Home Secretary, the Duke of Portland, advocated a ‘new firmness’ in the use of 
militia or volunteers to suppress disturbances, rather than magistrates entering into 
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paternalist negotiations.136 From this perspective, by the end of the century, the 
authorities no longer shared the same value system as those who rose up to reassert it. 
There is, however, evidence to suggest that the magistrates at county level were still 
using judicial paternalism as a means of securing social cohesion into the nineteenth 
century.137 It is worth noting that governmental histories cite the decline of judicial 
paternalism considerably later than Thompson; the decline of judicial discretion and more 
traditional, personal forms of government occurred with the ascendancy of central 
government control in the 1830s. Thompson was cautious in the extension of the concept 
of moral economy beyond the very specific context in which it was founded. If ‘the term 
was to be extended’, Thompson argued, ‘it needed to be redefined’. To retain the 
analytical validity of the model, the communities to which it is applied needed to have a 
particular conception of economic relations, based on custom and statute, which when 
threatened by ‘monetary rationalisation’ or the impositions of free market capitalism, ‘are 
made self-conscious as a moral economy.’138  
Peter Jones has met these criteria in his extension of the moral economy outside of 
the market place, and into a broader popular concern for the ‘right to subsistence.’ During 
the Swing disturbances of 1830, the agricultural labourers were not attempting to restore 
‘proper economic functions’ limited to the marketplace, but they were protecting 
‘customarily expected safeguards against unemployment and sever household distress’ in 
their demands for increased wages and secure employment.139 Carl Griffin, following 
Wells’ lead in his study of the Weald, has progressed the relationship between the social 
and political crises at the end of the eighteenth century and those in the wake of the 
Napoleonic Wars, addressing the cumulative effect of policies implemented to deal with 
distress in the subsistence crises of the 1790s, their evolution into the first decades of the 
nineteenth century, and concomitant acts of protest.140 As Griffin has indicated, if there is 
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scope to consider the continuity in the experience and reaction to distress amongst the 
rural poor, it must likewise be necessary to consider continuities in the exercise of local 
authority.141 
Despite the magnitude of the Swing disturbances of 1830, they tend to be included 
in histories of police reform and local government as part of the context which 
contributed to the extension of professional policing and the implementation of the New 
Poor Law. This period of acute unrest is explained away as an example - and as 
symptomatic - of the failure of the ‘old system’ of local government. Similarly, in studies 
of social protest, Swing was a relatively under-researched period of rural unrest, largely 
because the form of the agricultural labourers’ protest appeared to be reactionary and 
socially conservative, and does not, therefore, fit into the wider narratives on the 
development of the working class.142 Roger Wells’ discussion of the position of Swing in 
the experience of the rural proletariat has offered a more contextualised reading of its 
significance in redefining social relationships. The experience of Swing, and its ‘brutal’ 
suppression ‘brought the question of rural workers to the front of both democratic and 
labour movements’ contributing to the politicisation of rural workers and the 
establishment of working-class political organisations in the countryside.143 
Until the recent resurgence in studies of Swing, the historiography has offered a 
rather reductive account of the actions and attitudes of the authorities in this period. Eric 
Hobsbawm and George Rudé’s seminal work on the disturbances, Captain Swing, 
devoted one chapter to the authorities’ responses, indicatively entitled ‘Repression’. 
Hobsbawm and Rudé raised questions regarding the differing responses of the county 
magistrates and the nature of the prosecutions of Swing offenders but the breadth of their 
study prevented proper consideration of these points.144 Again little systematic study of 
the local authorities during this period has been addressed since.145 
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This neglect of the interaction of the authorities might be considered characteristic 
of many of the studies of social protest produced since the 1960s. Andrew Charlesworth 
has considered them in brief in his analysis of the spatial diffusion of the Swing riots, but 
Griffin has shown how productive this approach can be. His analysis of the trial of the 
first machine breakers at Elham in Kent has shown how the actions of the magistracy 
impacted on the movement of the Swing disturbances and on the attitudes of central 
government. It also highlights how the county authorities tempered their responses 
according to their immediate social contexts.146  
Harvey Kaye called for ‘class structuration studies focusing on the ruling 
classes’.147 While few would associate Marxists with the study of the ruling classes and 
State apparatus, as Kaye argues, ‘they are what makes the perspective of history from the 
bottom up necessary’. Similar calls for more concerted studies of the authorities in the 
context of social protest have been made more recently by Charlesworth in 1991, and 
Katrina Navickas in 2011.148 In studying magistrates in relation to their communities, 
exploring their local context and networks fully, we can contribute to our understanding 
‘of the ways that the agency of the lower orders have actually structured power’.149 
Studies of social protest at a local level afford the historian an almost unique 
opportunity. In his retrospective of the historiography on Swing, Adrian Randall stressed 
that ‘close attention to the local is clearly essential if we are to really understand the 
social politics, normally hidden from the historian’s sight, which was worked out in high 
relief only when riot or protest erupted.’150 Studying the interactions of the local judiciary 
with those engaged in such phases of unrest is integral to reaching this understanding of 
social politics. Too frequently the repressive function of the magistracy and local justice 
systems are emphasised, but the administration of the law was a negotiated process. The 
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suppression of disorder was framed by local social and political contexts, and local 
history, as much as by statute law and the demands of central government. 
Broadening this discussion back out into the field of government and governance, 
dialogues on the decline of judicial paternalism run parallel to those on changes in the 
nature of local authority and specifically, the institution of the justices of the peace. What 
is required is a continuation of this kind of detailed, local study, as exhibited by Landau, 
King, Morgan and Rushton, and Griffin, into the critical years of the nineteenth century. 
Although Eastwood has considered the decline of judicial discretion in his discussion of 
local government, we lack focused studies addressing the exercise of discretion (and 
judicial paternalism) as experienced by the communities over which magistrates presided, 
in a period where ostensibly, it was harder to make this form of governance function.151 
 
Changes in the nature of governance in the second half of the eighteenth century and into 
the nineteenth century have already been mooted regarding perceived changes in the 
social status of England’s rulers. The social composition of the magistracy has come 
under scrutiny by all of the historians considered here. Of particular relevance to this 
thesis, are the discussions regarding the apparent abdication of responsibility for local 
government by the landed gentry towards the end of the eighteenth century, and the 
related issue of the availability of active magistrates.152 Arguably it is Norma Landau 
who has set the bar for the complexity of such studies of the social character of the 
county commissions of the peace. She argues that the ‘change in the composition of the 
bench symbolized a new definition of the relation between the rulers and the ruled.’153 
Landau’s extensive statistical analysis provides both methodological precedents for 
further studies of county commissions and evidence for comparisons to be made. 
Building on Thompson’s conception of a ‘patrician’ elite distanced from the poor, 
Landau concludes that, over the eighteenth century, the county magistrate shifted from a 
local, patriarchal leader to what she describes as the ‘patrician justice’ – a figure more 
closely representative of the interests of government, an administrator as well as a 
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disinterested agent of the law.154 This is attributed, to a considerable extent, to the 
developing administrative function of the magistracy, and the need to include increasing 
numbers of lesser gentry and clerics into the commissions to fulfil the ever-increasing 
workload.  
With the inclusion of less substantial gentlemen and clergy into the commissions, 
the nature of governance changed. These men were ‘not obviously tied to their 
communities by family background, a tradition of local leadership, or landed estate’ and 
thus lacked the ‘ ‘natural’ authority’ of a ‘patriarchal justice’. The lesser gentleman JP 
thus derived his power more from the disinterested ‘rule of law’ than ‘personal’ 
leadership. To an extent this reconciled some of the problems with the discretionary and 
highly personal nature of the power wielded by the magistracy. Landau suggests that the 
‘patrician’ justice, the lesser gentleman more frequently acting in a group at either petty 
or quarter sessions, could present himself as the representative of government rather than 
the voice of his community.155 This change in the nature of local governance was 
furthered by the demands of central government who, by mid-century, placed greater 
emphasis on the local judiciary as the ‘bulwark of social order’, and were consequently 
keen to present the magistracy as a homogenous group rather than emphasising their 
authority as individuals.156 
Peter King’s study of the Essex magistracy in the 1780s has shown a similar trend 
to Landau with the inclusion of lesser gentlemen and clerics in the commission of the 
peace. Hay’s study of the Staffordshire magistracy and Morgan and Rushton’s analysis of 
the Durham bench also follow this pattern.157 
King’s analysis of the Essex bench is the most detailed study produced after 
Landau’s work on Kent. His research is revealing in its close ties to the geography of the 
county. In Essex, the poor availability of resident gentry in the populous county and their 
uneven distribution contributed to the need to incorporate lesser gentlemen and clergy 
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into the commission.158 It appears that the proximity of Essex to London had the most 
significant impact on the social character of the county and thus the men who could be 
called upon to act as magistrates in the commission of the peace. King describes the 
Essex gentry as ‘not so much an open elite as a revolving door’.159 New moneyed 
interests, especially London based businessmen, favoured the counties such as Essex and 
Hertfordshire where a small country estate could be purchased. According to King these 
estates were frequently kept small in order for their owners to retain capital for more 
‘profitable ventures’. The advantages of having a country estate in these areas were 
numerous: they provided a place to retire to, the prestige of a rural residence near their 
centre of business, an opportunity to hold office or a ‘conveniently placed’ investment. 
King suggests that these men, focused more on their entrepreneurial activities, and were 
unlikely to ‘settle permanently into local gentry society.’160 Whilst this led to a deficiency 
in the established county gentry, it did provide a continuous source of men willing to take 
public office if only for a limited time. From this evidence King finds that Essex did 
indeed ‘experience a move towards…a patrician style of justice’, those men most active 
in his sample having ‘virtually no involvement with their communities.’161 
 
Thus far our knowledge of the social composition English magistracy has been drawn 
from concentrated pockets of evidence. The conclusions of Landau and King have been 
widely cited and yet they are focused on the Home Counties. P. B. Munsche raised the 
issue of whether single-county studies can be more generally representative in his review 
of Landau’s work in 1987. From King’s evidence a fruitful comparison was made, but 
whilst sharing Landau’s conclusions on the changing social composition of the 
magistracy, he also highlighted the effect that the proximity to London had on these 
areas. Douglas Hay’s study of Staffordshire and Morgan and Rushton’s studies of north-
east of England offer alternative regional comparisons focused on areas characterized by 
their industrial production.162 
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Older studies of the composition of the magistracy tend to site the change in social 
composition toward the middle of the nineteenth century with the inclusion of ‘middle-
class’ men in the county commissions. Zangrel’s study of the English county judiciary 
from 1831 to 1887 follows this pattern, maintaining that the landed gentry remained 
dominant until legislative changes in 1835 started to see the addition of more ‘middle-
class’ men onto the bench in boroughs.163 He does not ignore the inclusion of lesser 
gentleman and clergy into the commissions of the peace in the second half of the 
eighteenth century but interprets this as an attempt to maintain the ‘landed character’ of 
the magistracy. These men were seen to share the same values and aspirations of the 
established gentry.164 Similar conclusions were offered by the Webbs, and more recently, 
by David Eastwood in his study of the Oxfordshire magistracy.165 
Eastwood argues that opposition to tradesmen or manufacturers on the bench 
persisted into the 1830s: the ‘gentry proved stubbornly resistant to any notion that they 
should share power and office with ‘new wealth’.’166 It is important to note however, that 
the Oxfordshire bench was largely composed of gentlemen – not the aristocracy. Any 
shift in the paternal ideal of the justice as identified by Eastwood, is one from an 
aristocratic to a gentle archetype: he was not a man to be diverted by the lure of the 
season, or the Grand Tour, but found ‘in the bosom of his family – performing with 
unwavering fidelity, the valuable functions of an able magistrate; enlightening the poor, 
comforting the sick, diffusing widely around him blessings of charity…and contributing 
to the promotion of virtue…by the silent but eloquent lesson of his own practical 
example.’167 These men dominated the Oxfordshire bench. 
In Landau and King’s discussions the inclusion of clerical justices in the 
commission of the peace has been used to bolster the case for the rise of the patrician 
justice. Clergymen did not have the same claim to social authority as the landed gentry as 
their property was bestowed upon them as part of their professional living. However, 
Eastwood allies them more closely with the gentry at the beginning of the nineteenth 
                                                
163 C. H. E. Zangrel, ‘The Social Composition of the county magistracy in England and Wales, 1831-1887’, 
The Journal of British Studies, 11:1 (1971): 115-6. 
164 Zangrel cited in J. V. Beckett, The Aristocracy in England, 1660-1914 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 122-
7. 
165 Webbs, The Parish and the County, 378-83. 
166 Eastwood, Governing Rural England, 13-14. 
167 Anon, ‘Late Elections’ London 1818, quoted in ibid, 79; ibid, 76. 
 
 
50 
century: ‘Their augmented glebes and imposing new rectories proclaimed them 
unambiguously as members of a ruling landed elite. They effortlessly mirrored its values 
and accepted its privileges.’168 Indeed, in Oxford the clergy excelled in policing elite 
interests, being most efficient in enforcing the game laws.169 
Perhaps Eastwood’s most pertinent point is that the character of judicial 
administration was dependent on the magistracy active in an area. Not only did local 
contexts and local governors shape the ‘character’ of local government, but this in turn 
shaped the development of different governmental structures in different areas. Eastwood 
calls for more studies comparing regional disparities and continuities in the composition 
and actions of the magistracy.170 
It is clear that the divergent views regarding social composition and governance 
need to be looked at anew. More regional studies of the composition of the magistracy 
and their actions within the commission need to be made in order to explore regional 
diversity. Certainly, it appears that studies of the Home Counties have coloured much of 
our understanding. We need to consider ‘static and remote’ counties (as the Webbs 
described Somerset), outlying counties whose distance from the centre, offers more scope 
for comparison.171  
Another caveat in the debates over social status is the way in which it is discussed 
as a series of inert categories. There is perhaps a tendency to classify individuals 
according to one criterion that may not accurately account for their social standing, as it 
was perceived at the time and in their locale.172 Magistrates occupied a variety of roles 
outside their judicial office – as clerics, landowners, military officers and members of 
parliament. Under which category do we classify them? How did they perceive 
themselves? And did this change? There is certainly evidence to suggest that the 
magistracy would represent themselves according to the needs of a given situation or 
particular context. For example, after the French Revolution of 1789, literature espousing 
the virtues of traditional, patriarchal government was widely disseminated, ‘the language 
of radical egalitarianism…was thus countered by the rhetoric of deference, and an 
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alternative discourse which sought to buttress existing authority’.173 The new regional 
studies presented as part of this thesis aim to include an awareness of the fluidity of 
identity, and to emphasize how the magistracy represented and perceived themselves, 
thus adding to our understanding of the county judiciary and governance in this period. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter has been to introduce the form and function of the English 
magistracy in the eighteenth century, and the significant changes it underwent in the 
period c. 1790-1835. The magistracy retained a crucial position in county government, 
encompassing the judiciary, the police and the administrative executive. Inherent to their 
function was a particular ideal of government, that of the paternal regulator of his 
community. Basing authority on essentially personal attributes – his connection to the 
land, to the local economy, and to his community – made an acknowledgement of local 
contexts necessary in the forms of government. Consequently, the magistrates were 
endowed with considerable discretionary powers in order to govern. This level of 
unregulated power was fraught with inequities and the potential for arbitrary rule. 
Nonetheless, it also allowed a flexibility in government, assisting the magistracy in 
establishing structures and procedures suited to their locales. The erosion of the 
magistracy’s status as rulers of the county was due to significant social, political and 
economic shifts in the aftermath of the French wars. 
This overview of the justices of the peace assists in unpacking the histories that 
have been written about them. The works considered in this chapter have brought to the 
fore important interpretations of these governmental developments: the importance of the 
county judiciary as local government, in its scope, its ability to innovate and its self-
regulation. It is also clear that they provided a critical connection between centrally 
administered authority and the people. In exploring the use and nature of discretion, it is 
no longer merely the hallmark of an arbitrary system of rule perpetrated by the elite, but 
an integral part of English governance at this time. This conception of governance based 
on a deferential hierarchy was understood by more than the authorities: it provided a 
discursive framework through which popular claims to the redress of the law could be 
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made. As Thompson argued, the space created by this paradigm allowed the negotiation 
of social relationships. This paradigm, and the particular mode of governance that 
underpinned it was challenged, and ultimately reconfigured over the turn of the 
nineteenth century. In pursuing an analysis of how this challenge was manifest in the 
context of social protest, we must retain an awareness of the regional particularities in the 
structures of local government to fully understand the exercise of authority. 
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Chapter Two 
Mapping the Magistracy c. 1790-1830 
 
This chapter introduces the two case studies of the magistracy of Norfolk and Somerset. 
It considers how local government was shaped according to the physical constitution of 
the counties, and in response to social and economic changes over the period c. 1790-
1830. It concentrates on the ways in which the magistracy managed the structures of 
government  - the county commission of the peace and its membership, the county courts 
and petty sessions – in order to fulfil their function as ‘rulers of the county’. The 
following discussion also serves as an introduction to the context which informed the 
phases of protest considered in subsequent chapters, and the structures of authority that 
were mobilised to deal with it. It provides the opportunity to contribute to the 
historiography on the character of local government at this point, in particular the decline 
of paternalist governance. 
The apparent decline of paternalism over the turn of the eighteenth century was 
both structural and ideological. Demographic growth and attendant economic and social 
change strained the ability of a highly personalised form of government to function. 
Rapidly growing populations contributed to the expansion of the magistracy’s 
administrative duties, and placed new importance on their function as local law 
enforcement.174 As a result, relatively few men bore sole responsibility for the prevention 
of disorder in the face of increasing pauperism and crime. Introduced here, but 
considered in greater depth in chapter three and Part II, the strain placed on social 
relationships at this point, challenged the efficacy of authority based on local connection 
and paternal reciprocity. 
The proliferation of judicial business over the eighteenth century necessitated an 
expansion of the commissions of the peace to augment the number of ‘men on the 
ground’. But the onerous, unrewarded obligations of judicial office proved less palatable 
to the gentry - hitherto, the mainstay of commission personnel.175 In consequence, 
‘lesser’ gentlemen – with new-moneyed interests and those from trade backgrounds – as 
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well as clerics, entered the ranks of the county magistracy. Norma Landau has argued that 
this change in the social composition of the commissions resulted in a change in the 
nature of governance: such men lacked social standing and historical connections to their 
communities, and could not, therefore, wield the ‘natural authority’ associated with the 
paternal gentleman justice.176 However, David Eastwood, and in an earlier study, C.H.E 
Zangrel, have suggested that the induction of ‘lesser’ gentlemen allowed the magistracy 
to retain its gentle character while meeting the need to expand.177 
The discussion of the commissions of the peace in Norfolk and Somerset 
presented here, while not as detailed as Landau’s monograph on the justices of Kent, 
offers a counterpoint to existing studies. Much of our evidence regarding the character of 
the magistracy has been derived from studies of the Home Counties or industrialising 
areas north of London. King’s study of Essex for example, has highlighted how its 
proximity to the Capital encouraged new moneyed interests to settle in the county, 
providing new members for the commission, but ones who rarely involved themselves in 
their communities.178 Norfolk and Somerset by contrast, were set apart from the centre; 
and as Steven Pole has suggested, may, as predominantly rural counties, have retained 
more traditional attitudes to local government.179  
Although broadly comparable at this point, as agricultural producers and maritime 
centres, the physical, demographic and economic make-up of Norfolk and Somerset 
produced quite distinct governmental arrangements. Neither county was immune to the 
pressures of the time, which tested and reconfigured the structures of government in this 
period. The nature of these structures and the ways in which they changed informs our 
understanding of the character of county government. While changes in the social 
composition of the magistracy are discernable in Somerset and Norfolk, they reflect the 
respective requirements of each region. There is, however, evidence in both counties for 
                                                
176 Landau, op. cit. 359; see also chapter 1.4. 
177 D. Eastwood, Governing Rural England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 13-14; C. H. E. Zangrel, ‘The 
Social Composition of the county magistracy in England and Wales, 1831-1887’, The Journal of British 
Studies, 11:1 (1971): 115-6. 
178 King op. cit. 122. 
179 S. Pole, “Crime, society and law enforcement in Hanoverian Somerset” (PhD thesis, University of 
Cambridge, 1983), 50. To an extent, this is also implicit in Susanna Wade Martins’ work on the Norfolk 
gentry, see for example: S. Wade Martins, Norfolk: A Changing Countryside 1780-1914 (Sussex: 
Phillimore, 1988).  
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the persistence of paternalist ideals, most notably the continued importance placed on 
local connection. 
 
The following discussion is founded on a statistical analysis, primarily of the records of 
the county commissions of the peace and courts of quarter sessions. Evidence has been 
organised in a relational database allowing changes in the membership of the commission 
and organisation of its institutions to be charted. Section two of this chapter considers the 
growth of the county commissions of the peace in this period, and the availability of 
acting magistrates in each region, particularly in response to the demographic and 
economic changes outlined in the two surveys of Norfolk and Somerset in section one. 
This statistical data regarding judicial availability and activity has also been 
mapped, establishing spatial as well as longitudinal patterns, that reveal a more detailed 
picture of the scale and scope of judicial jurisdictions: the nature and extent of the areas, 
and populations, over which a magistrate presided, and the groups in which they worked. 
Section three addresses how the geographical distribution of the magistracy intersected 
with the structures of government: the county and borough courts and petty sessions. The 
location and timing of these judicial meetings are not simple matters of fact, but 
considered arrangements that were organised in each county - by the commissions of the 
peace - to facilitate the more effective administration of justice. 
Section four considers the social composition of the magistracy of Norfolk and 
Somerset. Following other studies of the magistracy, particularly Landau’s, it 
incorporates elements of prosopographical technique. Starting with individual records of 
commission membership organised in the database, additional biographical data has been 
sought concerning the social status and background of those magistrates most active at 
county sessions. Taken together, the individual biographical information and data on 
judicial activity, highlights patterns and groupings in the county commissions of the 
peace, and significantly, changes and continuities in the social character of its 
personnel.180 Particular attention has been paid to networks of kinship, patronage and 
                                                
180 This approach has been informed by discussions regarding prosopography as an approach by Stone and 
Rohan in particular: L. Stone, ‘Prosopography’ in F. Gilbert and S. R. Graubard (eds), Historical Studies 
Today (New York: Norton 1972), 107-8; K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, ‘Prosopography and Computing: a 
marriage made in heaven?’ History and Computing, 12, 1 (2000), 2-3. 
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local connection as a means of gauging the criteria for membership of the commissions of 
the peace. As self-regulating institutions, in choosing with whom they would act, the 
magistracy had an active hand in shaping the nature of county government.181 This aspect 
of the study has benefited from an unusually rich vein of archival material: the 
correspondence to the clerk of the peace for Somerset, which details the attitudes, 
opinions and debates surrounding nominations to the county commission. It also provides 
valuable insights into the problems experienced by the magistracy in managing a growing 
population and the concomitant increase in judicial business.182 
 
1. Somerset and Norfolk 
 
1.1 Somerset 
Somerset’s diverse topography and geology resulted in equally varied production. The 
most fertile arable lands lay in the south of the county in the Vales of Taunton and 
Ilchester. The Levels and Moors, extending east from the Severn estuary, bounded by the 
Mendip Hills to the North and the Quantocks to the West, provided rich pasture for diary 
and sheep herds.183 Lead and copper were extracted from these hills; and the north and 
north-eastern quarter of the county, yielded important stocks of coal and stone.184  
 In 1801, Somerset had a population of 273,750. The most densely populated 
hundreds were concentrated in the north and east of the county. Taunton and its environs, 
and the expansive hundred of Willerton and Freemanners (comprised of more than 30 
parishes) were the only hundreds in the western division with a population exceeding 
10,000.185 In the eastern division, the population was concentrated around urban and 
manufacturing centres: primarily Bath, Frome, and Shepton Mallet, and in regions 
                                                
181 Landau, Justices of the Peace, 238-9; see also chapter 1. 
182 SRO: Q/JCP 1-7, Papers and Correspondence relating to Justices and the Commission of the Peace, 
1801-1830 
183 J. Collinson, The History and Antiquities of the County of Somerset, 3 vols. (Bath: R. Crutwell, 1791) 
xiv-xv [Hereafter: History of Somerset]; J. Billingsley, General View of The Agriculture of the County of 
Somerset, 2nd edition. (London: 1798) 14; G. East, ‘Land Utilization in England at the end of the eighteenth 
century’, The Geographical Journal 89:2 (1937): 167-171. 
184 Collinson, History of Somerset, xiv-xv; Geological Survey Map 1”, Bristol District, new series, special 
sheet (1962 edn). 
185 PP Census Returns for County of Somersetshire 1801 [hereafter Census 1801]; Collinson, History of 
Somerset, li; see Appendix 1, Map 1 Somerset Population Distribution 1801. 
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characterised by diverse production. The Mendip hills offered excellent herbage for 
pasturing livestock, and opportunities in the extraction of lead and stone. The parishes of 
Midsomer Norton, Paulton, Radstock and Timsbury, and High-Littleton, extending north 
of the Mendips, formed what Billingsley described as the northern collieries, whose chief 
market was the expanding city of Bath.186 
 Frome and Shepton Mallet, the two most populous parishes after Bath, were the 
main centres of the county’s principal manufacture: woollen cloth and worsted stockings. 
Taunton, and smaller boroughs such as Milborne Port and Axbridge were also engaged in 
textile production. All of these towns provided employment for residents of neighbouring 
parishes.187 
 Bridgwater, Bath and Wells were significant urban centres not characterised by 
any sort of manufactory. Bridgwater, situated on the banks of the Parret was 
distinguished as a market town and port, which traded chiefly in timber and coal. 
Although small in comparison to Bath, Taunton or Wells, with a population of c. 3,500 at 
the end of the eighteenth century, Bridgwater had more than doubled in size by 1831. The 
business of the port no doubt underpinned this growth, seeing an almost concurrent 
increase of inward vessels between 1822 and 1832.188 Bath, according to Collinson, could 
not be noted for its commerce or manufacture, being sustained by ‘the expenditures of 
fashionable company resorting to the city’, who in turn supported the proliferation of 
tradesman and shopkeepers within its bounds.189 Wells, dominated by its cathedral, was a 
market centre, and the ‘nucleus of diocesan administration’.190  
Historically, Ilchester had been the county capital and site of the county courts. 
By the 1790s it was diminished in both productivity and size, having a population just 
exceeding 800 in 1801. It had been surpassed by Taunton as the county’s administrative 
centre. Taunton, a town with almost 6,000 inhabitants, was noted for its large markets, 
and ‘in point of size, buildings and respectability of inhabitants’ it was argued, ‘may vie 
with most cities’. Its location and accommodation made it a more salubrious choice as the 
                                                
186 Census 1801; Collinson, History of Somerset, v. 1, xv and v. 3, 560; Billingsley, General View, 26-7. 
187 Collinson, History of Somerset, vol. 2, 352, and vol. 3, 226, 560; Billingsley, General View, 160. 
188 Census, 1801 and 1831; Collinson, op. cit. vol 3: 75; PP: Appendix to the First Report of the Royal 
Commission on Municipal Corporations (1835), 463-7. 
189 Collinson, op. cit. vol 1, 28; BCL: Bath Guide Directories, 1773-1799 
190 S. Pole, “Crime, society and law enforcement in Hanoverian Somerset”, 4. 
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seat of county government. Along with Bridgwater and Wells - as commercial and 
religious centres, Taunton hosted the county assizes and quarter sessions.191  
 
Competition in industry from other regions, and the experience of war and scarcity, 
particularly in the 1790s and first decades of the nineteenth century, strained both the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors of Somerset. While the county’s urban centres 
grew significantly in the period, demographic change created its own problems to 
contend with. 
According to Billingsley, agricultural wages in 1798 were low: men could expect 
a shilling a day in winter, and 1s 4d in summer; women were paid considerably less, 
earning 6-8d a day according to the season. The predominance of pastoral farming meant 
Somerset could not rely on its own crop production. Billingsley claimed that ‘the county 
would be drained of money’ through the vast quantities of grain it needed to import, were 
it not for the exports of livestock, coal and dairy produce, sent to external markets. But 
the poor harvests of the 1790s, the reliance on imported grain, high prices and low wages, 
resulted in outbreaks of social protest in 1795-6, and most notably, in 1800-01.192  
The pressures of mechanisation, competition from factories in the north of 
England, and the impact of war with France, saw a decline in the textile industry by the 
end of the eighteenth century. At Taunton and Ilchester, and latterly Shepton Mallet, silk 
manufacture was introduced to replace the decayed woollen trade. The introduction of 
mechanised production at Frome and Axbridge was acknowledged as a factor in the 
contraction of the textile trade in these towns. But the neighbourhood of Frome, unlike 
Axbridge, did not offer the possibility of agricultural labour as supplementary 
employment; and while ‘a number of hands’ had gone to war, their families were left 
reliant on the parish in the absence of available work.193 County expenditure on the poor 
had almost doubled between 1783-5 and 1803; and continued to increase from c. 
£126,000 to more than £185,000 per annum by 1813. Despite declining to around 
                                                
191 Ibid, 4; Collinson, History of Somerset, vol. 3, 226-7, 297-300; Census 1801. 
192 Billingsley, General View of The Agriculture of the County of Somerset, 12-14, 153, 259; see also 
chapter 3.1 
193 Billingsley, op. cit., 161-2; Collinson, op. cit. vol. 3, 226; F. M. Eden, The State of the Poor vol. II. 
(London: J. Davis, 1797) 644; PP: Appendix to the First Report of the Royal Commission on Municipal 
Corporations (1835),1098. 
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£150,000 in the first decade after the Napoleonic wars, the districts that witnessed a 
continued increase in claims for relief were those associated with manufacture.194 
By 1831, the population of Somerset exceeded 400,000. The most significant 
growth occurred in the hundreds surrounding its urban centres, including Bridgwater, 
Taunton, Wells and Bath.195 The parishes of Bath Forum, encircling the city, had a 
population of 5,726 in 1801. By 1831 it exceeded 21,000. The expansion of Bristol was 
likewise reflected in the growth of its suburban parishes lying within the county of 
Somerset. The hundred of Keynsham had increased from almost 7,000 inhabitants to 
more than 9,000; and the population of Hartcliffe and Bedminster had almost tripled 
since 1801, increasing from 5,797 to 17, 047 by 1831.196 The concomitant increase in 
criminal convictions over the period was closely associated with this growth, contributing 
to concerns - particularly amongst county government - regarding the connections 
between poverty, crime and urban expansion.197 
 
1.2 Norfolk 
Many of the problems experienced in Somerset at the turn of the eighteenth century were 
shared – to a degree – in Norfolk; but this county’s very different topographical and 
demographic organisation, created rather different social and economic structures which 
altered the context in which local government operated.  
In terms of agricultural production, Norfolk was overwhelmingly an arable 
county. In 1796, Nathaniel Kent estimated that more than 700,000 acres, ‘computed at 
two thirds of the whole county’, were used for the cultivation of crops. The ‘prime parts’ 
lay to the north and north east of Norwich, comprised of sandy soils with a temperate 
climate, watered by the Rivers Brue and Yare. The productivity of this region was 
                                                
194 Sig. Frome and Whitestone (Shepton Mallet); PP: 1803-04 (175) Abstract of the answers and returns 
made pursuant to an act, passed in the 43d year of His Majesty King George III. Intituled,"an act for 
procuring returns relative to the expense and maintenance of the poor in England."; 1818 (82) Abridgement 
of the abstract of the answers and returns made pursuant to an act, passed in the fifty-fifth year of His 
Majesty King George the Third, intituled an act for procuring returns relative to the expense and 
maintenance of the poor in England; 1825 (299) Abstract of returns into the practice of paying the wages of 
labour out of the poor rates. see also Chapter 4.1.2 
195 Appendix 1, Map 2, Somerset Population Distribution 1831. 
196 Appendix 1, Maps 1 and 2, and figures 1 and 2 Somerset Population by hundred 1801 and 1811-1831. 
197 PP: 1828 (545) Report from the Select Committee on Criminal Commitments and Convictions, 46; also 
below. 
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reflected in its population distribution: the hundreds in the east and central swathes of 
Norfolk had populations exceeding 5,000 in 1801, and South Erpingham, one of the most 
highly cultivated areas in the environs of the market town of Aylsham, had more than 
10,000 inhabitants. The lands of the south and west of the county were harder to cultivate 
and less evenly populated, but boasted some of the most innovative farming centres in the 
country. The estates of Holkham and Rainham, in the north west of the county were 
famed for there exemplary use of new techniques propounded by their proprietors, 
Thomas Coke and Charles Townshend. The lack of available hands in the west provided 
further opportunities for labourers in the more populous parishes in the east.198 
The most densely populated areas were concentrated on the urban centres of 
Norwich, Kings Lynn and Great Yarmouth.199 Yarmouth and Lynn were significant ports, 
acting as a hub for both internal and external trade, via their connection to the sea and the 
network of navigable waterways in Norfolk and adjacent counties. With the towns of 
Wells and Clay on the north-western coast, Lynn and Yarmouth allowed regional farmers 
to export their produce to the Midlands and northern counties of England, and reach more 
distant markets in western Europe. In 1796, it was claimed, that ‘the four Norfolk ports 
export as much corn as all the rest of England.’200 
Great Yarmouth was considered Norfolk’s ‘principal sea port and second town’. 
The chief business of the town was in fisheries: employing fishermen, ferrymen, and 
curers, and sustaining associated trades in rope, basket and net making. The port saw 
extensive traffic in coal and timber, importing significant quantities of the former for 
consumption in East Anglia, and exporting grains and legumes to English and 
Continental markets. The infertile land surrounding the port offered little scope for 
cultivation, consequently, local employment was concentrated on ‘the sea-faring life’.201 
King’s Lynn, situated on Norfolk’s western periphery was considered the region’s 
commercial ‘emporium’. It too served as an important trade centre, importing coal from 
the north and wine from Iberia, and exporting corn, wool and manufactured goods. Local 
                                                
198 N. Kent, General View of the Agriculture of the County of Norfolk (Norwich: Crouse, Stevenson and 
Matchett, 1796), 10-14; Census Returns for the County of Norfolk 1801 [hereafter Census 1801]; W. 
White, History, Gazetteer and Directory of Norfolk (Sheffield: Robert Leader, 1836) 513-4 [Hereafter: 
History of Norfolk]. 
199 Appendix 1, Map 3 Norfolk Population Distribution 1801 
200 Census 1801; N. Kent, General View, 17-18, 144-9. 
201 W. White, History of Norfolk, 237, 257; F. M. Eden, The State of the Poor, 525-6. 
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industries were varied, supporting the trade in and out of the port: there were malthouses 
and breweries, a tobacco mill, corn mills, and by 1836, three iron foundries and an 
agricultural machinery manufactory. 
Norwich was the county capital, surpassing the port towns in size, with a population 
of more than 36,000 in 1801. The city was a market centre and by 1750, the county’s 
textile production was concentrated in Norwich. Crepe, bombazine, silk and, perhaps 
most famously, worsted stuffs were produced and finished in the city. At the industry’s 
peak in the mid century, 12,000 weavers, and more than 70,000 spinners, were estimated 
to work in and around Norwich.202 Situated at the heart of the rich arable region, with 
strong communication links to the county’s ports and market towns, Norwich provided an 
important hub in Norfolk society, not only for manufacture and agricultural marketing 
but also as a professional and financial service centre, and as the leisure, administrative 
and ecclesiastical capital of the county.203  
County, as well as the city quarter sessions, and the summer Assizes were convened 
in the city. The Lent (Easter) Assizes were held at Thetford until they were removed to 
Norwich in 1833. Thetford was an ancient borough and market town in the south west 
corner of the county. Despite being small – certainly in terms of population, and of 
diminishing importance, Thetford’s significance derived from its heritage as the former 
regional capital of East Anglia.204 It was the requirements of county government in 
Norfolk, which saw the assizes moved from Thetford to Norwich in 1833. Of primary 
concern were the security and financial complexities of transporting felons for trial from 
the prison at Norwich Castle, almost 30 miles away from Thetford, together with the 
expense that prosecutors and witnesses would have to bear in order to pursue their case to 
the Assizes.205 King’s Lynn, Swaffham, Holt and Little Walsingham also served as 
county quarter session towns. 
The last three venues were not boroughs but were significant legal centres in the 
county from at least the seventeenth century. Despite its diminutive nomenclature, Little 
                                                
202 Census, 1801; White, History of Norfolk, 46; R. Wilson, ‘The Textile Industry’, in C. Rawcliffe and R. 
Wilson, Norwich Since 1550 (London: Hambledon and London 2004), 221, 228-9. 
203 P. Corfield, ‘From Second City to Regional Capital’, in C. Rawcliffe and R. Wilson, Norwich Since 
1550, 146. 
204 White, History Norfolk, 718. 
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Walsingham was an ancient parish distinguished as a site of Christian pilgrimage from 
the twelfth century. It was well positioned as a sessions town, having its own house of 
correction. Swaffham was similarly well provisioned with a bridewell. All three towns 
underwent considerable physical development in the eighteenth century. Both the 
bridewell at Swaffham, and the house of correction at Walsingham were rebuilt in 1787 
in line with the proposals of the prison reformer John Howard. Each of the three town’s 
shire halls, used as court houses, were also redeveloped by c. 1820.206  
 
Population growth by 1831 was strongly correlated with the growth of Norfolk’s urban 
centres and the boom in agricultural production during the Napoleonic wars. The 
population of the hundreds surrounding Lynn and Norwich increased significantly, as did 
the hundreds in the prime, central and eastern arable regions. In 1831, seventeen 
hundreds had a population of more than 10,000, compared to only five in 1801. The 
population of Norwich had almost doubled to more than 61,000.207 
The most densely populated areas felt the fluctuations in the county’s economy 
more acutely. The textile trade in Norwich had entered a decline in the later decades of 
the eighteenth century attributed to the increasing fashion in cottons, and after 1793, to 
the frustration of accessing markets in France and the Netherlands. Wages had stagnated 
from c. 1775, and the number of weavers without full employment placed an increasing 
strain on the poor rates. Frederick Eden cited an increase in expenditure from £2,318 in 
1784 to £7,327 in 1794. Despite a partial recovery in the textile trade with the cessation 
of hostilities in 1815, national recession from 1825 perpetuated the decline of 
manufacture in the city.208 
The problems of unemployment and increasing expenditure on the poor were not 
confined to Norwich and its environs. Eden noted that the poor state of the small 
tradesmen and labouring people at Downham Market (one of the western division’s most 
populous towns) was owed to the high price of provisions and the increase in the poor 
                                                
206 NRO: C/S 1/14-24 Sessions Books, MF 657-660; Norfolk Historic Environment Record: NHER 25455, 
NHER 15129, NHER 20972; J. M. Rosenheim, ‘County Governance and Elite Withdrawal in Norfolk, 
1660-1720’, in A. L. Beier et al (eds.) The First Modern Society: Essays in English History in Honour of 
Lawrence Stone (Cambridge University Press 1989), 102 nt 31; Prisons and Prisoners in Norfolk, leaflet 41 
(NRO 2011) 
207 Census 1801-1831. 
208 Eden, The State of the Poor, vol. II, 477-9, 488; R. Wilson, ‘The Textile Industry’, 236. 
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rates in 1795. As was the case in Somerset, protest erupted in the summer of that year, in 
market centres and at export points, where the labouring poor reacted to high prices and 
the removal of stocks from their region.209  
Under and unemployment, and increasing expenditure on the poor rates to 
supplement insufficient wages, continued to plague the county as agriculture was 
depressed after the artificial inflation of domestic markets during the wars. Distress was 
felt most acutely in the central grain producing regions and market towns, eliciting 
further outbreaks of protest in 1816, 1822 and 1830.210 Depression, pauperism and 
population growth were also closely associated with the more general increase in criminal 
convictions recorded in the county.211 
 
* * * 
 
As agricultural and maritime counties, of roughly equal size in terms of land and 
population, Somerset and Norfolk are broadly comparable. But they were quite different 
in their economic and demographic structures. Somerset’s topographical diversity meant 
production within the county was equally varied. The arrangement of pastoral farming, 
extractive industries and manufacture was reflected in uneven population distribution. 
Demographic growth was concentrated in these productive areas and in the county’s 
multiple urban centres. Norfolk’s flatlands and waterways saw arable farming 
predominate; its urban centres were generally limited to its ports, and the county capital, 
Norwich, where manufacture, commerce and administration were focussed. 
The remaining sections of this chapter will address how the physical, economic and 
social make-up of each county impacted on the organisation of local government. It is 
already evident that regional context informed governmental structures: both counties 
shifted their quarter sessions from historic, but declining capitals to growing urban 
centres. In Somerset, the sessions were convened in three of its most prominent market 
towns, which were distinguished from one another by their functions as commercial, 
                                                
209 Eden, The State of the Poor, 471; Kent, General View, 156-7; see also chapter 3. 
210 See chapter 4.1.1 
211 PP: 1822 (236) Agricultural Distress. Petitions presented to parliament 1820-1822; 1825 (299) 
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religious, and administrative centres. In addition, Somerset had a total of nine boroughs, 
including the city of Bath, which had their own juridical and jurisdictional arrangements. 
The interaction of county and municipal government needs to be considered; as this 
chapter, and the next, will show, the relationship between county and borough benches 
was not always an easy one.  
Commercial, ecclesiastical and regional government in Norfolk was concentrated 
on Norwich, while Lynn as a burgeoning commercial centre was likewise a seat of local 
government as a quarter sessions town. The in-depth study of Norfolk’s magistracy 
below, supports the notion that the adjournment of the county sessions to smaller towns, 
like Little Walsingham and Swaffham, served the county’s predominantly rural 
population, which was relatively evenly distributed in comparison with Somerset, and not 
concentrated in urban areas. 
The organisation and activity of the justices of both counties was shaped and tested 
by demographic expansion, and attendant economic and social crises. Both county 
commissions had to marshal an increasing population, and manage the effects of 
economic depression, increasing pauperism, crime and social protest, straining their 
number as the ‘front-line’ of law enforcement. As subsequent chapters consider in detail, 
the different social and economic structures in each county framed different problems 
within them. Somerset experienced more unrest in the subsistence crises of the 1790s, 
whereas Norfolk had to contend with protracted unrest in the context of acute agricultural 
depression post-war. Although Somerset did not experience rural distress in the same 
manner or on the same scale after 1815, the decline of its manufacturing centres in 
particular, created palpable social tensions by the 1830s. The different structures and 
experiences in each county informed the different organisation and actions of their 
justices, but by considering them in the shared context of rapid population growth, and 
social and economic crisis, it is possible to draw more general conclusions regarding the 
form and function of the magistracy and the pressures it faced as an institution. 
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2. The County Commissions of the Peace 
 
As a collective body, each commission of the peace was responsible for the structuring of 
county government, including the regulation of its own membership. It was a responsive 
organisation, growing to meet the demands of an expanding populace, and reconfiguring 
its sessions and courts to facilitate the more effective administration of government and 
the law. Despite swelling their ranks, the number of available and active magistrates in 
Norfolk and Somerset remained small, and consequently authority was stretched. 
 
Figure 1: Size and Growth of the County Commissions 1680-1830212 
 
1.a)      1.b) 
 
 
1.c)      1.d) 
                                                
212 NRO: C/Sda 1/14-18 Commission of the Peace 1798-1830; SRO: Q/JC/119-124, Commission of the 
Peace 1794-1830; N. Landau, The Justices of the Peace, Appendix A. 
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Norma Landau has charted the expansion of the county commissions for much of the 
eighteenth century. This increase she attributed to party interest, particularly in the first 
quarter of the century, but also to the growing administrative demands placed on county 
government. Both counties considered here, shared in this pattern of expansion: 
Somerset’s commission of the peace was five times larger in 1761 than in 1680. Norfolk 
exhibited more modest growth: starting from a healthier base of 96 justices, the 
commission had almost doubled in the same period (see. figs. 1.a & c).213 New data 
presented in figures 1.b and 1.d chart the continued development of the commissions 
from the turn of the eighteenth century. Membership has been counted from the 
commission lists drawn up at their renewal: new commissions were issued either on the 
accession of the monarch or in response to requests from within the county, accounting 
for the variance in the years considered here.214 
Although the membership of Norfolk’s commission of the peace remained 
relatively stable between 1798 and 1820, there was a marked increase from 1824, 
coinciding with growing concerns regarding crime and social unrest in the county.215 By 
1830, the total membership had more than doubled from 1761. Somerset’s commission 
followed a rather different trajectory. Membership peaked in 1814: the commission 
issued that year was intended to answer complaints made regarding the lack of 
magistrates at Taunton.216  However, the total membership had declined by 1820; this 
contraction no doubt magnified concerns expressed regarding the distribution and activity 
of the magistrates across the county, evident from at least 1819. The upturn manifest by 
1830 was in part a response to the need for more effective law enforcement. 
Whilst increases in the total membership of the commission were made to support 
the efficacy of the magistracy, entry was no guarantee that an individual would qualify to 
act. According to Landau, at the accession of George III, about 40 per cent of the 
commission members were acting magistrates, whereas at least two-thirds of the 
commissions had been actively maintaining the peace at the start of his grand-father’s 
                                                
213 Landau, The Justices of the Peace, 84-6, 134-8, 315-6, and Appendix A. 
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reign.217 The proportion of acting justices in Somerset and Norfolk from 1790 was 
considerably lower (below, fig. 2). 
Prior to 1831, no consistent records were kept of which commission members were 
acting as justices in each county.218 The writs of dedimus potestatem issued by the Crown 
Office to members of the commissions seeking to take their oaths of office at Quarter 
Sessions, give an indication of the number who intended to serve as magistrates. The 
writs themselves do not survive in any significant number, however the books of the 
Petty Bag Office kept by the Clerks of the Crown, record money received from 
prospective justices for their writ of dedimus potestatem.219 While the acquisition of the 
writ did not guarantee that a justice would act, it signalled his ‘intention that he not 
appear inactive’.220  
 
Figure 2: Number Qualified as a percentage of the commission221 
 
Somerset  Norfolk  
Year No. Qualified to Act 
% 
Year No. Qualified to Act 
% 
1794 18 1798 20 
1814 28 1811 31 
1820 31 1820 36 
1828 36 1824 33 
1830 36 1830 31 
 
The proportion of qualified justices in both counties falls well short of the figures 
identified by Landau for the earlier eighteenth century, and slightly less than the c. 40 per 
cent identified by King in Essex in the early nineteenth century.222 In 1794 only 18 per 
cent of the Somerset commission was qualified to act, and only 20 per cent of the Norfolk 
                                                
217 Landau, Justices of the Peace,, p. 322. 
218 Ibid, p. 319; PP: 1831-32 (39) Justices of the peace. A return of the number of all the justices of the 
peace in each county, city and town in England and Wales.  
219 TNA: C220/9 8 and 9, books of the Petty Bag Office. 
220 Landau, The Justices of the Peace, p. 320.  
221SRO: Q/JC/119-124, Commission of the Peace 1794-1830; NRO: C/Sda 1/14-18 Commission of the 
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222 Two fifths, or 40 per cent of the commission, King, Crime, Justice and Discretion, 110. 
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commission was in 1798 (figure 2). The number of qualified magistrates in both counties 
increased between 1790 and 1830, matching the overall expansion of the commissions; 
but by the end of the period, only about one third of those listed had taken our their writ 
of dedimus potestatem. 
 
Figure 3: The Timing of Qualification: writs of dedimus potestatem taken out in Somerset 
and Norfolk between 1790 and 1830  
 
 
Patterns can be discerned in the timing of qualification. An upturn in the number of 
newly qualified magistrates came with the renewal of the commissions, accounting – for 
example - for peaks in the number of writs of dedimus potestatem taken out by members 
of Norfolk’s commission in 1798, and the substantial increase in Somerset after the 
renewal of the county’s commission in 1814 (figure 3).223 The evidence also points to the 
timing of qualification in response to other social and political stimuli. Fears arising from 
the revolution in France, and the advent of war have been identified as catalysts for 
qualification,224 the increases in 1803 coinciding with preparations against invasion in 
both counties.225 Peaks are also discernable during the subsistence crises of the mid 1790s 
and in 1800-1801. In Norfolk, the heightened activity from 1816 reflects the tumultuous 
post war years experienced in the county, when phases of unrest broke out in 1816, 1822 
and 1823, whereas Somerset remained comparatively peaceful. Both counties saw an 
increase in the number of those seeking to qualify after 1828 confirming contemporary 
concerns about poverty and a perceived increase in crime, which were then compounded 
by the outbreak of Swing across the country.  
                                                
223 TNA: C 220/9 8 and 9 
224 Landau, Justices of the Peace, 294. 
225 SRO: Q/JCP/12; White, History of Norfolk, 86. 
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During the disturbances of 1830, which coincided with the renewal of the Somerset 
commission, many voiced the necessity of recruiting those willing to be active justices. 
One correspondent, Jonathan Elford, had been a member of the Somerset commission for 
nearly 18 years, but had never acted as a magistrate. However, he wrote: 
‘I have never acted; for it did appear to me that when a man retired from a valuable business 
for the sole purpose of enjoying ease and retirement, he had a right to enjoy the remainder of 
his life in Idleness. But as I conceive every man, in a time like the present, is bound to put 
his shoulder to the wheel. I have taken out my Dedimus, and am now acting as a 
magistrate.’226 
 
Figure 4: The Number of Qualified Magistrates in Somerset and Norfolk  
 
 
In terms of actual individuals, the number of qualified magistrates in Norfolk increased 
steadily, but modestly, throughout the period. Although the total membership of the 
Somerset commission contracted in 1820, the number of qualified justices remained the 
same from 1814 to 1820. However, a definite decline was manifest by 1828 (figure 4).227  
When comparing these figures to adjacent counties in 1831, Norfolk and 
Somerset’s active magistracy seemed healthy in comparison to its neighbours (figure 5, 
below). 
 
                                                
226 Q/JCP/7 Jonathan Elford to Edward Coles, 13 Dec. 1830 
227 SRO: Q/JC/119-124, Commission of the Peace 1794-1830; NRO: C/Sda 1/14-18 Commission of the 
Peace 1798-1830; TNA: C 220/9 8 and 9. 
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Figure 5: Numbers of active magistrates in six counties 1830 and 1831228 
 
 Nos. active in 1831  Nos. active in 1831 
Somerset (1830) 148 Norfolk (1830) 176 
Gloucestershire 176 Suffolk 156 
Wiltshire 89 Cambridgeshire 51 
It should be noted that both Wiltshire and Cambridgeshire were smaller in area, and in population, than 
Somerset and Norfolk, perhaps accounting for the considerable difference in numbers. 
 
But despite their relative strength, both counties had only a small number of men to 
marshal a sizeable population. Correspondence received by the clerk of the peace in 
Somerset between 1819 and 1830 indicates that ill health, infirmity, and the obligations 
of other offices prevented gentlemen from acting as magistrates. Likewise the growing 
population and concomitant increase in business before the courts was frequently cited as 
a significant burden on the county’s justices.229 
Considering Somerset had a population of over 300,000 in 1811, a crude ratio 
would suggest that one qualified magistrate was responsible for a population of 1,657. In 
Norfolk, the ratio was considerably higher at 1: 2,376. Both figures indicate that the 
county magistrates were spread few and far between. Moreover, the geographical 
distribution of qualified magistrates was uneven and thus impacted on the ratios even 
further.230  
In Somerset in 1811, the population over which one justice presided ranged from 
450 (Hampton and Claverton), to 4,460 (Chew and Chewton). In 1831, Hampton and 
Claverton still had the lowest ratio of 1: 587. The highest however, was 1: 8,974 in 
Wellow hundred. Throughout the period, between five and nine of the Somerset hundreds 
had no resident magistrate (figure 6 below.) including some of the most populous 
hundreds: Whitstone with a population of 11,000 in 1811, and Hartcliffe with Bedminster 
(located near Bristol) with a population of more than 17,000 in 1831. The hundreds with 
                                                
228 PP: 1831-32 (39).Justices of the Peace. A return of the number of all justices of the peace in each 
county; Census, 1831. 
229 Below 2.3.2 Structures of Government: Somerset 
230 Appendix 2 Distribution of Justices by Hundred, The location is generally derived from the commission 
lists and (or) records concerning a justice’s qualification, which frequently included their place of 
residence. In Norfolk however, this information does not become consistent until 1811. 
 
 
71 
the fewest resident magistrates - or none at all - were all manufacturing or expanding 
suburban districts.231 
 
Figure 6: Number of hundreds without a resident magistrate 
 
Year Somerset Norfolk 
1811 9 1 
1821 5 1 
1831 7 1 
 
Figure 7: Most common number of justices per hundred 
 
Year Somerset Norfolk 
1811 1 3 
1821 1 3 
1831 1 6 
 
In Norfolk, the range of population size was smaller: in 1811, the population within a 
justice’s jurisdiction ranged from 2,291 (East Flegg) to 3,870 (South Erpingham). In 
1831, it ranged from 1: 999 (East Flegg) to 1: 2,767 (Forehoe).232 The contraction in the 
ratios in 1831 reflects the increase in qualified magistrates recorded from the 1830 
commission (figure 4 above.), and their more even distribution across the county: 
between 1821 and 1831 the most common number of justices in one Norfolk hundred 
increased from three to six. In Somerset, by contrast, the modal number was one (figure 7 
above). Only a single hundred in Norfolk was consistently without a resident magistrate 
between 1811 and 1831 (figure 6). 
 
* * * 
 
The expansion of the county commissions of Norfolk and Somerset follow much of the 
same pattern established in studies of the Home Counties: population growth necessitated 
an increase in membership, and points of social and political crisis stimulated peaks in 
qualification. However, over the period, the number of commission members seeking to 
qualify and therefore act, remained in the minority. 
                                                
231 Appendix 2, Maps 2-4: Somerset 1811-1831; Census 1811-1831. 
232 Appendix 2, Maps 5-7: Norfolk 1811-1831; Census 1811-1831. 
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Despite these broad similarities, when mapped, the geographical distribution of the 
magistracy in each county produces two rather different pictures: in Norfolk, a single 
magistrate served a comparatively smaller population, and the distribution of justices was 
more even, pointing to a more structured but locally focused system of government. 
Considerable disparities in both population ratios and distribution are evident across 
Somerset, highlighting areas with limited access to the law, particularly where population 
growth outstripped the provision of local justice. These contrasting circumstances are 
borne out in a more detailed examination of the arrangement of governmental structures 
in each county, and attempts made by the commissions to alter them. In Norfolk, the 
ordering of judicial divisions and county sessions supported a system of localised 
administration. The apparent deficiencies in the distribution of Somerset’s justices were 
defrayed, in part, by the organisation of courts and jurisdictions to serve a wider area; but 
persistent problems in establishing adequate manpower were well documented 
throughout the period. 
 
3. Structures of Government 
 
The location of the county quarter sessions sittings, the number of judicial divisions, and 
the frequency and location of petty sessions hearings were organised by the county 
commissions and were dependent on the perceived requirements of regional 
administration. By mapping these structures in relation to the distribution of magistrates 
in both counties, the character and function of local governmental structures is made 
more visible: a clearer delineation of a magistrate’s jurisdiction is established, as are the 
means by which shortcomings in the availability of justices were managed. 
 
3.1 Norfolk 
From at least 1811, there were 33 petty session divisions in Norfolk, corresponding 
almost exactly with the county hundreds.233 In the absence of consistent sessions records, 
an analysis of available gaol calendars has been used to consider the activity of acting 
                                                
233 Census 1811 and 1821 
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magistrates outside of the county quarter sessions.234 The residence of acting magistrates 
has been cross-referenced with the location or residence of offenders they committed to 
the county gaols to establish the approximate area, or jurisdiction, over which they 
presided. 
 
Figure 8.a Committals made by a magistrate within his hundred of residence 
 
 Norfolk 1796-9 1809-11 1819-1820 
Same Hundred or 
Adjacent 36% 65% 71% 
Neither 27% 17% 18% 
Unknown 37% 19% 11% 
 
Figure 8.b Committals made in the hundred of residence or adjacent hundred  
 
 Norfolk 1809-11 1819-1820 
Same Hundred 46% 48% 
Adjacent Hundred 19% 23% 
 
From 1809, at least two-thirds of committals were made by magistrates in their hundred 
of residence, or an adjacent hundred (figure 8.a). The lower figure in the sample from 
1796-9 can be attributed to the greater proportion of cases where the magistrate’s location 
could not be confirmed due to the inconsistency in recording residences in the earlier 
commission lists. Disaggregating the home and adjacent hundreds for the nineteenth 
century confirms that the Norfolk justices were most active in the hundred in which they 
lived (figure 8.b). The only hundred consistently without a resident magistrate was 
Guiltcross, on the south western boundary of the county. It was, however, served by 
magistrates in the neighbouring hundred of Diss, and by 1836, had been joined with 
Shropham to form a larger petty sessional division.235 
 
This pattern of resident magistrates administering justice in their locales was replicated in 
the benches sitting at the county quarter sessions. From the seventeenth century, the 
county courts had been organised in three divisions.236 As the county capital, sessions 
                                                
234 NRO: MF/RO 36/1 Marsham Papers, Assize Calendars; all cases referred to the Assizes from the county 
quarter sessions have been excluded from the sample 
235 NRO: MF/RO 36/1; White History of Norfolk, (1836); Appendix 2, Maps 5-7 and figure 6 above. 
236 J. M. Rosenheim, ‘County Governance and Elite Withdrawal in Norfolk, 1660-1720’, 102 nt 31. 
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were convened in Norwich, four times a year. Kings Lynn with Swaffham, and Holt with 
Little Walsingham, comprised two further court divisions serving the west and north of 
the county respectively. 
 
Figure 9 Pattern of County Quarter Sessions sittings in Norfolk c. 1800-1830 
 
 January April July October 
Norwich     
Lynn     
Swaffham     
Little Walsingham     
Holt     
Colour = court in session 
 
The quarter sessions sat by adjournment at Kings Lynn in January, April and October, 
and at Swaffham in July. Likewise, an adjourned session at Holt was held in January until 
c. 1800, after which the months of sitting were changed to April and October. Sessions 
were also held at Little Walsingham in January, April and July. This pattern of 
adjournment meant that each regional division had a county session every quarter, in 
addition to the four courts convened at Norwich (figure 9).237 
Norfolk’s regional divisions were served by defined groups of justices. The number 
of magistrates regularly serving the regional benches was relatively small compared to 
the number attending in Somerset (c. 26-35, see figure 12 below). Considering the 
frequency of meetings at all the sessions locations in Norfolk, the regularity of their 
attendance is magnified further (figure 10 below). 
 
Figure 10 Justices at Norfolk Sessions 1790-1832 
 
Sessions Venue No. JPs sitting 
regularly 
No. Local JPs 
Holt 9 7 
Kings Lynn 14 14 
Little Walsingham 5 3 
Norwich 13 8 
Swaffham 7 6 
                                                
237 NRO: C/S 1/14-24 MF 657-660; White, History Norfolk 588-9, 610 and 669. 
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Fig. 10: regularity = attending more than a third of the sessions in the sample. 
Local = resident in the same or adjacent hundred 
 
The greater proportion of the justices at each sessions were local men, presiding at 
sessions in their hundred of residence or adjacent hundred (figure 10). Moreover, these 
magistrates largely attended one bench only, on a regular basis, confining themselves to 
the business of their closest court, if not their regional division. None of the justices 
regularly sitting at King’s Lynn sat at Holt, and very few sat at Little Walsingham or 
Norwich. There was however, a degree of overlap in the western division between the 
benches of Lynn and Swaffham. The same pattern is evident amongst the Swaffham 
bench: here, none of the magistrates sat at Holt or Little Walsingham, only three of the 
seven justices sat at Norwich, and only on one occasion each. Across the different 
benches, only five of the 48 magistrates in this sample sat at other sessions locations on a 
more frequent basis.238 More than half of the justices were also active in making 
committals outside of sessions,239 and the majority, in their home or adjacent hundred.240 
The evidence indicates that each sessions in Norfolk was within the specific 
jurisdiction of a particular group of magistrates; and even within the quarter sessions 
divisions, justices tended to concentrate their activity on one sessions location. The 
membership of these regional benches, was dominated by men residing in the areas over 
which they presided. 
 
 
3.2 Somerset 
The arrangement of governmental structures was markedly different in Somerset. The 
forty hundreds were organised as sixteen petty sessions divisions before 1829.241 Larger 
divisions comprised of two or three hundreds ameliorated, in part, the deficiency in 
hundreds without a resident magistrate. 
 
                                                
238 NRO: C/S 1/14-24 MF 657-660; see Appendix 3. 
239 As the committals only reflect felonies for trial at Assize, the figure of 51% may well under-represent 
the number of justices active out of sessions. 
240 Committal sample cross-referenced with JPs sitting regularly at quarter sessions. NRO: C/S 1/14-24 MF 
657-660; MF/RO 36/1. 
241 Census 1811, 1821; SRO: Q/JCP/3 inc. list of acting magistrates and their divisions, 1822.. 
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Figure 11.a Committals made by a magistrate within his hundred of residence 
 
 Somerset 1795-1799 1811 1820 
Same or Adjacent 83.4% 62.2% 80.4% 
Neither 10.4% 21.7% 11.7% 
Unknown 6.9% 15.6% 7% 
 
Figure 11.b Committals made in the hundred of residence or adjacent hundred  
 
 Somerset 1795-1799 1811 1820 
Same Hundred 32.8% 24.9% 53% 
Adjacent 
Hundred 49.6% 37.3% 27.4% 
 
From an analysis of petty session returns and prison registers,242 it is clear that the 
majority of magistrates worked in their home or a neighbouring hundred (figure 11.a). 
However, the high proportion of committals made in adjacent hundreds between 1795 
and 1811, confirms that the uneven distribution of magistrates in the county required 
individual justices, or petty sessional benches, to work over a wider area (figure 11.b). 
The concentration of judicial activity in a magistrate’s hundred of residence in 1820 
reflects the increase in acting magistrates between 1814 and 1820 (figure 4 above); and it 
is at this point that the number of hundreds without a resident magistrate decreased from 
nine to five (figure 6).  
The difficulty in sustaining adequate numbers of magistrates across the county was 
well documented in correspondence to Somerset’s clerk of the peace. Other factors 
besides the availability of gentlemen - including the age, occupation or temperament of 
members of the commission - were cited as frustrating the administration of justice in the 
county. In 1819, the clerks for the petty sessions at Wrington and Yeovil reported that 
some of their justices were too infirm to act consistently; and at Wells, the number of 
magistrates fluctuated according to canonical residencies. Another clerk, also writing 
from Yeovil, sought to excuse the reluctance of local magistrates to attend petty sessions, 
by claiming that the assizes and county courts drew them away.243 Rev. James Phillott 
declined an invitation to act as a magistrate for the Brislington division in 1824. Despite 
                                                
242 SRO: Q/RCC/bundle 1790-99; Registers of prisoners: Q/AGI/14, Ilchester Gaol; Q/AGS/14 Shepton 
Mallet Gaol; Q/AGW/14 Williton gaol. 
243 SRO: Q/C/3/7 Correspondence from Justices Clerks listing local magistrates and frequency of their 
meetings, 1819. 
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having taken out his dedimus, he objected to the distance he would have to travel to the 
petty sessions, some seven miles from his home, and the inconvenience of the clerk 
residing four miles away. He also explained that having a large family and a small home, 
he had ‘not the least room to receive common people on business.’244 
The expansion of Bath and Bristol had a considerable impact on the administration 
of the law in Somerset. Their growth saw a concomitant increase in the populations 
between the two cities.245 The justices operating in Bath Forum, and the City of Bath, 
appeared stretched to their limit in 1819: Mr Page, Clerk to the county magistrates of 
Bath Forum explained that, 
‘[f[rom the vast population of the Division and more especially in the immediate vicinity 
of Bath, the Duties of a Magistrate are become so laborious and almost everyday 
something happens to require the attendance of one or two of them in my office.’ 
 
In addition, the Clerk to the City magistrates reported that the justices sat daily at the 
Guildhall and that the Mayor was always present.246 
The apparent increase in crime in the county towards the end of the 1820s was 
highlighted in the report of the select committee on criminal commitments and 
convictions. Giving evidence to the committee, John Phelips – a county magistrate and 
Chairman of Quarter Sessions – attributed the increase in committals almost entirely to 
criminal convictions in Bath, stating that ‘an increase of vigilance has not taken place 
with the increase of the population.’247 
Bath and its environs, was however, the most well provisioned district in the county 
in terms of numbers of resident magistrates (Appendix 2, Maps 1-4). Perhaps more 
problematic, was the area lying between Bath and Bristol. As Phelips stated in his 
evidence:  
‘The Bath City magistracy is limited to their own hall, or strictly called the city of 
Bath; and there is also a divided jurisdiction with Bristol, and a vast scope is afforded 
for the commission of crime.’248 
 
                                                
244 Q/JCP/3 James Phillott to Edward Coles, 1 July 1824 
245 See above: 1. Somerset and Norfolk; S. Pole, “Crime, society and law enforcement in Hanoverian 
Somerset” 5. 
246 SRO: Q/C/3/7 Mr Page, Justices’ Clerk at Bath to Edward Coles, 21 Sept 1819, Mr George, Town Clerk 
at Bath to Edward Coles, 28 Sept 1819. 
247 PP: 1828 (545) Report from the Select Committee on Criminal Commitments and Convictions, 47. 
248 Ibid, 47. 
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In Keynsham, the death of one of the justices in 1824 resulted in what was described as a 
‘distressing want of magistrates’, leaving the division almost entirely un-provided for. 
Similarly, in Batheaston, the death of the local justice had seen a deterioration in the 
‘behaviour’ of the inhabitants, who could only – it was alleged -  ‘be reclaimed by the 
experience of regular and local authority.’249  
Writing to Edward Coles, the county clerk of the peace based at Taunton, in 1819, 
Mr. Chadwick, Clerk to the magistrates for the division of Bedminster, Hartcliffe and 
Portbury, lamented ‘it is very difficult to get a Bench at Bedminster, as the justices live a 
considerable distance therefrom.’ Chadwick continued to complain, ‘it is now very 
uncertain and sometimes difficult to get Justices of this Division to attend the heavy 
business necessarily arising amongst such a heavy population.’ In 1821, the division had 
a population of almost 19,000. Of the eleven justices who fell within its jurisdiction, nine 
did not attend on a regular basis: two had left the county on government business; three 
were incapacitated through poor health; and four of them, it appeared, had little 
inclination to attend. Chadwick did distinguish Mr James Vaughan, ‘a new justice and 
has hitherto attended tolerably punctual’.250 Between 1801 and 1821, the hundred of 
Hartcliffe with Bedminster had only one resident magistrate, but there is little evidence of 
their activity from the petty sessions returns or gaol calendars. Committals to the county 
gaols from the hundred confirm that the Portbury justices acted in the hundred, but also 
justices from the neighbouring divisions of Chew and Chewton, Winterstoke, and 
Wrington.251 
There was no formal intervention with the arrangement of judicial divisions in the 
counties by central government, however, an act passed in 1828 signalled parliamentary 
concern for the administration of justice in the provinces. The act for ‘the better 
regulation of divisions’ facilitated the reorganisation and creation of new divisions by the 
county quarter sessions.252 The Somerset commission reorganised their judicial divisions 
                                                
249 Q/JCP/3 1824 
250 Q/C/3/7 Chadwick to Edward Coles, 22 Sept. 1819; Census 1821 
251 SRO: Q/AG1/14 Ilchester and Q/AGS/14 Shepton Gaol 1811-21 
252 9 George IV, c.43 cited in W. D. Evans, A Collection of Statutes with the General Administration of the 
Law (London: 1836) 117; and D. Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century (London: 
Hambledon Press, 1998) 21. 
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under this act in 1829, increasing the number of petty sessional benches to twenty and 
consequently reducing the area contained within a single division.253  
It is hard to establish how far this reorganisation of the divisions impacted on the 
administration of the law. Criminal convictions in the period had risen by 72 per cent 
between 1820 and 1831; there was a marked increase in committals from 495 to 675 per 
annum between 1828 and 1829, and rates thereafter remained comparatively stable until 
at least 1833.254 There was little suggestion that the increase in committals was due to 
advances in the detection and apprehension of criminals; certainly commentators like 
Phelips did not see the increase in committals as proof of improved law enforcement, and 
correspondence to the county clerk pointed to continued problems in the organisation of 
the magistracy. The number of Somerset hundreds without a resident magistrate had 
increased by 1830 (figure 6, above), including the consistently under-provisioned district 
of Bedminster. In July that year, some of the acting justices for the division wrote to the 
clerk of the peace requesting more ‘efficient’ justices be entered into the commission. 
The division encompassed an area with a population of 25,000 by this point, ostensibly 
served by only six justices, but, as the correspondents complained, of the six, four were 
particularly aged and infirm and the other two were frequently absent from their 
residences.255 
 
Figure 12. Justices at Somerset Sessions 1790-1832 
Sessions Venue No. JPs sitting 
regularly 
No. Local JPs 
Bridgwater 27 9 
Taunton 26 8 
Wells 35 2 
Regularity = attending more than a third of the sessions in the sample. Local = resident in the same or 
adjacent hundred 
 
The arrangement of quarter sessions in Somerset did not tend towards a model of 
localised justice as in Norfolk. In comparison to the numbers sitting on each Norfolk 
bench, almost twice as many magistrates sat regularly at each Somerset sessions location 
                                                
253 SRO: Q/C/5/2-3 correspondence regarding reform of petty session divisions 1829; DD/SAS/C2402/37, 
map of petty session divisions, 1831. 
254 PP: 1828 (545) Report from the Select Committee on Criminal Commitments and Convictions. 
255 Q/JCP/7 Justices of the Bedminster Division to Edward Coles, 9 July.1830 
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(figures 12 and 10 above). The majority of these men were also active in making 
committals away from the county bench.256 There is, however, no pattern to indicate that 
certain meetings were exclusive to particular groupings of magistrates, or indeed that 
local justices dominated individual sessions. Only 12 of the 59 magistrates included in 
the sample sat in one sessions location and no other; of those, only six could be 
considered local men. The vast majority of justices sat at two, if not all three sessions 
locations. Six magistrates in particular distinguished themselves by sitting at more than 
half of all sessions at each location.257 The arrangement of the Somerset sessions, 
confined to three regular and seasonal locations in significant borough towns, therefore 
enabled the sessions to work as loci for county government, rather than centres of local 
administration.  
 
3.3 Structures of Government: The Boroughs 
 
The testimony of John Phelips to the select committee on criminal commitments and 
convictions in 1828 indicated that the county commission could expect little support from 
the overburdened justices of the city of Bath.258 Somerset had eight other boroughs, 
several of which had their own benches; Norfolk had five incorporated towns including 
the ports of Kings Lynn and Great Yarmouth. How far did the boroughs offer an 
alternative source of justice? Each of the incorporated towns had their own judicial 
arrangements and consequently, very different relationships to the county magistracy. 
Until 1792, there were ten borough towns in Somerset; five had their own bench 
and courts of quarter sessions, served by justices derived from the officers of the 
corporation, usually the mayor, the recorder and other members of the borough 
government. Yeovil, Chard and Ilchester had no corporate magistrates or courts; and at 
Langport, although the Portreeve and Recorder were justices (with one other appointed), 
                                                
256 Committal sample cross-referenced with JPs sitting regularly at quarter sessions. SRO: Q/RCC/bundle 
1790-99; Registers of prisoners: Q/AGI/14, Ilchester Gaol; Q/AGS/14 Shepton Mallet Gaol; Q/AGW/14 
Williton gaol; Q/SO 16-21. 
257 SRO: Q/SO 16-21; Appendix 3, below, chapter 2.4 
258 PP: 1828 (545) Report from the Select Committee on Criminal Commitments and Convictions, 47; see 
above. 
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they were not empowered to hold sessions.259 Borough sessions could be convened at 
Axbridge, Bridgwater, Wells, Glastonbury and Bath. All the borough courts – apart from 
Bridgwater – were restricted to the trial of misdemeanours. Whilst the Bridgwater 
sessions could prosecute felons, it was limited in practice (in the same manner as the 
county quarter sessions) to passing a maximum sentence of seven years transportation.260 
At Axbridge the borough court met infrequently, and no trials were held at 
Glastonbury, so all cases were referred to the county quarter sessions. Similarly, while 
the court was convened at Wells, and the jury called, no cases were heard. As a matter of 
convenience, all cases that could not be agreed out of court were sent to the county 
sessions, which were held in the city twice a year. Although all cases were left to the 
county courts, the corporate justices at Axbridge and Glastonbury had exclusive 
jurisdiction within the borough. The bench at Axbridge, it was reported, ‘resisted the 
execution of a warrant of a county magistrate unless backed by one of themselves’. 
Likewise, at Glastonbury no ‘interference’ from the county justices was tolerated in the 
committal of offenders within the town. A similar situation persisted at Bath, whereby a 
county justice had to have the support of a member of the corporate bench to arrest a 
felon within the city.261  
Conversely, the county commission had concurrent jurisdiction with the borough 
JPs at Wells, and sole responsibility for the administration of judicial matters at Taunton 
from 1792. Taunton was a parliamentary borough, and until its charter was forfeit that 
year through the town’s failure to renew its corporate body, the mayor, recorder and 
aldermen were empowered to act as justices. However, a clause added to the town’s 
original charter (d. 1627) at the Restoration, provided for six ‘adjunct’ or ‘supplementary’ 
county magistrates to act within the borough under special commission, with equal 
jurisdiction to the corporate bench. According to the town’s historian, Toulmin, this 
amendment acted as a check on the Corporation, whose ‘zeal in the cause of the 
                                                
259 PP: 1831-2 (39) Justices of the peace. A return of the number of all the justices in each county, city and 
town in England and Wales; House of Commons Accounts and Papers, Relating to Corporate Officers and 
Charitable Funds, Session Feb-Aug. (1834) vol. XLV; Appendix to the First Report of the Royal 
Commission on Municipal Corporations (1835); below, note 196. 
260 1835 Appendix to the First Report of the Royal Commission on Municipal Corporations, report of the 
Southern circuit from p. 1077. 
261 Ibid, Axbridge, 1094, Bath, 1114, Glastonbury, 1286. 
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Commonwealth’ incurred the ‘disgust and suspicion’ of Charles II.262 In 1810, an attempt 
was made to revive the corporation by some of the town’s inhabitants. Part of their 
petition to the Crown, cited the lack of available justices as cause for the town’s charter 
to be reinstated:  
‘That this populous town is indebted for the administration of justice to the occasional, and as it 
may be, casual aid of county magistrates; and such a magistracy from its want of locality and 
super-intending eye, is not so adequate to the police and internal order of the town, as a bench 
of resident magistrates exclusively for the attainment of these desirable objects’. 
 
The petition went on to rehearse the same problems of inadequate distribution and 
inactivity detailed in correspondence to the clerk of the county commission: 
‘That this town may, by the death, change of residence, or declining to act of the neighbouring 
county magistrates, or by a reluctance to public situation in any men who might be looked to as 
the successors of the now acting magistrates, be placed in the possible predicament of having no 
bench at all; or, of being so far from justice, as to be in a state of comparative prohibition to its 
benefits – an evil against which it is the duty of the town to endeavour to indemnify itself.’263 
 
The petition was ultimately rejected, but the lack of local justices was recognised: a new 
commission of the peace for the county was issued in 1814, and several men from the 
neighbourhood were entered into to it, providing an alternative to the constitution of a 
new corporate body.264 
In many respects, rather than the boroughs providing an alternative source of justice 
in Somerset, they added to the business of the county commission, either through their 
dependence on the county quarter sessions, or the justices themselves. Indeed, the 
frequency with which the county magistrates convened petty sessions in divisions 
surrounding towns highlights the level of business created in urban areas. For instance, in 
addition to the daily sittings in Bath Forum, the county justices met twice a week or 
weekly for Bridgwater, Taunton and the surrounding hundred of Taunton Dean, and 
Wells and Glastonbury, whereas the majority of divisions met fortnightly or monthly.265 
However there are clear indications that the borough corporations were also 
frustrated by these jurisdictional arrangements. The inability of the city magistrates to try 
                                                
262 Toulmin, The History of the Town of Taunton in the County of Somerset. first edition, (Taunton: T. 
Norris, 1791), 60-2, and second edition, (Taunton: John Poole, 1822), 283-7. 
263 Toulmin, The History of the Town of Taunton (1822), 289-90. 
264 Ibid, 293-5; SRO: Q/JC/120-1 commission of the peace, 1814. 
265 SRO: Q/C/3/7, Correspondence from Justices Clerks listing local magistrates and frequency of their 
meetings, 1819. 
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felonies at Bath was considered an ‘evil of serious importance’. Sending what were 
considered ‘the most trifling’ cases of larceny to the county courts for example, required 
between 18 and 50 miles travel from Bath (depending on where the court was sitting) and 
incurred significant costs for the prosecutor. It was suggested that the expense and 
inconvenience of prosecution had a ‘material effect in adding to the impunity of 
offenders.’266 The Glastonbury justices also cited the problem of access to courts at a 
distance from some settlements, highlighting the important role they provided to the local 
populace in ‘ordinary matters’. Although the borough bench did not rule in criminal 
cases, for local administration they served individuals from the surrounding parishes, 
who would otherwise have the expense of travelling to the petty sessions at Wells.267 
Where the boroughs were dependent on the county magistracy, they had to contend 
with the associated problems of consistent service. Echoing the petitioners at Taunton, 
the report on the condition of the borough of Chard in 1835 stated, that while the 
residence of two justices was more than adequate for the time-being, ‘the existence of 
county magistrates near any particular spot is not with any degree of certainty to be 
calculated upon.’268 
 
A more straightforward relationship existed between the county and borough benches in 
Norfolk; little evidence of jurisdictional clashes was cited in reports to government at 
least. The arrangement of the different benches replicated, to a degree, the relative 
insularity of the five county benches. Norfolk had five incorporated towns: Castle Rising, 
Kings Lynn, Norwich, Thetford and Great Yarmouth; each had its own magistracy, 
generally comprised of the Mayor, Recorder, and any Alderman who had held the office 
of Mayor.269 Thetford’s bench was organised slightly differently: including the mayor, 
recorder and ‘others nominated by the King’s commission’; this was usually only one 
                                                
266 First Report of the Royal Commission on Municipal Corporations (1835), 3110. 
267 Ibid, 1285. 
268 Ibid, 1242. 
269 PP: 1831-2 (39)Justices of the peace. A return of the number of all the justices in each county, city and 
town in England and Wales; House of Commons Accounts and Papers, Relating to Corporate Officers and 
Charitable Funds, Session Feb-Aug. (1834) vol. XLV; Appendix to the First Report of the Royal 
Commission on Municipal Corporations (1835), Eastern Circuit, from p. 2081. 
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additional gentleman, often the coroner or one of the burgesses.270 At Yarmouth, the High 
Steward also served as a justice alongside the Mayor and Recorder.271 
The corporate benches at Norwich, Kings Lynn and Yarmouth had exclusive 
authority within their respective boroughs. There was little need for a shared jurisdiction 
with the county magistracy as each corporation convened its own court of quarter 
sessions, which were empowered to try all felonies - although capital convictions were 
rare. The corporation at Thetford was also commissioned to try felons at the borough 
sessions, but the low number of prisoners, it was reported, meant that the court met 
infrequently, sitting only two or three times a year.272 
Castle Rising was the only borough where the county justices had concurrent 
jurisdiction. The town of c. 250-350 inhabitants generated little business, no courts for 
the trial of prisoners were called, and petty sessions met approximately once a quarter as 
required. All criminal matters were thus referred to the county courts.273  
 
In both counties, the distance between the borough and county magistracy was 
compounded by their respective membership, with little overlap between the personnel of 
the borough benches and the county justices. In Somerset, only 20 per cent of borough 
magistrates were also members of the county commission of the peace, and only half of 
those were active at the county quarter sessions (figure 13, below). A similar percentage 
of borough magistrates, 19 per cent, were also members of the Norfolk commission of the 
peace. But, of those that were members of the county commission, only four per cent 
were active at the county sessions, comprising just two of thirty justices recorded for 
Yarmouth and only one for Norwich (figure 14, below). 
 
 
                                                
2701835 Appendix to the First Report of the Royal Commission on Municipal Corporations, 2543. 
271 H. Barrett, A report of the investigation before his majesty’s Municipal Commissioners J. G. Hogg and 
J. Buckle Esqrs, Barristers at Law, appointed to examine into and report on the Corporate Affairs of this 
Borough (Yarmouth: 1834), 100-2. 
272 1835 Appendix to the First Report of the Royal Commission on Municipal Corporations, 2401, 2466, 
2543; H. Swinden, The History and Antiquities of the Ancient Burgh of Great Yarmouth in the county of 
Norfolk (Norwich: 1772) 788-90. 
273 1835 Appendix to the First Report of the Royal Commission on Municipal Corporations, 2211. 
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Figure 13. Borough Magistrates in Somerset, c.1812-1833274 
 
Borough 
Number of 
corporate 
JPs per 
Borough 
Total in sample  
(c. 1812-1833) 
Members of 
County 
Commission 
Active at County 
Sessions 
Axbridge 3 17 2 1 
Bath 12 29 11 4 
Bridgwater 4 19 3 3 
Glastonbury 3 15 2 1 
Wells 3 16 2 1 
 
Total 25 96 20 10 
 
Figure 14. Borough Magistrates in Norfolk c. 1812-1833275 
 
Borough 
Number of 
corporate 
JPs per 
Borough 
Total in sample 
(c. 1812-1833) 
Members of 
County 
Commission 
Active at County 
Sessions 
Lynn Regis 3+ 14 4 0 
Norwich 3+ 26 6 1 
Thetford 3 9 0 0 
Yarmouth 3+ 30 5 2 
Total 12+ 79 15 3 
 
The different qualification requirements for the office of a borough justice meant that the 
corporate benches were drawn from a broader demographic than the county commissions. 
There was no property qualification based on land or personal wealth; a municipal justice 
only needed to be resident, or own a house or trade premises in the borough.276 Unlike a 
county magistrate, there was no expectation that he would relinquish his business 
interests in order to serve.277  
 
                                                
274 PP: 1831-2 (39)Justices of the peace. A return of the number of all the justices in each county, city and 
town in England and Wales; House of Commons Accounts and Papers, Relating to Corporate Officers and 
Charitable Funds, Session Feb-Aug. (1834) vol. XLV; 1835 Appendix to the First Report of the Royal 
Commission on Municipal Corporations; SRO: Q/JC 119-124 commission of the peace. 
275 1831-2 (39) Justices of the peace. A return of the number of all the justices in each county, city and 
town in England and Wales; House of Commons Accounts and Papers, Relating to Corporate Officers and 
Charitable Funds, Session Feb-Aug. (1834) vol. XLV; NRO: C/Sda 1/15-18 Commission of the Peace. 
276 Bentley, English Criminal Justice in the Nineteenth Century, 21; see also chapter 1. 
277 Below: 2.4. 
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Figure 15. Occupation of Borough Justices 
 
 Gentlemen Professional Trade/other Total 
Somerset 35 (36%) 36 (38%) 25 (26%) 96 
Norfolk 9 (11%) 26 (33%) 44 (56%) 79 
Professional = legal, medical, military or clerical occupations 
 
In Somerset, the borough benches included curriers, malsters, a bookseller, and a linen 
draper. In Norfolk, shopkeepers, a printer, a farmer and a schoolmaster were amongst the 
corporate justices.278 The various occupations reflected the local economies of each 
borough: consequently Lynn’s bench (Norfolk) was dominated by mercantile interests, 
while at Bath, almost half of the borough magistrates were doctors, surgeons or 
apothecaries. As a fashionable resort, the City bench was also populated by 14 of the total 
35 gentlemen across the county who served as corporate justices. In the main however, 
members of the gentry, or those who represented themselves as of independent means did 
not dominate borough government (see figure 15).279 
 
* * * 
 
Although distinct in terms of their membership, the organisation of the borough benches 
in both Somerset and Norfolk impacted on the operation of county government. 
Norfolk’s boroughs bolstered the system of localised authority through their ability to 
rule without recourse to the county magistracy. In conjunction with the patterns 
established in the committal returns for Norfolk, the insularity of the county sessions 
benches points to the predominance of local judicial cliques. Local government in 
Norfolk, therefore, continued to be administered by men who had physical connections to 
the communities over which they presided.  
 The mapping of judicial residence and activity in Somerset outlined an uneven, 
and potentially over-stretched system of justice. Larger judicial divisions supported the 
need for the county magistrates to work over a greater area, to cover those regions 
                                                
278 PP: House of Commons Accounts and Papers, Relating to Corporate Officers and Charitable Funds, 
Session Feb-Aug. 1834, vol. XLV: at Bath, Wells, Axbridge, Bridgwater and Wells respectively; Thetford, 
and Norwich. 
279 Ibid. 
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without a resident JP. While the Somerset commission responded to the uneven 
distribution of magistrates by reducing the size of petty sessional divisions, and therefore 
increasing the number of summary court benches, the correspondence to the clerk of the 
peace confirms the persistent difficulties faced in managing the availability of active 
justices. The distance a magistrate would have to travel, infirmity, absenteeism, and a 
want of suitable candidates for the commission, exacerbated the problems attending the 
growth of Somerset’s population, particularly in its urban centres. The complexity of 
juridical arrangements in Somerset boroughs, further frustrated the administration of 
justice.  
 
4. The Social Composition of the Magistracy 
 
As the case studies of Norfolk and Somerset confirm, the pressures placed on the county 
commissions of the peace by population growth and increasing administrative duties, 
necessitated an expansion of their membership. The lowering of the property 
qualification in 1731 facilitated this expansion, but, it has been argued, it also encouraged 
the entry of men who lacked the economic and social connections to their communities 
that were traditionally associated with the magistracy, consequently altering the nature of 
county government. Landau, in particular, has highlighted this shift in the social 
composition of the magistracy as a significant factor in the decline of paternalist 
governance: ‘mere gentlemen, individuals not obviously tied to their communities by 
family background, a tradition of local leadership, or landed estate, emphasized the 
distance between governors and the communities they governed.’280 
The inclusion of increasing numbers of clergymen in the commissions of the peace 
constituted part of this change. The clergy were deemed suitable to serve as justices as 
men of education, more frequently resident in their communities than their lay 
colleagues, and arguably, more ‘conscientious attenders to magisterial duty’. However, 
the clerical justice became the target of popular resentment: by allying himself with the 
interests of government and assuming the office of a justice, he was perceived to have 
                                                
280 Landau, The Justices of the Peace, 318; see also chapter 1. 
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distanced himself from the interests of his ‘flock’.281 Their entry and poor reputation has 
compounded the sense that the gentry were shying away from their governmental and 
paternal responsibilities. However, Laurence Stone argued, that the tumultuous final 
years of the eighteenth century saw an increase in magisterial activity and the resurgence 
of the gentry in local government in the first decades of the nineteenth century.282 
Eastwood’s study of the Oxfordshire bench offers a more nuanced analysis of the 
changing composition of the magistracy. Emphasising the socio-political values shared 
by the clergy and the gentry, Eastwood sees the inclusion of clerical justices as a means 
of perpetuating the gentle character of the county judiciary. Any lasting change, he 
argued, was in the decline of the aristocracy among active justices, rather than a 
repudiation of local government by the gentry as a whole.283 
The social composition of the Norfolk and Somerset magistracy, follow in part the 
trends identified by Landau, Stone and Eastwood. The gentry continued to dominate the 
county commissions of the peace, although the activity of aristocratic justices (those with 
titles from baronetcies and above) declined (see figures 17 and 20 below). However, the 
expansion of the commission membership in both counties saw the inclusion of men who 
had no prior connection to local government, and who, perhaps, lacked the social and 
political influence associated with the county elites. But the evidence is ambiguous when 
considering how far these changes challenged adherence to traditional forms of 
government. The perpetuation of values and ideals underpinning the conception of the 
paternalist gentleman justice persisted in both counties. 
 
4.1 Norfolk 
 
Throughout the period, the gentry continued in the majority in the Norfolk commission, 
forming between 60 and 70 per cent of its total membership (figure 16 below). Likewise, 
they constituted around 60 per cent of qualified justices. There was however, a marked 
change in the inclusion of clerical justices by 1830. In 1798, the clergy accounted for 17 
per cent of the commission’s total membership, and less than a quarter of qualified 
                                                
281 E. Evans, ‘Some Reasons for the Growth of Anti-Clericalism c. 1750-c.1830, Past & Present, 66, 
(1975):, 101-103; Landau, Justices, 141-3. 
282 L. Stone, An Open Elite? England 1540-1880 (Oxford: Clarenden, 1984), 275. 
283 Eastwood, Governing Rural England, 79, see also 76; see also chapter 1. 
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justices. Despite the significant number of unclassified members from that list, the 
numbers of those most active at quarter sessions (figure 17 below) confirms that the 
clerical justices were a minority amongst the Norfolk magistracy at the end of the 
eighteenth century. 
 
Figure 16 Social Composition of the Commission of the Peace: Norfolk284 
 
Year 
Gentry 
listed in 
Commission 
Qualified 
gentry 
Clergy listed 
in 
Commission 
Qualified 
clergy 
Unclassified in 
Commission 
(total 
membership) 
1798 157 (55%) 44 (62%) 50 (17%) 15 (21%) 78 (27%) 
1811 199 (71%) 84 (66%) 77 (28%) 42 (33%) 3 (1%) 
1820 175 (66%) 92 (62%) 83 (31%) 51 (34%) 9 (3%) 
1824 185 (59%) 88 (56%) 114 (36%) 59 (38%) 17 (5%) 
1830 241 (61%) 99 (56%) 138 (35%) 71 (40%) 16 (4%) 
Gentry = all gentleman including titled aristocracy unless indicated 
 
Thereafter, the number of clerical members increased with each new commission. By 
1830, the proportion of qualified clerical magistrates had almost doubled. Although the 
number of gentleman entered in the commission increased from 1820, and most notably 
in 1830, this increase did not stimulate a concomitant upturn in the proportion of 
qualified gentleman justices. 
 
Figure 17 Social Composition of those most active at Quarter Sessions: Norfolk285  
 
Period Aristocracy Gentry Clergy 
1790-1815 4 (17%) 17 (74%) 2 (9%) 
1816-1830 1 (4%) 16 (70%) 6 (26%) 
Aristocracy = baronet and above; gentry = gentlemen without title; clergy = all clerics including holders of 
ecclesiastical offices 
 
At the county sessions however, the gentry remained firmly in the majority, constituting 
more than 70 per cent of the most active magistrates (figure 17). Only two of the clerical 
                                                
284 NRO: C/Sda 14-18; TNA: C220/9 8 and 9. 
285 Most active assessed as justices presiding at more than half of the sessions included in the sample; NRO: 
C/Sda 14-18; C/S 1 MF 657-660; TNA: C220/9 8 and 9. 
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justices in the commission presided at more than half the sessions in this sample between 
1790 and 1815. But after this point, the change in commission membership was manifest 
on the bench: clerical justices subsequently accounted for just over a quarter of the most 
active magistrates. The increase in clerical magistrates confirms that a change in 
personnel was needed to supplement commission membership as it expanded, but 
gentlemen continued to dominate at the county sessions. A more detailed consideration of 
the nature of both the gentlemen and clerics on the bench offers a more nuanced picture 
of how far the social composition of the Norfolk magistracy was changing. 
The assessment of the status of gentlemen has benefited from an unusual source: a 
map produced in 1787 for Thomas Coke of Holkham, by his friend Humphry Repton, 
most famous for his work as a landscape gardener. The map detailed the location of all 
the gentlemen in the county with an annual of income of more than £1,000, who could 
influence more than twenty voters in each Hundred.286 Of those named on Repton’s map, 
23 individuals, or members of those families cited, were also those most active at the 
county quarter sessions between 1790 and 1830 (below, figure 18). 
 
Figure 18 Indications of Social Status: Norfolk287 
 
Status criteria No. JPs 1790-
1815 
No. JPs 1816-
1830 
Total no. JPs 
1790-1830 
Included on Repton’s 
map 17 (80%) 6 (36%) 23 (66%) 
In county history 19 (90%) 16 (100%) 33 (94%) 
Seat in county history 12 (57%) 10 (63%) 22 (63%) 
Family in commission 15 (71%) 12 (75%) 27 (77%) 
County office holder 8 (38%) 4 (25%) 12 (34%) 
National office holder 0 1  1  
Total not in any category 2 (10%) 0 2 (6%) 
Total in 4 or more 
categories 5 (23%) 2 (13%) 7 (20%) 
Total JPs in sample 21 16 35 
                                                
286 Map reproduced in S. Daniels, Humphry Repton: Landscape Gardening and the Geography of Georgian 
England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Wade Martin, Norfolk: A Changing Countryside, 23. 
287 J. Burke, A Genealogical and Heraldic Dictionary of the Peerage and Baronetage of the British Empire 
(London: Henry Coleburn, 1838) [hereafter Burke’s Peerage]; J. Matchett, The Norfolk and Norwich 
remembrancer and vade-mecum (Norwich: Matchett and Stevenson, 1822); White, History of Norfolk 
(1836); Al. Cant.; Al. Oxon; R. Thorne (ed) The History of Parliament: the House of Commons 1790-1820 
(1986) www.historyofparliamentonline.org. 
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The vast majority (94 per cent) of the most active gentlemen justices in this period were 
likewise of significant enough social standing to be included in contemporary county 
histories, and more than 70 per cent had family members in the commission. Coupled 
with the localised organisation of judicial activity detailed above, these factors indicate 
that - in the main - the most active of the Norfolk justices were those who retained 
connections to their communities via residence, reputation and kinship. 
There is however a contraction in the number of the influential families featured on 
Reptons map, active at sessions after 1816. But those who acted in their stead were not 
necessarily men lacking in status or local connection: the proportion of justices with 
family in the commission had increased, and all of the justices in the sample were noted 
by county historians. Only four gentlemen in the later period had no prior connection to 
the commission. 
 
That Norfolk upheld traditional configurations of government, particularly at the 
beginning of the period, is evident in the delineation of the quorum in the commission 
lists until 1811, and, in the lack of clerical justices active at Sessions. Landau has argued 
that the adoption of alphabetized lists in the first half of the eighteenth century signalled a 
move to a more homogenous conception of county government, less concerned with 
status and rank; but in Norfolk, this distinction was preserved. Likewise, she has 
emphasised that magistrates took care in choosing with whom they acted, as this public 
manifestation of justice signalled particular social and political connections, and 
promoted a particular image of government.288 
Between 1790 and 1815, the two clerical magistrates acting most frequently at 
sessions were men tied to the county gentry by inheritance, social attachment and 
patronage. The Reverends Dixon Hoste and Charles Collyer were the only clerical 
justices active at quarter sessions between 1790 and 1800, and the most active thereafter 
until 1816.289 Both men were members of families named on Repton’s map in 1787. 
Hoste was from an established county family and was closely associated with Thomas 
Coke in the 1780s. Unable to sustain himself as a gentleman of independent means, he 
                                                
288 NRO: C/Sda 14-15; Landau, Justices of the Peace, 136, 275. 
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took holy orders and was patronised by Coke, serving the benefice of Tittleshall with 
Godwick until his death in 1826.290 Collyer was a man of independent property, owning 
his living at Gunthorpe. His income was augmented by his presentation to the rectories of 
Thornage, and latterly Cley, which he held in plurality with Gunthorpe. His respective 
patrons were Sir Jacob Henry Astley, and Mr. John Winn Thomlinson, both of whom he 
acted with regularly at the Holt quarter sessions.291 The gentle background and 
associations of Hoste and Collyer may well explain their inclusion on the bench in the 
absence of other clerical justices: their presence did not indicate any dilution of gentry 
government, as they were both intimately connected to it. 
 
‘New’ gentlemen and clerics acting from 1816 may have lacked connection to county 
government via patronage or kinship, but in the main they were men strongly associated 
with the county - most frequently via residence, but also by office and social connection.  
Two of the four gentlemen without antecedents on the bench, who sat most 
regularly at sessions from 1816, were nonetheless from Norfolk families. Originally from 
Nottinghamshire, Robert Plumptre’s family was established at Norwich with his father’s 
appointment as a prebendary of the Cathedral in 1756. Plumptre was a barrister and 
continued to reside in the city; he also served as Lieutenant Colonel in the Norwich 
Volunteers. He was the second most active justice on the Norwich bench.292 Dennis 
Gunton, also a newcomer to the commission, was from an old county family, who had 
been freeholders at Bodham and Matlaske in the north of the county from at least 1734. 
In 1836, Gunton was the chief landowner in Matlaske, owning the majority of the 500 
acre parish. He presided at approximately two thirds of the sessions convened at Holt.293 
The two remaining gentleman newcomers, Theophilus Buckworth and Thomas 
Hoseason, were not natives of the county, but had purchased estates in west Norfolk. 
Buckworth was the son of a Lincolnshire gentleman and settled in Cockley Cley by 1824; 
subsequently, he served as High Sheriff of the county in 1845.294 Aside from his position 
                                                
290 CCEd, ID: 113572; T. Pocock, Remember Nelson: The Life of Sir William Hoste (Glasgow: William 
Collins Sons Ltd, 1977, this edition, Barnsley: Pen and Sword Books, 2005), 21-7, 238, 243. 
291 CCEd, ID: 112306; see Appendix 3. 
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as an incomer, Hoseason is notable as the only Norfolk magistrate encountered in this 
study to be brought before the court of King’s Bench for judicial misconduct. In 1811, he 
was charged with ruling in his own cause, having one of the labourers on his estate 
imprisoned at hard labour and whipped for refusing to work during his dinner hour. Aside 
from the rarity of such a case, it reveals much about Hoseason’s entry into the 
commission of the peace, and the nature of relationships within it.295 
According to his defence, Hoseason was unable to refer the case to another of the 
three justices in the district as they were all absent from their homes. Indeed, Hoseason’s 
inclusion in the Norfolk commission was in response to the relative lack of justices in the 
far western division of the county. Until his qualification in 1810, the hundred of 
Freebridge Marshland had two ‘resident’ justices, Rev. John Cross Morphew of Walpole 
St Peter, and Admiral William Bentinck, lord of the manor of Terrington St Clement; but 
Bentinck only made short (albeit frequent) visits to his estates, and Morphew held his 
living in plurality with the rectory of Cley-next-the-Sea, some forty miles away. 
Hoseason’s qualification as a justice, along with Sir Anthony Snape Hamond in 1811, 
doubled the provision of magistrates in the hundred.296  
Rev. Morphew’s testimony to the King’s Bench confirmed both the insularity of the 
Norfolk judicial divisions but also the difficulties in maintaining order over a 
considerable distance. It was customary that he and Bentinck ‘acted to transact the whole 
business of Marshland within Marshland’, often receiving complainants in their own 
homes. But the two justices served a district extending over some 70,000 acres, and in 
consequence of the ‘growing ill behaviour of servants’ were frequently ‘obliged to inflict 
exemplary punishment to deter others from following such bad examples.’297 
Hoseason’s connection to his fellow magistrates at Marshland proved vital in the 
light handling of his case by the court. Hamond, Bentinck and Morphew all testified to 
                                                
295 TNA: KB 1/37/1 Michaelmas 1811, bundle 111; Law Report, The Times, 14 and 28 Nov. 1811, Ipswich 
Journal 30 Nov. 1811; D. Hay, ‘Patronage, Paternalism and Welfare: Masters, Workers, and Magistrates in 
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his good character, his humanity, honesty and independence ‘both as a Man and as a 
Magistrate.’298 Weight was lent to their evidence through the longevity of their 
acquaintance. Prior to settling in Norfolk, Hoseason was a purser to the Royal Navy, and 
the Naval agent in Madras in the early 1800s. His service coincided with Hamond’s 
tenure as head of the Navy Board and Bentinck’s governorship of Madras between 1803 
and 1807. Bentinck, who actively sought new speculative investors to the west Norfolk 
marshlands from c. 1809, may well have encouraged Hoseason’s acquisition of land in 
the area before 1810.299 Certainly Hamond emphasised that he had known Hoseason for 
more than twenty years and had acted with him on several occasions.300  
Confirmation from the three justices that they would have meted out the same 
punishment as Hoseason was used by the Lord Chief Justice to conclude the proceedings 
against him, preventing the disgrace of a public trial, and only inconveniencing Hoseason 
with the costs of the case.301 He continued to involve himself in county society as a 
driving force in the development of the Eau Brink Cut at Lynn - alongside Bentinck - and 
as a prominent figure at county meetings.302 Both Hoseason, and latterly Buckworth, 
continued as two of the most active magistrates at sessions until at least 1830.303 
 
From 1816, six clerical magistrates (including Charles Collyer) distinguished themselves 
as amongst the most active justices of the Norfolk bench (figure 17, above). Rev. Dr. 
Wenman H. Langton, rector of Warham and Rev. Robert Norris, rector of Tatterford, had 
connection with county society and the commission via their respective patrons: Thomas 
Coke, and Sir George Chad of Thursford. Langton had also served as Chaplain to the 
Prince of Wales from 1800.304 The vicar of Swaffham, William Yonge, also boasted 
significant regional connections but with the county’s ecclesiastical establishment: he 
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was the son of the Bishop of Norwich, and served as the Chancellor of the Diocese from 
1782-1814.305 
Only Rev. Benjamin Parke of Tilney All Saints and Rev. Dr. Peter Sandiford of 
Fulmodeston, had no discernable familial or social ties to the county.306 Despite their 
apparent lack of connection, Sandiford and Parke served their local sessions with great 
regularity. Benjamin Parke sat at more than three-quarters of the Kings Lynn sessions 
between 1815 and 1825. Peter Sandiford, acted alongside Langton and Norris, and 
together they were the three most active justices sitting at Little Walsingham, dominating 
proceedings there between 1816 and 1830.307 
The most active justice throughout the period was John Thurlow Dering, who was 
likewise not a Norfolk man. He sat at virtually every session included in this sample for 
Kings Lynn and Swaffham, the two courts closest to his residence at Crow Hall. But 
Dering was from an established gentry family in Kent and had inherited his residence in 
West Norfolk. He nonetheless embedded himself in county society, forging ties with 
other more established families in the commission through his service as Captain of the 
Clackclose troop of Yeomanry, and through the marriage of his daughter Mary Anne to 
one of the Lee Warners of Little Walsingham and Dereham in 1819.308 Subsequently, 
Dering and his son in law acted together on more than one occasion.309 
 
Any change in personnel amongst the Norfolk magistracy did little to detract from its 
traditional form. Newcomers were of significant social standing and local connection, 
either via their own families, or through networks of kinship and patronage. They were 
still men ‘tied to their communities’, and to one another. Indeed, the inclusion of 
clergymen, and ‘new’ gentlemen into the Norfolk commission bolstered the system of 
localised justice. Between 1790 and 1815, 65 per cent of the most active justices were 
local to the sessions bench over which they presided. From 1816, this figure had 
                                                
305 CCEd ID: 1136; Alumni Cant. 
306 CCEd Parke ID: 18240, Sandiford ID: 89395 
307 Appendix 3. 
308 Jackson’s Oxford Journal, 24 December 1819; Harvey, Records of the Norfolk Yeomanry Cavalry 
(1908). 
309 NRO: C/S 1/14-21 MF 657-660 
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increased to 88 per cent. Each sessions, bar the Norwich bench, was dominated by the 
presence of local men.310 
 
4.2 Somerset 
 
Figure 19 Social Composition of the Commission of the Peace: Somerset311 
 
Year 
Gentry 
listed in 
Commission 
Qualified 
gentry 
Clergy listed 
in 
Commission 
Qualified 
clergy 
Unclassified 
in 
Commission 
(total 
membership) 
1794 296 (76%) 55 (63%) 96 (24%) 32 (37%) 0 
1814 334 (71%) 108 (60%)  138 (29%) 73 (40%) 0 
1820 278 (70%) 113 (62%) 120 (30%) 68 (38%) 0 
1828 170 (64%) 91 (60%) 95 (36%) 60 (40%)  0 
1830 221 (75%) 103 (70%) 75 (25%) 45 (30%) 0 
Gentry = all gentleman including titled aristocracy unless indicated 
 
Unlike Norfolk, clerical justices were a more established group within the Somerset 
commission of the peace from 1794 (figure 19). As a proportion of qualified magistrates, 
they accounted for c. 40 per cent until 1828. In 1830 however, their number contracted 
significantly, as both a proportion of the total membership and qualified justices. At the 
same time, the number of gentlemen increased sharply. 
In terms of those most active at the county sessions, the social composition of the 
bench followed that of the commission (figure 20, below): while the gentry formed the 
majority, clerical justices accounted for 24 per cent, increasing to almost 40 per cent, of 
men most regularly presiding at sessions. The increase in the activity of clerical 
magistrates after 1815 points to their utility at a time when available magistrates were 
few, and their distribution uneven. 
 
 
                                                
310 Sample of justices presiding at more than half of the sessions in the sample; all justices in the sample, 
for the four benches excluding Norwich, were local men, ie. resident in the Hundred where the sessions 
were held, or in the adjacent hundred; Appendix 3. 
311 SRO: Q/JC/119-124; TNA: C220/9 8 and 9. 
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Figure 20 Social Composition of those most active at Quarter Sessions: Somerset312 
 
Period 
Aristocracy 
Gentry Clergy 
1790-1815 
2 (8%) 17 (68%) 6 (24%) 
1816-1830 
2 (4%) 27 (57%) 18 (38%) 
1831: Jan-Oct 
4 (2%) 119 (73%) 41 (25%) 
1831: April-Oct 
0 73 (78%) 21 (22%) 
Aristocracy = baronet and above; gentry = gentlemen without title; clergy = all clerics including senior 
office holders, e.g Archdeacons 
 
The upturn in the number of gentlemen justices in 1830 (figure 19) follows the trend 
identified by Stone, signalling, as he argued, the re-engagement of the gentry with county 
government. The increase in the number of gentlemen entered in the commission in 
December 1830 appeared to have an immediate effect on the social make-up of the bench 
the following year (figure 20), when the gentry then accounted for more than 70 per cent 
of presiding justices. Even when the ‘unusually large’ bench sitting in the aftermath of 
the Swing disturbances in January 1831 is discounted,313 the gentry were firmly in the 
majority. 
Despite these fluctuations in the composition of the Somerset bench, a more 
thorough consideration of the status of county justices points to –as was the case in 
Norfolk – the persistence of particular values amongst the magistracy for much of the 
period. According to the same measures of status employed in the analysis of the Norfolk 
Commission, the most active gentleman JPs in Somerset before 1815, were of significant 
social standing: 95 per cent were included in Collinson’s history of the county in 1791, 
and 84 per cent had kinsmen in the commission (figure 21 below). 
 
 
 
                                                
312 Most active assessed as justices presiding at more than half of the sessions included in the sample; SRO: 
Q/SO 16-21; Q/JC/119-124; TNA: C220/9 8 and 9. 
313 Bath Chronicle 6 Jan. 1831; see also chapter 5 
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Figure 21 Indications of Social Status: Somerset314 
 
Status criteria No. JPs 1790-
1815 
No. JPs 1816-
1830 
No. JPs 1790-
1830 
In county history 18 (95%) 21 (72%) 35 (81%) 
Seat in county history 14 (74%) 18 (62%) 29 (67%) 
Family in commission 16 (84%) 17 (59%) 29 (67%) 
County office holder 8 (42%) 14 (48%) 20 (47%) 
National office holder 0 1 1 
Total not in any category 0 7 (24%) 7 (16%) 
Total in 4 or more 
categories 4 (21%) 11 (38%) 13 (30%) 
Total JPs in sample 19 29 43 
 
From 1816 however, considerably fewer men of note were active on the bench, and a 
similar decline was manifest in the proportion of men who had familial ties to county 
government. Seven of those included in the sample did not fall under any of the criteria. 
The majority of clerical justices most active in this period also lacked established 
connections with county government; only 44 per cent had family in the commission and 
even fewer were patronised by its members.315 
Both the increase of clerical justices at sessions, and the apparently declining 
status of gentlemen magistrates, support the changes in personnel making up the sessions 
benches (figure 20), confirming that the Somerset commission had to meet the deficiency 
in the number of active justices in the county by allowing ‘lesser’ men into the 
commission. Dr Malachi Blake and Thomas Poole were two such new entrants into the 
commission, who, whilst not boasting established gentry status, or familial connection to 
county government, distinguished themselves as two of the most active justices at the 
quarter sessions. Both men were included in the commission in 1814 and qualified within 
a year of their entry. Blake sat at every session after 1816, at all three sessions locations. 
Poole presided at every session convened at Bridgwater and Wells, and all save one at 
                                                
314 Collinson, History of Somerset (1791); Phelps, The History and Antiquities of Somersetshire, 4 vols. 
(London: R. B. Nichols, 1836), Burke’s Peerage (1838), Al. Cant., Al. Oxon, CCED, ODNB; R. Thorne 
(ed.), History of Parliament: the House of Commons, 1790-1820 (1986) 
www.historyofparliamentonline.org 
315 11/18 no patron in comm. SRO: QS/JC 119-124; CCED; Al. Cant; Al. Oxon. 
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Taunton .316 By their backgrounds, and occupations as a professional and a tradesman, 
they might be considered ‘lesser’ gentlemen. But both men adopted, and were 
remembered for, many of those attributes associated with the gentleman justice. 
Blake hailed from a non-conformist background. He was the consulting physician 
and treasurer at Taunton hospital and the only doctor to be acting as a justice of the peace 
in the Somerset commission.317 His entry into the commission in 1814 directly addressed 
the particular need for magistrates in the populous town of Taunton. Although Blake did 
not give up his medical practice on his qualification as a magistrate, he declined to 
continue to take fees for his services, preserving the notion of a justice as a man of 
independent means, free to act without requiring financial reward. On his death in 1843, 
he was remembered as an important local figure, ever tempering ‘justice with mercy… 
willing at all times to give the unfortunate the benefit of the doubt’. One of his fellow 
magistrates was reported to have praised his capacity to ‘keep people and parties together 
which no one else had the power of doing.’318 While the accuracy of such posthumous 
statements might be challenged, what is clear is that Blake, and his friends sought to 
attribute him with many of the characteristics of the paternal justice. 
Thomas Poole had similarly unconventional beginnings. He was a native of Nether 
Stowey where he had been apprenticed to his father’s tanning and farming business. 
Allegedly never keen on pursuing his inherited occupation, Poole turned over its 
management to an assistant in 1801, and retired to the life of a gentleman farmer. Like 
Blake, Poole was lauded for his local social initiatives: he established a Book Society in 
1793, a Female Friendly Society in 1807, and an elementary school in 1812–13.319 
Thomas De Quincey, wrote that Poole  
‘so entirely dedicated himself to the service of his humble fellow countrymen … that for 
many miles around he was the general arbiter of their disputes, the guide and counsellor of 
their daily lives’.320 
 
Prior to his entry into the commission of the peace, Poole was also noted for his 
associations with Samuel Coleridge, William Wordsworth, and the radical orator John 
                                                
316  TNA: C 220/9/9; Appendix 3. 
317 J. Toulmin, The History of the Town of Taunton (1822), 207, 212-3. 
318 R.M.M. ‘Memoir of the late Malachi Blake M.D.’ The Christian Reformer 10:63 (May 1843): 270-2. 
319 ODNB: T. W. Mayberry, ‘Thomas Poole 1766-1837’ (2004). 
320 De Quincey quoted in Ibid. 
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Thelwall. This acquaintance, coupled with the popular affection felt towards him locally, 
advanced suspicions of his radical tendencies. In 1797, a government agent, John Walsh, 
inaccurately reported that Poole was ‘a most Violent Member of the Corresponding 
Society and a strenuous supporter of Its friends’, and that he had the ‘intire [sic.] 
command’ of 150 poor men belonging to the Nether Stowey Benefit Club.321 Certainly 
Poole engaged in political debate with Coleridge, and was openly critical of the 
government of the day. During the disturbances that plagued his neighbourhood in 1801, 
Poole wrote to Coleridge describing the success of price fixing crowds ‘as a curious 
phenomenon’:  
‘we see the people doing what Government dared not do, and Government permitting them to 
do it. Is Government timid, weak or ignorant? One of the three it must be…’ 
 
But Poole was no revolutionary. He had assisted the local magistrates in negotiating 
redress of grievances during the subsistence crises.322 Subsequently, he continued to 
involve himself in the condition of the poor, taking responsibility for compiling the 
official abstracts of returns made to government regarding the maintenance of the poor in 
1804.323 Certainly Poole’s radical connections did not prevent him entering the 
commission in 1814; no doubt his philanthropic activity and local engagement 
recommended him to the role of a magistrate. Indeed, in many ways Poole was a true 
paternalist. John Thelwall described him as ‘Arcadian Pool’ - 
‘…swain of a happier age, 
When Wisdom and Refinement lov’d to dwell 
With Rustic Plainness…’324 
 
It is clear that Blake and Poole cannot be so easily categorised as either lesser gentlemen 
devoid of social authority, or as men adhering to the archetype of the gentleman justice in 
terms of social status and socio-political affiliations. What can be drawn out is their 
adherence to particular paternal ideals, which supported a more traditional understanding 
of local government. 
 
                                                
321 Ibid ODNB; M. E. Sandford, Thomas Poole and his friends (London: Macmillan and Co. 1888). 
322 Letter to Coleridge, 9 April 1801 in Sandford, Thomas Poole and His Friends, 42-43. 
323 ODNB ‘Thomas Poole’ 
324 J. Thelwall, ‘Lines, Written at Bridgwater’ Poems Chiefly Written in Retirement (Hereford: W.H. 
Parker, 1801) 131. 
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Considerations of local and social status permeated the discussions surrounding entry into 
the Somerset commission.325 Despite the lack of magistrates in the county, the 
commission’s existing membership were discerning in their recommendations, and once 
again, adherence to a more traditional conception of government is implicit. In 1822, Mr 
Hassell, resident in the distressingly under-provisioned parish of Bedminster, had been 
recommended for the commission, but his entry had been rejected. One of his neighbours, 
Richard Hart Davis, MP for Bristol, already entered into the Somerset commission and an 
acting magistrate, wrote to Edward Coles, the Clerk of the Peace, to support a 
reconsideration of Hassell’s candidacy. Davis described Hassell as a man of considerable 
fortune and ability, who had previously served as the Sheriff of Bristol. From this 
exchange, it appears that the problem with Hassell was his connection ‘with his Brothers 
in the business of a Tanner’. Davis, who had made his own fortune as a merchant, was 
happy to report that Hassell’s trade connections, being the only objection to his entry, 
would soon be removed as he intended to retire from the business. But the Lord 
Lieutenant, the Marquis of Bath, would not reconsider.326 
Captain Page had been similarly aggrieved when his name was not included in the 
1830 commission. Page felt it was a personal affront as other men of apparently lesser 
status, such as Rev. Bernard of Pilton, had been admitted and he was ‘only possessed of 
ecclesiastical property.’ In defence of Captain Page, Justice John Thring explained that he 
was a gentleman of considerable property who had resided in the county for nearly 
twenty years. Other members of the commission seemed more sceptical about Page’s 
commitment to his estates, suggesting they were merely investments that ‘he will sell 
tomorrow if he can get his price.’327  
Rev. Henry Bennett was successfully recommended to the Lord Lieutenant in 1826. 
William Dickinson (an active magistrate and member of parliament for the county) 
supported Bennett as a ‘respectable and well conducted gentleman with a landed estate of 
                                                
325 SRO: Q/JCP 3-7 Correspondence to the clerk of the peace, 1822-1830. 
326 Q/JCP/3 R. Hart Davis to E. Coles 16 Nov.1822; Marquis of Bath, copy to E. Coles 22 Nov. 1822; R. 
Thorne (ed.), History of Parliament: the House of Commons, 1790-1820 (1986), 
www.historyofparliamentonline.org 
327 Q/JCP/7 Thring to E. Coles, 10 Dec. 1830; H. Hobhouse to E. Coles, 8 Dec 1830. 
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some extent at Sparkford left him by his father’; he also highlighted Bennett’s connection 
to county government via his brother James, a magistrate residing at North Cadbury.328 
From these examples, it appears that entry into Somerset’s commission was 
predicated on independent wealth, local residence, gentlemanly conduct and connection 
to county government. Although not rigid criteria for membership, these cases serve as 
exemplars of themes repeated in the correspondence to the clerk of the peace. As was the 
case in Norfolk, they testify to the persistence of a traditional conception of the 
magistracy, which betrayed their desire to be perceived in a particular light. Likewise, as 
locality was emphasised in Norfolk, in Somerset, practical as well as prejudicial factors 
played their part: a magistrate without the need for a trade, and one who was less likely to 
abandon his estate, was more likely to act. Blake and Poole, therefore, while lacking in 
elite status perhaps, had proved themselves in their local activities and concern for the 
poor. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The expansion of the commissions of the peace of Norfolk and Somerset over the end of 
the eighteenth century, confirm trends established in other histories of the magistracy. 
The strain placed on county government by a growing population and a concomitant 
increase in poverty and crime, necessitated the inclusion of new personnel. However, the 
process of longitudinal and spatial mapping in the case studies presented here, offer 
qualifications to this process of change and the effect it had on traditional forms of local 
government. 
The different topographical, demographic and productive capacities in each county 
produced markedly different governmental arrangements. The diversity of Somerset’s 
topography was reflected in the variety of its urban and manufacturing centres. It was in 
these areas, towns like Frome and Shepton, and Taunton, and the cities of Bath and 
Bristol, where population growth was most significant and the effects of economic 
depression felt most acutely. These settlements provided the greatest cause for concern 
for local government. Over the turn of the eighteenth century, the availability of acting 
                                                
328 Q/JCP/4 W. Dickinson to E. Coles, 9 Nov. 1826 
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magistrates in Somerset was exacerbated by a decline in the number of qualified 
members of the commission and their uneven distribution across the county. It is clear 
that the judiciary struggled to keep pace with an expanding population. 
The arrangement of petty sessional divisions and the patterns established from 
records of committals, show that magistrates had to work over larger areas, comprised of 
at least two hundreds if not more. Rapidly growing districts such as Bedminster were 
consistently without a resident magistrate. In consequence, justices from neighbouring 
divisions, at some distance from the parish, had to incorporate this populous region into 
their jurisdiction. Issues regarding the impracticality of working over large distances were 
cited in the correspondence to the clerk of the peace, alongside complaints of the 
difficulty in finding fit and willing men to serve the office of a magistrate.329 Little relief 
was afforded by the borough courts in Somerset’s multiple urban centres; both the 
restrictions placed on borough benches and the vagaries surrounding shared jurisdictions 
further complicated the administration of justice. 
The problems faced by the Somerset commission of the peace had implications for 
the nature of government in the county. Increasing numbers of clerical magistrates and 
men hailing from non-traditional gentry backgrounds, were incorporated into the county 
judiciary in order to meet the deficiency in available magistrates. The location of the 
quarter sessions at three of Somerset’s larger urban centres provided the loci for county 
government. This arrangement, therefore, perhaps bears more resemblance to the 
patrician model of justice identified by Landau, where the authority of the magistracy 
was derived from their status as a governmental group, rather than from their position as 
individuals within their community.330 
 Norfolk provides a stark contrast to Somerset. The county’s economy was less 
varied, being dominated by arable production; consequently, the majority of its 
population lived in primarily agricultural communities. Its urban centres were 
concentrated in the county capital, Norwich, and the port towns of Kings Lynn and Great 
Yarmouth. The mapping of judicial activity in the county reveals the organisation of the 
                                                
329 SRO: Q/JCP/ 3-7; Q/C/3/7. 
330 Landau, Justices of the Peace, 3-4, 342-4. 
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magistracy orientated towards a localised system of justice, operating away from these 
large urban centres. 
Through the arrangement of its petty sessional divisions, and the distribution of 
acting justices, almost every hundred in Norfolk was consistently served by at least one 
resident magistrate. The regularised adjournment of the county sessions to the towns of 
Holt, Little Walsingham and Swaffham, ensured the administration of government in 
rural communities, in addition to the quarterly judicial meetings in the county’s major 
urban centres. In both their activity outside of court, and at sessions, Norfolk justices 
focused their work in the areas in which they lived. Almost half of all committals were 
made by magistrates within their hundred of residence, and each regional bench was 
predominantly comprised of men from the community in which it was convened. 
Although there is evidence of a shift in personnel within the Norfolk commission 
over the period, notably the increasing number of clerical magistrates active on the 
bench, this did not signal a significant change in the nature of local government. The 
majority of active magistrates retained connections to county government via kinship or 
patronage, and to their communities via residence. The patterns discerned in both the 
governmental structures in Norfolk, and the distribution and activity of the judiciary, 
adhere to a more traditional conception of the form and function of the magistracy as 
paternal rulers: maintaining a tradition of local leadership, and proximity to the 
communities over which they presided. 
 
Despite the contrast in governmental arrangements, important similarities can be drawn 
from the case studies of both counties. More apparent in Somerset, but still evident in the 
changes identified in the Norfolk commission of the peace, and in the concerns expressed 
regarding poverty and crime detailed in subsequent chapters, is the precarious nature of 
personalised, voluntary government in this period. The correspondence to the clerk of the 
peace, and the reports on the borough benches in Somerset, highlight how infirmity, 
absence or a disinclination to act, could frustrate access to the law, or leave a community 
without the superintending eye of a magistrate. In the absence of such detailed 
correspondence in Norfolk, the case of Justice Hoseason signals that the county was not 
immune to the difficulties posed by periodic absenteeism. The attempt to prosecute him 
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points to the problems inherent in relying on local men and individual discretion in the 
administration of the law. 
Such shortcomings were not lost on contemporaries, but there is evidence in both 
counties of continued adherence to traditional ideas about who should govern. The 
emphasis placed on local leadership in Norfolk is clear, but even in Somerset, where 
problems with a lack of available magistrates were so evident, the commission was still 
discerning in its membership. The strictures placed on entry to the commission were not 
impractical. In the absence of professional policing, rule by the local gentry was still 
prudent: it ensured the presence of an agent of the law via residence in their communities, 
and one who was wealthy enough to obviate corrupt dealings for personal gain.  
Likewise, local influence was still significant but not necessarily derived from a 
gentleman’s family connections or the extent of his estates. The philanthropic activities 
and social initiatives instigated by men like Malachi Blake and Thomas Poole testify to 
their influence, and might be cast as evidence of their position as local leaders. The 
continued emphasis placed on many of the characteristics associated with the archetypal 
gentleman justice, in both counties, follows Eastwood’s assessment, that while the social 
composition of the magistracy had to change to meet the requirements of expansion, it 
included men who aspired to particular social ideals. 
 
The remaining chapters consider how the magistracy mobilised the structures of 
government to suppress social protest. The experience of unrest was manifest differently 
in each county, shaped by the differences in their social and economic make-up, but it 
posed for both the magistracy of Norfolk and Somerset, the most acute challenge to local 
government. The availability of active magistrates, or the lack thereof, was a persistent 
problem. In Somerset, for example, the spread of protest via itinerant crowds during the 
crisis of 1801 was assisted by the uneven distribution of the magistracy. And while the 
more rationalised organisation of judicial divisions in Norfolk provided the basis for a 
more efficient network of suppression in the same period, across all phases of protest 
considered here, measures to augment the civil force had to be taken in order to quell 
disorder. 
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The effective suppression of protest was also frustrated by questions of judicial 
jurisdiction. The complexity of juridical arrangements led to clashes between county and 
borough magistrates, but more consistent problems were generated by the variance in 
decisions made by individual justices, local, and county benches. Of particular concern 
was the granting of concessions and the precedent that it set. The demands made upon the 
magistracy by protesters were often framed by popular expectations of traditional 
government: of what the paternal responsibilities of the judiciary were. Here, the 
proximity of ruler and ruled was no guarantee of social peace, indeed in many instances it 
created the space for grievances to be voiced. In this context the discretionary powers that 
enabled the magistracy to act independently, and their reliance on local influence and 
connection, were called into question. 
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Chapter Three 
The Magistracy and the crisis of paternalism, 1795-1801 
 
A system of local government based on voluntary service and judicial discretion was 
seriously tested by riot. The effective maintenance of order was dependent on the 
availability and activity of magistrates; there was no effective and regularised police 
support, and magistrates felt a general reluctance to use military might against ‘their own’ 
people. Not only did the use of professional repressive agencies smack of continental 
absolutism, but the aftermath of such violence permeated the community in which both 
the protesters – and the magistrates – lived. Keeping the peace, therefore, was a carefully 
negotiated process. The expansion of justices’ summary jurisdiction was necessary to 
encompass their increasing responsibilities in local government, it likewise allowed for 
the flexibility required to address protest.  
By the end of the eighteenth century, population increase pushed existing systems of 
relief, which were placed under further strain during persistent phases of dearth. Popular 
unrest stimulated by food shortages and high prices in 1795, and again in 1800-01, was 
exacerbated by continental revolution, war, and radical political agitation at home. In this 
context, the exercise of judicial discretion proved problematic, particularly the granting 
of paternalist concessions to the crowd, laying the justices of the peace open to personal 
criticism, generating disparities across regions, and pitting the county judiciary against 
the demands of central government and different sectors of society at once. 
 ‘To understand’, Thompson argued, ‘the ‘political’ space in which the crowd might 
act and might negotiate with the authorities must attend upon a larger analysis of the 
relations between the two.’331 Since the publication of The Moral Economy of the English 
Crowd in the Eighteenth Century in 1971,332 historians have endeavoured to recover the 
‘political spaces’ that enabled popular pressure to be exerted. Studies of the authorities 
have been included in this corpus, notably by Roger Wells and John Bohstedt, 
highlighting the often ‘bewildering’ complexity and variety in judicial responses, and the 
                                                
331 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy Reviewed’, idem, Customs in Common (London: Merlin 1991, 
this ed. Penguin 1993), 261. 
332 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century’, Past & 
Present, (1971): 76-136. 
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social tensions that underpinned popular interactions with authority.333 This chapter aims 
to provide a more nuanced understanding of judicial attitudes and actions, and the 
political spaces available to both the magistracy, and their communities, by addressing 
unrest in Somerset and Norfolk through the lens of local governmental infrastructure. 
 
The magistracy held a pivotal position in Thompson’s thesis: as the employers and 
landlords of the crowd - as well as agents of authority, they had an obligation to ensure 
the supply and fair sale of foodstuffs to the poor. Popular understanding of the 
magistracy’s responsibilities was based on more than social obligations. Precedents for 
their intervention had a legal basis, albeit one derived from ‘an eroded body of statute 
law, as well as common law and custom.’334 In apprehension of riot or in response to 
direct demands by the crowd, the magistracy resurrected repealed legislation at common 
law.335 The revival of these legal traditions formed part of the repertoire on which the 
magistracy could draw to maintain or restore order. In upholding their end of the 
paternalist bargain, the magistracy perpetuated popular expectations, reinforcing the 
‘field of force’ of social relations. 
The successful operation of the moral economy relied on ‘a particular equilibrium 
between paternalist authority and the crowd’. This, Thompson argued, was frustrated in 
the final decades of the eighteenth century by governmental support for a free market 
economy and ‘acute anti-Jacobinism’. The wars with France and radical political 
agitation at home, augmented fears of popular action and justified not only the 
mobilisation of military and volunteer forces, but their deployment against price-setting 
crowds. Where the local judiciary did not tow the line, the Home Secretary, the Duke of 
Portland, left them in no uncertain terms of the ‘new firmness’ that was required.336 
Remonstration, negotiation, intervention in the operations of markets and chains of 
supply, were cast as inflammatory. Order was to be maintained through the swift 
                                                
333 R. Wells, Wretched Faces (Alan Sutton Publishing 1988, this ed. London: Breviary Stuff, 2011), esp. 
288; J. Bohstedt, The politics of provisions: food riots, moral economy and market in transition in England, 
c. 1550-1850 (Farnham: Ashgate 2010) esp. 5. 
334 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century’, 83. 
335 Ibid, 83, 88; D. Hay, ‘Moral Economy, Political Economy and Law’, in A. Randall and A. Charlesworth 
(eds.), Moral Economy and Popular Protest: Crowds, Conflict and Authority (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
2000) 97, 99 & 105. 
336 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral economy of the English Crowd’, 129-31. 
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suppression of riot – by force if necessary – and punishment according to the letter of the 
law.  
The particular context at the end of the eighteenth century makes an analysis of the 
responses of authority more complex.337 The validity of moral economic tactics was 
debated at the highest levels, as well as being contested on the ground. Roger Wells’, 
perhaps unparalleled study of the crisis of 1795-6 and 1800-01, offered one of the most 
detailed discussions of the responses of authority. His analysis focused on the struggle 
between central and local government emphasising the increased intervention of the 
centre in the provinces, but also the frequent disregard for government recommendations 
by large sectors of the local magistracy.338 Order was restored through a ‘proverbially 
English mixture of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ tactics’ running in tandem. Despite robust direction, 
and attempts by government to counter the ‘unreliability’ of the magistracy by insisting 
military officers could act without judicial supervision in 1800, the county commissions 
of the peace retained their independence in directing operations on the ground.339  
Wells suggests that the tensions between central and local government betray the 
relative impotence of the State at this point. The ‘bonds of paternalism’, he argues, and 
the independence of local authority remained intact into the nineteenth century when 
changes to governmental structures and attitudes stimulated a more pervasive redefinition 
of social relationships, and allowed for more ‘effective’ central intervention in the 
periphery after the Napoleonic Wars.340 However, the particular decisions made at a local 
level, remain as ‘a local affair’. In attempting to draw broader conclusions, the 
contradictions and inconsistencies in both popular and judicial behaviour, and the reasons 
behind them, are, perhaps necessarily in a project of that scale, left without 
interrogation.341 
Bohstedt has highlighted the importance of regional and local contexts, and how 
particular ‘local social frameworks’ influenced the forms protest took and the ways in 
                                                
337 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy Reviewed’, 292. 
338 R. Wells, Wretched Faces, sig. chapters 15, 16 & 18; also idem, ‘The Revolt of the South West, 1800-
01: A Study in English Popular Protest’ Social History 2:6 (1977): 713-44; reprinted in Rule, J. and Wells, 
R. Crime, Protest, and Popular Politics in Southern England 1740-1850, (London: Hambledon Press, 
1997), 17-52. 
339 R. Wells, Wretched Faces, 258-9, 264 & 288. 
340 Ibid, 325, 340-1. 
341 Ibid, 288. 
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which it was responded to.342 In Riots and Community Politics he established a spectrum 
of social relationships: at one extreme were the larger, industrial and urban centres, 
devoid of traditional networks of interaction, where ‘newer, more ‘artificial’ forms of 
popular mobilization’ occurred. At the other lay rural, agrarian communities too closely 
bound by vertical hierarchies ‘to permit effective collective action.’ From a wide-ranging 
statistical study, he considers ‘the smaller towns of Devon, whose dense and stable social 
networks furnished the optimum milieu for the ‘classic’ tradition of riots.’ It was these 
small market towns, he argues, that could mobilise the moral economy and the paternalist 
sensibilities of the authorities.343  
Bohstedt’s more recent work has built on his conception of riot as ‘community 
politics’, a locus for testing and shaping policies and power relationships, emphasising 
the importance of more regular, ‘day- to –day’ governance in understanding the ways in 
which protest in times of dearth played out.344 He has consistently challenged the 
intangibility of Thompson’s ‘paternalist model’ that, he argues, rests on ill-defined ideals 
derived from a mythical golden age and erroneous popular memory of Elizabethan 
paternalism as manifested in the Book of Orders. However, he maintains ‘[r]ioters clearly 
expected magistrates…to make the system work the way it worked routinely in matters of 
poor relief, apprenticeship, justice and patronage.’345 Restructuring the moral economy as 
‘the politics of provisions’: he looks beyond a shared socio-political ideology as a 
structure underpinning food riots, to consider how the experiences of local government, 
past disturbances and their suppression, as well as immediate pragmatic responses, 
shaped the ways in which riot was dealt with and when and why it occurred.346  
The magistracy, and local government form an important part of his discussion; 
indeed, he suggests that ‘provision politics’ was integral to ‘the evolutions of English 
                                                
342 J. Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics in England and Wales 1790-1810 (London: Harvard 
University Press 1983) 20-21. 
343 Ibid, 26. 
344 J. Bohstedt, Riots and Community Politics, 5; J. Bohstedt, ‘The Pragmatic Economy, the Politics of 
Provisions and the ‘Invention’ of the Food Riot Tradition in 1740’, in A. Randall and A. Charlesworth, 
Moral Economy and Popular Protest: Crowds, Conflict and Authority, 55-92; idem, The Politics of 
Provision (2010). 
345 J. Bohstedt, ‘The Pragmatic Economy, the Politics of Provisions and the ‘Invention’ of the Food Riot 
Tradition in 1740’, 57, 77 and 78; idem, The Politics of Provision’, 7, 11-12. 
346 J. Bohstedt, The Politics of Provision, 6-9. 
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governance.’347 Through his survey of three centuries, he charts the longevity of the 
repertoire of tactics employed by magistrates, in relation to changing economic, 
demographic and political contexts. He too cites the decline of paternalist authority, or 
more particularly, the decline of ‘provision politics’ in the nineteenth century. After 
1800, demographic and economic growth expanded markets and ‘swamped the 
‘traditional’ networks of ‘social patronage’ that had permitted accustomed negotiations’, 
undermining the basis of the social contract between ruler and ruled, and obviating riot as 
a means of restoring it.348 
Despite his important contribution in focusing on local structures and networks of 
social interaction, Bohstedt’s enumeration of incidents, and typologies of riots and 
communities have been criticised.349 The strictures on what constituted a riot, and the 
limitations his models of social relations imposed on rural communities for example, 
obscure the fluidity of both the development of crowd actions, and the often very mixed 
demography of the crowd. 
 Local studies, limited in both chronological and geographical scope, have offered 
more detailed and comprehensive analyses of market protests. Steve Poole and Simon 
Renton, for example, concentrating on Bristol and Norwich respectively, have drawn out 
the complex of community experiences and the ‘workings of power relationships’ that 
underpinned the forms and management of popular protest. Significantly, their work has 
shown the important role the middle classes played in exerting pressure on authority to 
intervene in the market. Here, there is evidence of a wider social support for the moral 
economy, and a clearer picture of the social relationships that framed the political spaces 
in these communities.350 
 The analysis presented in this chapter follows this focused approach, 
concentrating on the structures of government in each county to unpack the complexity of 
                                                
347 Ibid, 3. 
348 Ibid, 269. 
349 R. Wells, Wretched Faces, 94-5; A. Charlesworth, ‘‘An agenda for historical studies of Rural Protest in 
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regional judicial responses. As chapter two has shown, the arrangement and management 
of commission membership, judicial benches and divisions, influenced the character and 
operation of local government. While Adrian Randall and Bohstedt have acknowledged 
histories of the magistracy undertaken since Thompson and Wells’ studies of these 
disturbances were written, notably Landau’s, they are used in conjunction with broad 
evidentiary bases to characterise the magistracy as a whole, rather than to consider the 
regional nuances of individual county commissions, and how the personnel and structures 
of government in a particular area interacted, thereby affecting the suppression of 
unrest.351 The evidence presented here shows the limits placed on justices of the peace by 
protocols, regarding jurisdiction for example, as well as ambiguities manifested in legal 
definitions and processes. These factors complicated the suppression of riot, and 
frustrated relationships between communities and benches, as well as between local and 
central government. This perspective brings the complex of social relationships the 
magistracy had to negotiate to the fore. Complimented by previously overlooked (or 
certainly underused) material from local archives and the court of Kings Bench, the 
challenges this period of unrest posed for authority, and in particular, the use of judicial 
paternalism as a reciprocal part of the ‘moral economy’, can be considered in greater 
depth.  
 
1. The nature and location of protest 
 
Before considering the responses of the magistracy, it is necessary to outline the timing, 
geography and nature of crowd action in each county. The different contexts and 
manifestations of unrest framed the ways in which the authorities mobilised the structures 
of government to suppress disorder. 
 
In 1794 the harvest had failed and as stocks depleted, prices rose until they reached 
unprecedented levels in the summer of 1795.352 The Home Secretary, the Duke of 
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Press, 2006), 28-35; J. Bohstedt, The Politics of Provision, 4-6; N. Landau, The Justices of the Peace 
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Portland, embarked on a scheme to import stocks and manage their supply in order to 
ameliorate shortages. National management of provisions was made all the more 
necessary when the country was at war, frustrating supply routes and adding to the 
pressure of provisioning troops.353 
 
Figure 22: The nature and location of crowd actions in Somerset, 1795-6354 
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The disturbances of 1795 started in the spring in Wales and Cornwall, moving into the 
South West. Somerset was most affected from April through to August (see table. 1). The 
disturbances in the spring and summer followed the same patterns of protest across other 
effected areas of England: initially, increasing prices stimulated crowd interventions in 
the market place (fig. 22: April-May); from mid-June, shortages of provisions became 
more acute, and popular action moved out of the markets, to grain producing regions and 
transit points, where the crowds sought to prevent stocks leaving their locale (fig. 22: 
Somerton and Bath).355 The first disturbance in Somerset was in January amongst the 
cloth workers of Frome, who were likewise the originators of the disturbance in June. 
Here, the increase in prices in the spring and summer compounded existing problems of 
                                                                                                                                            
Protest, and Popular Politics in Southern England 1740-1850 (London: Hambledon Press 1997) 17; J. 
Bohstedt, The Politics of Provision, 191. 
353 J. Bohstedt, The Politics of Provision, 171-4. 
354  Mells Manor Muniments: Thomas Horner, papers and correspondence 1795; TNA: HO 42/34, HO 
42/36; WO/1/1093; KB 29/462, KB 1/29/1-2; Bath Chronicle 1795-6; The Times, 1795-6; S. Poole, 
“Popular Politics in Bristol, Somerset and Wiltshire, 1791-1805” (PhD thesis, University of Bristol 1992), 
Appendix C. 
355 Ibid, 191-2. 
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unemployment and concerns regarding the introduction of new textile machinery. Further 
price-setting actions were reported at Frome in 1796, and amongst other coalmining 
communities in the north east of the county, signalling how market dependent 
communities continued to be sensitive to price fluctuations (see Map 3.1, p. 116).356 
 
Figure 23: The nature and location of crowd actions in Norfolk, 1795357 
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In East Anglia, disturbances started in the summer of 1795 as food produced locally was 
sent to consuming regions. Outbreaks of unrest in Norfolk were more sporadic than those 
in Somerset but followed a similar pattern, flaring in the summer and into the winter 
months (see figure 22). Norfolk’s position as one of the country’s largest producers of 
grain may have ameliorated the scarcity while they could supply their own markets. 
However, the first crowd actions in late spring and summer, in Norwich, the suburban 
parish of St Faiths, and at the Forehoe House of Industry, were – as in Somerset – 
amongst communities more sensitive to disruptions in supply and fluctuations in 
prices.358  
The county was also, by 1794, the largest exporter of grain in England. The 
majority of incidents in the autumn and winter of 1795 concerned attempts to prevent 
grain leaving the area in which it was produced, or blockades at transit points in northern 
coastal districts (see fig. 23: Oct-Dec, and Map 3.2, p. 117).359 These crowd actions were 
made all the more concerning by rumours of Radical foment in the county.  
                                                
356 Mells Manor Muniments: letters to JP Thomas Horner from Messrs. Sheppard of Frome, 17 Jan 1795; 
Horner’s papers concerning his investigation into unemployment, provisions and relief in Frome, 1795; 
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In October 1795, Justice Robert Fellowes of Shotesham wrote to the Duke of 
Portland, having received information regarding seditious meetings in the area around 
Diss (see fig. 23: Oct. Saxlingham). Ostensibly the meetings had been convened ‘for 
redress of Grievances’, but Fellowes had ridden directly to Saxlingham360 where it was 
reported that the speaker wore a ‘Ribband or Cockade in his Hat’. On his arrival, the 
crowd had already dispersed, but Fellowes retrieved a copy of the speech that had been 
circulated amongst them. Signed by ‘A Friend to Reform’ it pointed to the ‘Land-
Monopolists’, ‘Contractors and Pensioners’ who ‘Wallow in Luxury, while thousands are 
starving’, and called for ‘firmness and unanimity’ among the disenfranchised to effect 
reform. It concluded: 
‘You may as well look for CHASTITY and MERCY in the Empress of Russia, HONOR and 
CONSISTENCY from the King of Prussia, WISDOM and PLAIN DEALING from the 
Emperor of Germany, as a SINGLE SPEECH OF VIRTUE in the COLD-BLOODED HEART 
of our HELL-BORN MINISTER’ 361 
 
Such a ferocious attack on the government (and the notion of monarchy) could not go un-
noted. 
In June of the same year, the Lord Lieutenant, the Marquis Townshend, had been 
proud to publish a letter from the Home Secretary congratulating the county magistracy 
on the suppression of all ‘seditious assemblies’ by their continued ‘zeal and vigilance’; 
no doubt he was anxious to preserve their reputation.362 Fellowes had been informed that 
the meeting at Saxlingham was one of several held ‘in this part of the Country’. He was 
rightly concerned about political dissidents capitalizing on genuine issues of poverty and 
dearth: the ‘very high price, not only of bread Corn but of every other necessary of Life’ 
he argued, gave ‘to every ill disposed person but too plausible a ground to harangue the 
Common people’. Before completing his letter to the Home Secretary, Fellowes received 
reports of a serious disturbance at Diss, only eight miles south of Saxlingham.363 
 
  
                                                
360 Saxlingham Nethergate in south Norfolk, as opposed to Saxlingham in the north near Holt; Fellowes 
lived at Shotesham Park little more than a mile and a half north of the settlement. NRO: C/Sda 1/14-18. 
361 TNA: HO 42/ 36 Fellowes to Portland, 19 Oct. 1795. 
362 Norwich Mercury, 13 June 1795 
363 HO 42/ 36 Fellowes to Portland, 19 Oct. 1795; Norwich Mercury, 24 Oct. 1795. 
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3.1. Crowd Actions and Related Incidents: Somerset, 1795 
Map of Somerset by F. S. Weller, originally published in The Comprehensive Gazetteer of England and Wales, 1894-5 (London and 
Edinburgh: William Mackenzie 1894-5) http://ukga.org/images/maps/Somerset.jpg Data added by author (see appendix 4)  
Key: Green = Blockade, Purple 
= Price Fixing, Orange = Other 
(see Tables, Chapter 3), Red = 
Related Incidents 
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3.2. Crowd Actions and Related Incidents: Norfolk, 1795 
 
 
Map of Norfolk by F. S. Weller, originally published in The Comprehensive Gazetteer of England and Wales, 1894-5 (London and 
Edinburgh: William Mackenzie 1894-5) http://ukga.org/images/maps/Norfolk.jpg Data added by author (see appendix 4) 
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3.3. Crowd Actions and Related Incidents: Norfolk, 1800-01 
 
 
Map of Norfolk by F. S. Weller, originally published in The Comprehensive Gazetteer of England and Wales, 1894-5 (London and 
Edinburgh: William Mackenzie 1894-5) http://ukga.org/images/maps/Norfolk.jpg Data added by author (see appendix 4) 
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3.4. Crowd Actions and Related Incidents: Somerset, 1800-01 
 
Map of Somerset by F. S. Weller, originally published in The Comprehensive Gazetteer of England and Wales, 1894-5 (London and 
Edinburgh: William Mackenzie 1894-5) http://ukga.org/images/maps/Somerset.jpg Data added by author (see appendix 4) 
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In 1800, it was the industrial areas of northern England that saw the first outbreaks of 
unrest in the New Year. Sharp increases in the price of flour at the end of August 
stimulated what Wells described as a ‘hyper-crisis’ in September: almost every region 
experienced some level of disturbance.364 Norfolk was no exception. Here, disorder, as in 
most affected areas, was largely confined to market centres (see fig. 24 and Map 3.3, p. 
118). Although the resurgence of popular discontent was largely confined to the 
southwest in the spring of 1801 (below fig. 25), isolated incidents of popular price-fixing 
occurred in Norfolk’s largest urban settlements in March and June.365 
 
Figure 24: The nature and location of crowd actions in Norfolk, 1800-01366 
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The context, and consequently the nature of disturbances, was markedly different in 
1800. The harvest of 1799 was more promising and prices had fallen. However, once the 
crop had come in, the deficiency in yield due to hollow, light grains, sent prices back up. 
In contrast with the acute awareness of scarcity displayed in 1795, consumers still 
believed the harvest of 1799 to have been a plentiful one ‘and so they were doubly 
outraged at the idea of ‘starving in the midst of plenty.’’367  
 Popular unrest was directed at those perceived to be keeping up prices. Mr Spract, 
a Norfolk miller, was set upon by a group of women at Dereham. According to the press, 
they were intent on taking ‘revenge on the millers, in consequence of the exorbitant price 
of flour and meal’. Spract was also accused of adulterating produce. He was ‘dragged… 
upon the ground’ by the crowd, who set about ‘pelting him with his own materials’. At 
Norwich, the producers and vendors of food were likewise the target of the crowd’s 
resentment.368  
                                                
364 R. Wells, Wretched Faces, 123-34. 
365 A. Charlesworth (ed.) An Atlas of Rural Protest, 97-103. 
366 Norfolk Chronicle 1800-01, Norwich Mercury 1800-01; Bury and Norwich Post, 1800-01; Ipswich 
Journal 1800-01 TNA: 42/51; ASSI; NRO: NCR Case 20a/25 City of Norwich Quarter Sessions Minute 
book 1794-1807. 
367 J. Bohstedt, Riot and Community Politics, 1, 18. 
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121 
 
Figure 25: The nature and location of crowd actions in Somerset, 1800-01369 
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All the disturbances in Somerset in 1800 (bar the deputation at Stowey in October) 
involved crowd actions against vendors or farmers (fig. 25). Although unrest was 
concentrated in the period of ‘hyper-crisis’, high prices and market malpractices appear 
as a prolonged issue, which elicited more violent responses. At Bruton in May, two of the 
most prominent millers in Somerset were shot at on their way home from market. Four 
months later, one of the victims - George Cox - was the target of the crowd at Farrington 
Gurney, who seized eight sacks of wheat from his wagon. At Minehead, threats contained 
in an anonymous letter to a local farmer were put into action in July, and his farm was 
burned down.370  
The location and nature of protest became more complex in the spring of 1801, 
when price-setting crowds did not limit themselves to the market place, but proceeded to 
seek out producers - and magistrates - across the centre and south of the county, requiring 
their signatures to an agreement fixing the price of wheat, bread and other provisions (see 
                                                
369 SRO: Q/SO/17 Quarter Sessions order books; DD/AH 59/12; DD/MT/19/1/1; TNA: HO 42/50, 42/61; 
ASSI 25/1/3; Bath Journal 1800-01 
370 TNA: HO 42/50 f. 55 Col. Robert Stevens to Portland, 11 May 1800; ASSI 25/1/3; SRO: DD/MT/19/1/1 
Assize Calendar Lent 1801; HO 42/50 J. F. Luttrell to Portland 31 July 1800.  
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Map 3.4, p. 119).371 Following the example set in Devon, itinerant crowds were reported 
at Wellington on 24th March. Between 500 and 1000 processed some 20 miles from 
Stogursey, via Goathurst to Bridgwater and Hill on the 29th. Two different crowds were 
reported at Chard (c. 1400 people) and Old Cleeve on the 30th, and another at Ilminster 
on the 31st March.372 
 The prospect of crowds of this size was made all the more threatening by the 
discovery of a handbill at Wellington only a day before the reported disturbance. The bill 
made explicit connection between the apparent scarcity of provisions and the example of 
continental revolution: 
‘Let half starv’d Britons all Unite, 
To tread Oppressors down; 
Nor fear the rage of Red or Blue 
Those Despots of the Crown… 
 
…On Cursed Statesmen and their Crew 
Let Bolts of Vengeance fly; 
Let Farmers and Engrossers too 
Like Brute [?] be doom’d to die. 
 
 
Then shall we live as Heav’n design’d 
On finest flour of Wheat; 
When all the Knaves are put to Death, 
Our joy will be Complete. 
 
Then Raise your drooping Spirits up; 
Nor starve by Pitt’s Decree; 
Fix up the Sacred Guillotine; 
Proclaim French Liberty!!! 
 
The local magistrates lost no time in reporting this to the Home Secretary and calling out 
the military.373 
 
                                                
371 TNA: HO 42/61 f. 301 W. A. Sanford, Nynehead to Portland 23 March 1801, f. 357 Codrington, Mayor 
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As exporters and importers respectively, the scarcity of 1795 impacted significantly on 
both Norfolk and Somerset. While disturbances were largely confined to market 
dependent communities in Somerset, protest was more diffuse in Norfolk complicating its 
suppression. The nature of the second crisis, namely high prices and the perception of a 
false scarcity, heightened popular discontent, and the market place provided a forum 
where grievances against ‘middlemen’ and ‘greedy’ producers could be aired. Incidents 
like the attack at Bruton in Somerset were rare, but other violent or inter-personal 
expressions of discontent were apparent in both counties in 1800 and 1801. The scale and 
diffusion of unrest in its final upsurge in the spring of 1801 tested the Somerset judiciary 
to its limit. 
 The magistracy in both counties, also had to contend with personal assaults, not 
just amongst the itinerant crowds in Somerset, but at Lynn in Norfolk, and Stockwood 
and Bath in Somerset, justices received threatening letters criticising their conduct; and at 
Holt (Norfolk), Justice Charles Collyer had several ricks destroyed by arson.374 The 
evidence is not always explicit with regard to the nature of the justice’s apparent 
transgression, but these threats placed further pressure on their administration of the law. 
War with France and political agitation at home were also a pressing concern. Whether 
the threat of insurrection was genuine or not, the radical presence coloured perceptions of 
popular protest and the ways in which it was dealt with. Certainly Fellowes felt that the 
‘most vigorous measures’ were not merely apt, but ‘just’.375   
 
2. Responses to Protest: Relief, Charity and ‘official’ paternalism  
 
Repression was preceded, and accompanied, by ‘softer’ tactics. As Wells and Bohstedt 
have highlighted, the judiciary mobilised means of redress established through more 
routine systems of local government in order to meet popular expectations regarding 
relief.376 Alongside charitable subscriptions and parochial relief, the local justices 
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carefully monitored marketing practices. These measures were employed from as early as 
1793 in a bid to stave off riot and were persisted with as a means of restoring social 
bonds in the aftermath of disturbance. 
Typically parish vestries and overseers of the poor regulated the distribution of 
relief, but the county justices had the final say in matters when payments were in dispute. 
This position as the ultimate arbiter in relief was used more extensively to manage the 
impact of dearth. Attributed to the meeting in the village of Speenhamland, Berkshire, in 
the midst of the 1795 famine, justices in several counties organized scales of allowances 
for impoverished labourers drawn from the parish rates. Calculations were made relating 
relief the size of the claimant’s family and the price of bread. Although the system was 
not adopted consistently across England, increasingly, local benches of magistrates chose 
to adopt comparable measures.377  
In response to the disturbances in Frome at the beginning of 1795, Justice Thomas 
Horner of Mells reassured concerned clothiers, and their employees, that ‘no efforts of 
mine as Magistrate or Neighbour, will on occasion be wanting to promote, Collectively 
or Individually their Prosperity and Happiness.’ Seeking both a remedy to the immediate 
issue of subsistence and the more persistent problems regarding adequate employment, 
Horner initiated an investigation into the conditions of the local clothworking industry 
and the cost of living, with a view to implementing a similar scheme to that of the 
Berkshire justices.378 By implementing allowances for underpaid or underemployed 
labourers from the parish poor rates, Horner intended to prevent unrest and alleviate the 
pressures of high prices, crucially without pushing up real wage rates. In administering 
relief in this way - on a parochial level- magistrates secured the dependency of the 
labourers on their social superiors.379 
But this sort of paternalist intervention, made through formal channels, did not sit 
easily with the ratepayers, or indeed, members of government. In 1796, Edmund Burke 
denounced financial aid to labourers as sentimental, ‘affected pity’, claiming it only 
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‘tends to dissatisfy them with their condition, and to teach them to seek resources where 
no resources are to be found, in something else than their own industry, and frugality, and 
sobriety.’380 Burke had identified what would become the much-paraded flaws of this 
type of relief: that the allowances would push up the parish rates and increase the 
expectations of the poor in terms of their entitlements. Despite such criticisms, wage 
supplements in ‘Speenhamland parishes’ like Mells, were increased in in the second 
crisis of 1800-01; and by 1802, the cost of parish poor relief had more than doubled.381 
This increase reflected the changing pattern of relief expenditure in both counties in the 
last decade of the eighteenth century. Perhaps more concerning was the number of 
claimants in receipt of out-door relief: 60 per cent of total county expenditure in Norfolk, 
and 70 per cent in Somerset, was made to individuals away from parish institutions.382 
Charitable subscriptions offered an alternative means of relief, and one that did 
not put such a burden on the parish rates, or engender a sense of entitlement for payments 
from local government coffers. The Lord Lieutenant of Norfolk, Marquis Townshend, 
had advocated the use of subscriptions in 1792. A sum had been raised to make up the 
price of flour to enable millers and bakers to sell their produce on at an affordable price. 
Townshend approved of the measure, as it did not gratify ‘the labourer with higher wages 
which he would insist upon being continued or probably spend at the alehouse.’ No doubt 
the Lord Lieutenant was also anxious to avoid any paid supplements, as the seamen of 
Yarmouth and Lynn had been agitating for an increase in wages.383 
This mode of assistance encouraged deference and provided an opportunity for 
public shows of paternalism, but without the longer-term commitment implied in the 
manipulation of the regular channels of relief. In 1793, Chairman of the county sessions 
bench, Henry Jodrell, addressed the grand jury on the propriety of such measures. As 
‘respectable farmers and gentlemen’, he reminded the jurors, 
                                                
380 E. Burke, The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, vol. viii Three letters addressed to a 
member of the present Parliament on the Proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directory of France, 
(London: F and C. Rivington, 1801), 295. 
381 R. Wells, ‘The Revolt of the South West’, 22-3, see also Wretched Faces, 306-12, 357. 
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of His Majesty King George III. Intituled,''an act for procuring returns relative to the expense and 
maintenance of the poor in England.' 342 and 442.  
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November 1792; J. Bohstedt, The Politics of Provision, 236. 
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‘presiding over the parishes to which you belong, to attend from time to time to the price 
of corn, and those necessary articles of life which are proper for the comfort and support 
of the inferior sort of people, - to compare their possible earnings with their necessary 
expenditures’ 
 
He recommended that subscriptions should be raised to allow parish officers to procure 
‘the necessaries of life’ and sell them on to labourers at a price they could afford. While 
Jodrell’s suggestions encouraged a Speenhamland-type arrangement, it was framed in 
terms of charity. He likewise cautioned against judicial involvement in the regulation of 
wages, as any ‘universal rule in this respect would be attended with more difficulties and 
inconveniences than the law was meant to remedy.’ The charge was subsequently 
published at the request of the magistracy.384 This initiative persisted in 1795, in July 
a ‘numerous body of the poor’ from the village of St Faiths just outside Norwich, had 
assembled to address the Bench. The press reported that they wished to petition the 
magistrates for relief from ‘the present high price of meal and flour.’ In consequence, the 
justices ‘recommended to the inhabitants to subscribe a sufficient sum of money for the 
above laudable purpose, which was cheerfully acquiesced in’.385 
Charitable relief was also implemented in a more piecemeal fashion to prevent 
imminent disorder. However, in Diss (Norfolk) at least, this was contingent merely on the 
threat of tumult. Despite agreeing to a subscription to alleviate the distress of the poor in 
the neighbourhood, the rate-paying inhabitants ‘cooled’ to the idea once the apprehension 
of disturbance had subsided. They did, however, feel they could stretch to a £30 reward 
for the detection of the author of the incendiary letter posted in the neighbourhood that 
had originally stimulated them to acts of charity.386  
In Somerset, provision committees organised subscriptions and the distribution of 
provisions with considerable success, most notably at Bristol and also in Bath. The 
extension of economic hardship however strained such good will. By 1800, many of the 
middling-sort were feeling the pinch and could no longer afford to make charitable 
donations. Limits had to be applied to the claimants of charity. That year, the Bath 
                                                
384 ‘A charge delivered to the Grand Jury of Norfolk, at the General Quarter Sessions held on Wednesday, 
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committee stipulated new criteria for relief, ensuring that all applicants had to have a 
personal recommendation from a subscriber.387  
Cheaper, perhaps more popular measures were available to the magistracy by 
upholding the regulations for correct weights and measures and implementing the Assize 
of Bread.388 A particularly consistent run of returns made to the Somerset quarter sessions 
highlight the concentration of summary convictions for deficient weights and measures 
and marketing irregularities, immediately prior to, and during the crisis of 1795. Only one 
comparable return had been made between January 1793 and October 1794; thereafter, 
12 of 37 returns for summary convictions concerned the malpractices of hawkers and 
bakers, and eight of the convictions were made as the scarcity intensified between 
January and August 1795.389 Jodrell’s charge to the Norfolk bench in 1793 had also 
recommended careful attention to weights and measures, and confirmed that the county 
magistrates ‘had taken the same into their consideration’.390 The press in both counties 
bolstered these measures by widely publicizing the maintenance of the Assize of Bread 
and seizure of deficient provisions at markets by the attending magistrates, who 
generously distributed the stock amongst the poor.391 The county judiciary also led by 
example in publicly resolving to reduce their own consumption of wheat and promoting 
alternative diets.392  
Such ‘crowd pleasing spectacles’ reassured several sectors of the local community 
and provided timely reminders of the efficiency of the local judiciary and the propriety of 
the law.393 In May 1795, the Bath Chronicle praised the magistrates who had intervened 
                                                
387 S. Poole, ‘Scarcity and the Civic Tradition: market management in Bristol, 1709-1815’ in A. Randall, et 
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Wiltshire 1791-1805 (PhD thesis, Bristol University 1993), 413-6, and 424. Bath Journal, 15 January and 
19 February 1795, 23 June 1800.  
388 The Assize of Bread regulated the size of loaves according to the price of grain; loaves had a stable 
price, therefore their size fluctuated with the changes to the price of wheat. Although magistrates were not 
empowered to set the price of wheat, they could establish the cheapest market price to ensure the loaves 
were sold at their maximum weight. A. S. C. Ross, ‘The Assize of Bread’, Economic History Review, 9, 2 
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389 SRO: Q/RCC/bundle 1790-99. 
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391 See for example: Bath Chronicle, 07 and 14 Aug 1794, 30 Oct. 1794, 25 Dec. 1794, 28 May 1795; 
Norwich Mercury, 20 July 1795, 25 July 1795, 08 Aug. 1795. 
392 SRO: Q/SO 16 Order of Quarter Sessions, 15 July 1795; Norwich Mercury 20 July 1795  
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to placate the ‘misguided populace’ of Frome, who had ‘proceeded to compel the vendors 
of butter and other articles to reduce the prices.’ A fortnight later, the paper lauded the 
example of the same justices’ for their prosecution of forty hucksters for retailing goods 
by short measure.394  
The Norwich Bench were under increasing pressure to do something about high 
prices throughout the summer and into the autumn of 1800. Despite maintaining the 
Assize of Bread, fining several millers and bakers during the summer, a ‘riotous 
disposition’ was so manifest in the city by the autumn, that the local troop of Yeomanry 
cavalry were being held in readiness. Popular demands made of the bench were 
compounded by a petition from the Grand Jury of the City sessions (comprised of the 
respectable inhabitants of Norwich) complaining about ‘the malpractices of several 
jobbers in the hay-markets, who constantly bought up the hay and re-sold it at advanced 
prices to the prejudice of inn-keepers and other regular buyers’.395  
Matters appeared to be coming to a head in September when some of the millers 
and bakers in the market had been openly abused, and the justices had received yet 
another petition signed by the city’s skilled workmen and merchants regarding the high 
price of provisions. The magistrates were keen to resist disorder and protect the suppliers 
of the markets, but conscious of the need to address prices that were effecting more than 
the poor. They set about examining the millers and bakers ‘very minutely’, establishing 
the highest, but more importantly, the lowest prices of wheat, in order to more effectively 
regulate the Assize of Bread. The press welcomed their intervention in the market and 
praised their more proactive regulation of prices.396 
In 1766, the more stringent measures taken against food rioters by the Norwich 
bench had met with the opprobrium of the city’s ‘middling sort’ (its smaller craftsmen 
and manufacturers) and resulted in the public shaming of some of its more prominent 
justices.397 In 1800, it is clear that the city’s moral economic sensibilities persisted: this 
                                                
394 Bath Chronicle, 14 and 28 May 1795. 
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time, the bench acknowledged both the discontent of the poor and the petitions of the 
marginally better off and intervened before serious disturbances took place. This was 
more than populist platitudes, the Norwich bench had to take seriously the demands of 
broad sectors of the community in order to ensure peace, and prevent a more concerted 
attack on their authority. 
Although it has been suggested that popular comprehension of the moral economy 
was not based on common ideals, there was clearly a degree of shared understanding that 
resided somewhere between pure pragmatism and faith in the ‘common weal’.398 At Bath 
in May 1800, Justice John Bowen had been actively engaged in dispersing and 
apprehending rioters who had attacked potato sellers in the market and gone out of the 
city to ‘pillage’ their stocks, and in one instance assault the gardener.399 Despite the day’s 
events - and being the recipient of several anonymous threatening letters -, Bowen 
professed remarkable understanding. He concluded his report to the Home Office by 
confirming popular assumptions about the scarcity, laying the blame on producers who 
sold all their produce to ‘Higlers.’ The gardener who had been beaten by the crowd that 
day, ‘had imprudently boasted’ that he had over 100 sacks of potatoes ‘which he was 
determined to keep up till they should produce 1 guinea per sack altho. they cost him 
only 4’. Bowen felt that the ‘spirit of forestalling prevails much in the Markets at this and 
I believe I may add almost every other place’ and for ‘want of a better mode of punishing 
it’ he recommended prosecution for such offences. The Home Secretary, the Duke of 
Portland noted that Bowen had acted ‘with great probity’, but he thought it ‘very 
desirable to convince him and all people of the same description of the reality of the 
scarcity’.400 
 
* * * 
 
The manipulation of relief, support and encouragement for charitable subscriptions, and 
regulation of market practices were implemented by the magistracy in both Norfolk and 
Somerset to prevent tumult and restore order to their communities. The actions of the 
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magistracy were framed by established functions of local government and popular 
expectations of how local government was supposed to work. 
A strong performative element is apparent in the very public bestowing of relief or 
charity, and the prosecution of ‘pernicious middlemen’, but as the evidence suggests, this 
was not merely a nod to public opinion. The magistracy had to take seriously the 
demands of the community – not just the poor – and carefully negotiate around issues of 
public expenditure, trade and welfare. Undeniably this was motivated by pragmatic and 
possibly professional concerns to maintain order and the status quo, but many of the 
justices’ statements and actions betray a sense of duty and obligation. These ameliorative 
measures were employed alongside the active suppression and prosecution of disorder, as 
a necessary means to restore social relationships and the legitimacy of their authority. 
 
3. Responses to Protest: suppression and the civil authorities 
 
Figure 26. Responses to Protest: Norfolk 
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Figure 27. Responses to Protest: Somerset 
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Figures 26 and 27 show an aggregation of the responses by the authorities to disorder in 
Somerset and Norfolk.401 The data in column 1 confirm that the limited availability of the 
magistracy prevented them from responding to every reported incident in the first 
instance. The differences in judicial responses in both regions, reflects the distribution of 
acting magistrates in Norfolk and Somerset as outlined in the preceding chapter.402 The 
higher proportion of responses by the magistracy in Norfolk follows the more even 
distribution of justices across the county. Indeed, the two incidents where no intervention 
by magistrates is counted can be attributed to the lack of clarity in the reports, rather than 
confirmation that the judiciary did not act.403  
In Somerset in 1795, the three incidents where no initial judicial response was 
recorded all occurred in settlements without resident magistrates. The parish of Bruton, 
and the hundred as a whole had no resident justice; and Frome was served by magistrates 
living outside the town.404 The disturbances of 1800-1801 stretched the civil authorities 
even further. Of the seven incidents where no judicial intervention was recorded, four 
took place at locations where there was no resident magistrate, and two were in Hundreds 
without any local justices.405 The mobility and multiplicity of disturbances in March 
1801, as well as their concentration (twelve locations were cited in ten days), complicated 
their suppression. As detailed below, magistrates had to leave their locales to serve 
neighbouring hundreds. Matters were made worse by absent justices, at least one 
gentleman had removed himself to Bath, and others were in attendance at the Assizes 
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sitting at Taunton. Considering the highly disturbed central region of the county had only 
c. 25 active magistrates, such deficiencies were felt acutely.406 
When faced with crowds feasibly numbering into the hundreds, the use of military 
forces – both professional and voluntary – were the only means of augmenting the 
magistracy’s coercive power.407 Bohstedt has highlighted the increasing use of armed 
forces in the crises of 1795-1801. His national averages indicate that the military was 
used in half of all disturbances in 1795, and two-thirds in 1800-01. This apparently 
increasing dependency, he argues, signalled a significant change in governance.408 
Indeed, his figures would suggest the preference for a ‘new firmness’ voiced by central 
government was adhered to, to a considerable extent. But, as Bohstedt suggests, this point 
must be qualified by the context: recourse to military power required less effort at this 
time, as the mobilisation of both professional and volunteer forces for war made them 
more readily available.409 In both phases of riot, central government sought to capitalise 
on this asset, and advocated the use of military intervention to ensure supply routes in 
1795 and the suppression of disturbance in 1800-01.410 The magistracy, caught between 
the immediate need to suppress disorder and the longer-term ramifications of keeping the 
peace, interpreted these directives according to their local contexts. 
The use of armed forces in both Norfolk and Somerset in 1795 follow the national 
pattern established by Bohstedt, but in 1800-01, the frequency of military intervention 
falls well short (tables 5 and 6, column 2). The use or otherwise of force in both counties 
was informed by local governmental infrastructure, as well as local governmental 
attitudes. 
 
3.1 Responses in Norfolk 
 
In five of the six disturbances in Norfolk where armed intervention was recorded, local 
volunteer yeomanry troops were used. Most volunteer activity was concentrated in 1795, 
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when they were involved in the suppression of half of all disturbances.411 The 
disturbances in the autumn and winter of 1795 proved a greater cause for concern; they 
breached the bounds of the market place and saw the cooperation of different 
occupational groups. 
In December at Wells-next-the-Sea on the north Norfolk coast, a group of women 
had prevented grain being exported to London. Joined by people from various 
neighbouring communities, including agricultural labourers, they succeeded in preventing 
its departure for several days. The Lord Lieutenant, Marquis Townshend, accompanied 
by Rev. Justice Dixon Hoste, rode out to Wells with the Pembroke militia to end the 
impasse. Nothing appeared to move the crowd: the magistrates had warned them of the 
illegality of their actions, they had offered them assurances that the local landowners 
would address their grievances, and after reading the Riot Act twice, the militia were sent 
in.412 But the assembly was only dispersed after the arrival of Thomas Coke of Holkham. 
Coke was the local magistrate. His unexpected return to the region proved timely. After 
promising ‘assurance of attention to their real distress upon peaceable application’ he 
appointed a day to hear them. Apparently satisfied with these arrangements, the crowd 
consented to the corn being shipped.413 
Coke made good his word and had organised ‘the best Regulations for supporting 
the Poor’. The ‘lower trades people’ of Wells however, were ‘dissatisfied at what they are 
to contribute and have disseminated their resentment amongst the Sailors’. The Lord 
Lieutenant received reports that the sailors had professed they would resist any further 
intervention in the town, and had they had the opportunity, they would have fired on the 
magistrates and militia.414 Their example was, he feared, spreading through coastal 
towns: the Mayor of Lynn had been informed of ‘a Conspiracy to destroy the Town and 
Shipping in the Harbour by fire’. Townshend was convinced that ‘some connexion’ 
existed between the threats at Lynn and ‘attempts to detain Flour in other parts’. Earlier 
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in December he had also received reports of violent and disruptive behaviour amongst the 
troops barracked at Yarmouth.415 
The belligerence of the crowds in the north of the county, cooperation between 
artisans and sailors, and the presence of political radicals in the south was a most 
worrying situation to be faced with. Consequently Townshend mobilized volunteer forces 
across the county, creating something akin to a police network. As early as 1791, the 
Lord Lieutenant advocated the formation of associations of gentlemen and farmers. 
Writing to Lord Orford, he claimed, 
‘In this county in particular…vigilance is necessary, as upon any sudden decline of the 
Norwich manufacture, or upon a rise in the price of provisions, riots have followed, and our 
magistrates in this part of the county have sometimes been intimidated to inaction or 
disgraceful compliance.’ 
 
Fearing risk of invasion, volunteer troops had been raised in the northern coastal areas of 
the county in 1782. Townshend’s Norfolk Rangers, established that year, were joined by 
the Hingham Corps and East Dereham troop by October 1794. By the autumn of 1795, 
troops had also been raised for Blofield and Lodden in the east of the county, and 
Clackclose and Lynn in the west.416 
 Townshend’s criticism of judicial timidity may have been directed at the City 
bench at Norwich, or towards some of his nearer neighbours – men such as Thomas Coke 
who voted against the county motion to raise volunteer troops in 1794.417 From 1795 
however, it is clear that the Yeomanry Cavalry were closely allied with the county 
commission of the peace. At least one officer in each of the six troops raised between 
1794 and 1796 was an active county justice. Of the 23 officers in total, 14 were members 
of the commission of the peace and 12 were qualified magistrates.418 The Yeomanry and 
volunteers played a pivotal role in the regulation of the country communities, one that 
relied upon their local connections.  
Three days after the disturbance at Wells in 1795, a crowd stopped and seized five 
loads of flour on its way to Lynn, lodging it in a house at Sharrington. Justices Henry 
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Jodrell, and Rev. Charles Collyer, assembled nearly one hundred gentlemen and farmers 
of the neighbourhood at Holt, who secured the flour and escorted it through their 
jurisdiction. The force was subsequently formalised as the ‘Loyal Holt Association’, and 
Jodrell was clear as to its purpose: he stated the absolute necessity of such an association 
‘to make an Impression on the Mind of the common People that the civil Power was ever 
ready and determined to suppress all Violation of the publick Peace’. Jodrell’s example 
was met with the approbation of the Lord Lieutenant, who reported to the Duke of 
Portland that the presence of such volunteer troops had maintained the peace of many 
parts of the county. Townshend also highlighted a more subtle purpose: the presence of 
the yeomanry in several Hundreds across Norfolk, allowed for the ‘total communication 
of this County with the Sea Ports [to] be intercepted.’419 
 In addition to the regulation of communities inland by volunteers and the 
county judiciary, Townshend suggested to the Home Secretary that the Navy should 
assist in maintaining discipline in the coastal communities. He imputed the 
‘refractory Conduct’ of the sailors at Wells to the lack of a press tender in the area; 
these holding ships were used to contain impressed men before they were assigned to 
a ship in service. Despite having denounced naval conscription and press gangs as 
unconstitutional in 1775, Townshend intimated that such a presence might be held 
over the men of Wells, as the town had ‘contributed the least of any to the supply of 
the Navy.’ His proposed cooperation between the Navy and the civil authorities 
thereby completed the policing of the county by both land and sea.420 
 The Norfolk yeomanry played a less visible role in the disturbances of 1800-
01. The concentration of protest in market centres did not require the mobilisation of 
a ‘police force’ across the countryside. Although the Norwich City bench displayed a 
more conciliatory attitude than Townshend had in 1795, the Norwich mounted 
volunteers, raised by Alderman John Harvey in 1797, were kept in readiness in the 
county capital. The only disturbance requiring the intervention of the troop was at 
                                                
419 TNA: HO 42/37 Townshend to Portland, 22 Dec. 1795; HO 42/37  
 to Townshend, 22 Dec. 1795, enclosed in Townshend to Portland, 23 Dec. 1795. See also Norwich 
Mercury 26 Dec. 1795. Emphasis added. 
420 NRO: MC 36/180-184; TNA: HO 42/38 f. 56 Townshend to Portland, 5 Jan. 1796; HO 42/37 f. 354, 
Townshend to Portland, 4 Dec. 1795; N. Rogers, ‘Liberty Road’, Crowds, Culture and Politics in Georgian 
Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 92-3, 115; D. J. Ennis, Enter the Press-Gang: Naval 
Impressment in Eighteenth-century British Literature (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2002), 38. 
 
 
136 
New Mills, where a group reported to be largely comprised of women, endeavoured 
to lower the price of flour. The emphasis here was once again on a show of civil 
strength: the Sheriff raised a posse of respectable inhabitants of the city, and Captain 
Harvey led a detachment of the Norwich volunteers ‘without uniform’ to New Mills. 
According to the Norwich Mercury, the appearance of the troop and their 
‘gentlemanly deportment’ had the ‘happiest effect’, and the assembled crowd 
dispersed peaceably to their homes.421 
 
3.2 Responses in Somerset 
 
Almost the opposite response can be found in Somerset. Despite the deployment of 
nearly 8,000 professional troops in the region in 1801, and clear directions from the 
Home Secretary that their use was imperative to the restoration of peace, military 
forces were only involved in the suppression of one third of the disturbances in the 
county. Armed forces were deployed more frequently in 1795, but only on two 
occasions was this clearly at the behest of the magistracy.422 
Certainly in comparison to Norfolk, there was little in the way of volunteer 
corps in Somerset. Writing to Thomas Horner at Mells, in November 1795, Captain 
Robert Stevens explained in some detail the difficulty in sustaining his troop in any 
one place for an extended period of time: illness, billeting and the process of raising 
the troop frustrated their speedy deployment. Stevens’ troop was reputedly the only 
one in the north of the county; the next closest troops were based at Yeovil, 
Crewkerne and Coker, all some 30 miles south of Frome. Coupled with the absence 
of a resident justice in the town, it is unsurprising that it was the leading clothiers, 
Messrs Sheppard, who had petitioned government for military assistance during the 
disturbances only a few months before.423 
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The reported intervention of soldiers on the side of the crowd at the market in Wells 
(Somerset), in April 1795, has been frequently cited as an example of the unreliability of 
militiamen during the subsistence crises.424 According to John Turner - a canon of the 
Cathedral, Archdeacon of Taunton, and a county magistrate - men from the 122nd 
Regiment then quartered at Wells, entered the market ‘with fixed Bayonets and 
compelled Persons who had purchased large quantities of Butter at nine pence half penny 
per pound to sell it at eight pence’. They continued to reduce the price of potatoes, and 
then moved out of the market ‘to the limits of the city’ to seek out more ‘Jobbers’ and 
compel them to sell on their goods at lower prices. Turner feared that this example might 
cause further unrest, and lamented his plight, ‘being the only county magistrate residing 
here and altogether without Expectation of any assistance in case of Disturbance.’425 
Turner’s statement can be read as quiet condemnation of the justices of the corporation. 
Wells had its own bench, comprised of the mayor, the recorder and another justice 
elected from the city masters. Although the city courts were empowered to try 
misdemeanours, they were only convened as a formality; the majority of cases were 
agreed out of sessions, or failing that referred to the county bench, which sat in the city 
twice a year.426 The correspondence between Turner and Colonel Shaw, commander of 
the regiment, showcase a dispute pitting townsmen against the militia, and the corporate 
bench against the county judiciary. 
Turner does not appear to have been present at the disturbance, but his involvement 
was instigated by the complaints of some of the ‘jobbers’. At least one of them had 
approached the Deputy Mayor after his butter had been seized, but several of those who 
had been targeted by the crowd subsequently complained to Turner.427 From letters sent 
to the War Office prior to the market disturbance, it appears that tensions between the 
regiment and some of the city’s tradesmen were well established. One of the 
complainants before Turner was the wife of a local Innkeeper, Mr James, who had hosted 
the officers of the 122nd quartered at his establishment. The officers had quit his house 
‘compelled by the repeated insolence of his conduct’. They claimed that Mr James and 
                                                
424 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd’, 113; R. Wells, Wretched Faces, 104, 
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425 TNA: HO 42/34 f. 348 Rev. John Turner to the Duke of Portland, 28 April 1795. 
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his wife were both abusive and prone to drunkenness; in consequence, the Mayor had 
fined James for his offensive behaviour. This initial dispute led to further complaints 
against the regiment from James.428  
Lieutenant Colonel Shaw, commander of the 122nd, was informed of Turner’s 
report to the Home Secretary and confronted him in a letter, claiming most vehemently 
‘there is not a word of truth in your statement’.429 Shaw explained that the presence of his 
men in the market had been at the behest of the Mayor of Wells, for ‘preserving the Peace 
and Protecting the Peace Officers from the Mob not from the Soldiers’. Far from being 
inactive, Shaw and the city magistrates had apprehended the possibility of disturbance 
and went to the marketplace to maintain order. He argued (mistakenly) that Turner ‘had 
no jurisdiction’ there as a county magistrate, and accused him of thinking the ‘City 
Magistrates either completely Indolent or grossly Ignorant.’ Shaw praised ‘The Manly 
conduct of the Magistrates of the Town so opposite to’ Turner’s, he suggested that had 
events transpired as Turner had claimed, it would have ‘better become the duty of an 
Active Magistrate to have stepped forward’ to intervene.430 Shaw roundly denied that his 
men had been the originators of any disturbance.  
No mention of the alleged riot was made in the press, lending some credence to 
Shaw’s version of events. But Turner likewise lent weight to his case by submitting a 
series of depositions detailing the complaints made against the regiment.431 What is clear 
is that those targeted by the crowd, and perhaps James the innkeeper in particular, 
endeavoured to enlist the county judiciary where the city justices would not, or were less 
likely, to intervene on their side. The shared jurisdiction at Wells created the space for 
benches to be played-off against one another. 
 
The reluctance of the magistracy to utilize available military forces in 1801 can be 
attributed in part to the adoption of more conciliatory measures. Across the central 
region of Somerset, magistrates convened meetings with farmers to ‘recommend’ the 
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lowering of prices and encourage the supply of local markets.432 But it was not 
merely a matter of paternalist sympathy: the mobility of the crowds touring central 
Somerset at the end of March prevented swift interception. Their largely orderly 
conduct also meant that violent suppression was potentially inflammatory. 
The survival of a series of correspondence between resident gentlemen and 
members of the bench from March and April of that year present additional perspectives 
on the crises and how it was experienced. The letters provide another level of local 
evidence that compliments the correspondence sent back and forth between the county 
and central government. The events and the ways in which they were managed 
encapsulate the challenges faced by the magistracy in suppressing disorder. 
On the 29th of March, more than a hundred predominantly agricultural labourers 
from the Stogursey area, assembled in the market place at Stowey. Having established a 
petition to reduce the price of provisions, they considered it the ‘most prudent step’ to 
enlist the support of a magistrate to make their case to local farmers and producers.433 
The nearest magistrate, John Acland of Fairfield House (Stogursey) was away at Bath. So 
the crowd attempted first to find Justices Major Tynte and Mr Parsons at Goathurst, but 
they were away at South Petherton dealing with a similar complaint. Failing to find a 
local justice, the crowd moved on, increasing ‘snowball like’, to the number of 1000 by 
the time they had reached Bridgwater. 
A deputation from the assembly was sent to call upon Rev. Justice William 
Wollen, desiring him to sign their petition ‘and to be their friend.’ Wollen heard the 
labourers’ complaint but decided, ‘that they were acting in a very illegal manner’ and 
threatened to arrest them if they did not desist. The deputation refused to leave without 
their paper, Wollen ‘imprudently refused’ to return it, and a scuffle broke out. When he 
‘became a little cool, and saw perhaps, the consequences that would ensue… he delivered 
it to them with the gratuity of a shilling a piece.’ As Mr Davis stated in recounting the 
events to Acland, this gesture was ‘a tacit acknowledgement that he was in the fault.’434 
In consequence of this disturbance, troops had been called out in the town, but 
seamen from the quay, ‘declared that if the Soldiers fired, they would immediately 
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discharge their Pieces.’ Davis maintained that trouble had only been ‘prevented by the 
orderly behaviour of the Petitioners’. Having been again denied the support of a 
magistrate, the crowd left Bridgwater and made for Otterhampton, where they were 
intercepted by Justice John Evered of Hill House Farm. Evered ‘assured them with tears, 
that he felt for their Distresses, and promised to exert his utmost to relieve them.’ On 
these assurances the crowd were satisfied and returned home.435 Confronted by a crowd 
estimated to be between 500 and a thousand strong, Evered had given a quite deliberate 
performance of paternalist authority. Davis claimed that his actions had earned him the 
affections of the people who declared they would ‘spill the last drop of blood in his 
defense’.436 However Evered’s promises might be considered high-handed. Although 
Wollen was antagonistic, he had attempted to adhere to the letter of the law. Nonetheless, 
in losing his temper he failed to retain the authority bestowed upon him by the law and 
his status, and ended up brawling with the labourers and having to bribe them to leave. 
Davis’ comment to Acland, had he been faced with the situation, summarizes the critical 
dilemma of interpreting the law on the spot:  
‘if you had given sanction to their proceeding, you would have been by many condemned, 
and that you did it from the motive of fear. If you had not, on the other hand, you would 
have been subject to the resentment of the people.’437  
 
This division of opinion was widespread. The subsequent publication of 
recommendations and agreements between the magistrates and local farmers polarized 
opinion further.  
Evered managed to make good his word when the local justices assembled at 
Bridgwater the following day to ‘seriously recommend’ that farmers reduce their prices 
to the levels posited in the crowd’s petition. Local responses to the measures passed at 
Bridgwater varied, as Davis had predicted. Many felt that the local authorities  
‘have fix’d a Maximum for the price of Wheat under the pretence of recommendation, 
which the wisdom of Parliament would not attempt. And in so doing, they have been 
accessory to hasten a Revolution and contributed their Mite to accomplish the ruin of their 
country’.  
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Some of the farmers attempted to make alternative arrangements to defray the expense of 
relief across the whole community rather than letting it eat into their profits. They were 
also reluctant to stock the markets and bread shortages persisted.438 On the other hand, 
some felt that ‘by their kind interposition,  
they [the justices] have saved the lives of many People. And in so doing, they have also 
repressed the design of those mischievous Persons, who avail themselves of the Miseries of 
their Country to render it still more miserable.’ 439 
 
The seditious handbill had been discovered at Wellington a little over a fortnight before, 
and Davis had reports that ‘the delegates of the Jacobin Party were very busy and active 
in this Neighbourhood’. The prospect of rebellion in Somerset was unlikely, but rumours 
of this kind altered perceptions of popular disturbances and the responses of authority to 
them. 
Justice Evered, justified his concessions to the crowd from Stogursey, convinced 
that the most effective way to maintain social peace was ‘by adhering to [the] most 
conciliatory means in our Power’ thereby ‘stifling in its birth an Evil, which in its 
consequence would be attended with Calamities and Horrors too great for Language to 
express.’ Lieutenant General Simcoe, the regional military commander, concurred that 
the disturbances in Somerset were not inherently ‘disloyal’ although the continuation of 
‘illegal acts’ would ‘have speedily terminated in rebellion’. Simcoe did not, however, 
share the same approach to prevention as Evered, he advocated the surveillance of the 
poor while the dearth continued, adherence to the letter of the law and the appropriate use 
of military force.440 
 
As the level of unrest peaked at the end of March, the county bench was called 
together to receive legal clarification regarding the suppression of riot. The statement 
produced by the Crown counsel attending the Taunton Assize, strongly advocated the 
use of force, and can be read as a prompt for the magistracy to take more stringent 
measures. However, the questions posed to counsel by the county judiciary 
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underscored the complexities of law enforcement, and the crucial fact that a 
magistrate ‘cannot be in all places at once’.441 Jurisdictional issues were also 
highlighted: while a justice might be excused if he pursued a crowd into a 
neighbouring division, there was some question of how far constables could stray 
from their place of appointment. And in all cases where jurisdiction might be in 
question, counsel agreed that the permission of resident magistrates should be sought.  
The military, by contrast, were presented as a more effective and flexible 
solution to protest. The statement confirmed that the military could be deployed 
without recourse to the magistracy, nullifying the strictures faced by the civil force. 
But care was taken to couch the advocacy of force in terms that detracted from the 
professional status of soldiers: ‘The Duty of the military is the same as that of all 
Subjects, and they are alike bound to Use the means in their power to maintain the 
public peace.’442 This last statement is significant; while it supported the use of more 
extensive military power, it was kept within an established paradigm of self-
governance. Considering the concerns for popular insurrection mooted by Evered, 
Davis and Simcoe, those proposing more repressive measures still wished to draw 
short of any sort of public abrogation of English freedoms. 
 
The Home Secretary, the Duke of Portland, was unimpressed by the conciliatory actions 
of the county authorities: in a letter to the Lord Lieutenant of Devon, Earl Fortescue, he 
lamented the ‘excessive forbearance and disposition to accommodate which had 
manifested themselves in the conduct of the Lord Lieutenant and several of the 
Magistrates.’443 Portland had sent a set of resolutions to Earl Poulett, the Lord Lieutenant 
of Somerset, to circulate amongst the magistracy, leaving the local authorities in no doubt 
of the illegality of any attempts to set prices. Reinforcing the statement produced at the 
Assize, he stated that once the justices had made public assurances to protect the poor 
from the current scarcity of wheat, they were consequently obliged to meet any 
disturbance with the full rigours of the law.444 But attempts by the county bench to meet 
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the crowds’ demands for lower prices persisted, alongside the resolutions for more 
dynamic suppression. 
Apparently adhering to the ‘new firmness,’ Poulett rode out to meet a crowd at 
Ilminster on the 31st March. The crowd had been at nearby Chard the day before where 
they had held a magistrate and commander of a troop of yeomanry, Colonel Hanning, 
hostage for two hours. Hanning had been released when he had agreed to sign their paper, 
and had dismissed his troops. The same crowd, it was being reported, would have hanged 
a farmer with a halter had it not been for the timely intervention of some local gentlemen. 
Poulett met the crowd, accompanied by troops. He received a deputation from them 
and ‘expostulated and offered terms’. His terms were rejected three times over an hour 
and three-quarters. Losing his patience, Poulett threatened to set the troops amongst the 
crowd, and the delegation finally conceded. They dispersed having secured prices for 
provisions (although not at the level they set) that would stand until a meeting of the 
magistracy was convened.445  
Simcoe wrote to Earl Poulett shortly after the disturbances at Chard and Ilminster, 
warning him of the impropriety of setting a dangerous example to the ‘impatient poor, 
misguided by a set of Jacobins’. He entreated Poulett, ‘by all that you hold dear…’ 
‘… by your attachment to the constitution of the country, and the real happiness of every 
rank of society, in no one instance to compromise your own dignity and our common safety, 
by admitting for a moment that any persons, or body of people should force others to 
dispose of their property and not leave them to their own choice – a most illegal act, and in 
itself totally subversive of liberty and property, our household words so dear to the heart of 
every honest Englishman’. 
 
Simcoe framed his appeal in terms of the nation and the law, espousing adherence to the 
legal protection of property as a means to insure British liberty. He also implied that in 
risking his ‘own dignity,’ Poulett compromised his authority as commander of the civil 
power in Somerset.446 
The criticisms of Simcoe and the Home Secretary did not dissuade Poulett from 
convening the meeting of the magistracy as planned. On 4 April the farmers, millers, 
mealmen and Bakers met at Ilminster, and under the chairmanship of Poulett 
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‘voluntarily’ agreed to sell provisions at fixed prices.447 No doubt the Lord Lieutenant 
exerted some influence as a local landholder, his seat at Hinton St George was five miles 
east of the town; but his connection, as well as his office, also denoted a responsibility to 
address the causes of unrest. The arrangements brokered by Poulett were offset by the 
trial and swift execution of two rioters within a fortnight of the meeting.448 
 
The aftermath of the disturbances continued to betray the tensions manifested by the 
actions of the magistracy and the subsistence crises in Somerset. Portland had written to 
Poulett reminding him that the use of troops was imperative to the maintenance of order, 
and in slightly stronger terms, Simcoe boasted that there were enough troops in the 
vicinity of Chard to face Bonaparte himself. The aim was ‘to intimidate that part of the 
Country’ into submission.449 
As Adrian Randall has suggested, the adoption of this stance saw judicial 
recommendations unravel.450 Buoyed by the presence of forces in the area, the farmers 
reneged on the deal. Davis wrote again to Acland confirming ‘the Agreement entered into 
at Bridgwater is at an end. 
What the consequence will be it is even unpleasant to surmise. The People here were two 
days without Bread, and I fear, from the fickle and avaricious Conduct of the Farmers they 
may put their Threatenings in Execution.’ 
 
To keep them in ‘awe’ a troop of horse was sent into the neighbourhood.451 
 
* * * 
 
The disorder of 1801 laid bare the complexities of maintaining order; but the challenges 
faced by the magistracy were also evident in 1795 and 1800. In Norfolk in 1795, and in 
Somerset in 1801, crowd actions beyond the market place required the mobilisation of the 
civil forces over considerable tracts of land. These mobile protests were made all the 
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more concerning by radical agitation, and the cooperation of different occupational 
groups and communities. 
The means of suppressing unrest were underpinned by the different 
governmental arrangements in each county as much as they were by differences in 
attitude. In Norfolk, the Lord Lieutenant, Marquis Townshend had been on his guard 
from 1791. He was able to mobilise the judicial divisions, assisted by troops of 
yeomanry, to create a network to police protest across the county. The complexity of 
juridical arrangements in Somerset and the uneven distribution of magistrates across 
the county could not withstand the scale of protest in 1801. Paternalist conciliation 
therefore, was offered as a means of preventing more significant rebellion.  
The different responses in each county, nonetheless, underline the scope for 
autonomous action lodged with the county commissions. In contrasting ways, the 
magistracy tailored their responses according to their understanding of circumstances, 
even if it placed them at odds with central authority. 
 
4. The use of the courts 
 
Less than half of the crowd actions in Norfolk and Somerset resulted in prosecutions (see 
tables 5 and 6 above). As the arrest figures show, very few of those involved were 
apprehended, let alone charged in court. Considering crowds could number into the 
hundreds, the ability of the magistracy to apprehend and prosecute significant numbers 
was severely curtailed by both manpower on the spot, and the subsequent expenses of 
incarceration and prosecution. The crowds’ victims may also have been reluctant to 
pursue cases where significant sectors of the community would not share in their attempts 
to criminalise ‘moral’ regulation.452 The social upheaval more comprehensive 
prosecutions would create also had to be taken into account. Consequently, the 
magistracy tended towards exemplary prosecution – at least at the Assizes and Quarter 
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Sessions. This selective and limited use of the courts was replicated across many of the 
effected areas in both 1795 and 1800-01.453 
Quantifying cases that were brought before the courts, poses its own problems: 
firstly, it is not always possible to relate crowd actions to prosecutions. All the 
prosecutions included here are ones that can be clearly related to actions included in the 
enumeration above (figs. 22-5). Other prosecutions made in the period suggest that they 
may have been related to crowd actions – for example the case brought against Stephen 
Taylor, Jeremiah Green and John Rich at the Lent Assizes in Somerset in 1801: the three 
men were charged with ‘assisting in company’ in breaking into the mill of William 
Bough with intent to steal. Aside from the indications that they acted together and they 
had targeted a miller, this case cannot conclusively be seen as the result of popular action. 
Similarly, other charges of riot cannot be clearly linked to the subsistence crises: in 1795, 
three men were charged at the Somerset quarter sessions for riot and the assault of 
Edward Best, and at the next sessions, thirteen people were charged with riotously 
assembling and attempting to bring ‘scandal and infamy’ upon Mary Bobbett spinster. 
Both cases appear to have been motivated by personal disputes rather than community 
actions in response to dearth.454 
Local justices may have preferred to deal with some of the rioters under summary 
jurisdiction, discharging them once they had given sureties for their good behaviour. 
However, this is almost impossible to estimate due to the paucity of records. There is 
some evidence of the use of informal sanctions, for example: prisoners taken up at 
Walcot (Bath) for a riotous assault on a suspected forestaller in May 1800, were 
processed back into the city where all bar two of them ‘were dismissed with severe 
reprimands’. The arresting magistrate, Bowen, did, however, openly advocate the 
prosecution of ‘Higlers’ (like the victim) for being ‘the Cause of so much Clamour 
amongst the Poor.’455 
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Figure 28: Prosecuting Courts in Norfolk 
 
 Assizes 
(nos. tried) 
Quarter 
Sessions 
(nos. tried) 
Borough 
Quarter 
Sessions 
1795-6 4 13 0 
1800-01 2  0 1 
 
Figure 29: Prosecuting Courts in Somerset 
 
 Assize 
(nos. tried) 
Quarter 
Sessions 
(nos. tried) 
1795-6 1* 0 
1800-01 9 7 
*Sent from trial in King’s Bench to the County Assize 
 
Even with relatively few cases brought before the courts in each county, rather different 
patterns in prosecutorial practices are discernable. At one level, the number of cases 
heard reflects the respective levels of protest experienced in each county: more 
prosecutions were made in Norfolk in 1795 than in 1800-01, whereas the significantly 
greater scale of unrest in the later period in Somerset saw more cases brought before the 
courts (see above figures 22-5, 28 and 29)456. On closer inspection, the selection of cases 
in both counties reveals particular judicial responses to local contexts and national 
pressures. 
 
4.1 The Norfolk Courts 
 
None of the cases tried in Norfolk in 1795 were related to price-fixing crowds or market 
disturbances. All the prosecutions were made against those involved in the blockades at 
Diss and Sharrington, and for the reportedly insurrectionary meeting at Saxlingham.457 In 
many respects, the county magistrates were towing the government line by focusing their 
attentions on these incidents. The Duke of Portland had sent a circular to the Lord 
Lieutenants of the counties in July 1795 emphasising the stringency with which the 
magistracy should treat all those who ‘obstructed’ the removal of grain and thereby the 
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government’s program of supply. ‘Every degree of legal authority’, Portland maintained, 
should be employed to prevent ‘all such unlawful proceedings’ and the magistrates 
should be encouraged to ‘issue their warrants for apprehending and seizing all persons 
concerned therein, in order that they may be dealt with according to Law.’458 
 These measures seemed to be employed with alacrity in Norfolk. Having taken 
two men during the Sharrington blockade, Henry Jodrell explained to Townshend his 
intention to ‘apprehend 3 or 4 of the worst and commit them to be tried for riotous 
unlawful assembly.’ The justice succeeded in his task, and seven men and women were 
tried for riot at the county sessions at Norwich in January 1796. The women were 
acquitted and the four men received sentences of imprisonment from six to nine 
months.459 Five individuals were charged before the same bench for riot and rescue at 
Diss; three of whom were referred to the Assizes on potentially capital charges. James 
Beasor (alias Berry) was also committed to Aylsham bridewell for 12 months, and 
entered in to sureties to keep the peace for two years, for ‘reading a seditious and 
libellous hand-bill…to a multitude of people’.460 While the prosecutions served the 
interests of government, it must not be forgotten that the county’s chief business was the 
production and export of grain. Townshend, and other justices as landholders and 
gentleman farmers were no doubt concerned to prevent such ‘Outrages upon the 
Commerce of the County.’461 
 
Figure 30: Charges 
 
 Riot Riot +* Other 
1795-6 7 5 1** 
1800-1 1 2 0 
* Riot plus an aggravating circumstance: for example – riot and rescue, riot and assault, or riot and 
unspecified misdemeanour. ** For sedition. 
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Figure 31: Verdicts 
 
 Guilty at 
Assize 
Not guilty 
at Assize 
Guilty at 
QS 
Not guilty 
at QS 
Total 
1795 1 3 9 5 18 
1800-01 2 0 0 1 [City 
bench] 
3 
 
Figure 32: Sentencing 
 
Year Court Charge Prison ≤ 6 
months 
Prison ≤ 12 
months 
Sentence: 
other 
1795-6 Quarter 
Sessions 
Riot 5 - - 
  Riot & Rescue - - 3 referred to 
Assize* 
  Sedition - 1 - 
 Assize Riot & Rescue* 1 - - 
1800-1 Assize Riot & 
Misdemeanour 
- 2 - 
 
Despite being the site of repeated market disturbances in 1795 and 1800-01, the Norwich 
justices showed little inclination to prosecute those involved. Only one case was brought 
before the borough bench in 1800, and the defendant was acquitted for their part in the 
disturbance at New Mills (above, figs. 28 and 31).462 Again the memory of 1766 must 
have loomed large in Norwich. As detailed above, the execution of rioters under a Special 
Commission that year, had brought popular – and critically, cross-class – censure down 
on the city justices. Their management of crowd actions, particularly in 1800, was 
ensured to minimise social disruption.463 The City magistrates did not need to lay 
themselves open to criticism by making unpopular prosecutions; all the cases tried by the 
county magistracy in 1795-6 were heard at the county sessions at Norwich. Many of the 
defendants (and feasibly the prosecutors) were not brought before their nearest court at 
Holt, where personal feeling may well have coloured proceedings, but tried centrally, at 
the county capital as a measured warning to all.464 
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above 3.2 
464 NRO: C/S 1/15 Sessions Books 1791-1800. 
 
 
150 
4.2 The Somerset Courts 
 
A very different pattern of prosecution is found in Somerset. The majority of cases in 
1801, and the only case in 1795, were tried at the county assize (above, fig. 27). The 
emphasis here was on exemplary prosecution. In 1801, the assizes were convened at 
Taunton at the end of March, in the midst of unrest. The convictions were calculated to 
put an end to widespread protest in the county and the south west more generally (fig. 
35).465  
 
Figure 33: Charges 
 
 Riot Riot & theft Theft (during 
crowd action) 
‘Exciting’ riot 
1800-1 4 9 2 1 
 
Figure 34: Verdicts 
 
 Guilty at 
Assize 
Not guilty 
at Assize 
Guilty at 
QS 
Not guilty 
at QS 
Unknown Total 
1795 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1800-01 4 4 1 6 1  16 
 
Figure 35: Sentencing 
 
Year Court Charge Prison ≤ 12 
months 
Sentence: 
other 
1795 Assize Exciting riot 
(neglect of 
duty as a JP) 
- Struck from 
commission of 
the peace 
1800-01 Quarter 
Sessions 
Riot 1 - 
 Assize Riot 1 - 
  Grand Larceny - 1 transported 
7 years 
  Felony 
Theft/breaking 
and entering 
- 2 death 
 
The use of the assizes also points to central intervention in the administration of justice in 
the county. A reluctance to prosecute amongst the local magistracy is discernable in 
1795, and only one of the seven individuals tried by the Somerset bench between July 
1800 and January 1801, was found guilty (figs 27, 34 and 35). The only case brought in 
relation to the 1795 disturbances provided an extraordinary example – the defendant 
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himself was a magistrate. This case and the capital conviction of two rioters in 1801 were 
certainly intended to counter popular protest and the over-conciliatory attitude of the 
local judiciary. 
 
4.3 George Donisthorpe and the crisis of paternalism 
 
In 1796, George Donisthorpe, gentleman and resident magistrate of Somerton, was tried 
for ‘wilful neglect of his duty as a magistrate’ in refusing to assist in quelling a riot and 
‘with having rather encouraged it.’466 The public prosecution of a Justice of the Peace 
was an exceptional occurrence.467 His prosecution exemplifies the tensions between the 
exercise of judicial discretion in the context of unrest, and changing attitudes to the 
nature of local authority, particularly with regard to paternalist interventions in the chains 
of supply. Donisthorpe’s case was initially brought before the centrally administered 
Court of Kings Bench and subsequently tried publicly at the Somerset Summer Assizes in 
1796. It is an exceptional case but one that has been largely overlooked thus far.468 
Interrogating the archive of the King’s Bench reveals the full circumstances of the case, 
and provides a rare insight into the regulation of the magistracy at law.  
The court of King’s Bench provided the only check on magisterial discretion; 
holding the power to review justices’ decisions and to punish magistrates for their 
actions. Douglas Hay has made a compelling case to show that due to a reliance on the 
magistracy as the ‘front-line’ of law enforcement, the King’s Bench tolerated a 
considerable amount of ignorance and misconduct amongst the county Commissions of 
the Peace.469  In theory, a justice could be prosecuted by criminal indictment or criminal 
information but prosecution under the latter was especially rare. Magistrates were 
frequently given the benefit of the doubt, ‘even where a justice acts illegally… if he has 
acted honestly and candidly, without oppression, malice, revenge, or any bad view or ill 
intention whatsoever, the court will never punish him in this extraordinary course of an 
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information.’470 A criminal indictment was used to prosecute for intentionally illegal 
actions on the part of the magistrate, but an information was only warranted when  
‘‘flagrant proofs of their having acted from corrupt motives’’ were produced.471 Despite 
the general leniency of the Court towards their brethren, Donisthorpe was brought before 
them under criminal information. Between 1790 and at least 1805, he was the only 
Somerset Justice to be informed against in the Kings Bench.472 
The indictment against Donisthorpe described how a number of Somerton’s 
inhabitants ‘unlawfully and wickedly conspired combined and confederated 
together…with force and arms’ to seize wagonloads of corn deposited in the town for 
sale at the market on 28 July 1795. The case for the prosecution was based on accusations 
made by Richard Welch, a gentleman from Somerton, and James Lovell of Wells, a 
Baker and Cornfactor.473 
According to Lovell, the target of the crowd was corn belonging to Thomas Burnell 
and Richard Pierce of Wells stored at the house of John Haggett, a Malster. The crowd 
obstructed the passage of the wagon leaving Haggett’s, stating that ‘the wheat should not 
be taken away and they had orders from Mr Donisthorpe to stop it.’474 Mr Welch 
described how the most ‘dangerous consequences’ of this disturbance were prevented by 
‘by the judicious interference’ of Rev. Walter Wightwick, resident and Justice of the 
Peace for Somerton.475  Despite being ‘an aged and infirm man’, Wightwick ‘went 
amongst…the Rioters and used all the Arguments he could to prevail on them to 
disperse’. He also persuaded Burnell and Pierce to sell him the wheat for ‘the use of the 
Poor’. Lovell maintained that they consented, as they feared it would only be taken by 
force. The corn was then taken to the Reverend’s house, adjacent to Donisthorpe’s home. 
Lovell continued that he was surprised that Donisthorpe had not been present in 
assisting Wightwick, particularly when the disturbance occurred in such close proximity 
to his house. Welch said he had seen Donisthorpe’s servant Samuel Martin going in and 
out of his master’s house, and accused him of being one of the most active of the rioters. 
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Lovell encountered Donisthorpe in the Bear Inn later that day, sitting in a public room 
‘composedly smoaking a Pipe’.476 When Lovell questioned his inactivity he replied, ‘that 
they [the rioters] had been with him the night before, and said they were starving’, 
He told them it was better to steal than to starve. They asked the Magistrate if he would 
hurt them if they stopped the corn. He replied if you do not injure me, I shall not hurt a 
hair of your heads. 
 
Lovell’s testimony compounded Welch’s accusation that Donisthorpe had prior 
knowledge of the incident and had actively encouraged the alleged disturbance.477  
In his defence, Donisthorpe claimed that he had been absent from the town for the 
majority of that day, and that when he had been in the market, no disturbance had taken 
place. All the witnesses examined in support of Donisthorpe also testified that no riot had 
occurred, and that the people present had only assisted in moving, loading and unloading 
the corn in a peaceable manner.478 
There had been prolonged shortages in the market at Somerton. John Barrett, a 
Baker, had been forced to cease baking for want of wheat.479 Barrett and several others 
argued that the ‘Scarcity is Artificial and created by certain cornfactors and mealmen 
who forestalled and monopolized the Corn whereby there was little or no wheat brought 
into Somerton Market for sale other than that which was privately sold by sample to said 
Cornfactors and mealmen.’480 So ‘middlemen’ - like James Lovell -were seen to frustrate 
‘correct market practices’. Another Deponent explained that the people gathered in the 
market had only come to ensure that some ‘Wheat might be Lodged in the Market as 
usual in order that they…might purchase and have Bread’.481 
 Donisthorpe had made an attempt to quieten discontented voices the week before 
the incident. During a conversation that had taken place in a local inn ‘something passed 
respecting the stoppage of corn’ and Donisthorpe had been heard to say ‘there was corn 
enough in the town and neighbourhood and he would take care it should be kept there.’482 
Two parish constables and an overseer of the poor, present during the alleged riot, 
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testified in support of the justice, maintaining that the inhabitants were merely helping to 
load and unload the corn. Constable Thomas Dowden argued that had there been any 
disturbance he, along with the local justices – including Donisthorpe - would have 
fulfilled their duties by assisting to quell it.483  
Even testimony offered by the prosecution, can be read in support of Donisthorpe’s 
inactivity as well as the plight of the poor. The Times reported that a clerical justice 
(probably Wightwick) had been called upon to read the Riot Act but declined: ‘he did not 
think it proper to as he deemed it best to appease the populace by quiet means rather than 
to irritate them by rigid ones, declaring that he saw no necessity of putting in force any of 
the powers vested in him as a magistrate.’484 The Times also confirmed that the corn had 
been bought by subscription for the use of the poor.485. The authorities at Somerton - 
Donisthorpe, the constables and overseers, and even Wightwick indirectly - upheld 
popular appeals to the ‘moral economy’. But their paternalist sentiment flew in the face 
of government concern for the free circulation of grain, and was punished accordingly. 
Donisthorpe’s actions were presented in such a fashion as to bring down the full 
force of the law. Not only was he accused of actively encouraging a ‘conspiracy’ 
amongst the townsfolk to riot, as it was framed in the indictment, but concern was 
expressed about the troop of volunteers he had raised. Richard Welch reported to the 
Kings Bench that the corps were armed ‘and had been learning their Exercise’, and that in 
consequence of the riot the peaceful inhabitants of Somerton were in fear for their 
‘persons and property’.486 Welch also alleged that the clerk, who had sworn 
Donisthorpe’s affidavits, was under the influence of the Justice and some of his 
witnesses. In consequence, he was accused of deliberately misleading the court in his 
attempt to claim no riot had occurred.487 Parallels were even drawn between 
Donisthorpe’s actions and those of Alderman Kennet, Mayor of London, who, in 1780, 
had failed to act decisively against the anti-Catholic rioters until the city faced 
devastation.488 While the incident at Somerton bore little resemblance to the Gordon 
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Riots, the implication was that Donisthorpe and Kennett shared a supine disposition and 
sympathy for the rioters’ cause.489 The portrayal of Donsithorpe in this manner 
highlighted the worst abuses, and weaknesses, of magisterial authority. 
Donisthorpe’s case was presided over by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon who shared 
some of the sensibilities of judicial paternalism. He ‘felt that the law must sustain the 
rights of the poor as well as the wealthy, [and] was profoundly convinced of the 
immorality as well as the illegality of…marketing offences.’ During the dearth of 1795-6, 
Kenyon actively encouraged the prosecution of those in breach of the repealed laws 
against forestalling, regrating and engrossing. He believed that by asserting the 
legislation that underpinned the popular conception of the moral economy, he could, and 
had, prevented riots.490  
Considering Kenyon’s paternalism as well as the general leniency of the King’s 
Bench to the lay magistracy, Donisthorpe’s prosecution appears particularly harsh. It was 
within Kenyon’s power to throw out the information, or at least refuse to grant a rule 
absolute and thus prevent a public prosecution before a special jury at the court of Assize. 
But Kenyon concluded the proceedings at the King’s Bench by stating ‘He was not then 
to decide on the guilt or innocence of this Gentleman. He hoped he was innocent. But he 
thought the door of justice ought not to be shut here,’ that the case should go to trial at the 
Assizes and be ‘discussed in the face of the Public’.491 
Hay noted in his study of the Staffordshire magistracy, that criminal informations 
‘touched on issues of sharp political and social significance to gentlemen’ and that a case 
was far more likely to be forwarded if the magistrate’s behaviour ‘cast a bad light on their 
class and office’. The stoppage and seizure at Somerton in July 1795 occurred three days 
after Portland’s circular specifying the illegality of such actions and calling for their 
rigorous punishment.492 In this context, Kenyon could not be seen to forgive riot, even 
when it stemmed from what was arguably misplaced paternalist concern. Donisthorpe 
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had been presented – in the words of the indictment - as an ‘evil example’ to others.493 He 
was perhaps already a contentious figure having been brought before the Assizes 
concerning a summary conviction in 1795.494 In a judicial system still reliant on 
exemplars, Donisthorpe was a suitable target and his case provided a useful opportunity 
to make it explicitly clear to the public that riot was not to be tolerated and that not even 
the magistracy were beyond the reach of the law. 
At the Somerset Assizes, Donisthorpe was defended by Thomas Erskine, a 
controversial figure who had secured the freedom of the leadership of the London 
Corresponding Society in the treason trials of 1794. The central theme of his argument 
drew heavily upon the tradition of judicial paternalism. Erskine presented his client as a 
Gentleman, loyal to the Establishment, concerned with the maintenance of order, who, 
‘foregoing his own ease, and the pleasures of retired life… when some persons high in 
Administration thought we were in danger from foreign invasion and internal feuds’, had 
‘raised at a very considerable expence and personal trouble, a corps of yeomanry to 
defend his country.’ Justice Donisthorpe, ‘feeling for the state of the poor’, was presented 
as ‘amongst the largest subscribers to relieve the distress, and consequently to quiet the 
minds of the starving poor.’495  
Certainly his eloquent defence did not sway the judge who, in his summation, led 
the jury to find Donisthorpe guilty for having ‘not exercised the powers vested in him as 
a magistrate, in coming forward to prevent practices which were most illegal’.496 He was 
convicted for negligence, falling short of inciting riot, and subsequently removed from 
the county Commission of the Peace. Perhaps Erskine’s most pertinent point was that 
Donisthorpe ‘acted according to his best discretion; and hard indeed would be the lot of 
Magistrates, were they not at liberty to judge for themselves.’ His argument tended to the 
base of magisterial authority, but it also highlighted its weakness. The nature of 
Donisthorpe’s prosecution made explicit the tensions between traditional paternalist 
forms of authority and the demands of central government. He provided a potent 
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deterrent to other paternalists: even as a magistrate, he was not beyond the reach of the 
law. 
 
Lord Kenyon ruled again in June 1801 regarding the interventions of the magistracy – but 
this was not a case regarding a criminal information, nonetheless the Mayor and 
Magistrates of Bath, found their conduct queried publically by the city’s bakers. The 
bakers had complained that the Magistrates had broken with established conventions by 
fixing the price of wheat according to the Bristol market, rather than by an average taken 
from prices at Warminster and Devizes (Wiltshire).497 
The Bath justices claimed they had altered their processes because the bakers 
‘used to buy up the grain at these markets [Warminster and Devizes] and practise 
methods to enhance the price of bread’; in light of these malpractices the magistrates 
‘were induced to take the average from the great public market of Bristol, over which the 
bakers could have no influence.’ The bakers denied such callous behaviour arguing that 
the assize was then set so low, they ‘could not get a fair profit for their labour’.498  
In this instance, Lord Kenyon firmly maintained his paternalist sentiments and 
ruled in favour of the magistrates. This case did not pertain to any disturbances, and the 
justices’ defence – Thomas Erskine again – had statutory precedents with which to back 
their decision. In making his ruling. Kenyon stated ‘that there never was a case where 
there was less occasion to make harsh remarks on the conduct of Magistrates than the 
present.’ They, he continued, ‘had a discretionary power in chusing what market they 
thought proper.’ The bakers were reproached for showing ‘an inclination to grind the 
faces of the poor, [and] they might do much mischief in their endeavour to enrich 
themselves.’499 Kenyon’s ruling at this point was safely couched by the law, and the fact 
that the city and the county had been peaceful for some months. It is clear however, that 
his concern to support the attentions of the Bath magistracy to market practices was 
informed by the disturbances that had gone before. 
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As Hay has shown in Kenyon’s prosecution of Samuel Waddington for 
engrossing in 1800-01, the court of King’s Bench played a significant part in shaping 
public opinion and policy in the debate over paternalist versus political economic 
measures in the context of riot.500 While Donisthorpe’s prosecution was markedly 
different from Waddington’s, his trial was likewise used as a platform, in this case, to 
support government supply issues, and to establish the limits of judicial discretion. 
 
4.4 The trial of Samuel Tout and Robert Westcott, 1801 
 
Protest in Somerset in the spring of 1801 had effectively been put paid to by the 
execution of Samuel Tout and Robert Westcott. The two men were arrested for breaking 
in to a baker’s premises at Old Cleeve in Somerset on 30th March. They were singled out 
from a crowd of more than twenty, as having forced the baker’s wife, Mary Griffey, to 
sell them loaves of bread at 10d, and sign a paper promising to maintain this price.501 
Their prosecution exemplified central government’s rejection of moral economic 
sentiment. 
Tout and Westcott were tried only three days after their arrest at the Somerset 
Assize, already sitting at Taunton. Considering their actions in setting the price had been 
replicated in other parts of the county without eliciting sanctions, their case was framed 
to ensure that they would not escape punishment. They were indicted on three counts of 
capital felony: putting fear into the defendant in the process of stealing from their house, 
breaking and entering, and theft. The prosecution went to pains to emphasise the 
illegality of their actions and to detract from their willingness to pay for the goods. Mrs 
Griffey explained that the value of a loaf was in fact 1s and 6d, and that she had indeed 
been forced to part with it for less than the asking price. In his summation of the evidence 
to the jury, the Judge dismissed the first charge against the defendants, but carefully 
outlined the validity of the remaining two, concluding that the fact they had paid their 
own price for the bread, was 
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‘the same as if they had taken it without paying anything, because no person has a right to 
fix the price, and take another persons property.’502 
 
Both men were found guilty and sentenced to death with no hope of a reprieve. In passing 
sentence, the judge made the purpose of their trial explicit: he observed that Tout and 
Westcott ‘had formed part one of those mobs, who, under pretence of lowering the price 
of provisions, commit depredations upon the community.’ He hoped that all those within 
the court, and those ‘who were without’, ‘might learn from their fatal example the 
dreadful consequences which arise from such crimes.’503  
 The two men had been tried and sentenced within seventy-two hours of their 
arrest. While executions normally took place at Ilchester, in this instance they were 
removed to Taunton, on market day, ‘by way of a stronger example’. Tout and Westcott 
were hanged on the 15th April, under military guard in case of disturbance. None 
occurred and Earl Poulett, the Lord Lieutenant, hoped they would ‘have a good effect.’504  
The case has been cited as a much needed example to counter the conciliatory 
attitude shown by much of the county magistracy.505 The disturbance in the Stogursey 
area had taken place only the day before the riot at Old Cleeve, and the crowd at Chard 
had held Colonel Hanning hostage on the same day. The county authorities were in 
disarray and concessions to the crowd only seemed to perpetuate unrest. The draconian 
trial and execution of Tout and Westcott by centrally appointed judges and the Crown 
counsel, ensured the demands of the centre were met in the provinces, and levelled tacit 
criticism at the ability of the local magistracy to maintain order. But there is evidence to 
suggest that members of the county commission – beyond the Lord Lieutenant – were 
complicit in the handling of this case. The two magistrates who committed Tout and 
Westcott for theft were Thomas Gordon and Rev. George Trevelyan. Both were justices 
for the hundred of Willerton and Freemanners in which Old Cleeve was situated, and 
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Trevelyan was the closest magistrate to the village, living four miles away at 
Nettlecombe.506 
The Assize grand jury, responsible for progressing indictments to trial, was usually 
comprised of ‘gentlemen of the best figure in the county’; increasingly their number was 
made up from the county magistracy.507 Of the gentlemen included in the Somerset grand 
jury in 1801, approximately one third can be confirmed as acting magistrates for the 
county and three-quarters were members of the commission of the peace. None of them, 
however, were involved in the active suppression of riot on the ground. Perhaps more 
significantly, the foreman of the jury, James Bernard of Crowcombe, had a vested interest 
in the case as a resident justice for the division of Willerton and Freemanners. Bernard, 
and other of the Somerset justices, therefore, were also responsible for the gamut of 
capital charges Tout and Westcott faced.508  
The involvement of county magistrates in this case does not alter the fact that it 
countered the level of concessions granted in Somerset, or that it no doubt offered the 
Home Secretary some satisfaction; but it does show that the local magistracy were not 
passive, and merely led by the centre into acts of judicial terror. As was the case in 
Norfolk, different benches or groups of justices held different perspectives on the best 
means of suppressing disorder, and in this particular context, the expediency of 
paternalist concessions. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
By paying closer attention to the physical arrangement of authority in each county, this 
chapter offers a more comprehensive understanding of judicial responses to disorder. 
Two markedly different patterns of judicial behaviour emerge as a result. The highly 
rationalised organisation of judicial divisions in Norfolk and the complimentary 
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organisation of the Yeomanry allowed Townshend to create a network with which to 
police the county in 1795. In Somerset, the uneven distribution of magistrates and the 
complexity of governmental arrangements frustrated the swift suppression of unrest most 
notably in the spring of 1801. Space was created for the itinerant crowds to take the upper 
hand. Consequently the Somerset justices resorted more frequently to conciliatory tactics 
than the Norfolk bench, whose energetic suppression of disorder adhered more closely to 
the demands of central government. 
 The adoption or otherwise of paternalist measures was not merely predicated on 
available resources. In both counties, genuine fears regarding the influence of radical and 
revolutionary agitation informed judicial activity. Reports of seditious meetings, and 
wage disputes and the potential for more widespread protest, particularly along the 
Norfolk coast, underpinned Townshend’s concern for the total surveillance of the county. 
And as Evered explained to Acland, if the itinerant crowds touring the county were not 
brought back into the fold by conciliation, their number might prefigure a more 
significant rebellion. Indeed, as Randall and Hay have posited, recourse to the paternalist 
model provided the means of securing community cohesion in times of acute crisis.509  
There is, however, evidence that adherence to paternalism was more than 
pragmatic. Thomas Horner’s interventions at Frome, the attitude of both county and city 
magistrates at Bath and in Norwich, indicate that notions of duty and obligation to the 
governed were not necessarily timely platitudes. While paternalist regulation was clearly 
an important part of the judicial repertoire, as Randall and Charlesworth have argued, 
recourse to these practices signal the ‘symbolic importance’ of such actions ‘as totems of 
a deep-rooted normality.’ They were vital in the restoration of order and social 
relationships.510 
In addressing the operation of governmental structures the complex of social and 
political relations negotiated by the magistracy have been drawn out. The Norfolk and 
Norwich benches offer a potent contrast in their preferences for hard and soft tactics. But 
they were, as discussed in chapter two, very different groups of people, working in 
different contexts. The Norwich bench bound in no small way by the moral economic 
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sensibilities of the city, were more embedded within it as tradesmen and entrepreneurs. 
The county justices’ adherence to Portland’s resolutions in 1795 was not necessarily 
evidence of deference to the centre, but a means of securing the commercial activity on 
which their estates were founded. Their ability to police the county was reliant on 
mobilising local connections and networks. The Yeomanry, comprised of gentlemen and 
their tenantry, and led by magistrates in many instances, augmented rather than detracted 
from the authority of the civil force. Divergent attitudes can also be found in Somerset, 
between the county and borough benches at Wells, and between the justices on the 
ground and those in the grand jury. Here, the issues revolved around conflicting 
perspectives on market regulation and the role of the judiciary. Unsatisfied with the 
corporate bench’s apparent paternalist sympathies, the commercial interests at Wells 
sought to use the county justices’ concomitant jurisdiction to address their grievances. In 
1801, by seeking clarification on the use of the military, and in supporting the 
prosecution of Tout and Westcott, the magistrates on the grand jury signalled their 
dissatisfaction with paternalist concessions and their willingness to pursue more stringent 
means of restoring order. These conflicting perspectives in Somerset in 1801 contributed 
to the breakdown of social alliances that made paternalist measures work. 
Divergent opinion within local government was indicative of both its strengths and 
weaknesses. It afforded scope for both independence and inconsistency. The crises of 
1795-1801 highlighted many of the weaknesses of traditional magisterial authority. The 
lack of manpower was exacerbated by the exercise of judicial discretion. The prosecution 
of George Donisthorpe exemplified government distaste for judicial paternalism, and 
recast the pre-eminence of local authority and discretionary justice as the characteristics 
of arbitrary rule. But this period did not witness a more comprehensive attack on the 
traditional formations of local government. The magistracy retained their independence. 
As Eastwood has suggested, despite criticisms of the county magistracy, and judicial 
paternalism in particular, central government was unwilling to publically undermine the 
traditions of English governance when engaged in war with Revolutionary France and 
facing agitation for more egalitarian reform at home.511 
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 Governmental histories locate a more concerted challenge to the independence of 
the magistracy and patriarchal government in the 1830s. The Swing disturbances exposed 
the long-term effects of the social policies implemented in the last decade of the 
eighteenth century, and the weaknesses of both judicial discretion and traditional, 
personal forms of government.512 But neither protest nor government histories have 
considered the responses of the magistracy to Swing in detail. Part II of this thesis seeks 
to redress this deficiency in our understanding and consider the decline of paternalism in 
a new context. 
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Part II: The Magistracy and Swing 
 
The strain placed on rural society during the agricultural depression in the wake of the 
Napoleonic Wars, and the Swing disturbances in particular, placed unprecedented 
pressure on law enforcement and the administration of local government. Unemployment 
and underemployment, high rents, and tithes, exacerbated social tensions. Perhaps 
considered most pernicious was the widespread practice of subsidising the wages of 
impoverished labourers from the poor rates. The investigations of the poor law 
commissioners in the aftermath of Swing attributed the disturbances, to a considerable 
extent, to this maladministration of the poor laws.513 
Inherent within that discussion was a reappraisal of the magistracy and the function 
of parochial authority. Nassau Senior, perhaps the most influential member of the Poor 
Law Commission convened in 1832, criticised the paternal relationship between local 
authorities and the poor. The alleged willingness of the local judiciary to support wage 
subsidies from the rates and intervene on the side of relief claimants, encouraged a 
dependency that generated an expectation of support. An expectation, it was claimed, that 
would only lead to increasing demands for relief and thus greater unrest as a means of 
achieving them.514 The failure of the magistracy to effectively put down the disturbances 
of 1830 likewise furthered demands for more professional policing. Collectively, this 
contributed to a sense that forms of governance that privileged localism and discretion 
were incoherent and inadequate.515 
With the implementation of the New Poor Law in 1834, the local justice of the 
peace was ostensibly removed from his pivotal position in the administration of relief.516 
This legislation, along with the extension of professional policing beyond the Metropolis, 
significantly altered the role of the magistracy, reducing their powers in local government 
and law enforcement, and moving control towards a system governed by policies 
established at the centre. 
                                                
513 Chapter 1.3. 
514 P. Dunkley, The Crisis of the Old Poor Law in England 1795-1834 (London: Garland, 1982) 98-100. 
515 D. Eastwood, Government and Community in the English Provinces, 1700-1870 (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1997), 132-3. 
516  S. & B. Webb, English Local Government: Volume 1, The Parish and the County (London: Longmans 
and Co, 1906, this edition, London: Frank Cass and Co. 1963) 603-4. 
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 Histories of local government posit this intervention by the centre as the crisis 
point for paternalist governance.517 The works of Wells and Bohstedt have also 
considered these changes as pivotal factors in the decline of judicial paternalism in the 
context of unrest in the nineteenth century.518 But there remains little concerted study of 
the magistracy and the ways in which they dealt with the Swing disturbances. This 
section of the thesis seeks to redress the balance and pursue the decline of paternalism in 
this context. 
 
In 1969, Eric Hobsbawm and George Rudé published their seminal monograph on the 
disturbances, Captain Swing. Widely acclaimed, their detailed study has been the 
stimulus for much subsequent work. Their comprehensive study created a history of 
Swing from below.519 In establishing the scale of protest and the continuities in crowd 
action, they depicted Swing as a ‘coherent social movement’ that challenged the 
inequities of rural life.520 The work that has followed has developed Hobsbawm and 
Rudé’s original thesis, debating the scale and diffusion of protest, its political origins and 
impact and more recently, its congruence with popular notions of moral economy.521 
Most significantly, in terms of this thesis, Hobsbawm and Rudé devoted little space 
to the actions of the authorities. They noted, but largely dismissed, the variation in the 
                                                
517 Dunkley, op. cit., 106; Webbs, The Parish and the County, sig. chapter VI, from 557; D. Eastwood, 
Governing Rural England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 182-7, 262; idem, Government and Community, 
132-4. 
518 See Chapter 3: Introduction 
519 E. J. Hobsbawm and G. Rudé, Captain Swing (Lawrence and Wishart, 1969, this ed., London: Phoenix 
Press, 2001); P. Jones, ‘Finding Captain Swing: Protest, Parish Relations and the State of the Public Mind 
in 1830,’ International Review of Social History, 54 (2009): 429. 
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Charlesworth, Social Protest in Rural Society: The Spatial Diffusion of the Captain Swing Disturbances 
1830-1831, Historical Geography Research Series, I (Norwich: Geo. Abstracts for the Historical 
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behaviour of the county authorities in suppressing and prosecuting unrest.522 Indeed, 
there has been little interest in the multifarious responses of the authorities to disorder, 
since their work was published.523 Carl Griffin’s work on the south-eastern judiciary 
provides a noteworthy exception (see below). What attention has been paid has tended to 
focus on the repressive responses of the authorities, most notably the Special 
Commissions initiated to try Swing offenders, and the unprecedented scale of 
transportation used to punish those convicted. The county magistracy have largely been 
confined to the machinery of repression following the hardline established by central 
government.524  
However, as established in part one of this thesis, the magistracy occupied a 
powerful and yet precarious position: they constituted the ultimate authority in terms of 
local government, ruling in both administrative and criminal matters. And as residents of 
the communities over which they presided, they also had a vested interest in restoring 
peace and maintaining order.525 As Griffin’s analysis of the Kent judiciary has shown, 
policies of law enforcement ‘whilst loosely framed in the context of law, were not 
predetermined. They were dependent on the local contingencies which provided the 
context of events, personalities and the often odd juxtapositions created by unfolding 
events.’526 Consequently, the actions of the magistracy are worthy of more concentrated 
attention, both to better understand the social politics which shaped the disturbances, but 
also the impact of Swing on the administration of local government at this time. 
The following two chapters consider the Swing disturbances from the perspective 
of the local authorities: contributing to our understanding of the scope of the protests by 
offering a less reductive analysis of the actions of the county judiciary in suppressing 
disorder, and affording Swing a more pivotal role in historiographical discussions 
concerning the changing role of the magistracy and local government in the nineteenth 
century. 
                                                
522 Hobsbawm and Rudé, Captain Swing, 262. 
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524 C. Griffin, “Policy on the Hoof’: Sir Robert Peel, Sir Edward Knatchbull and the Trial of the Elham 
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The analysis presented here is based on a continuation of the two regional studies 
of Norfolk and Somerset and the actions of their respective county commissions of the 
peace. Addressing the disturbances at a local level allows the differences in the 
manifestation of popular protest - and the responses to it - to be understood through an 
exploration of local contexts and governmental structures. As Adrian Randall has argued, 
‘[c]lose attention to the local is clearly essential if we are to really understand the social 
politics, normally hidden from the historian’s sight, which was worked out in high relief 
only when riot or protest erupted.’527 Concerns have been expressed that the move 
towards micro-studies of Swing have the potential to fracture our understanding of it as a 
‘coherent social movement’ by concluding that each outbreak of unrest was regionally 
specific: a response to, and contingent upon, specific conditions within a given area.528 In 
many respects the two experiences of Swing in Norfolk and Somerset offer very different 
insights. Norfolk was one of the most disturbed ‘Swing’ counties, whereas Somerset 
remained comparatively peaceful. However, by reintegrating the two regional studies into 
a comparative analysis, continuities as well as disparities can be discerned, particularly 
with regard to the operation and attitudes of the magistracy, and contemporary 
perceptions of Swing as a movement.  
 
Nassau Senior’s criticisms of the magistracy in the wake of Swing echoed the 
disapproval of paternalist governance voiced forty years earlier during the subsistence 
crises of the 1790s. Although Edward Thompson cited the decline of paternalism (and the 
erosion of the moral economy) at this juncture, Senior’s concerns betrayed the 
persistence of this form of social relationship.529 Peter Jones has already advocated the 
use of Thompson’s conception of the ‘moral economy’ as a paradigm for understanding 
the Swing disturbances, arguing that the form and function of the protests were informed 
by a ‘legitimizing notion’, a popular understanding of the ‘right to subsistence’. Again 
                                                
527 A. Randall, ‘Captain Swing: A Retrospect,’ International Review of Social History, 54:3 (2009): 427. 
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this was permeated by expectations regarding the role of the magistracy and the 
propertied classes to maintain the labouring poor.530  
Griffin has extended the relationship between the eighteenth-century moral 
economy and Swing in 1830: rather than being a known paradigm through which 
grievances could be expressed, Griffin maintains that the accumulated experience of 
distress from 1790, and responses to it - both in terms of protest and official policy - had 
an historic and material relevance in 1830.531 This context informed the interaction 
between the authorities and protesters. Indeed, Griffin identifies much of the ‘stately 
gavotte’ of the ‘field of force’ (as delineated by Thompson) in the nature of protest and 
responses to it. He also argues however, for the abrogation of the social relationship on 
which the moral economy rested. Adherence to a social compact based on fairness in the 
operation of the commonweal was not consistent amongst farmers, and consequently, not 
amongst the rioters in 1830; nor was its restoration in the aftermath of Swing long-lived. 
The New Poor Law, and legislation on policing, Griffin argues, were a betrayal of 
Swing’s attempts to restore social bonds, a reaction to ‘the crisis in social relations’ that 
the disturbances had exposed.532   
It is clear from the conciliatory actions of some members of the magistracy in 
response to the disturbances that notions of fairness extended beyond the expectations of 
the crowd. The authorities also capitalised on this popular conception of rights as a means 
of restoring order, maintaining peace and managing the aftermath of significant social 
upheaval. Debates regarding the appropriate or excessive use of paternal concessions 
permeates contemporary evidence regarding the role of the judiciary. The discussion 
presented here considers how far the local judiciary upheld this form of social 
relationship as a means of government, and the impact Swing and its suppression had on 
the institution of the magistracy and paternalist notions of governance. 
 
The following chapter (four) considers the actions of the authorities in suppressing 
Swing. Foregrounded by a discussion of each region in the period between the end of the 
                                                
530 Jones, ‘Swing, Speenhamland and the moral economy’, 274. 
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French Wars and the outbreak of unrest in 1830, it concentrates on the issue of 
concessionary or repressive measures in the suppression of disorder. A debate that 
plagued the county benches, but that also resonates with the criticism of judicial 
conciliation in the crisis of 1795-1801. The study of Somerset in particular, provides the 
almost unique opportunity to study the absence of open protest: how the county 
magistracy prepared for ‘imminent invasion’ and their uses of traditional governance to 
stem the tide of unrest. 
 Chapter five focuses on the prosecution of those accused of perpetrating Swing 
offences. This analysis emphasises the use of the courts as structures of government. 
Pursuing the analysis of governmental structures and prosecutorial practices in chapters 
two and three, this chapter addresses the ways in which the judiciary manipulated the 
courts to restore particular social relationships and hierarchies. In addition to the courts of 
Norfolk and Somerset, this chapter incorporates a case study of the Wiltshire Special 
Commission, allowing stronger comparisons to be made regarding central government 
sponsored trials and the independent prosecutions in the counties. In doing so, this 
chapter offers new insights into the proactive role of the magistracy in the Special 
Commissions. The debate regarding the expediency of judicial concessions is pursued 
throughout the trials. Indeed the Norfolk bench and the Wiltshire Special Commission 
managed the prosecutions in such a way as to negate any sense of future entitlement to 
concessions levied by force. This chapter, and the section on Swing, concludes by 
addressing the investigation of the Poor Law Commissioners into the disturbances, and 
the implications their critique had for the continuation of the magistracy as ‘rulers of the 
county’.  
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Chapter Four 
Rural War versus the Spectre of Swing 
 
From an enumeration of events, Swing manifested itself quite differently in Norfolk and 
Somerset (see fig. 36 below). The number of ‘Swing incidents’ in a region has been key 
in deciding which counties have warranted attention from historians. In consequence, 
‘quiet’ counties have been overlooked. Somerset was described as one of the ‘marginal’ 
Swing counties by Hobsbawm and Rudé; in the two paragraphs devoted to the region in 
their seminal work, it was distinguished only by the fact that its disturbances had a 
‘physical connection’ to those spreading from Wiltshire and Dorset. Despite the county 
remaining relatively peaceful throughout the winter of 1830, the Somerset magistracy 
were active, indeed at times panicked by, the spectre of Swing. Rather than concentrating 
on an enumeration of the attacks on threshing machines, and the incidence of riot and 
incendiary fires, an analysis of the actions of the local justices can reveal an alternative 
manifestation of Swing as context: what impact the threat of popular tumult had on the 
administration of the law and the interactions of authority with their communities. As 
Griffin has suggested, we must consider the very real impact the threat of Swing had. 
Latent or implied violence, or the proximity of more overt expressions of unrest, could 
and did inform the actions of the magistracy.533 Despite the far greater level of open 
protest in Norfolk, continuities can be discerned in the concerns and actions of the 
magistracy in both counties. 
This chapter will consider how the justices sought to prevent rebellion, and on a 
few occasions suppressed it; their communications with central government; and 
revealingly, their discussions amongst themselves. By focusing on the actions of the 
county magistracy, this approach reveals alternative perspectives and, possibly more 
significantly, the authorities’ perceptions of Swing as a movement: its causes, the scale 
and scope of protest, and debates regarding the most effective solutions for its 
suppression. 
The extent to which Swing can be considered a movement has been the subject of 
debate since Hobsbawm and Rudé first lamented the failure of the Swing rioters to 
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‘link[..] up with the rebellion of mine, mill and city’.534 While the authors spoke of a 
‘movement’ of the agricultural labourers in 1830, they denied the existence of any 
political or truly proletarian collective consciousness. Subsequent studies have posited a 
range of factors in the diffusion of Swing, resurrecting the role of political radicals and 
communication networks, and latterly stressing the importance of regional contexts and 
experiences and the ways in which they informed the motives of the crowd.535 More 
recent investigations have reached a sort of consensus, confirming Swing as a movement: 
one that was not nationally coordinated, but in its shared tactics and patterns of diffusion, 
a popular rising that embodied a mutual awareness amongst its participants.536 But there 
has been little discussion of the perspective of the authorities. Their role in shaping the 
diffusion of protest has been acknowledged, but whether they saw Swing as systemic, or 
as an outpouring of local grievances, has not been drawn out. The authorities’ conception 
of Swing is an important consideration in understanding their responses to it. 
Communications between justices, and from the counties to the Home Secretary, 
are permeated by the debate regarding the use of conciliatory or repressive measures to 
restore order. Both the out-going Tory, and new Whig administration were keen to 
suppress tumult swiftly. Radical agitation for parliamentary reform and the eruption of 
revolution on the continent in the summer of 1830 made central government especially 
wary of popular action. Although the government remained unwilling to intervene 
directly in the provinces, their communications with the county magistracy clearly 
advocated a hard-line against protesters and proscribed concessionary measures.537 
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Nonetheless, many magistrates were reluctant to take repressive action, 
acknowledging the dire situation of many agricultural labourers. Indeed, Hobsbawm and 
Rudé suggested the magistracy of Norfolk ‘had divided loyalties and were obviously 
dragging their feet’. The level of concessions granted by the Norfolk bench were 
described as ‘remarkable’.538 This analysis was not pursued, nor has it been taken up 
subsequently. On closer inspection, the Norfolk justices took proactive measures in 
suppressing revolt, and in their correspondence, it is clear that the commission was not 
united over the issue of concessions. It is important to acknowledge that both repressive 
and conciliatory measures formed part of the repertoire of responses to riot, and are 
consistently evident in tandem. As the subsequent analysis shows, the responses of the 
judiciary were framed both in terms of local contingencies and national concerns. This 
debate regarding concession or repression reveals competing ideas regarding the role and 
abilities of local government, and more particularly the role of the judiciary. 
 
1. Swing in Context: Norfolk and Somerset 
 
In 1816, reports collated by the Board of Agriculture show that Somerset and Norfolk 
were in a similar predicament as depression deepened.539 Respondents from both counties 
outlined the plight of the farmer: land value had increased, without wartime profits and 
with decreasing prices for produce, the farmer struggled to pay his rents and tithes. 
Consequently, smaller occupiers were giving up their tenancies, and those who persisted, 
could not afford to employ labour, or pay adequate wages.540  Thus, increasingly, the 
poor applied to the parish for relief, further pushing up the rents and the rates. The burden 
of the depression appeared to affect every stratum of society: many landowners were 
forced to abate rents and retrench.541 The majority of respondents to the Board testified to 
the increasing distress of the poor, and approximately half of them indicated an increase 
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in the poor rates. The practice of relieving able, under-employed, labourers was lamented, 
as was the ‘too liberal application of the act by magistrates.’542 
The problems highlighted foreshadowed many of the issues and social divisions 
underlying the disturbances of 1830: poverty was seen to be contributing to an increase in 
crime, particularly a greater number of prosecutions for minor offences at petty and 
quarter sessions. Justice Stone from Somerset advocated the reinstatement of badges for 
those in receipt of relief, ‘Reliance on charity of any kind’ he argued,  
‘but more especially where it is not open to public observation, tends to deprive the soul of 
activity and energy, and sinks it into idleness, vice and profligacy…whilst this goes on, 
cunning and art take the place of exertion and fair dealing, and the ties of nature and society 
are both made subservient to the grand object – gain under any deception.’543 
 
Stone’s anxiety was also reflected in concerns over the payment and use of tithes, 
‘originally destined to support the Bishops, the Clergy and the Poor. How they are 
perverted from these purposes, is too generally known’. The reluctance of farmers to pay 
tithes was perceived to be ‘engendering hostility between the Rector and his 
Parishioners.’ Indeed, one respondent from Norfolk had some doubt as to ‘how the poor 
are to be kept peaceable’.544 These divisions and the issues around which they revolved 
would come to the fore in the winter of 1830, although discontent in each county was 
manifested differently. 
The data presented in fig. 36 clearly shows the difference in levels of disturbances 
across the two counties. It should be noted that the figures here are at variance with other 
enumerations of incidents. This is due in part to the source materials used and the process 
of classification. The events that have been counted for this study are only those that were 
perceived to be incidents related to the Swing agenda at the time. One of the problems 
with quantitative studies is that enumeration does not necessarily acknowledge the 
shifting and multifaceted nature of disturbances.545 Consequently, there is some overlap 
between incidents of riot and incidents of machine breaking; on more than one occasion, 
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of the workhouse: P. Jones, ‘Swing, Speenhamland and rural social relations: the moral economy of the 
English crowd in the nineteenth century,’ Social History, 32:3 (2007): 278. 
543 Agricultural State of the Kingdom, Part II (1816), 5 and 13-14. 
544 Agricultural State of the Kingdom, (1816), 190 and 219. 
545 A. Randall, ‘Captain Swing, A Retrospect,’ International Review of Social History, 54:3 (2009): 426; 
Poole, ‘Forty Years of Rural History from Below,’, 8-10. Problems of enumeration – particularly with 
regard to the FACHRS project methodology will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 5. 
 
 
174 
one ‘type’ of protest would become another. Likewise, the nature of the sources 
themselves limits comprehensive enumeration. The reporting of events to government, or 
the press, was dependent on the inclination and availability of correspondents.546 The 
sources consulted for this study includes material that has hitherto been neglected; 
significantly, the correspondence between magistrates in Somerset.547 What we have 
therefore is an outline of events; taking this as a starting point, the apparent disparity in 
numbers of disturbances, their nature and their distribution must be addressed.  
 
Figure 36: Number of Incidents associated with Swing in Norfolk and Somerset, October 
to December 1830548 
 
Incident Norfolk Somerset 
Fire 8 2 
Threatening Letter 1 10 
Machine Breaking 4 0 
Breaking Threshing Machine 18 3 
Riot 17 4 
Other* 2 0 
 
* Relating to one wage dispute and one industrial strike 
 
Although both Somerset and Norfolk shared the same problems in 1816, their different 
manifestation in the disturbances of 1830 is due in part to structural differences within 
each county, and the experience of the depression between 1815 and 1830. Both counties 
were predominantly engaged in agricultural production but Norfolk was overwhelmingly 
an arable centre. Somerset’s agricultural economy was more mixed: encompassing 
arable, but more pastoral farming, significantly dairy production. It was in the arable 
farming areas of England that Swing was most prevalent.549 
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1.1 Rural War: Swing and Norfolk, 1815-1830 
 
Norfolk boasted one of the most advanced agricultural economies in England, and was 
reputed for pioneering improvements in farming techniques. Such successes in 
reclaiming land and revolutionising method pushed land value up, and the expense of 
making and managing improvements, further added to the burdens of tenant farmers.  
Threshing machines were produced and used in the region. Introduced to counter 
labour shortages during the Napoleonic Wars, they remained popular amongst the 
yeomanry as they allowed the farmers to get grain to market more quickly, and to hire 
cheaper, unskilled labour, especially women and children, to operate the machinery.550 
The majority of the county’s population was involved in agricultural labour; hiring was 
generally on a daily basis, and competition for employment was intensified by an 
increasing population – particularly with demobilization after 1815. Employers were also 
unwilling to extend labourers’ tenure in order to prevent claims to settlement in a parish. 
Wages were linked to the price of wheat and dropped steeply as prices fell; levels were 
particularly low in the south and southwest of the county. Wage levels also correlated 
with the size and nature of estates: the larger estates in the northwest and west of the 
county being considerably higher in comparison to the smaller, owner-occupied farms in 
the south and east. These farms were often poorly managed and the standard of farming 
was much lower.551  
In 1820, 1821 and 1822, multiple petitions to parliament testified to the persistence 
of agricultural distress in the southern and central hundreds of Norfolk.552 In response to 
the government’s enquiry into the prevalence of supplementing wages from the poor 
rates, 14 of the 17 returning districts in Norfolk, confirmed that supplements were made. 
Twelve of the districts had also seen an increase in claims for relief amongst the 
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labouring community. The burden on the rates was felt from Holt on the North coast to 
Diss in the South.553  
 
High prices, low wages, rents and tithes, and the imposition of machinery stimulated 
popular disturbances throughout the period 1816-1830. The Swing disturbances are 
rightly cast as another battle in a ‘protracted rural war’ in East Anglia.554 A. J. Peacock, 
Paul Muskett and John Archer, in particular, have drawn attention to the most dramatic 
and open manifestations of agricultural labourers’ discontent in 1816 and 1822. Food and 
wage riots broke out in the spring of 1816 at Downham Market in the west of Norfolk, 
and Brandon on the border with Suffolk, as well as at Littleport and Ely. In 1822, a spate 
of threshing machine breaking straddled the boundary of south Norfolk with Suffolk. The 
discussions of these phases of protest, in conjunction with broader studies of covert acts 
of rural protest (made most notably by Archer) have emphasised popular resistance to 
changes in the rural economy and society.555  
While the protests of these years have served as an explanation for the occurrence 
and form of the Swing protests in Norfolk, they must also be considered as part of the 
context that informed the actions of the magistracy in 1830-31. Peacock in particular 
framed these protests as evidence of the breakdown of a traditional social order - the 
decline of the moral economy in essence, and the rise of untrammelled free market 
capitalism and its attendant stratification of social relationships: ‘ideas of a just wage 
fixed and enforced by the justices of the peace were thrown over and the hind was turned 
out of his master’s house and left to fend for himself.’556  
In 1816, judicial regulation of prices and wages was demanded by a deputation of 
labourers sent to the assembled magistrates at Downham Market in West Norfolk. 
Unsatisfied with the compromise offered by the town’s justices, the crowd attacked a mill 
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and the Yeomanry were called out.557 The following day, the magistracy capitulated to 
the demands of the labourers, mediated by one of the farmers. More than one provincial 
newspaper reported with incredulity that the labourers were to ‘have an advance of 
wages, and that the persons already taken should be allowed to return to their homes!’ 
Concessions, it was claimed, as a ‘mode of suppressing tumults…is sure to multiply 
them’.558 The disturbances that followed these extraordinary concessions at Downham 
were swiftly repressed. In consequence of the 1816 riots, two of the Downham rioters 
were executed at Norwich, and five of those sentenced to death by a court of Special 
Commission were executed at Ely.559 
In 1822, threshing machines, concentrated in the southern division of the county, 
were the avowed targets of the labourers. Twenty machines were broken in Norfolk, at 
Wymondham, Attleborough, and Snetterton, and in their immediate vicinity;560 a figure 
comparable to the number broken in 1830 (see fig 36). According to one correspondent to 
the Home Office in 1830, the disturbances of 1822 were put down far more effectively 
than those in 1816 ‘by the most prompt and determined measures of the magistrates aided 
by a troop of yeomanry cavalry’, rather than any reliance on concessions.561 Although the 
immediate response may have been more robust, the sentencing of those convicted for 
their part in the disturbances was certainly more lenient than those of 1816. The majority 
of those involved in the disturbances in Norfolk in 1822 received terms of 
imprisonment.562 
Significantly, for the most part, those areas disturbed in 1816 and 1822 appear to 
have remained quiet in 1830. While the precedent of relative or at least short-lived 
success in 1816 and 1830 may have informed the rising in 1830, the geographical 
distribution of unrest was focused in the previously undisturbed areas in the north, north-
east and centre of the county. Certainly the ultimate sanction handed down by the Special 
Commission at Ely and the Assizes at Norfolk in 1816 remained in popular memory, and 
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thus maybe considered to have had the desired effect in the west of the county.563 Archer 
has attributed the lack of disturbance in south Norfolk to the absence of pernicious 
threshing-machines, removed in 1822 and not subsequently restored. Certainly the first 
instances of open protest in mid-November in North Walsham and Holt, and the 
subsequent riots at Reepham concerned attacks on threshing machines.564  
The only area to see machine breaking in both 1822 and 1830 was Attleborough. In 
the Select Committee report of 1821, Attleborough had been highlighted as an area where 
the distress of farmers was greatest.565 In 1830, it was the site of what was perceived to 
be one of the most serious incidents of riot. On December the 4th a group of labourers, 
having attacked the workhouse at Attleborough, proceeded to Rev. Frankland’s property. 
The labourers threatened to destroy the chaff-cutting machine and held the aged 
clergymen for over three hours until he capitulated to their demands for a reduction in his 
tithes in order that they could be paid better wages.566 According to Rev. Temple Frere, a 
justice of Diss, farmers had been complicit in the proceedings. Frere claimed that the 
Rector at Attleborough faced the ‘rough justice’ of being dragged through the pond by 
the crowd. When he appealed to the farmers present to assist, they ‘attempted to persuade 
me that they had been brought there by force I saw no appearance of force, but on the 
contrary observed that there was an understanding between the Farmers and the 
Labourers.’567 
The reluctance to pay tithes, evident from at least 1816, had been at the heart of the 
Norfolk farmers dispute in 1823. Six thousand had assembled at Norwich that year to 
hear the radical agitator William Cobbett; when, according to Archer, ‘the meeting ended 
in spectacular fashion when the normally deferential tenantry voted in favour of 
Cobbett’s resolution and petition’. Consequently, landowners and rectors reduced rents 
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and tithes. Having dealt with the labourers’ protests the previous year, they could not 
‘withstand the verbal attacks of their natural allies.’568   
Despite the concessions granted, tensions between landowners and the yeomanry 
persisted. In March 1830, Lord Suffield used the opportunity as Chairman of the Bench at 
Quarter Sessions, to address the tenant farmers who comprised the grand jury on the 
subject of the poor rates: despite increases in the amount of relief, he argued, the 
condition of the poor had degraded. He alluded to the impact this had on social 
relationships within the county:  ‘that spirit of independence which formerly existed is 
now restrained…those social affections from which so much moral good might flow are 
now impaired.’ Suffield openly acknowledged that the problems associated with poor 
relief, were due to a considerable extent, to the actions of the magistracy in their 
willingness to allow the rates to subsidise wages. After a lengthy discussion of the need 
to reform the existing poor laws, he concluded by considering the problems of wages, and 
significantly how the farmers were allowing the rates to make up wages they would not 
pay. Consequently he recommended the payment of a fair wage, at a rate that might be 
informally fixed amongst members of the parish vestries.569 
The Grand Jury responded, claiming Suffield had blamed the yeomanry for the 
‘great odium of the present system’. Their solution lay with the landowners in a reduction 
of rents and tithes. Suffield reiterated his statements regarding the problematic conduct of 
the magistracy, suggesting that the fault lay with justices motivated by ‘a false feeling of 
humanity, or by the irresistible impulse to relieve extreme and unmerited distress.’ His 
final comments implied that the yeomanry expressed no ‘regret for the degraded and 
miserable condition of the poor, or the slightest manifestation of a desire to improve that 
condition.’ A week later the Norwich Mercury published a conciliatory statement that 
publicly assured peace between the gentry and their tenantry, at least in the short term.570 
 
But Swing as it was manifest in Norfolk was not entirely confined to the ‘rural war’ in 
the minds of the authorities. The proximity of disturbances to the county capital, made 
the prospect of disorder spreading to urban areas a terrifying possibility (see Map 4.1, 
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p.182). Writing from Norwich at the end of November 1830, the Lord Lieutenant, John 
Wodehouse, informed Lord Melbourne that he ‘tremble[d] for this town. The Mob are 
trying to force in to Norwich and to unite in great force.’ Wodehouse was particularly 
concerned for the extension of machine-breaking amongst the city’s depressed textile 
manufactories. As a result, military forces in the county were concentrated on the 
protection of the capital.571 
 Some insisted on distinguishing elements of unrest, particularly the occurrence of 
arson in previously undisturbed areas, from the problems associated with agricultural 
society. The fires at Irmingland and Lingwood were unequivocally attributed to the ‘work 
of some diabolical incendiary’ but the labourers stood ‘exonerated from all manner of 
suspicion’. This proved somewhat ironic in the case of the Lingwood fire, as the 
labourers who had assisted in putting-it out, got drunk on the beer they had been given in 
reward, and proceeded to the neighbouring farm and demolished the threshing machine 
there. But in the press, the two incidents remained separate; the disorderly actions of the 
labourers did not detract from their praiseworthy conduct in putting out the fire.572 
Justice Berney at Eynesford, believed the fires to be ‘entirely occasioned by foreign 
influence’ and the labourers’ disturbances by ‘agricultural distress.’ He had information 
on ‘persons of very gentlemanly appearance having been prowling about some Premises 
on my property’; and claimed, ‘Upon minute enquiry your Lordship will find that the 
whole country is overrun with Foreigners.’573 In the neighbouring hundred of North 
Greenhoe, the magistrates had arrested an Irish vagrant, suspected of being an incendiary. 
They also arrested his acquaintances: a black man, a Portuguese man, two Italians and 
several other Irishmen - ‘all suspicious characters and vagrants’.574 
Even where disturbances were clearly perpetrated by Norfolk residents, some 
believed the examples of popular action on the Continent were to blame. Edward 
Grigson, Wodehouse’s attorney at Watton, argued that ‘if it had not been for the late Stir 
in France and Brussells [sic] I believe every thing would have been quiet.’575 One 
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anonymous correspondent to the Home Office reported that republicans were mixing 
with the labourers, giving a ‘more political tendency’ to their ‘indignation and their 
desires’. Having been within the ‘same’ mob twice, he noted the presence of weavers and 
mechanics, and that the new cries of ‘We shall never do till we get some heads off till 
some blood is let’ were met with ‘general approbation’.576 The nature of this report did 
less to ease the minds of the authorities as the insinuations here allied agricultural, urban 
and revolutionary causes. As well as allowing the most serious instances of disorder to be 
distinguished from the distress of the agricultural labourers, fear of foreign elements also 
heightened anxieties.  
 
The continued experience of depression in Norfolk was certainly a factor in the 
disturbances of 1830. Annual reports to parliament evidenced the poor situation of small 
farmers and labourers across the county, and informed their interactions with the 
magistracy in the build up to Swing. Nor can the disturbances of 1830 be divorced from 
earlier incidents of protest. Not only do the same grievances emerge, but the ways in 
which they had been dealt with – be it through conciliatory or repressive measures – 
informed the nature and location of protest in 1830. This context complicated the task of 
the magistracy, particularly the extent of social divisions between labourers and farmers, 
and farmers and the gentry. Despite the apparent polarisation of Norfolk society, an 
understanding of social, particularly paternal, responsibilities would permeate the rhetoric 
and actions on all sides in the next battle in the rural war. But the scale of protest 
nationally, and its manifestation in previously undisturbed areas in the North and East of 
the county, perhaps made Swing something more. Even if the attachment to ‘foreign 
agitation’ was an act of denial, these immediate and long-term considerations informed 
the response of the Norfolk judiciary to Swing. 
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4.1. Swing Incidents: Norfolk 
Map of Norfolk by F. S. Weller, originally published in The Comprehensive Gazetteer of England and Wales, 1894-5 (London and 
Edinburgh: William Mackenzie 1894-5) http://ukga.org/images/maps/Norfolk.jpg Data added by author (see appendix 4)  
Key:  Threatening Letter  Fire  Crowd Action  
 indicates more than one incident at this 
location 
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4.2. Swing Incidents: Somerset 
Map of Somerset by F. S. Weller, originally published in The Comprehensive Gazetteer of England and Wales, 1894-5 (London and 
Edinburgh: William Mackenzie 1894-5) http://ukga.org/images/maps/Somerset.jpg Data added by author (see appendix 4)  
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1.2 The Spectre of Swing: Somerset, c.1815-1830 
 
The relative peace of Somerset can be attributed to its different socio-economic structure 
– it was not a typical ‘Swing’ county. Agricultural production in the county was diverse, 
dominated by pastoral farming, particularly dairying. In the east of the county, dairy 
farming appeared to weather the depression marginally better than arable sectors. 
Production here also formed part of a wider area of manufacture including parts of 
Wiltshire. Grain production was largely confined to the Vales of Taunton and Ilchester; 
these regions could not meet the demands of the population, so Somerset’s markets where 
supplemented by grain from Wiltshire and counties further east.577  
Petitions complaining of distress were sent from these grain producing regions in 
1822. In 1820 and 1821, complaints had been concentrated in depressed manufacturing 
regions like Frome and Shepton Mallet. While poverty was a general concern, it was 
more acute in urban areas, particularly the declining textile centres.578 
The returns regarding labourers’ wages in 1825 confirmed that while poor relief 
expenditure was reducing in many hundreds, Whitestone (the district encompassing 
Shepton) and Frome, were the only two where claims were increasing.579 
The textile industry in Frome had been in decline for some years, and 
disturbances amongst the weavers had broken out in 1822 and 1823.580 William Cobbett 
had visited Frome on his ‘Rural Rides’ in 1822. He sympathized with the plight of 
hundreds of weavers, now out of employ, and being forced to work on the roads for next 
to nothing. He blamed their dejected state on the ‘bluff manufacturers’ who called upon 
the yeomanry and magistracy to keep the poor in check, threatening them ‘when they 
dare to ask for the means of preventing starvation in their families’.581 Although Cobbett 
invoked a somewhat melodramatic scene, the poor of Frome continued to suffer from the 
deterioration of the textile trade there. In January 1830, the magistrates sitting at the 
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county quarter sessions received a letter from the inhabitants ‘describing the great distress 
that prevails in that town, and praying for relief’.582 
It was in these areas, not amongst the agricultural community, that disturbances occurred 
prior to 1830, however, not on the scale of those experienced in Norfolk and elsewhere. It 
is perhaps unsurprising therefore that Somerset only experienced three outbreaks of riot 
during the Swing disturbances. However, it is clear from the number of threatening letters 
received in the county, and their urban distribution that tensions existed in Somerset 
society (fig. 36 above). Indeed, the reliance on relief in depressed centres like Frome, 
limited the possibility for impoverished workers ‘to resist openly the masters of the 
parish and the other paymasters.’583 The timing and nature of the incidents that did occur 
were framed by the social and economic context within the county, but also by the 
progress of the disturbances in neighbouring regions. From the perspective of the 
Somerset magistracy, the spectre of Swing had arrived by November, manifest in 
incendiary fires, threatening letters, radical agitators and in the apprehension of imminent 
invasion from the rioters in Wiltshire. 
On 10th November 1830, the Lord Lieutenant of Somerset, the Marquis of Bath, 
wrote to the county’s clerk of the Peace, Edward Coles, instigating a ‘confidential’ 
investigation into the ‘state of the public mind’. Lord Bath was already concerned about 
spurious reports in The Times regarding the poor level of wages in Somerset – apparently 
penned by a Justice in Kent. He also reported the firing of two or three ricks in his 
neighbourhood a few nights before.584 Relatively contained fires were also reported as 
the work of incendiaries at Ilminster in the second week of December, and at Keynsham 
at the end of the month, and a pair of suspected incendiaries on horseback had been 
spotted at Yeovil and Chard (see Map 4.2, 183). These incidents contributed to the sense 
of potential trouble that pervaded the otherwise quiet county.585 
The fire at Ilminster had been the subject of a threatening letter received a week 
before the incident. Just prior to the arrival of the letter, William Hammond, the oldest 
                                                
582 Bath Journal, 18 Jan. 1830. 
583 C. J. Griffin, ‘The culture of combination: solidarities and collective action before Tolpuddle’ The 
Historical Journal, 58:2 (2015): 462. 
584 SRO: Q/JCP/7 Lord Bath to E. Coles Clerk of the Peace, 10 Nov 1830 
585 The Bath Chronicle, 12 Dec 1830; HO 52/9, f. 628 J. Philips, 27 Nov 1830, W. East 1 Dec 1830, R. 
Phippen, 6 Dec1830, f. 548, E. Coles, 16 Dec 1830. 
 
 
186 
magistrate in the Ilminster Division, had perceived an ‘unusual disposition of discontent 
amongst the lower and even some of the middle classes of this neighbourhood’. He 
admitted that the tenant farmers were much oppressed by high costs and poor prices for 
their produce, and could no longer afford to pay proper wages.586 Threatening letters 
were also sent to Frome, Taunton, Shepton Mallet, and Walcot in Bath.587 Many of these 
letters attacked the use of both agricultural and textile machinery perceived to have been 
the causes of poor wages and unemployment.588 The letter addressed to two silk 
manufacturers in Shepton, ominously declared, ‘Swing must of necessity soon be 
here’.589 The distribution of these letters was distinctly urban (see Map 4.2, p. 183), 
however, the grievances voiced by their anonymous authors illustrate how the concerns 
of the poor were shared across both agricultural and manufacturing communities, and this 
commonality proved of particular concern to the authorities.  
Justice Moysey of Bath, writing to the Secretary of State, expressed particular 
concern about the potential for riot in manufacturing centres like Frome and Shepton, as 
well as the collieries around Bristol and reported that there were ‘many disaffected 
among the lower orders in Bath’.590 As was the case at Norwich, both the central and 
local authorities prioritised preventing an alliance between urban and rural labourers. 
Indeed, the government’s minimal intervention in Somerset during the winter of 1830 
was focused on the larger urban settlements of Bath and Bristol.591 
 The authors of the threatening letters capitalised on the sense that Swing was an 
all-pervasive movement. The Shepton Mallet letter claimed Swing was acting through his 
agent in the town. Justice Henry Hobhouse believed there to be a ‘system of threatening 
letters’ distributed by agitators from outside the county. Both he and one of his tenants 
had received letters.592 He was convinced that ‘From the contents of the letter to me it is 
obviously not the production of a very low sort of person, nor of anyone conversent with 
this Country.’ Hobhouse lived in Wincanton close to Somerset’s border with Wiltshire; 
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consequently his concerns regarding the influence of ‘foreigners’ was compounded by 
the threat of the Wiltshire rioters ‘marching forward into this County.’593 To make 
matters worse, the suspected incendiaries seen at Chard and Yeovil were wanted in 
connection with arson attacks in Pewsey (Wiltshire). But the Justices in Hobhouse’s 
division were prepared: they had already met to establish a plan to resist the Wiltshire 
rioters should they ‘invade’. Likewise, Justice Vincent Stuckey of Langport was ‘keeping 
a sharp eye out’ for a man riding about on horseback enquiring about the location of 
threshing machines.594 
Hobhouse’s concerns were not unfounded. The first riot to take place in Somerset 
was at South Brewham on 26 November, a few miles away from the county boundary 
with Wiltshire. The assembled labourers threatened to destroy the threshing machine 
situated there. It was also in the vicinity of Maggs of Wincanton (just south of South 
Brewham) who had been producing threshing machines from at least 1815.595 The only 
actual case of machine breaking by labourers occurred on December 1st at the two 
neighbouring villages of Yenston and Henstridge. It was the day of the riot at Stalbridge, 
a small town in Dorset, on the road south from Yenston and Henstridge (see Map 4.2, p. 
183). According to a report in the Bath Chronicle, the same group of labourers 
perpetrated all three riots.596 
Aside from a disturbance at Banwell (see below) the riots in Somerset were 
connected to the disturbances in neighbouring counties. Indeed, the absence of collective 
action in the county may also be attributed to the suppression of disturbances outside it. 
Peace had been restored in Wiltshire by the end of November, credited to the ‘great zeal’ 
of the Yeomanry Cavalry who rode out to suppress tumult, most notoriously in the 
‘Battle of Pythouse’ – reputedly the bloodiest incident of the Swing disturbances.597 As 
Andrew Charlesworth has suggested, the ‘movement’ of Swing began to falter as it 
moved west. After the initial vacillations by the authorities in eastern counties, a more 
repressive attitude was manifested in the actions of the Hampshire justices and the use of 
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force in Wiltshire. As Justice John Mills of Ringwood (Hampshire) argued, it was better 
to act ‘offensively…attacking the rioters instead of waiting for them’. By mid December 
1830, the Special Commission was sitting at Winchester, checking the further spread of 
unrest to the West through draconian exemplary sentencing.598 
 As well as concern for the spread of Swing from Wiltshire, the Somerset 
magistracy had to contend with the interference of local political agitators and the 
presence of the notorious Radical orator Henry Hunt. Hunt had been at Glastonbury on 
December 3rd at a reform meeting, and he also addressed meetings in Chard and Taunton 
twice. Hunt’s presence at Taunton generated considerable concern amongst the 
justices.599 The report of Mr. Robert Ayerst – a gentleman awaiting his entry into the new 
Commission of the Peace – stated in no uncertain terms that Hunt preached nothing but 
‘sedition and treason’. According to Ayerst, Hunt had used ‘the most ‘inflammatory 
language’’ to tell the crowd of countless threshing machines that had been ‘justly 
destroyed’, and how he hoped for the destruction of more, and that he had already visited 
‘most of the principal towns in Kent’.600  Allegedly, all this was said in the presence of 
the civil forces including a party of Yeomanry and numerous Special Constables, some of 
whom cheered Hunt’s oration.601 Ayerst’s account certainly implicated Hunt in the 
spread of the Swing disturbances, so much so, that the government saw this as an 
opportunity to prosecute him if the account could be corroborated.602 More significantly 
perhaps, the presence of Hunt and the perception of his influence bolstered the sense that 
agitators outside Somerset society could spark rebellion, or at least expose tensions 
within it.603  
Hunt’s associate Rev. Henry Cresswell attempted to foster the local farmers as 
allies. In a handbill he called for the farmers to recognize that they were not the ‘tame and 
willing and obedient slaves’ of the landowning classes by supporting Radical 
parliamentary reform. Cresswell’s position as the Incumbent of Creech St. Michael 
                                                
598 Charlesworth, Social Protest in a Rural Society, 17; see for example, HO 52/7 ff. 21-3 John Mills, 
Ringwood, to Melbourne, 26 Nov. 1830; Hobsbawm and Rudé, Captain Swing, 258. 
599 HO 52/9 f. 582, R. G. Ayerst, 6 Dec 1830. 
600 HO 52/9 f. 582. 
601 SRO: Q/JCP/7 H. Hobhouse to E. Coles, 8 Dec 1830. 
602 HO 52/9 f. 582, R. G. Ayerst, 6 Dec 1830. 
603 C. J. Griffin, ‘The culture of combination’, 465-6. 
 
 
189 
further outraged Justice John Evered who felt Cresswell had foregone his position and 
social responsibilities as ‘a Clergyman of the Established Church.’604 The press reported 
that many farmers felt that Hunt had ‘shewn a good example to the large landed 
proprietors by reducing his rents and tithes’.605 Here the radical agenda in the context of 
Swing placed further pressures on the local authorities. Justice Hammond reported to the 
Home Office from Ilminster, he ‘perceived an unusual disposition of discontent amongst 
the lower and even some of the middle classes’.606 Letters from the Clerk of the Peace, 
Edward Coles, also implicated Hunt in frustrating the recruitment of special constables; 
and one farmer, who had spoken against Hunt, had subsequently been the recipient of a 
threatening letter.607 
 
* * * 
 
Neither county was immune to the pressures of depression after 1815. Poverty, rising 
poor relief, and  - as chapter 5 will show – an increase in the business before the criminal 
courts, were shared concerns for the local authorities by the autumn of 1830. However, 
protest manifested itself in different ways in Somerset and Norfolk.  
The judiciary in Somerset was not faced with the same level of overt protest, but in 
many parts of the county they perceived the potential for more protracted disturbance. 
Fires and letters signalled that some communities, such as the impoverished weavers of 
Frome and Shepton Mallet, and the labourers of Ilminster, shared the grievances 
articulated through Swing. The situation was further exacerbated by widespread disorder 
in neighbouring Wiltshire, and the presence of radical reformers allying their campaign 
with the complaints of farmers and the middling sort. In Norfolk, extensive open protest 
erupted in November 1830. The disturbances there stemmed from long-term structural 
problems in arable production, aggravated further by the tensions that existed between all 
classes of society. The magistracy had to negotiate these social divisions as part of an on-
going ‘rural war’.  
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Although the national, and even international context coloured the perception of 
protest in both counties, local contexts and local history necessarily framed the responses 
of the authorities to the Swing disturbances. Arguably felt most acutely in Norfolk, the 
magistracy had to consider the long-term repercussions of their actions. 
 
2. Suppressing Swing 
 
From the outset, responsibility for the suppression of riot and the restoration of peace 
rested with the county commissions of the peace. Aside from the enduring distaste for 
intervention by the state in local matters, the political context of 1830 inhibited direct 
involvement by central government.  Revolution in France and Belgium in the summer 
appeared all the more threatening with the revival of Whig and Radical agitation for 
parliamentary reform. Widespread discontent regarding Wellington’s Tory 
administration, especially their anti-reform stance meant, ‘there was a reluctance on the 
part of the middle class to join any force which might be ordered to act against the 
rioters.’ The government’s unpopularity made them wary of deploying troops to suppress 
uprisings; as Halevy suggested, ‘the least step in this direction and Wellington would be 
accused of attempting the role of a British Polingac and might well find that instead of 
suppressing riot he had provoked revolution.’608 With the escalation of machine breaking 
in the east, the Home Secretary’s ‘interventionism was intensified and his advice became 
more severe.’609 Although the government could not take a ‘pro-active role in the 
physical suppression of events’, both Robert Peel, and his Whig successor, Viscount 
Melbourne, sent out agents to act in an advisory capacity and maintained a continuous 
correspondence with local law enforcement, allowing them to attempt ‘to manipulate the 
application of the law’ from a distance.610 
In a circular dated November 25th, Melbourne recommended the ‘Sussex Plan’ to 
every County Commission. The Duke of Richmond in the West of Sussex, had enrolled a 
constabulary force of shopkeepers, yeomen and respectable labourers, and organised 
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them into sections and districts under local commanders ‘and sent them out as mobile 
units to occupy villages, whether already rebellious or likely to become so.’611 The 
public, however, did not consistently welcome these measures. Echoing critics in both 
counties, the Norwich Mercury argued that the special constables were only effective as 
an immediate, short-term measure to suppress disorder. Without addressing the distress 
of the poor, peace could not be sustained.612 
Thus the magistracy, left largely unaided, were responsible for the suppression of 
tumult with a limited civil force. The Sussex Plan, or similar schemes of enrolling Special 
Constables, offered a temporary remedy for policing, but as local government, the 
judiciary had to consider more long-term solutions that addressed the root causes of 
unrest. Concessions to the labourers’ demands therefore, had to be considered. 
 
2.1 Activity in the ‘absence’ of Swing: Somerset 1830 
 
Even in the absence of any outbreaks of open protest, the Somerset justices were anxious 
regarding the adequacy of the civil force in the first weeks of November. Many members 
of the commission wrote to Edward Coles, clerk of the Peace, entreating him to allow 
new justices to act as their divisions of the county were inadequately provided for.613 The 
High Sheriff, James Gordon, wrote to Coles expressing his concern for the ‘unprovided 
state’ of the area to the South of Bristol. If more gentlemen were not enlisted as 
magistrates, it would ‘leave 18 miles of populous country without a single magistrate.’614  
Gordon’s division had been under-provisioned from at least 1819.615 The High 
Sheriff was certainly concerned with the maintenance of order, resorting only a few 
months earlier to an exceptional display of judicial authority. In September 1830, Gordon 
ordered the execution of three incendiaries to be staged at the scene of their crime, at 
Kenn, two miles from his estate. Attended by the Chief Constable, 100 special 
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constables, other justices and local landowners, the sentence was carried out in front of a 
crowd of thousands.616 
Exemplary punishment might have provided a ‘salutary warning’ to the community 
at Kenn, but in the absence of open protest in the winter of 1830, the county commission 
had to consider other means of preventing disorder. With the circulation of the Sussex 
Plan, Lord Bath, the Lord Lieutenant, immediately recommended these measures to the 
Somerset justices.617 But the establishment of a sort of police force, when little 
manifestation of riot was evident, was a contentious move for the magistracy to make. 
Political critics made much of its illiberality. At Taunton, Henry Hunt deemed the 
establishment of constabulary and yeomanry forces as ‘unnecessary measures, and only 
calculated to deter people from demanding their just rights which might now be obtained 
by an unanimous call from all parts of the Kingdom for Parliamentary Reform’.618 
Certainly in Somerset, the magistracy were anxious to avoid the perception of such 
measures as oppressive. Instead, they were justified as a precautionary measure against a 
foreign element – those ‘Wicked Agents’ and ‘evil disposed persons, coming from those 
Districts which have been disgraced by Scenes of Riot and Outrage.’619 Nonetheless, 
many felt that the presence of these organised forces would create alarm amongst the 
peaceable inhabitants, or prove antagonistic to the disgruntled populace. 
Justice John Barrow of Wedmore would not implement the Sussex Plan explaining 
to Lord Melbourne that he would ‘decline taking further measures unless I again hear 
from your Lordship feeling confident that... the Inhabitants of this very extensive and 
populous parish (altho’ many of them have considerably felt and are suffering from the 
oppression of the times) remain Loyal, Peaceable and well disposed’. He believed ‘the 
measure recommended by your Lordship may cause much uneasiness in the 
Neighbourhood and produce more harm than good’.620  
The establishment of a constabulary force at Bath aroused considerable concern 
about the effect it would have on the social season. So much was the public concern that 
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Mayor Davis was forced to defend his actions in the press: Davis claimed ‘He had, of 
course, no discretion in the matter – no alternative’ but to act according to the legislation 
and the government’s recommendation to enrol Special Constables.621 
In the first week of December, the magistrates of Somerton (a declining agricultural 
town) were in constant apprehension of disturbances in their neighbourhood.622 So 
panicked were they by the prospect of Swing that the justices succeeded in enlisting the 
Somerton and Langport troop of Yeomanry cavalry to aid in the suppression of the 
expected riot. No disturbance occurred. Their peers were scathing in their comments 
concerning the measures taken by the Somerton magistrates: Justice Thring writing to 
Edward Coles exclaimed, ‘What a phantom they contrived to conjure in the Somerton 
division this week; it was indeed much ado about nothing.’623 Even Lord Bath agreed that 
‘the dismissal of the Yeomanry would tend to allay anxiety and alarm’.624 The Langport 
troop subsequently made a public appeal to their Captain - Justice Vincent Stuckey - to 
use his influence ‘with the landed proprietors and clergy to ease their burdens’ as tenants 
and tithe-payers.625 In the context of social discontent, the necessity of enrolling members 
of the community into a force to regulate it - be it as Special Constables, or as the 
Yeomanry Cavalry - created the opportunity, the political space, for the populace to 
confront the authorities. 
Justice Clarke of Wellington met with some resistance amongst the farmers in his 
jurisdiction when attempting to enlist them as special constables. He was presented with a 
paper signed by half of those who paid tithes to him, calling for him to lower them, 
retrospectively, from the previous New Year. Having remonstrated with them, Clarke 
explained that ‘[s]everal have withdrawn from the combination and I have gladly acted 
towards them as if nothing of the kind had taken place but some still hold out and annex 
as a condition to be sworn in special constables that their demands shall be complied 
with’. The farmers were bargaining with their loyalty. Clarke was keen to appear 
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immoveable in the face of such threats and suggested that the most unwilling might be 
made an example of, and be indicted:  
‘we only wish that those whose situation in life makes them competent to know better should 
be convinced by legal proceedings that they must act better lest by chance their bad example 
should extend to the Peasantry and we should be compelled to punish them for acts into which 
they are led by the bad conduct of those that employ them.’626 
 
Clarke was not only securing his own financial interest but calling for his natural allies to 
be punished for their disloyalty.  
At a meeting to swear in special constables at Banwell, Rev. Moncrieffe became 
apprehensive that the measure might cause alarm, and postponed it. The men that had 
assembled for the meeting ‘having been regaled with beer, were accordingly dismissed’. 
They did not go home however but ‘became themselves the originators of a serious 
disturbance’. They demanded money, beer, bread and tobacco, all of which was supplied 
by local shopkeepers; a loaf was then placed on a pole and carried aloft, ‘and they swore 
they would have a larger sized loaf and two shillings a day wages’. When one man was 
arrested, other members of the crowd broke into the house where he was incarcerated and 
freed him, subsequently parading him ‘in triumph around the village, in a chair’.627 The 
press reported the incident with little concern, attributing the ‘disposition to riot’ to the 
‘effects of intoxication.’628 Somewhat ironically, in their attempts to prevent disorder, the 
Somerset justices found that precautions alone could excite alarm, and even expose 
tensions within their communities that in other counties were played out under more 
violent circumstances. 
 
2.2 Alliance and conspiracy: suppressing Swing in Norfolk 1830 
 
Despite the Norfolk Bench’s characterisation as indolent, the Lord Lieutenant, John 
Wodehouse, was active from the moment disturbances broke out in the north east of the 
county, pre-empting governmental support for establishing constabulary forces.629 The 
Norfolk Yeomanry who had proved so vital in the suppression of unrest in the 1790s, had 
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been disbanded without the prospect of revival in 1827. Despite calls form the Norwich 
bench in particular, funding for the troops could not be maintained.630 
Unsurprisingly, reluctance to enrol in support of the civil force was also 
experienced in Norfolk. Here, justices were confronted by a farmer-labourer alliance that 
reputedly amounted ‘ to a case of conspiracy’’.631 Indeed, the magistracy were rightly 
convinced that ‘there can be little doubt that many of the outrages …take place with the 
deliberate connivance of some of the farmers.’632 The assertion of the farmers’ interests 
occurred as the intensity in machine breaking waned at the beginning of December. 
Justice Robert Plumptre reported to the Home Office that many of the magistrates 
perceived ‘a great disinclination in the class of society above the lower orders to 
contribute their services to the preservation of the public peace’. He enclosed a paper 
from Holt ‘as a specimen of that disposition which they fear is becoming too prevalent in 
the County.’633 The situation at Holt reflected the same circumstances as those at 
Wedmore in Somerset. The inhabitants had declined to enrol as special constables, 
defending their decision in terms of local social relations: ‘our poor have continued to 
evince the most peaceable disposition, and express their willingness to rely upon the 
liberality of their employers as to the Wages which they are to receive.’ The labouring 
poor of Holt had ‘declared they should have regarded it as so hostile an act towards them 
that a riot would have been the consequence.’ Although this divergence of opinion had 
led to some bad feeling at Holt, ‘the landowners and clergy in the neighbourhood have 
since come to [agree to] …reducing their rents and tithes so as to enable the farmers to 
employ and properly pay the labourer.’634 
As was the case in Somerset, at Holt the presence of serious unrest in its environs, 
and the call for the community to assist the authorities created the opportunity for the 
labourers and yeomanry to extract concessions without recourse to outright violence. 
Writing to the Home Secretary, Colonel Wodehouse admitted that the implementation of 
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the Sussex Plan had ‘been productive of Mischief by affording the Farmers in a Body an 
opportunity of expressing their discontent at the Landlords and the Clergy.’635 
The alliance between farmer and labourer against the clergy played out in a more 
violent manner in several instances, particularly in the south of the county. Similar 
disinclination to act was found at a meeting at Harling, just south of Attleborough. The 
‘principal occupiers’ declined to enrol ‘thinking it advisable not to take any steps that 
could in any way irritate the feelings of the lower Class.’ Their determination to deal with 
matters amongst themselves clearly did not have the desired effect: four days after the 
meeting a ‘mob’ attempted ‘to compel the Rector of Banham to lower his Tithes, but not 
finding him at home they departed intending to return.’ Two days later the riot at Rev. 
Frankland’s took place.636  
At Haddiscoe, Rev. William Boycott called a public meeting to discuss the issue of 
wages. He overcame his reluctance to offer any abatement in tithe payments when one of 
the assembled farmers publicly declared he would give everything he was refunded to the 
labourers; as a result, Boycott felt compelled to consent to a refund.637 It was widely 
acknowledged that ‘the assembly was, in some measure, convened by Rev. Gentleman 
himself’. Indeed the jury at the county sessions refused to condone Boycott’s action, and 
acquitted all charged in relation to the meeting. Sergeant Frere took the opportunity to 
use Boycott’s misfortune as a salutary example: ‘everyone who looks at this case must 
see that concession only produces further violence.’638 
 
2.3 A question of concession or repression 
 
The level of concessions granted by landowners, clergy and magistrates in Norfolk – 
despite the extent of violent protest – proved to be contentious. Decisions made at 
differing levels of county government created disparities and awkward precedents. The 
insular and localised operation of justice in Norfolk foundered in the context of Swing.639 
The debate over the validity of such measures was not confined to Norfolk; the actions of 
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conciliatory magistrates were strongly disapproved of by government. Indeed the issue 
was contested across all the counties affected by Swing, and formed part of the critique of 
the institution of the magistracy more generally in its aftermath. 
The public concessions made on 24th November, after the first incident of machine 
breaking in North Walsham, were described by Hobsbawm and Rudé as a ‘remarkable’ 
display of ‘indulgence’ on the part of the magistrates.640 The North Walsham bench had 
recommended the disuse of Threshing Machines, and an increase in wages. Similar 
concessions were made by the magistrates at Gallow and Diss.641  
In a letter to the Lord Lieutenant, John Wodehouse, the Home Secretary responded 
to these measures with telling brevity: ‘I trust that your expectation that the simple 
Concession with respect to the Thrashing Machines, will be attended with the desired 
Effect’.642 It was not. In addition to the example of concessions from various districts 
across the county, Lord Suffield suggested that Wodehouse had unwittingly agreed to 2s 
a day being a just wage when remonstrating with a crowd, stimulating further demands 
for increases in wages.643 
Wodehouse’s instructions to the magistracy on December 2nd stated, ‘the most 
forcible measures must be adopted against the Rioters, no conciliatory language must be 
used till they are overcome.’644 This was not so much a change of direction but a 
reiteration of the necessity for vigorous as well as ameliorative measures; the Lord 
Lieutenant had rode out on several occasions to disperse crowds and apprehend rioters.645 
Employing a combination of ‘firm’ and conciliatory measures was advocated in many 
quarters, including by representatives of government: Colonel Brotherton, who had been 
sent throughout the Swing counties of the West, determined a combination of ‘energetic’ 
and conciliatory measures was most efficient in restoring peace.646 
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By the beginning of December it appeared that peace was returning to Norfolk. 
Consequently, a general address was made by the Committee of Magistrates at Norwich 
on the 3rd. This announcement recommended the 
‘general Disuse of THRESHING MACHINES as a friendly concession on the part of 
Proprietors to public opinion, and as proof of their anxiety to remove as far as possible 
every pretext for the violation of Laws.’647 
 
This step was more significant than the localised concessions already granted, it was 
almost unprecedented in the context of Swing as it was a countywide measure delivered 
from the bench.  
Local opinion was divided over the validity of Wodehouse’s recommendations. 
William Withers, an attorney writing from Holt, argued that the ‘timely adoption of 
conciliatory measures’ would have prevented outrages throughout the county. Reductions 
in rents and tithes at Holt ‘had more effect in tranquillising the minds of the people’. At 
nearby Briston the magistrates had failed to remonstrate with the people. Instead the 
military were sent in and the arrests made, Withers alleged, sparked more acts of 
violence. A few days later, a reduction in rents and tithes was agreed but as a 
consequence of the magistrates timing, the poor ‘perceive that the relief they obtain is 
extorted from the Fears, and not granted from the good Feeling of the higher orders.’ 
Withers was particularly concerned with the erosion of social relations if force was used. 
Considering the poor ‘know the causes of their distress’ force would make them unite, 
‘they will act together either openly or secretly for effecting a common object, and it is 
much to be feared they will not ultimately be satisfied with a mere increase of wages.’648 
Withers advocated concessionary measures in order to maintain a set of social relations 
where the poor were beholden to authority. 
Withers’ assessment was born out by events at Reepham. Sir Jacob Astley, High 
Sheriff of the County and an acting magistrate, was reproached for having ‘so much 
rashness, so little conduct’ in his management of a disturbance expected there on the 24th 
November. Allegedly, Astley had entered the town at the head of 100 horsemen, 
expecting a mob, but ‘only the boys of the town’ were there ‘having been scattered and 
nearly ridden over by the entrance of these horsemen at full gallop’. The boys ‘avenged 
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themselves by throwing a few stones’ which was enough to scare some of the horsemen. 
Astley then gave the order to charge the crowd ‘innocent as most of them were and mixed 
with women’. The yeomanry overturned several people and left the High Sheriff to find a 
way of escaping the crowd who were ‘very justly exasperated’.649 Social relations on 
Astley’s estates close to the town were already fraught. An Overseer of the Poor and 
tenant of Astley’s had been the victim of an incendiary attack in the preceding week. His 
rash actions on the 24th did not discourage, and quite possibly encouraged, further 
disturbances that occurred at the town in the next three days.650 Shortly after Astley’s 
ousting, he publically supported a recommendation for the disuse of threshing machines 
made at Melton Constable, less than ten miles north of Reepham.651 
Lord Suffield was highly critical of the concessions of the North Walsham 
magistrates, so much so he ‘almost reproached them with inactivity’. The magistrates ‘all 
avowed their disinclination to take severe measures against an oppressed class, until 
forced to do so for the preservation of life and property.’652 Suffield was not unjustified in 
his concern that the concessions had left them at the mercy of the mob. Indeed he felt any 
force would be ‘of no avail’. He was not entirely opposed to relieving the situation of the 
poor but he felt ‘strong condemnation of the lawless proceedings’ and the restoration of 
peace should come before any concession. His criticism was framed more in terms of the 
uneven process of granting concessions. He feared that neighbouring districts would soon 
demand the same level of relief won in North Walsham. The countywide 
recommendations issued on December 3rd,might therefore be interpreted as an attempt to 
establish parity that would prevent such situations.  
Thomas Hoseason, one of the justices for the hundred of Freebridge Marshland, 
raised a more specific problem with the general recommendations made at Norwich. 
Hoseason resided in the far west of Norfolk, an area considered ‘separated from the rest 
of the county’, and one that had remained almost entirely peaceful.653 The concessions 
granted in response to the disturbances in the east had the potential to disrupt this 
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otherwise quiet locale. Hoseason explained, that as a result of the previous acts of 
machine-breaking,  
‘Policies insuring Farming stock be void, if thrashing machines shall be used on the 
premises. Such a Resolution at this moment will greatly add to the Farmers difficulties; 
Especially since the Committee of Magistrates at Norwich…have printed and circulated the 
… address under date the 3rd instant.’654 
 
Threshing machines were deemed ‘absolutely indispensable…but particularly so in this 
hundred.’ The crops ripened much later there, so they would harvest it green, meaning 
the wheat was ‘a fine and heavy sample, a flail will not touch it which makes Thrashing 
Machines to us not only necessary but invaluable.’ Indeed, he had written to Colonel 
Wodehouse, Lord Lieutenant of Norfolk, to explain their peculiar circumstance.  
Hoseason was in a predicament: the Farmers wished to defend and continue to use 
their property, but ‘they are recommended to give them up, by so large a body of 
magistrates, their minds become paralised’.  
The ‘majority of the magistrates being Men of Rank as well as large Land owners, even 
M.P.s have sent notices to their tenants that if they Continue to use Thrashing Machines, 
they will not only incur their displeasure but most likely be removed from their farms.’ 
 
In pointing out the partiality and manipulation of societal bonds by other (perhaps more 
established) county justices, Hoseason, having already been challenged in his judicial 
conduct,655 was keen to present himself in the best light. He assured the Home Secretary 
that he had ‘recommended the Use and Protection of Thrashing Machines at all risks and 
hazards’ and had always paid his labourers no less than two shillings a day.656 
In a different manner to Suffield, Hoseason’s criticism of concessionary measures 
referred specifically to the disunity countywide policies provoked amongst the 
magistrates. He saw little place for paternalist sympathies in the maintenance of order, he 
believed ‘all Magistrates should be obliged to Act together, and upon the same principle 
which is strictly to adhere to the Law.’657 
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Certainly the strongest censure came from government in a circular issued by Melbourne 
on December 8th. The Home Secretary ‘observed, with great Regret,’ those Justices of the 
Peace that had approved a ‘uniform Rate of wages’ or recommended the discontinuance 
of threshing machines, and instructed them to ‘oppose a firm Resistance to all Demands’ 
for wages and against agricultural machinery.658 Perhaps through fear of more directed 
reprimands many of the responses to the circular concurred with Melbourne.659 The 
number of disturbances and concessions associated with the issue of tithes were reflected 
in some of these responses. Clerical justices were squarely blamed for the misconduct in 
Norfolk, ‘who besides being in bad Odour with the People’ were ‘fearful of acting with 
the promptitude decision and firmness which is required in a Magistrate.’660 
 Wodehouse was not so agreeable in his response where he stoically defended the 
conduct of the Norfolk magistracy. The circular had ‘been the cause of great uneasiness 
to many of our Magistrates…I have indeed heard with deep regret that some who were 
the most active in the late trying occasions, have determined to act no longer.’ He 
claimed the priority of every magistrate had been the apprehension of offenders and their 
commitment to trial. But, in the particular context of economic hardship,  
‘we could not forbear to admit, that wages had been generally too low, and that we thought 
that, under the actual difficulty of finding employment for the Labouring Poor, which has too 
long existed, Threshing Machines ought to be discontinued.’  
 
Wodehouse finally declared,  
‘that, under a perplexing choice of difficulties we have so acted as to check the spirit of 
insubordination in a much shorter time than has been the case in other counties, and that we 
have in no instance acted under the influence of threats and intimidation.’661 
 
Wodehouse’s defence epitomised the problems faced by the magistracy in keeping the 
peace. The suppression of disorder was of paramount concern, however, as leaders of 
their communities they also had to address the underlying causes of discontent. 
Conciliatory measures were seen as a legitimate part of the limited repertoire of actions 
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available to them; the Norfolk justices invoked a particular conception of judicial 
paternalism to renew failing societal bonds.  
The magistrates at Norwich offered their concessions ‘as a token of good will and 
feeling for those, whose lot is cast in a more humble station.’ Despite the displays of 
sympathy, the Justices at Norwich invoked the terror and majesty of the law in reminding 
the people of their reciprocal obligations: ‘that duty which they owe as subjects, and that 
gratitude, which they ought to feel as men, to a gracious and benevolent King, who has 
proved by his attention to the rights and complaints of his people, that he is no less a 
Father than a Sovereign. Let them reflect also before it is too late that ‘he beareth not the 
sword in vain’.662  
The justices at Melton Constable emphasised local connection:  
‘the Magistrates, who live among you and know you, cannot but respect it [poverty] and pity it, and 
desire to relieve it to the utmost of what they are allowed by law. More they cannot do. It would be 
false of them to promise it, as it would be unfair of you to expect it but as they have done the most 
painful part of their duty, and would again do so because it is their duty, in apprehending some of 
those who were engaged in breaking machines, so they do most cheerfully undertake that which is 
equally but more agreeably their duty – to protect the poor man, and see that he has all the rights to 
which he may be justly lay claim.’663  
 
Although the justices set the limits on their capabilities at law, their expressions of 
sympathy acknowledge a shared understanding of what was considered right and just; but 
they establish the parameters of this within the law, casting the expectations of the poor 
as an abrogation of legitimate bounds should they manifest themselves in disorder. 
Nonetheless, the concessions and recommendations made had proved problematic. 
The uneven distribution of measures, and their implementation at a local level (as was the 
case at North Walsham, Gallow and Diss for example) established a precedent which 
neighbouring communities could call upon to justify a change in their own 
circumstances, and therefore stimulate further disorder. More significantly, many of the 
concessions made by the Norfolk magistrates were public, and clearly emanated from the 
bench, rather than in their private capacity as landowners, gentlemen and clerics. This 
endowed the labourers’ protests with the legitimacy of the law. It was widely reported 
that the rioters at East Tuddenham brandished a paper claiming they ‘had got an authority 
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from the magistrates to break threshing machines’. Lord Suffield had even received 
reports that machines had been broken in the presence of magistrates.664 
The opportunity to seek legal redress fostered the sort of expectation and 
dependence on the magistracy that was so criticised in their administration of the poor 
law. Suffield had met with other justices in his division and agreed  
‘not to put forth any public recommendations as to the amount of wages because the 
obligation to advance upon those terms would be an obvious concession on our part to the 
feelings of a mob, but we agreed to dictate to our tenants such a rate of wages as we 
consider to be just and reasonable’.665  
 
This mode of concession was used to side-step criticisms that the authorities had 
responded to intimidation, and potential accusations of illegality in setting wages. It also 
allowed the justices to exert their paternalist influence to assist the poor, but in a manner 
that divorced their action from their role as a representative of the law. Encouraging a 
deferential relationship still retained its utility as a means of ensuring social cohesion and 
control, but in this private context, allowed the law to retain a disinterested distance. 
 
The preference for private concessions – or at least ones not associated with the 
institution of the magistracy – prevailed in Somerset. There is less discussion of 
conciliatory measures probably due to the relative peace of the county. Nonetheless, 
measures were taken to alleviate the condition of the poor. Certainly many of these were 
taken as precautionary measures to ensure that order prevailed. 
Meetings of magistrates, landowners, farmers and clergy were held at Bathampton, 
Wrington and Lympsham to address the relief of the poor. The meeting at Wrington was 
focused on the relief of the miners at Rowberrow and Shipham, their ‘good conduct and 
peaceable demeanour justly entitle them to the commiseration and assistance of the 
public.’ Relief was made through a charitable subscription rather than any official 
sanctions. More charitable schemes and subscriptions were made into the New Year at 
Bath and Frome.666  
Some reductions in tithes and increases in wages were made but magistrates – or 
gentlemen acting in their judicial capacity – were absent from these meetings. Rev. J. 
                                                
664 Norwich Mercury, 15 Jan 1831; TNA: HO 52/9 f. 151, Suffield to Melbourne 30 Nov. 1830 
665 HO 52/9 ff. 151-3, Suffield to Melbourne, 30 Nov. 1830. 
666 Bath Chronicle 2, 9, 23 Dec 1830 and 6 Jan 1831. 
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Stephenson of Lympsham was held up as an ‘Example to Clergymen, Landowners and 
Farmers’ for reducing his tithes by fifty per cent. At the same meeting local landowners 
agreed to cut their rents to the same extent, in order to relieve the vast number of 
labourers out of employ, and ‘seeking relief from the Overseer.’ Mr Loaring of Ilminster 
offered to increase his labourers’ wages if farmers in the area would do the same. In this 
grain-producing region, concern to ensure the labourers remained peaceful appears more 
acute: ‘the farmers in this neighbourhood are very busy putting down their thrashing-
machines.’667 
Following the same line as Suffield in Norfolk, Justice Stuckey of Langport, who 
had been prevailed upon by his troop of Yeomanry to exert pressure on their landlords, 
admitted to the Home Secretary that he had made concessions to his tenants, but 
everything had been done ‘gradually and quietly’. He saw no better way to ‘prevent 
Contagion from spreading’ than ‘through the exertion of local influence’.668 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
By taking a regional approach to the Swing disturbances, the long-term and immediate 
structural causes that account for the different manifestation of unrest in Norfolk and 
Somerset can be more accurately discerned. In Norfolk, dependence on arable production 
and the intensification of agriculture meant the effects of depression were felt more 
acutely in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars. Social tensions persisted, erupting into 
more open expressions of discontent in 1816, 1822 and 1830. By contrast, Somerset’s 
more diversified economy allowed the county to weather the depression a little better. 
Here, poverty was more problematic in the declining manufacturing centres such as 
Frome. In 1830, the experience of Swing in Somerset was directly affected by the 
progress of the disturbances in neighbouring counties. 
This sort of contextual approach is not new, however by focusing on the actions of 
the magistracy, greater insight into the nature and significance of the disturbances in each 
county is gained. In Somerset, Swing did not have a strong physical presence in the form 
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of open protest, but rather a spectral one manifested in fires and threatening letters, and 
external agitators, that nonetheless affected the nature and operation of social 
relationships and local government. While many of the county judiciary attributed the 
disturbances to political radicals and foreign agents, the apprehension of disorder in the 
depressed manufacturing towns and agricultural regions such as Frome, Shepton Mallet, 
and Somerton, betrayed an awareness of the genuine structural causes underpinning the 
labourers’ grievances. Despite remaining comparatively peaceful, the spread of Swing 
across Southern England threw the divisions in Somerset society into sharp relief. 
The awareness of the disturbances provided opportunities: opportunities for radical 
reformers to bolster their campaign, and for the government to counter by attempting to 
prosecute them as the instigators of rebellion. There was an alliance amongst the 
labourers of both rural and manufacturing communities, although to the relief of the 
authorities their shared grievances did not erupt into collective action. And the calls of 
the magistracy for the community to assist in policing, created the space for grievances to 
be aired and bargains to be struck. 
From at least November of 1830, the Somerset judiciary saw the possibility of 
Swing spreading to their county. In response, they were keen to establish their authority 
by augmenting the civil force and punishing any disturbance severely. The magistracy 
also sought to prevent disorder by maintaining community cohesion. This was achieved 
by publicly associating the origin of disturbances with radical agitators and rioters from 
other parts of the country, elements from outside Somerset society, and by seeking the 
support of all sectors of the community as Special Constables, even though this proved 
problematic in some cases.  
In Norfolk, enduring agricultural depression and social tensions manifested 
themselves in protracted, often destructive protest. Most problematically for the 
magistracy, not only did they have to contend with the protests of the labourers, but with 
the pernicious involvement of the disgruntled tenant farmers. Unlike 1822 and 1823 
where the grievances of the labourers and farmers were expressed in isolation, in 1830, 
the justices faced the two allied. The scale of unrest likewise tested the existing structures 
of government. In several instances, localised measures intended to prevent disorder, 
stimulated further popular demands, undermining the judiciary as a whole.   
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Although the context and manifestation of Swing was markedly different in 
Norfolk in comparison to Somerset, continuities in magisterial attitudes and actions can 
be discerned. The necessity of augmenting the civil force – as it had in Somerset – 
created the space for social tensions to be expressed. In Norfolk however, the farmers did 
not only take advantage of the space created by the enrolling of special constables, they 
used the labourers to extract concessions in a reduction of rents and tithes. 
To a lesser degree in Norfolk, apprehension of foreign elements stirring up unrest 
within the county concerned the local judiciary, particularly with regard to the potential 
for disturbances in Norwich. As was the case in Somerset, there was a perception of 
Swing beyond county borders, as a movement, an external threat that could trigger unrest. 
As we shall see, the manipulation of xenophobic feeling became more significant in the 
trials of Swing perpetrators in Norfolk, allowing the most problematic incidents of protest 
to be divorced from the enduring distress of the agricultural labourers.669  
On the whole, the Norfolk magistracy could not ignore the reality of poverty. 
Indeed the extent of the concessions granted, in the recommendation of the disuse of 
threshing machines, and setting levels of wages, showed the magistracy were acutely 
aware of the labourers’ distress. The application of these measures generated 
considerable debate, not just in terms in of their potential to stimulate unrest, but also 
regarding the role of the magistracy. 
While Colonel Wodehouse and many of the other Norfolk justices adhered to a 
particular conception of the paternalist function of the magistracy, central government, as 
well as other members of the commissions of the peace (in both counties) wished to make 
a distinction between the paternalist social relationship, and the function of the 
magistracy as law enforcement and local government. 
The efficacy of paternalist concessions can be challenged when addressing the 
evidence form Norfolk. Concessions had been made in 1816, 1822, and to the farmers in 
1823, however, the same grievances were voiced in 1830: the same rate of wages was 
                                                
669 See Chapter 5. 
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called for, reductions in rents and tithes were still perceived as necessary, and the use of 
threshing machines still aggravated the plight of the labourers.670 
In both counties, but again most acutely in Norfolk, the Swing disturbances also 
highlighted the deficiencies of local law enforcement based on voluntary service, social 
status and personal connection. Even when the civil force was augmented, the social and 
personal nature that was supposed to unite them, made them unreliable. The subsequent 
trial of the perpetrators of unrest provided an important opportunity for both national and 
local government to check the spirit of discontent and to attempt to re-establish social 
cohesion. 
  
                                                
670 Peacock, Bread or Blood, 93; Muskett, ‘The East Anglian Riots 1822’, 5-9; Archer, By a Flash and a 
Scare, 52, 56. 
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Chapter Five 
‘The protection of the local authorities’: Prosecuting Swing in Norfolk and Somerset 
1829–1834 
 
By the end of 1830, approximately 1,900 prisoners awaited trial for their part in the 
Swing disturbances that had affected over twenty English counties throughout the autumn 
and winter. In five counties, where machine-breaking and damage to property had been 
most prevalent, the government appointed Special Commissions to try Swing offenders 
outside the usual court schedule.671 The repressive sentences meted out by these centrally 
appointed, irregular courts, have somewhat eclipsed the prosecution of Swing offenders 
at county quarter sessions and regular Assize courts. Little comment has been made on 
the process of prosecution in general: how the cases were selected and how the charges 
were framed. In neglecting this avenue of research, we overlook the opportunity to 
address the actions and attitudes of the regional authorities.  
Carl Griffin’s most recent - and extensive - work on Swing in the south of England, 
has addressed this deficit in part, by considering the interaction of the state with the 
county authorities in organising the Special Commission at Winchester. He has shown 
that Peel, and latterly Melbourne, did not seek to override judicial discretion in the 
selection of cases for trial. Sending government solicitors, notably Maule and Tallents, 
into the provinces ensured that suitable examples were made of the worst offenders. 
However, government was reluctant to bear the financial burden of wholesale 
prosecutions, and sought to avoid accusations of prejudicial meddling in the 
administration of the law.672 
But the operation of the regular regional courts has not been interrogated in the 
same detail. The significance of the county courts of quarter sessions as the seat of local 
government has been marginalised in the context of the Swing disturbances. The county 
sessions, convened by the magistracy, were responsible for all non-capital criminal cases 
                                                
671 Quotation in chapter title: The attorney general quoted in J. H. Barrow (ed.) The Mirror of Parliament, 
vol. 1 (London: 1831). E.J. Hobsbawm and G. Rudé, Captain Swing (Lawrence and Wishart, 1969, this ed. 
London: Phoenix Press, 2001.), 258.  
672 C. J. Griffin, The Rural War: Captain Swing and the Politics of Protest (Manchester University Press, 
2012) 231, 248-59; R. Wells, ‘Mr William Cobbett, Captain Swing, King William IV’, Agricultural 
History Review, 45:1 (1997): 37. 
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and local administrative matters.673 The trials therefore, can be seen as an exercise of 
local government; at this juncture they were integral to the maintenance of peace and to 
the restoration of social relationships in the aftermath of unrest. They also provided the 
county judiciary with a much needed opportunity to present themselves both locally and 
nationally as the able and legitimate ‘rulers of the county’. 
 
Griffin’s analysis of the trial of the first machine breakers at Elham in Kent has shown 
how the actions of the magistracy impacted on the movement of the disturbances and on 
the attitudes of central government. It has also highlighted how the county authorities 
tempered their responses according to their immediate social contexts.674 Eric Hobsbawm 
and George Rudé noted that in some county courts a Swing offender ‘might expect a 
more reasonable chance of acquittal than in others’, however, the breadth of their study 
precluded the depth necessary to understand why the judiciary appeared more lenient in 
some counties.675 This chapter investigates the ways in which the county commissions of 
the peace in Norfolk and Somerset structured the prosecution of Swing offenders at 
Assize and quarter sessions. 
 Hobsbawm and Rudé highlighted Norfolk as one of those counties where, unlike 
Wiltshire, a Swing offender had a better than average chance of acquittal. Indeed, the 
Home Secretary, Lord Melbourne, had reproached the magistrates for the concessions 
they made to rioters during the disturbances. The apparently merciful sentencing in the 
Norfolk courts was cast in Captain Swing as a continuation of placative judicial 
attitudes.676 However, this is an oversimplification. Griffin’s discussion of the sentences 
passed on the Elham machine breakers reveals that what Sir Robert Peel (Melbourne’s 
predecessor) described as, the ‘unparalleled lenity’ of the local judiciary, was due in part 
to an awareness of the general unpopularity of threshing machines and local economic 
conditions, but also due to fear of popular reprisals. The perceived betrayal of the 
labourers by one justice had already caused him to be the victim of an incendiary 
                                                
673 See chapter one. 
674 C. Griffin, ‘“Policy on the Hoof”’: Sir Robert Peel, Sir Edward Knatchbull and the Trial of the Elham 
Machine Breakers, 1830’, Rural History, 15 (2004): 127–28, 137. 
675 Hobsbawm and Rudé, Captain Swing, 262. 
676 Ibid, 257–62. 
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attack.677 From the evidence presented here, the Norfolk magistracy’s comparatively light 
handling was as much a consequence of a tactical decision to make examples than any 
expression of humanitarian leniency. Significantly, the following analysis addresses the 
Special Commission issued for Norfolk in the spring of 1831, which has hitherto been 
ignored by all other studies of Swing.678 
Placing the prosecutions in the context of local judicial decision-making allows us 
to understand the discrepancies in prosecutorial practice, and how far the local judiciary 
broke with the interests of central government. In stark contrast to Norfolk, Somerset 
remained largely undisturbed, but parallels can nevertheless be drawn between the two 
counties in the way prosecutions were structured and in the use made of exemplary 
justice. 
 As well as grounding these trials within their immediate, local contexts, the 
practice of the courts in each county will be considered in relation to prosecutions and 
court sessions throughout 1829 and 1832. The actions of the Norfolk and Somerset bench 
will also be compared to the Wiltshire Special Commission convened at Salisbury. This 
supplementary study allows for further consideration of how central government and the 
local authorities cooperated in these extraordinary prosecutions, acknowledging the role 
the county magistracy played in the pre-trial process and as members of the Grand Jury. 
It also provides the basis for a comparison between state-sponsored trials and those kept 
within the purview of the justices of the peace. 
 
1. The Context of Prosecution 
 
In the years immediately preceding the trials of 1831, the courts of Norfolk and Somerset, 
like those of Wiltshire, tried very few of those offences most closely associated with 
Swing: riot, machine breaking and arson. The counties’ assize calendars for 1829 and 
1830 contained six cases of arson and one of riot (see fig. 37), but in nearly every case it 
appears that personal disputes, rather than social protest, underpinned the prosecutions. 
Certainly the response of the court indicates that little significance was accorded to these 
                                                
677 Griffin, ‘“Policy on the Hoof”’’, 132–37. 
678 See below, 5.3. 
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cases: five of the seven prosecutions were either dismissed before they had been heard or 
the defendants were acquitted.679  
 
Figure 37: Cases characterized as ‘Swing’ offences January 1829-October 1830 
 
Offence: 
 
County: 
Arson Riot Machine Breaking 
Norfolk 2 1 0 
Somerset 3 0 0 
Wiltshire 1 0 0 
 
The vast majority of cases put through the courts in the period immediately before Swing 
were for varieties of theft. It is difficult to assess how far appropriative crime served as an 
indicator of social protest, but the magistracy in all three counties saw a distinct 
correlation between poverty and crime.  
In the south west, wages were declining, while petty theft and poaching were 
perceived to be on the increase.680 Although the Somerset magistrates had been praised 
for the declining number of felonies tried at the assizes, the heavy business at the county 
quarter sessions had been a persistent concern from at least the end of 1829.681 At the 
Easter Sessions of 1830, the Chairman John Phelips observed with regret the number of 
prisoners for trial, in particular the prevalence of convictions for hay and fowl stealing. 
But ‘Poverty’, he claimed, ‘cannot be admitted as an excuse for such offences’. He saw 
the remedy in stringent sentencing; he recalled the positive influence of the examples 
made of hay stealers five years previously. Consequently, at the 1830 sessions, ten of 
                                                
679 For this para. and table: NRO: C/S 1 MF 660 Quarter Sessions books 1829-30; SRO: Q/SCA/1-30 
Calendar of Prisoners: Assize, and Q/SCS/28-59 Calendar of Prisoners: Quarter Sessions, 1829-30; 
Wiltshire and Swindon History Centre, Chippenham [hereafter WSHC], A1/125/55 Calendar Prisoners 
Quarter Sessions 1829, A1/125/55 Calendar Prisoners Quarter Sessions 1830; Norfolk Chronicle, Norwich 
Mercury, Bath Chronicle, Bath Journal, Devizes and Wiltshire Gazette, 1829–1830.  
One such case concerned James Charles Baynton, who was sentenced to death at the Somerset Assizes in 
August 1829 for the destruction of two hay ricks. Baynton’s motivation was quite extraordinary and wholly 
unconnected to the social and economic context of the county. Baynton was in Somerset from London, 
visiting his lover: when their affair was thwarted by her father and friends, he ‘conceived the idea of self-
destruction…he would commit an act which should make his life forfeit to the laws of his country, and 
which would free him from existence while it left him at liberty to make his peace with God.’ See Bath 
Chronicle, 27 Aug and 03 Sept 1829. 
680 Bath Journal, 26 April 1830; Devizes and Wiltshire Gazette, 12 and 19 March 1829; Hobsbawm and 
Rudé, Captain Swing, pp. 76, 118. 
681 Bath Journal 18 Jan, 19 July, 23 Aug 1830. 
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those tried for theft of crops or fowl were imprisoned for terms ranging from five weeks 
to a year, and one man was transported.682 
At the Summer Assizes in Somerset in 1830, one case stands out, not for the 
motives of the perpetrators but for the mode of their punishment; for here, three 
incendiaries were hanged in what was the last scene of crime execution in England. This 
grizzly affair was staged at Kenn in the North West of the county with great pomp and 
circumstance, and only weeks before the outbreak of Swing. The three labourers had 
fired Farmer Benjamin Poole’s wheat mows in retaliation for the prosecution of an 
unlicensed alehouse.683 At the behest of the High Sheriff, James Adam Gordon, the 
prisoners were executed on Kenn Moor, on 8th September 1830. They were not afforded 
the relative mercy of the drop-system, but suspended from a gallows and dropped from 
the back of a wagon in front of a crowd of over twelve thousand onlookers.684 
Steve Poole has argued that the draconian response of the Somerset authorities had 
less to do with the circumstances of the crime than with the reputation of the community 
in which it was committed. The punishment of the offenders was intended to ‘create a 
lasting impression of judicial and hierarchical order on a poorly governed parish’.685 
While few would consider this to be a ‘Swing incident’, to limit the treatment of this case 
by positioning it outside a discrete movement denies its relevance in the continued 
context of local governance. The execution of the three incendiaries was orchestrated to 
show the troublesome inhabitants of Kenn, and the county at large, that authority reigned. 
 
Similar concerns regarding an increase in crime, and of poaching in particular, were 
expressed in Norfolk. But the response of the Bench to the perceived causes was perhaps 
more compassionate than that of the justices in Somerset. Both the Lord Lieutenant, John 
Wodehouse, and the Sessions’ Chairman, Lord Suffield, attributed the increase in cases 
of poaching and theft to rising prices, the operation of the Game Laws and the poor 
law.686  
                                                
682 Bath Journal, 26 April 1830. 
683 S. Poole, ‘“A Lasting and Salutary Warning’: Incendiarism, Rural Order and England’s Last Scene of 
Crime Execution, Rural History 19 (2008): 1–15. 
684 Ibid., 4, 10; Bath Journal, 13 Sept 1830. 
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The plight of the poor was frequently debated at the county sessions. However, it is 
clear that the attitude of the bench was informed by long-term antagonisms between the 
grandee landowners, tenant farmers, and labourers. In the Spring of 1829, Justice 
Plumtpre took the opportunity as Chairman of the Sessions to address the grand jury on 
the impropriety of supplementing labourers’ wages from the poor rates; a practice – he 
argued - that was ‘extremely pernicious in its tendency – very unfair in its operation… 
and calculated to destroy industry, and independence of feeling on the part of the 
peasantry’.687 Lord Suffield, as Chair of the county bench, took up the cause in 1830. He 
addressed the Norfolk grand jury, claiming the situation of the agricultural labourer, ‘has 
become so wretched from the extreme depression of wages. The demoralising 
consequences, in the increase in poaching and theft, have become so alarming, that it is of 
the utmost consequence to apply a speedy remedy’. The grand jury, comprised of the 
county’s yeomen, took offence at the implication that the current state of distress rested 
with their failure to pay a proper wage. The jurymen retorted that all solutions lay in the 
hands of landholders (many of whom – like Suffield - were listening from the bench) in 
the reduction of rents and tithes.688 
The social tensions played out in the courtroom may have contributed to the only 
incident of riot that was prosecuted in 1829 (see fig. 37). In April, six labourers were 
indicted for a riot at Kenninghall at the Norfolk Lent Assize. Allegedly, the prisoners had 
accosted two other labourers in a field and ‘swore they would break our tools, and learn 
us to go to work there’. Neither riot nor assault was proved and the defendants were all 
acquitted. The presiding judge considered the case to be problematic but purely in terms 
of it taking up the court’s valuable time: in his summation he argued it would ‘have been 
better if the magistrate had reprimanded the prisoners and discharged them, rather than 
have sent them to the Assizes.’689 
Despite the relative absence of offences explicitly associated with social protest, the 
business of the courts highlights the tensions that existed between the county magistracy 
and the populace in the months before Swing. The distress of the agricultural poor and 
the incidence of crime was a pressing concern but the magistracy did not foresee the scale 
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of the disturbances that would follow. The ‘riot’ at Kenninghall, and the sporadic rick-
burning in Norfolk and Wiltshire might be considered as precursors to the disturbances of 
1830, certainly as indicators of discontent. However, the attitude of the court limited 
these cases to private, localised matters not worthy of serious sanction. If the ‘salutary 
warning’ from Kenn could be taken as an indicator, disorder in Somerset at least, would 
be met with sharp reprisals.  
 
2. The Special Commissions: the example of Wiltshire 
 
The Swing Special Commissions opened in mid-December 1830, and by mid-January 
over 500 prisoners had been tried at Winchester and Salisbury. Special commissions were 
also issued in Berkshire, Dorset and Buckinghamshire.690 These irregular courts occurred 
outside the bi-annual circuits of the court of assize, by permission of the central 
authorities, and were reserved for ‘those offences which stand in need of immediate 
inquiry and punishment’.691 The courts were presided over by judges from the courts at 
Westminster and had – as the regular Assizes – the power to levy the ultimate sanction of 
death. Leaving no doubt as to the purpose of the trials in 1830, Judge Alderson stated, 
‘[w]e do not come here … to inquire into grievances. We come here to decide law’.692  
In ten days, the Special Commission at Salisbury tried 339 prisoners and convicted 
206. Not all those apprehended for their part in the disturbances were committed for trial. 
For example, 18 of the 35 individuals taken in Tisbury connected to the riot at Pyt House 
were discharged or dismissed on their recognizance after examination by the justices.693 
Nonetheless, the number presented for trial was the largest group of prisoners to be tried 
in consequence of the disturbances.694 It had been expected that the commission would 
try all capital offences as exemplars, and the minor cases would be dealt with by the local 
                                                
690 Hobsbawm and Rudé, Captain Swing, 258. 
691 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the laws of England, in four books. By Sir William Blackstone, Knt. 
one of the justices of His Majesty's court of common pleas. And with notes and additions by Edward 
Christian, Esq. Barrister at law, and Professor of the Laws of England in the University of Cambridge, vol 
4 chapter 19, 12th edition (London: A. Strahan and W. Woodfall, 1793-1795) 267. 
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judiciary at quarter sessions.695 However, only five prisoners were scheduled for trial at 
the next quarter sessions, and four others were left for trial at the Lent Assizes.696  
The scale of prosecution was partly a matter of pragmatism: from November, the 
county clerk had requested that persons convicted of minor offences unconnected with 
Swing should not be sent to the county gaols, which were ‘filling so rapidly by the 
apprehension of rioters’. Upwards of 100 prisoners had already been delivered to 
Devizes. By early December, the number committed on charges of riot and machine 
breaking was 123; a further 80 were held at Fisherton gaol, and ‘several’ more at 
Marlborough Bridewell.697 Consequently, the county magistrates sought a comprehensive 
gaol delivery at the Special Commission. Lord Melbourne, who had supported the 
reservation of minor cases to the quarter sessions, wrote to the Earl of Radnor, 
confirming his agreement ‘with the Magistrates in the view… that the clearing of the 
Gaols will be of great public convenience.’698 
Far from the Special Commission constituting a remedy for the ‘over-tenderness of 
local magistrates’,699 the Wiltshire bench was complicit in the trial of the vast majority of 
offenders at Salisbury. But it was not merely a matter of practicality in emptying the 
gaols; the Grand Jury, responsible for progressing indictments to trial, was comprised 
entirely of county justices.700 Making a show of the alliance between the county and 
Assize judges, members of the Wiltshire commission were among the one hundred 
members of the local gentry and nobility in the cavalcade that opened the trials at 
Salisbury. The High Sheriff had recommended their attendance ‘to shew that the higher 
and respectable Classes of Society are organized to suppress any riotous proceedings.’701 
 
                                                
695 WSHC: 1553/12 Circular to the Magistrates from Edward Ings, County Clerk, Devizes, 15 Dec 1830. 
696 WSHC: A1/125/57 Calendar of Prisoners 1831, Quarter Sessions 15 Feb 1831. 
697 WSHC: 1553/12 Circular to the Magistrates from Edward Ings, County Clerk, Devizes, 15 Dec 1830 
and letter from Mr Ings to Salisbury, 5 Dec 1830; J. Chambers, The Wiltshire Machine Breakers, vol i, 
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The level of unrest in Wiltshire stemmed in part from engrained structural problems: the 
county was ‘notorious for its low agricultural wages and extensive unemployment and 
rural poverty’. The use and production of threshing machines, and the decline of the 
textile industry across the south west further exacerbated the nature of rural 
employment.702 The disturbances moved from the east of the county, from the tumultuous 
border shared with Hampshire, to the west of Wiltshire. Outbreaks of riot and machine-
breaking were concentrated in areas to the south and east of Marlborough, around 
Salisbury and Devizes. The suppression of disorder by the beginning of December was 
attributed to a significant extent to the exertions of the Yeomanry Cavalry.703 
The majority of cases tried by the Special Commission were for machine breaking 
or robbery. Due to the prevalence of the destruction of threshing machines – a non-capital 
offence – in the indictments, far fewer faced the death penalty than those tried at 
Winchester. However, the severity of the court can be seen in its unprecedented use of 
transportation. Over one hundred prisoners received the maximum penalty for breaking a 
threshing machine, seven years transportation.704 In the ten cases regarding the 
destruction of non-agricultural machinery the penalties were greater still: nine of the 
prisoners were found guilty and sentenced to death but their sentences were commuted to 
transportation for life.705 In all, 152 people were sentenced to be transported, for terms of 
between seven years and life by the Special Commission, and all bar one reached 
Australia.706 
Government involvement in the prosecutions at Salisbury was limited to cases ‘of a 
very serious or an aggravated nature.’ The process of selection did not ignore the 
situation of the offenders. William Tallents, one of the Crown lawyers who had been at 
Winchester for the Hampshire Special Commission was sent on to Wiltshire. In addition 
to all depositions made to the county justices, he sought information on the circumstances 
of those committed: whether they were employed, at what rate of wages and whether they 
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were ‘suffering under actual distress together with any other particulars of their 
situations’.707  
As Hobsbawm and Rudé noted, the Wiltshire Commission appeared to be more 
sensitive to the age and circumstances of those brought before it than its predecessor in 
Hampshire: for instance, James Ford and Edward Looker, amongst others, both escaped 
the noose because of their ‘tender years’ and otherwise good character.708 Nonetheless, 
the court made potent examples of those involved in some of the bloodiest disturbances 
during Swing.  
 
The Special Commission opened with those cases supported by the Crown. The first case 
tried concerned the destruction of a threshing machine belonging to John Bennett, 
Member of Parliament and foreman of the Grand Jury at the Special Commission. 
According to Mr Bennett, approximately 400 labourers had assembled and approached 
his farm, Pyt House, threatening to destroy ‘all the thrashing machines in the country, and 
that they would have two shillings a day’. The Hindon troop of Yeomanry arrived too late 
at Mr Bennett’s to prevent the destruction of his threshing machine but engaged the 
rioters and a battle ensued; the troop met the stones of the crowd with bullets. In the fray, 
Mr Bennett had his hat knocked off and his nose bloodied; several of the rioters were 
wounded and one labourer, John Hardy, was shot dead.709  
Bennett was already an unpopular figure: his estates lay in Tisbury parish where 
wages were low and unemployment was high. As a progressive farmer he was a 
proponent for the use of agricultural machinery, and in his role as Member of Parliament 
he supported the continuation of the Corn Laws that were seen to maintain the high price 
of bread. Indeed, Bennett had complained to the Lord Lieutenant of Wiltshire, the 
Marquis of Landsdowne, that he had struggled to recruit farmers as Special Constables, 
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leaving him almost entirely unassisted in defending his property in the wake of the 
‘battle’.710 
Bennett’s position as prosecutor, magistrate, MP and juryman was publicly 
criticised by Henry Hunt, who argued Bennett had ‘acted as judge, jury, and witness, in 
his own cause, and that he had done all he could to hang the unfortunate men’. Bennett 
defended himself in parliament, stating that he had not been involved in his judicial 
capacity in any of the cases where he was the victim, and had only appeared in court as a 
witness for the prosecution. He also claimed he had declined to give evidence where the 
men convicted were facing death.711 Despite Bennett’s apparent concern for the labourers 
embroiled in the disturbances, those involved in the machine-breaking at Pyt House felt 
the full rigour of the law. 
Lord Arundell – Bennett’s neighbour - testifying to the character of James Mould 
of Hatch, one of the defendants, described Mould’s wretched existence: having struggled 
to maintain his family, his wife and six children were left wholly unsupported after his 
incarceration. Whilst awaiting trial, the family had been struck by typhus killing two of 
the children. Despite such pitiful circumstances and reports of a good character, Mould, 
along with 12 others received the maximum penalty of seven years transportation. Two 
others were acquitted and two were sentenced to 12 months in prison at hard labour. 
James Blandford, singled out by Bennett as a recidivist, received consecutive maximum 
sentences and was transported for 14 years.712  
Hunt had also alleged that the Wiltshire magistrates had selected those for trial in 
an attempt to ‘make these riots useful in getting rid of all individuals who were 
personally obnoxious to themselves and other landholders.’ He claimed that he had 
evidence from the wives of the Hindon rioters, who believed their husbands had been 
selected because they were known poachers.713 Certainly one correspondent writing to 
the Clerks for the Special Commission from Chilmark (less than three miles from 
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Tisbury) hoped the prisoners ‘will receive the Punishments they merit’ believing ‘several 
of them have before Trespass’d against the Laws of their Country.’714 
Bennett was familiar with some of the men involved; he had admonished Blandford 
who had ‘already been in many scrapes, but that this was the worst affair in which he had 
ever been engaged.’ Blandford had previously been convicted at the summer Assizes in 
1827, for stealing a purse belonging to Henry Lambert. Despite allegedly robbing 
Lambert of £15, he received a comparatively light sentence, and was committed to 
Fisherton gaol for a year.715  
Bennett did not shy away from Hunt’s accusations, emphasising the utility of 
exemplary justice: 
‘[A] selection certainly did take place; when so many persons were concerned in the riots, it 
was natural that we should select only the worst characters for trial, and should be influenced by 
the previous good character of men.’716 
 
The indifference shown to Mould can likewise be explained by his position in local 
society – according to Bennett, as a farmer, grocer and cattle-dealer, Mould could not 
claim that his actions were motivated by distress, or perhaps, as Arundell had, that it was 
any sort of justification for mercy.717 Indeed, Bennett was convinced that some of the 
more respectable members of the Tisbury community were complicit and culpable for the 
riot on his property. 
Samuel Alford, a tenant of Lord Arundell’s at Tisbury, was accused of 
commanding the crowd that destroyed Bennett’s threshing machine. In a letter to 
Arundell he explained that he had rode out to meet the crowd at Fonthill, and dissuaded 
them from destroying the factory of Mr Faquhar. He succeeded in persuading them to 
move on, only for them to take down the threshing machine of Mr Turner (apparently 
with the proprietor’s consent) and then to progress to Pyt House. Alford was also charged 
with fuelling the labourers’ demands for an increase in wages. He admitted that he had 
encouraged his men, and other local labourers, to attend the vestry meeting convened to 
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discuss the issue of wages, which had been arranged as a preventative measure prior to 
the disturbances taking place. 
 Arundell wrote to the Home Secretary to defend his tenant, describing him as ‘the 
most sensible, prudent and humane man on my Estate’ and extolling ‘his kindness to the 
poor’, and ‘his willingness to come into measures for bettering their condition in a Parish 
in which the Poor have been more oppressed and are in greater misery as a whole than 
any other Parish in the Kingdom.’718 Bennett himself had testified to the misery of the 
labourers’ conditions in 1817, estimating that three-quarters of the working population 
had their wages supplemented from the parish rates.719 
Government interest in the case was – like that of Mould - piqued by the 
involvement of Alford as a farmer, and perhaps as a vestryman.720 Arundell was in no 
doubt that much of the evidence against Alford was propagated by his opponents in the 
administration of relief. Compounding the ferocity of parish politics, he went on to 
explain that many had attributed the disturbances to the machinations of Tisbury’s non-
Anglican inhabitants; Arundell, a Catholic, and Alford as a dissenting Congregationalist, 
were both implicated.721 Bennett did not remark on the role of religion but he did allude 
to the disruptive influence of Alford and the parish overseers in Parliament.722  
The ‘Battle of Pyt House’ exposed a web of social conflict in Tisbury. Its 
prosecution offered the opportunity to restore order, to eliminate problematic elements 
from the community and to punish those whose actions transgressed societal bounds. 
 
Peter Withers and James Lush were the two prisoners left for execution by the Salisbury 
Special Commission.723 Their offences were marked additionally by accusations of 
violent conduct, in Withers’ case throwing a hammer at a constable and speaking in terms 
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‘to put down the Magistracy’. Withers had initially been committed ‘only for a riot’ but 
ultimately faced capital charges for ‘maliciously wounding a magistrate’.724 In passing 
sentence, Judge Vaughan commented on the ‘lenity of Mr Bennett’ without which those 
tried for the destruction of his threshing machine, might have found themselves in the 
same predicament as Withers. James Lush was capitally convicted for robbing Bartlett 
Pinnegar during a riot. When Pinnegar had drawn a pistol on the crowd and threatened to 
shoot, the crowd had rushed him, and a serious scuffle ensued. Both men were sentenced 
to hang on 25th January but the day before their execution, through substantial public and 
political pressure, the sentence was reprieved and they were transported for life. Lush had 
been spared because he had ‘on several occasions, interfered to prevent personal 
violence’, and in Withers’ case there was some suggestion that he had acted to defend 
himself.725  
The cases against Peter Withers, James Lush, and James Blandford and his co-
defendants, all concerned outright physical conflict; and at Pyt House and in the case of 
Withers, attacks on authority. In punishing the actions of the labourers so severely the 
court not only made an example of the most sensational incidents of disorder, but also 
mitigated the use of violence by the ‘victims’, and the authorities, as a proportionate 
response. 
 
The Salisbury Special Commission dominated the prosecution of Swing offenders in 
Wiltshire. The scale of the disturbances, and their character, warranted ‘this extraordinary 
exercise of the Royal authority’. It also served as an antidote to the widespread 
concessions granted during the riots.726 The magistrates from Devizes had felt compelled 
to recommend a ‘general advance of wages’ of ten shillings a week, justifying their 
actions in terms of parity:  
‘this we find to be the wages recommended in the South of this county. The magistrates have 
agreed to the same in Pewsey and in many other parts...With regard to the labourers of those 
Parishes where they would have taken 5/- or 9/- per week we consider that they would have 
remained satisfied only until they discovered that in other Parishes they received 10/-.’727 
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Colonel A’Court, a magistrate resident near Warminster, exclaimed that he knew of 
nothing more likely to provoke unrest than the ‘proclamation of the magistrates at 
Devizes...interfering in the most direct manner with the price of labour. I contend my 
lord, that Magistrates have no such power.’ In a similar tone to many of those critical of 
concessions in Somerset and Norfolk, A’Court argued that, 
‘as landowners and Individuals their recommendations would have been most reasonable. It is 
only when such a proclamation issues from the constituted authorities that it becomes 
dangerous. The district of Salisbury, Pewsey and Devizes have now adopted the scale 
recommended at Andover...can it be expected that the Labourers in Dorset, Somerset and 
Devon will be satisfied with their present wages?’728 
 
Reports from Colonel Brotherton stationed near Warminster did little to instil confidence 
in the Wiltshire bench.  His correspondence with the Home Office betrayed a lack of 
confidence in the local magistracy in the suppression of disorder, insinuating the majority 
were inactive and that concessionary measures had been prevalent.729 
Such criticisms pointed to the necessity of restoring the reputation of local 
government. A’Court’s statement resonated with Melbourne’s circular issued on 
December 8th, that condemned concessions issued from the Bench. While the Special 
Commissions were certainly an opportunity for central government to assert their 
interests, they were not unsupported in the provinces. Indeed, in Wiltshire the Special 
Commissions were seen as financially expedient, a means of defraying the expense of 
prosecution nationally, as well as providing an opportunity to reassert governmental 
authority. And although the trials were presided over by centrally appointed judges, the 
local magistracy played a significant part: in the selection of cases, and in bringing them 
to trial, both as members of the Grand Jury and as prosecutors. 
 
The management of the Special Commissions was publically debated, fuelling reformist 
agitation. Cobbett forwent any explicit comment in 1831, merely hinting at the 
prejudicial ‘forming of the juries with regard to the charges and other acts of the Judges, 
with regard to the sentences’ (original emphasis).730  Hunt, however, was more definite in 
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his commentary in Parliament. Despite divergent opinions on the matter, the debates on 
both sides of the House were permeated by questions and critiques on the exercise of 
justice and the position of the magistracy. 
Hunt highlighted the problems arising from the light sentencing of those prosecuted 
in the earliest phases of protest, particularly in Kent. Those convicted were sentenced to 
imprisonment for ‘only a few weeks, and some only a few days.’ What he complained of 
was ‘either that the leniency which was shown in the first instance was not continued 
throughout, or that, in the first instance, an example was made for the purpose of 
preventing others from following in the same steps, by shewing them not only that they 
were violating a great moral principle, but that they might be required to atone for with 
their lives.’ Crucially, he claimed that, ‘The poor do not think they have committed any 
great moral offence’; the concessions given by so many of the magistrates compounded 
this sense of legitimacy.731 
He went on to highlight the difficulty for Members of Parliament acting as 
magistrates, unable to ‘restrain their feelings’ or remain unbiased when ‘the plaintiff in a 
case were my friend, and the defendant an opponent’; although his comments were 
limited to the political realm, implicit within his critique were the problems manifest in 
voluntary government where the judge is connected to those he is ruling over.732 
Despite being generally opposed to the sentiment of Hunt’s speech to the House, 
John Smith of Sussex shared in some of his criticisms, he was ‘convinced that the 
magistrates in many places have been justly arraigned for an excess of mercy. I think the 
exercise of so much lenity was not the proper way to deal with these infatuated men, and 
that greater severity was necessary.’ He, however, attributed peace to the ‘strong arm of 
the law’: ‘The late special commissions, by intimidating the misguided peasantry, were 
one of the great causes which operated to prevent a continuance of tumult and 
outrage.’733 
Hunt called for parliamentary support of a general amnesty for all prisoners 
sentenced by the Special Commissions, arguing ‘there will be no peace in the country 
unless the poor are convinced that the laws are administered with mercy as well as 
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justice.’ MP George Lamb highlighted the danger of extending such a mercy: ‘Are we to 
bring them again among the magistrates who committed them, among the persons who 
prosecuted them, and among the witnesses who gave evidence against them?’ According 
to Lamb, an amnesty would only compound the feelings of injustice around their 
sentences, and thus cause further tumult. The debate between Hunt and Lamb emphasised 
the familiar dichotomy faced by the magistracy and the courts in this context: their 
decisions were not limited to the enforcement of the law; they had to consider the long-
term ramifications of the prosecutions in a society where the judiciary were closely 
connected to the populace, and not afforded the protection of professional disinterest. 
 Providing the final word in the debate, the Attorney General offered his insights 
on the Special Commissions. He reiterated the great number charged before the courts - 
one thousand by this point, 700 of which were from Wiltshire and Hampshire; but this he 
claimed, was only a selection of a far greater number. Many he explained had not been 
tried because of an unwillingness to prosecute on the part of the victim, and several bills 
had been thrown out, many of the magistrates being aware that some had been ‘seduced’ 
into criminal acts. Indeed he suggested that the trials ‘were much more remarkable for 
lenity than for the reverse.’734  
 
Through the unprecedented use of transportation, the Commission made an extraordinary 
example of the Wiltshire rioters. While a process of selection was employed, the number 
of those who were prosecuted was extensive enough to send a potent message to the 
populace - both in Wiltshire and beyond  - that disorder would be met with the full force 
of the law. 
The trials exposed not only the scale of the protests, but many of the structural and 
interpersonal problems that underpinned them. They also provided the opportunity for 
both national and local government to reassert their interests and control. Indeed, the 
Attorney General made it explicit that ‘one of the leading principles of the prosecutions 
[was] the protection of the local authorities’.735 Most particularly in the capital 
convictions of Withers and Lush, and in the prosecution of the Pyt House rioters, the 
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Commission judges – with the assistance of the magistracy – pressed the dangers of 
attacks on the established authorities and validated the violent response with which they 
were met. The severity of sentencing throughout also served as a corrective to judicial 
concessions made during the disturbances thus negating any moral justification for the 
rioters’ actions. Although the scale and management of prosecutions was very different in 
Norfolk and Somerset, the ‘protection of authority’ is a recurrent theme. As had been the 
case in Wiltshire, the prosecutions were more than the means of punishing criminal 
behaviour; they facilitated the restoration of particular social hierarchies and 
relationships. 
 
3. Prosecuting Swing in Norfolk and Somerset 
 
Figure 38: Numbers tried for Swing offences 1831, disaggregated by court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38 shows the discrepancy in numbers tried across the three counties. At one level 
this is purely a reflection of the level of disturbances experienced in each region. 
According to Hobsbawm and Rudé’s enumeration, Wiltshire saw more than twice as 
many incidents of unrest than Norfolk.736 What is more significant is the distribution of 
prosecutions across the courts.  
Prior to this study, the fact that Norfolk had a Special Commission to try Swing 
offenders has been overlooked. At the request of the Lord Lieutenant, Colonel John 
Wodehouse, the court was convened in March 1831; it fell outside the circuit of special 
commissions in the Home Counties, and was of a rather different form to those at 
Winchester or Salisbury. As Colonel Wodehouse explained, ‘yet many of the Persons 
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here probably heretofore borne of good Characters … were compelled either by open 
violence or threats to commit the felonies with which they stand charged’. The 
Magistrates wished to review all cases ‘and only send those to trial, who were seen and 
known to be Ringleaders and Active Agents in perpetrating the Outrages’ which ‘might 
fully answer the ends of justice, and be a great saving of Expense to the Country’.737 
Wodehouse made the case for a system of exemplary punishment. Rather than the 
punishment of large numbers of people, as had been the case at Salisbury, in Norfolk, the 
use of specific exemplars was perceived to be both financially and socially expedient.  
Therefore, the majority of ‘Swing’ cases prosecuted in Norfolk were tried not by 
Special Commission, but at the county court of quarter sessions. In January 1831, 158 
people stood accused of machine breaking and riot; 68 of them were discharged on their 
own recognizance or acquitted. In Somerset, the county judiciary tried all of the cases 
associated with Swing. At the Epiphany Sessions, eight were charged in relation to the 
destruction of threshing machines, six of whom were convicted, and 13 men were 
indicted for riot: five were convicted, the other eight were still to be apprehended.738 Very 
few Norfolk cases were ‘reserved for the higher tribunal’ of the Assize courts but three 
cases of machine-breaking at the paper mills at Lyng were tried at the Thetford Assize, 
and the eight prisoners held for arson were remanded for trial by Special Commission at 
Norwich.739 In Somerset, there was no Special Commission, only one case was referred 
to the Assizes, and that was thrown out.740 
By prosecuting the majority of cases at the county quarter sessions the magistrates 
of Norfolk and Somerset kept the framing of the trials within their jurisdiction, allowing 
them to prioritise local interests above those of the higher courts and central government. 
Indeed, Sergeant John Frere who presided over the Norfolk sessions, felt that the 
prosecutions in all counties were better administered by men with local connection and 
should not be subject to the pressures of public opinion:  
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‘The punishment of offenders must not be carried into execution because forsooth the London 
press have taken it up…How is it possible that they can better know what is necessary to be 
done in Hampshire and Berkshire than those who are aware of the whole nature of the 
case.’741 
 
But the organisation of the county trials was not without thought to their public impact: 
all, bar one, of the prosecutions made in January 1831 were tried at Norwich. In the 
regular circuit of county sessions, cases would also be tried by adjournment at Kings 
Lynn and Little Walsingham, facilitating more convenient gaol delivery from Swaffham 
and Walsingham bridewells. No cases associated with the disturbances were tried at the 
meeting at Lynn on the 25th January, and only one was heard by the Walsingham bench 
on the 28th. All the prisoners from Swaffham and Walsingham were delivered to the 
county capital to face an unusually full bench of magistrates.742 
 
The majority of cases heard at the Norfolk quarter sessions concerned machine breaking. 
In passing sentence on those accused, Sergeant Frere was clear in his purpose, ‘to prevent 
a recurrence of such conduct, by the effects of example’. Those who received the most 
stringent sentence of transportation were a particularly necessary example. Having made 
a countywide recommendation for the disuse of threshing machines during the 
disturbances, the magistrates had been subjected to government criticism, which placed 
the blame for on-going disturbances with the over-conciliatory attitude of the bench.743 
Although the Lord Lieutenant had unashamedly defended the measures taken 
by the Norfolk judiciary in suppressing disorder744, it is evident that the prosecutions 
at the quarter sessions were framed in such a way to emphasise the competency and 
credibility of the local judiciary. At the opening of the court, the Norwich Mercury 
reported that the bench was ‘crowded with Magistrates’, encompassing ‘the leading 
noble men and gentlemen of the county’. Despite this show of social strength from 
the Norfolk elite, the sessions were presided over by Sergeant Frere. 
Notwithstanding the importance Frere placed on local men administering local 
matters, he cast himself as an impartial arbiter – a non-resident (although a close 
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cousin from Cambridgeshire) and ‘not engaged in any of these prosecutions in 
preference to any of my able colleagues who might, from fatal necessity, have been 
in some degree concerned in proceedings’.745 While his presence was used to 
remove the Norfolk justices from any accusations of partiality or abuse of their 
power, the Sergeant drew attention to ‘the great care and discretion used by the 
committing magistrates’ celebrating the fact that ‘not one bill connected with the late 
unhappy outrages was thrown out by the Grand Jury.’746 
 
The proceedings nonetheless revealed the problematic nature of their concessions. More 
than one testimony claimed the prisoners’ had said ‘they had got an authority from the 
magistrates to break threshing machines’.747  This popular notion of legality was most 
evident in the round of machine breaking focused upon the settlements of Cawston, 
Heydon, Dalling, and Reepham. 
Henry Parnell was prosecuted for his involvement in two incidents of machine 
breaking in the area around Field Dalling at the end of November. One witness stated that 
Parnell had declared that Justice Sir Jacob Astley had given ‘him leave to break all the 
machines he could find’.748 Parnell’s claim was in reference to the public notice from the 
justices of Melton Constable recommending the disuse of threshing machines that had 
been signed by Astley along with several others. The magistrates had met the morning 
after Astley had had to retreat from an angry crowd at Reepham.749 Following the 
example of Astley and his colleagues, a meeting was held at Dalling on the same day, and 
made similar recommendations.750  
The sense of legitimacy derived from the concessions was not merely used to bolster 
the rhetoric of the crowd: a few days later at Whinburgh, and then at East Tuddenham, 
crowds intent on destroying threshing machines made similar assertions and actually ‘had 
a paper in their hand, and offered to show it.’751  
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Accordingly then, in passing the maximum penalty for machine breaking, seven years 
transportation, on men such as William Catchpole and James Gunton– prominent figures 
in the round of destruction, and the men who produced the paper at East Tuddenham – 
the magistracy checked suggestions that they had tacitly sanctioned criminal behaviour. 
Parnell was acquitted on one count of machine breaking, but failed to escape the full 
rigour of the law: he was charged and prosecuted on a second count of machine-breaking, 
and sentenced to twelve months in prison.752  
However, Sergeant Frere noted that the Norfolk disturbances lacked those ‘flagrant 
acts of violence’ that had accompanied other incidents of machine breaking; occasions, 
he continued, that ‘imperiously call for much more severe examples than I am happy to 
say is requisite here’.753 He attributed the more tempered response of Norfolk machine 
breakers to the stringent example made of the Ely and Littleport rioters in 1816, whose 
violence had been met with severity. Of the 24 rioters sentenced to death by the Special 
Commission that sat at Ely that year, five were executed and buried together with the 
epitaph ‘May their awful fate be a warning to others’.754 Only nine of the 65 prisoners 
charged with breaking threshing machines in 1830 received the maximum seven years 
transportation for it.755 
 
Four cases of riot were focussed on as particular examples, all of which were 
characterised by attacks on figures of authority. At Southrepps, Docking, Haddiscoe and 
Attleborough, the labourers sought redress from clergymen or magistrates and in all cases 
a confrontation ensued. David Pye was singled out for his involvement in the riot at 
Southrepps. This disturbance was drawn upon as one of the first, and most violent in the 
county, ‘with no excuse of example set them by their neighbours.’ Pye had attempted to 
rescue a relative already taken by the magistrates and military that had been called out to 
disperse the crowd. He was identified by Rev. Justice William Rees as very prominent in 
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the mob and armed with a bludgeon. Although the justices’ clerk stated that Pye had been 
struck by the troops, his case was considered to be of ‘a very aggravated nature’, and 
worthy of ‘a very severe punishment’. Pye’s situation was exacerbated by a previous 
conviction for sheep-stealing in 1818, when the court had shown mercy due to his young 
age, and he had escaped execution. But in 1830, he was strongly criticised by the judge: 
‘instead of that lenity having had the effect of deterring you from the commission of 
crime, you have been found to persevere in disobedience of the law.’ Consequently, Pye 
was sentenced to eighteen months in prison.756 
The case made against the Docking rioters was presented as a more overt attack 
on authority. Sergeant Frere stated, ‘If ever a tumultuous and riotous assembly 
approached the crime of high treason, it was this.’757 The rioters were accused of an 
assault on Justice John Davey and one of his special constables. Davey had gone to 
remonstrate with the assembled crowd, but his attempts to point out their illegality proved 
futile. His horse was knocked down, at which point he read the Riot Act, but continued to 
try to address them. One of the constables was knocked to the ground and struck at whilst 
prostrate. Davey attempted to assist the felled man and was pelted with stones, one 
‘rendering him insensible; a surgeon's attendance was necessary, and his life was actually 
placed in jeopardy.’758 
Sergeant Frere used the case as a forum to emphasise the role of the magistracy 
and the propriety of the existing social order.  He acknowledged that the labourers had 
every right to approach the justices for redress, but he could not conceive of how ‘an 
attack upon the persons or the destruction of the property of their best friends and 
employers [would] in any way alleviate their wretchedness?’ Davey’s conduct was 
lauded as ‘mild and conciliatory’, only serving to highlight the actions of his assailants as 
‘so uncharacteristic of an Englishman.’759  
In his sentencing, Frere continued to imply that this incident exceeded matters of 
local grievance. In framing it as treasonous, he suggested that the rioters intended to ‘go 
throughout the country to affect a particular purpose’. Seven men were convicted for their 
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involvement in the riot, receiving sentences of between four months and two years in 
prison. The most stringent sentence of 24 months was handed down to James Goatson. 
He was proved to be the man who knocked down Davey’s horse and who had struck the 
constable, and was further reproached for being ‘the elder of a family’; his younger 
relative, Edward, was sentenced to four months, having already served time in prison, 
and for his connection to ‘this bad family.’760  
Frere’s only doubt regarding the conviction of the defendants was ‘whether they 
ought not to have directed the Jury to acquit the prisoners of the misdemeanour and send 
them to a higher tribunal to be tried for treason’: 
‘there was a general attack on the Magistracy, an attack upon the government, a defiance of the 
law and levying war; and had the prisoners been sent to answer for the treason, their lives 
would have been justly forfeited.’761  
 
Despite the heavy terms of imprisonment handed down, considering the scope the court 
had attributed to this disturbance, the Docking rioters sentences were framed as an act of 
clemency. 
The disturbances at Attleborough and Haddiscoe were also marked by the 
challenges they posed to the Establishment. The Attleborough rioters were deemed an 
exceptional case, more particularly due to the apparent complicity of the farmers in their 
actions. The aged Rev. Fairfax Franklin (also a member of the Commission of the Peace) 
was held captive for several hours. Whilst escaping he was struck at by the crowd who 
eventually dispersed when the military arrived. Some 200 labourers and 20 farmers were 
reported to be present, but no more than one or two of the farmers gave any assistance to 
Franklin. The labourers had attempted to force an increase in wages and consequently a 
reduction in tithes to achieve that end. The court was certain that ‘some pre-meditated 
understanding, some unfair and unhandsome communication’ existed between the 
labourers and their employers. Indeed, the Reverend and his companion Mr Dover 
claimed they saw ‘something like concert between some of the farmers and the 
labourers’.762 
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 In the prosecution, everything was done to highlight the criminality of the 
labourers involved in the disturbances. The crowd assembled at Franklin’s property were 
also accused of attacking the Attleborough workhouse. Their abuses were greater still 
because they took place in the early hours of a Sunday morning. Frere went to pains to 
highlight the immorality of this breach of the Sabbath. More sinister were the 
insurrectionary undertones of some of the statements the rioters were alleged to have 
made. Samuel Smith had been heard boasting, ‘that the devil was dead; they were the 
strongest party, and always should be; that this was only the beginning; that they were at 
the feet but should go up to the head’.763 
Seven men were sentenced for their involvement. The perceived ringleaders, 
labourers Robert Smith, Samuel Smith and John Stacey, were imprisoned for two and a 
half years, two years, and 18 months respectively.764  In answering queries regarding the 
absence of farmers in the convictions, Frere stated that if other men ‘no matter in what 
situation they might be’ had been detected and apprehended, they ‘would most assuredly 
have been dealt with equal if not greater severity than any of the prisoners at the bar.’765 
There is no evidence to suggest that any of the farmers present were ever brought before 
the court. Despite his ordeal, Rev. Franklin appealed for the release of the Smith brothers, 
highlighting their previous good behaviour; but – perhaps unsurprisingly - his petitions 
fell on deaf ears.766  
 The imprisonment and attempt to exact a reduction of tithes from the Rev Ellison 
at Haddiscoe was directly compared to the experience of Franklin. Described as ‘a more 
unfeeling and unmanly offence… in extent perhaps it falls short of the riot at Attleburgh 
[sic.], but in daring and disobedience to the law, it was scarcely its parallel.’ Sergeant 
Frere used the case as an opportunity to dispute the idea that had apparently informed 
these disturbances, that the poor were entitled to one third of the tithes. The judge 
claimed this was a falsehood spread amongst the labourers by pernicious radicals 
endeavouring to effect a change in the payment of tithes. The two most prominent figures 
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in the disturbance, Charles Turner and John Soames were both sentenced to twelve 
months imprisonment in Norwich Castle. 
 The issue of tithes and the intervention of farmers were also central to the case of 
a riot at Burgh St Peter. The incumbent of the parish, Rev. William Boycott had agreed to 
meet representatives from the labourers to discuss the issue of wages. He alleged that the 
crowd that came to meet him abused him and attempted to extort money from him. 
Gorbold, one of the defendants, had argued with Boycott and threatened him, claiming 
wages were too low, and ‘that the farmers said they were so oppressed by me [Boycott] 
they could not pay, and I must reduce my tithes’. Initially the clergyman refused to give 
any sort of concession claiming that the yields were so great the tithes could be paid 
comfortably. However, he explained that ‘nearly all the farmers were present’, and when 
one publicly declared he would give everything he was refunded to the labourers, Boycott 
felt compelled to consent to a refund.767 
 Mr Palmer, speaking on behalf of the defendants, mounted a successful defence. 
Under cross-examination it transpired that Gorbold had clearly stated that he had no 
intention of physically harming Boycott. Palmer also argued that the crowd had 
assembled and dispersed peacefully. One other defendant, Turner, had been accused of 
abusing Boycott, but this was cast as legitimate criticism; apparently the Reverend had 
neglected his duties as a clergyman by failing to visit the sick or relieve the poor. All the 
defendants were acquitted.768 
 In his summation, Frere compared Ellison’s ordeal and Boycott’s altercation. The 
disparities he saw were that Boycott was considerably younger, and relatively new to his 
position and the community, and he could not escape some of the blame as ‘the assembly 
was in some measure, convened by the Reverend Gentleman himself’. Consequently, 
Boycott’s case was held up as proof ‘that concession only produces further violence’. 
This did not however make it any easier for the learned judge to accept the verdict 
presented by the jury: 
 ‘If from some scruple of conscience – if from some stretch of ingenuity, they could come to 
such a conclusion, whatever notion they could have had in their minds I know not, but such 
a verdict makes me reflect on and join in the sentiment with the poet when he said, ‘England 
with all thy faults, I love thee still.’ 
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Frere had expressed similar misgivings about the acquittal of rioters at Honing, but with 
both cases chose to present them as a reflection of the fairness inherent within trial by 
jury.769 It is impossible to say how far Boycott’s poor reputation influenced the jury, but 
it is evident in their attitude, and from the cases at Attleborough, Haddiscoe and Burgh St 
Peter, that existing social relationships influenced the outcomes of the prosecutions as 
much as the nature of the disturbances.  
Sergeant Frere maintained that any farmers proved to have been complicit in the 
disturbances would be punished, sentiments which echoed those made by the Judges at 
the Salisbury Special Commission; however, little effort appeared to be made on this 
front by the trial jury or the Norfolk magistrates.770 
The only farmer tried at the sessions in January 1831 was Lee Amis of Roughton, 
who was charged with instigating a riot. On 29th November 1830, another farmer at 
Roughton, Stephen Sutton, was accosted and ‘bustled about’ by a mob of 12 to 20 
labourers. He had previously refused to see their delegation to discuss the issue of wages. 
The disgruntled labourers accused him of being ‘the person who oppressed the poor.’ 
Amis had witnessed the rough treatment of Sutton, and had called out to them: ‘they were 
all damned fools if they let me [Sutton] escape, for I was the one who had oppressed 
them; now was the time to stand up for their rights, which was a stone of meal per day, 
and the farmers could afford to give it.’771 
Amis was a small farmer, occupying eight to ten acres of his own. He and Sutton 
had had dealings together in parish matters. At local vestry meetings Amis had been 
critical of the practice of paying labourers out of the rates ‘instead of being paid good 
wages’. How far the meagre circumstances of the defendant, or his previous disputes with 
the victim, led the jury to acquit Amis is uncertain. They may have also considered the 
incident to have been the product of drunkenness, the crowd having been given beer by 
many others – a fact that was drawn attention to in the proceedings.772 Clearly, while 
parochial politics had informed the disturbance at Roughton, the jury did not seek to 
make an example of Amis as a troublesome farmer. Indeed, the attitude of the jury in this 
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case, and in their generosity to the rioters at Burgh St Peter may have been influenced by 
their sympathy with men of a similar standing – yeomen who shared the burden of tithes 
and poor rates. Certainly the Norfolk courts had been a forum for disputes between the 
ruling classes and their inferiors in matters of local politics before.773 
Aside from Amis, two separate indictments were brought against two other farmers 
at the county sessions in April 1831. The Crown attempted to prosecute John Carman and 
David Roll for ‘exciting riot’ the previous winter. Carman was acquitted because there 
was ‘no venue laid’ of the alleged incident in the indictment. The chief witness for the 
prosecution against Roll, Mr E. Wodehouse (also a member of the Commission of the 
Peace), wished to ‘withdraw all further prosecution, with a view to putting an end to 
these cases, and in the hope the defendant would see the impropriety of his conduct and 
desist from such a course of proceeding in the future’.774  
 
Before the proceedings had begun at the Norfolk sessions, Sergeant Frere outlined the 
purpose of the trials: the gravity of the offences warranted ‘the rigour of the law if the 
bonds which keep society together are to be preserved.’775 The management of the 
prosecution of Swing offenders in Norfolk was calculated to restore social order in its 
broadest sense. In trying the majority of the perpetrators at quarter sessions, the county 
magistracy had – in theory at least – greater control over the outcome of the process.  
The Norfolk magistracy were comparatively lenient in their sentencing of ‘Swing’ 
offenders: forty-eight per cent of those brought before the court were either acquitted or 
discharged on their own recognizance (see fig. 39 below). However, the examples made 
of the machine breakers, and of the rioters at Docking and Attleborough in particular, 
were used to check any sense of legitimate entitlement amongst the populace. The strong 
sentencing in these cases served to counteract the concessions that had been made by the 
magistracy and act as a deterrent to any who sought to challenge the established 
authorities. Indeed, the local press was awed by the stringency of the examples made at 
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the sessions.776 This selection of exemplary cases would eventually culminate in the 
capital cases tried by the Special Commission at Norwich. 
As was the case in Wiltshire, the proceedings also revealed the socio-political 
divisions in county society. In both literal and symbolic terms, the Attleborough riot 
presented the most awful consequence of an alliance between the labourers and the 
yeomanry in a co-ordinated attack upon authority, but it was the labourers that bore the 
brunt of the reprisals, while the farmers were taken back into the fold. There were 
indications however that the magistracy could not have it all their own way, for on more 
than one occasion the jury ruled according to popular mores rather than bowing to the 
will of the Bench.  
 
Figure 39: Sentencing at Quarter Sessions 1831 
 
Sentence: 
 
County: 
Transported Imprisonment:  
≥ six months 
Imprisonment: 
< six months 
Acquitted/Discharged 
Norfolk 9 
(6%) 
33 
(21%) 
44 
(28%) 
68 
(48%) 
Somerset 1 
(8%) 
3 
(23%) 
7 
(54%) 
2  
(15%) 
NB re Somerset: 8 others were indicted at the same sessions for the riot at Banwell but were still to be 
apprehended. Four verdicts re the Norfolk cases are unknown 
 
The Somerset judiciary also chose to keep the punishment of Swing offenders within 
their influence by trying all cases at the county quarter sessions. Unlike Wiltshire and 
Norfolk, there was little discussion of the framing of the trials; the local press being 
preoccupied with the terrifying examples made at Salisbury and in the Home Counties.777 
When the sessions opened in January 1831, the ‘unusually large attendance of 
magistrates’ was noted. As had been the case in Norfolk, the justices presented a show of 
strength, both in numerical terms but also in terms of status. On this occasion the bench 
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included rare appearances from aristocratic justices as well as numerous gentlemen.778 
Attention was also paid to the numbers for trial: of the 118 prisoners – fewer in total, it 
was observed, than the previous year – only 13 appeared in connection with the Swing 
disturbances. The magistracy were keen to emphasise that ‘not more than six charges for 
rioting and breaking machines occur in the whole list’.779 
Somerset by no means shared the same level of tumult as Norfolk, but punishment 
was nevertheless comparatively robust. As fig. 39 shows, only two of the men tried 
escaped punishment. The most severe sentences were passed on Isaac Wheeler and 
George Eavis. Wheeler had threatened to destroy a threshing machine in a minor riot at 
South Brewham on the county boundary shared with Wiltshire.780 He encountered Martin 
Drew, the owner of the machine, in one of the local public houses where they had both 
been drinking. Drew was told that if his thrashing-machine was not taken down by the 
morning, it would be burnt down. Wheeler was singled out as the ‘ringleader of the party’ 
that accosted Drew, and he received four months imprisonment for his actions. Only 21 
of the prisoners tried at the equivalent court in Norfolk, for the actual destruction of 
threshing machines, received prison sentences of the same length or greater.781 Although 
Wheeler’s confrontation with Drew might be attributed to inebriation or personal 
quarrels, he had threatened arson. His sentence reflected the gravity which attended such 
a serious felony. 
George Eavis was involved in both incidents of actual machine breaking to occur in 
the county, and he was also indicted for riot. He was sentenced to the maximum penalty 
of seven years transportation. The disturbances occurred at Yenston and Henstridge, on 
the same day, and in close proximity to the Stalbridge riot in Dorset.782 The stringency of 
Eavis’ sentence was reflected in the petition sent on his behalf to the Home Secretary: 
347 people from Henstridge, including the Minister, Churchwardens, Constables and 
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Overseers of the Poor, testified to Eavis’ industrious nature and hitherto ‘irreproachable 
character.’783  
Although there was little public discussion of the sentencing of Eavis and Wheeler, 
the comparative severity of their sentences reflects an intolerance to disorder, even on a 
small scale in Somerset, and the magistracy made their position perfectly clear. The 
rioters indicted at the same sessions were uniformly convicted for a disturbance that 
appeared to stem more from opportunity and inebriation rather than considered 
grievances. At Banwell, several labourers had assembled to be sworn in as Special 
Constables; when the attendant magistrate, Rev. Moncrieffe, decided to postpone the 
meeting, the men, by then somewhat inebriated, seized the opportunity to make their own 
demands for higher wages and lower prices in a riotous manner.784  
The press reported the incident with little concern, attributing the ‘disposition to 
riot’ to the ‘effects of intoxication.’ However, the local magistracy struggled to regain 
control: ‘All attempts to restore order were useless; and although one of them was 
apprehended and placed in confinement in a house used as a temporary prison, the rest 
immediately procured pick-axes and iron bars, and actually demolished the premises. 
They then carried their liberated companion in triumph around the village, in a chair, and 
threw the prison bed and furniture into the river.’785  
Although the men had initially assembled at Banwell to show their willingness to 
assist the magistracy in the maintenance of order, their drunken antics had made a 
mockery of the proceedings. Consequently all of those ‘deluded men’ apprehended for 
the disturbance were toughly dealt with and sentenced to terms of imprisonment and hard 
labour of up to six months.786 Only five of the men where tried in January, true bills were 
found against eight others who were still at large. The prosecution of these men was 
pursued. By April, six of the remaining rioters had been apprehended and were tried at 
the Easter Sessions. Four of them were dismissed for want of evidence, but Charles 
Hurley was found guilty and sentenced to three months imprisonment at hard labour.787 
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The only case reserved by Somerset’s magistrates for the Assize was one regarding a 
threatening letter, and that was dismissed as no true bill. In Wiltshire, a total of six cases 
relating to the disturbances were tried at the regular Assizes rather than by Special 
Commission.788 Norfolk, as we have seen, removed very few cases to the higher courts 
but those cases that were, and the mode of their prosecution were orchestrated for 
maximum effect. The Assizes were usually held at Thetford but the Special Commission 
sat at Norwich to hear the cases of what the Assize judges described – in private 
correspondence – as a ‘particular class of prisoner’.789 Of the eight on trial for the 
destruction of various ricks and agricultural property by arson, Richard Nockolds was the 
only person executed for a Swing offence in Norfolk.790 
The opening of the Special Assize at Norwich was described as ‘an epocha in the 
history of Norfolk’. It was the first Lent assize to have been held in the city. Much was 
made of the fact that the presiding Judge, Sir Edward Alderson, was a ‘native’ of the 
county. Indeed, the proceedings were framed, in the press at least, to emphasise the 
power and identity of the county. Parallels were also drawn with the Special Commission 
held in Norwich in 1766 ‘for the trial of the rioters’ involved in protracted market 
disturbances. Ominously, the harsh sentencing of the men tried was revisited: ‘A great 
many prisoners were convicted and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, two… 
were executed’. Noting the charges before the court - Nockolds and his accomplices for 
arson, and several poachers for murder - Alderson considered them to be ‘offences of the 
deepest dye.’791  
Authority viewed arson with particular abhorrence: incendiaries worked in secrecy, 
with no other motive than injuring their victim through the destruction of property.792 As 
Norfolk’s landowners publicly exclaimed,  
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‘It is for the honour of our country, it is for our credit as men, that we must find out and punish 
these cowardly miscreants. Englishmen were never assassins! Englishmen were never 
incendiaries …’793 
 
It was supposed by many at first that the disturbances were the work of foreign agents 
fomenting revolution. Justice Berney, writing to Lord Melbourne, was convinced that the 
fires were ‘entirely occasioned by foreign influence … a set of Hell Hounds who are 
carrying devastation through every part of [the country]’.794 Nockolds was not a 
foreigner, but aspects of this xenophobic attitude permeated his case. In the words of 
Judge Alderson, he was ‘not an agricultural labourer … driven to extremities’ but a 
weaver residing in Norwich. He had given up ‘the restraints of religion’ and been 
corrupted by Cobbett and Carlisle; the Sunday reading-room he had established was seen 
as a nursery of dissent.795 All legitimacy that could be derived from the plight of the 
labourers was denied Nockolds; the judge concluding, ‘you therefore committed this act 
for the purpose of exciting general confusion and alarm throughout the country’.796 
Nockolds’ trial and his execution were conducted in Norwich, his home and the county 
capital, as opposed to Thetford, where the assizes were usually held, to ensure maximum 
exposure. He was hanged in front of his family and a considerable crowd, who watched 
in silence. There had been only one other execution in Norwich in the previous nine 
years.797  
 
4. The aftermath 
 
It is clear that Norfolk’s magistrates dealt with Swing offenders in terms of exemplary 
cases. Their leniency must also be seen in the wider context of social conflict in Norfolk 
over a longer period, for local perceptions of Swing’s relatively non-violent expression in 
the county were only so in comparison to the (by then) notorious Littleport and Ely riots 
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of 1816. The magistracy of 1830 structured the prosecution of Swing offenders to restore 
a particular form of social peace, one that emphasised traditional hierarchies and 
allegiances. Their lenity does suggest they sympathised with the labourers’ grievances, 
and this was betrayed by many in letters to the Home Secretary. Justice Berney, while 
convinced that foreign agitators perpetrated the fires, saw more overt disturbances as the 
result of genuine distress and ‘that the demands of the labourers are but too just’.798 Lord 
Suffield reported that the magistrates of North Walsham ‘all avowed their disinclination 
to take severe measures against an oppressed class, until forced to do so for the 
preservation of life and property’.799 
Such reports would have done little to inspire the government’s confidence in the 
Norfolk judiciary, but the harsh examples they made served to counter their original 
concessions and their association with the escalation of machine breaking. The Bench 
also aimed to prevent any continued alliance between the labourers and farmers. In the 
disturbances of 1816 and 1822, the magistracy had had to contend with riots and 
machine-breaking perpetrated by labourers, and in 1823, the authorities faced an 
unprecedented meeting of disgruntled farmers at Norwich. In 1830, Swing saw the 
cooperation of the labourers and their employers – as was the case at Attleborough – with 
dangerous consequences. As John Archer has argued, Norfolk’s gentry ‘could perhaps 
live with an angry work-force but to withstand the verbal attacks of their natural allies, 
their tenants, in the rural war was unthinkable and beyond them’.800  
Richard Nockolds’ prosecution met the demands of both central and local 
government. Wells has highlighted the Home Office’s anxiety to secure convictions for 
arson, and to lay blame for popular depredations at the door of ‘notorious radical 
publicists’ such as Cobbett and Carlile.801 Nockolds was certainly not as well-known, but 
his execution satisfied the ends of government: providing a terrifying example, and 
papering over long-term structural problems in Norfolk society, by tying the most 
‘heinous’ Swing offences to elements outside the agricultural community. 
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The trials in Norfolk did little to resolve the long-standing differences between 
labourers, farmers and landowners; threatening letters were sent to prosecutors, and 
throughout the trials and for the greater part of 1831, fires blazed.802 The alliance between 
farmers and the labourers however, was extinguished. At Brampton Hall near Aylsham, a 
farmer was praised by the courts for arming himself and resisting the demands of 
labourers; an example the bench thoroughly recommended.803  At the October Sessions, 
Daniel Hammant was sentenced to two years in the county gaol for his part in the 
destruction of a threshing machine. A sense of unease persisted in the county: in 
December 1831, Justice Hoseason writing to the Home Office cited the same issues 
plaguing Norfolk agricultural society.804  
Having so few cases, the Somerset magistrates had greater scope for the 
punishment of every offender in 1831. But their consistent prosecution of those involved 
in the disturbances was intended to signal that any signs of insurrection would be nipped 
in the bud. The Assize judge praised the county for having none of those cases ‘of that 
deep moral dye’ which he had tried in other parts of the country, ‘and even on the last 
time I visited this town’ when he alluded to the Kenn incendiaries.805 How far the 
terrifying spectacle of their execution impacted on the potential for conflict in Somerset 
is difficult to gauge; however, in an open letter to The Times, George Emery, deputy 
lieutenant of the county, recommended that terrible example as a means of successfully 
checking incendiarism.806 Aside from the tumultuous meeting at Banwell, and a single 
individual prosecuted for riotous assembly at Cheddar, Kenn and the Winterstoke district 
in general, remained peaceful in the winter of 1830 at least.807  
Despite the lack of serious and widespread disturbances in Somerset, the 
magistracy had remained on their guard throughout the winter of 1830, suggesting that 
while there were few incidents of open protest, the judiciary still saw the potential for 
disturbance. In the New Year, writing to the Clerk of the Peace, the Lord Lieutenant, the 
Marquis of Bath, hoped the convictions at Quarter Sessions would stop incendiaries, but 
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he had received reports of a recent attack in his neighbourhood on the property of a 
prosecution witness in the late trials.808 In April 1831, a partly government-sponsored 
reward was offered for the capture of incendiaries who had fired the property of Mr Good 
at Banwell - just 10 miles south of Kenn.809 Although we cannot always equate the 
motives of incendiaries with social protest, Somerset’s judiciary had to consider arson 
attacks focussed on agricultural property throughout the Spring of 1831 and through the 
Autumn and into the Winter of 1832.810  
In neighbouring Wiltshire, incendiarism also continued to concern the authorities, 
and issues surrounding wages persisted in on-going labourers disputes and strikes.811 
Perhaps the legacy of Swing can also be discerned in some of the prosecutions made in 
the aftermath of the disturbances. At the Summer Assizes, Sarah Wheeler was found 
guilty of arson despite the clearly domestic circumstances of the crime. Refusing to 
consider the pleas of the defendant or her witnesses, the judge ‘told them that 
circumstances had nothing to do with a case like the present’. Wheeler was spared the 
noose but the judge warned her that she would be more than likely transported for life. In 
the same court, Job Hetherall was sentenced to be transported for life for sending a 
threatening letter. In his summation to the jury, the judge went to considerable lengths to 
stress that proof was only required that the prisoner had caused the letter to be written or 
sent. The jury returned their verdict immediately.812 Such stringent examples failed as a 
deterrent: in the Spring of 1832, the Assizes had to rule again, in cases concerning 
anonymous threats to burn farms, and actual acts of agricultural incendiarism.813 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
808 SRO: Q/JCP/7 Marquis of Bath to Edward Coles, 12 Jan 1831. 
809 Bath Journal 18 and 25 April 1831. 
810 Bath Journal, 11April, 14 Nov, 12 Dec 1831, and 2 Jan 1832; TNA, HO 64/2 ff. 33-5, parish of 
Drayton, 17 Jan, ff. 73-4 from D. Williams, 14 April and ff. 280-1, Davies to HO 19 Nov 1831.  
811 Chambers, The Wiltshire Machine Breakers, vol. i, 243–45. 
812 Devizes and Wiltshire Gazette, 21 July 1831. 
813 Devizes and Wiltshire Gazette, 8 March 1832. 
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Figure 40: Perceived causes of the disturbances of 1830-1831 from responses to the 
Poor Law Commissioners 
 
Cause Norfolk Cause Somerset 
Education 1 Attitude of labourers 1 
Population increase 1 Foreigners/strangers 1 
Sanctioned by authority/justified 1 Press 1 
Foreigners/strangers 2 Sanctioned by authority/justified 1 
Law Enforcement 2 Poor social relationships 2 
Press 2 Poverty 2 
Attitude of labourers 3 Employment 3 
Following example (Kent) 3 Wages 3 
Not distress 3 Political agitation 5 
Poverty 3 No answer 16 
Farmers 6   
Machinery 6   
Poor social relationships 7   
Poor Law 8   
Employment 12   
No answer 12   
Political agitation 13   
Wages 13   
Total respondents: 41 Total respondents: 25 
 
Source: Responses to question 53: information on the cause and consequences of the agricultural riots and 
burnings 1830 and 1831, ‘Rural Queries’, Appendix B, V. from the Poor Law Commissioners Report 1834 
 
The investigations of the poor law commissioners in 1834, afford a slightly longer view 
of the aftermath of Swing. The report attributed the disturbances, to a considerable extent, 
to the maladministration of the relief system. Inherent within that discussion was a 
reappraisal of the magistracy and the function of parochial authority. Paternalist 
concessions were cast as inflammatory, as a ‘perversion of the traditions of reciprocity’: 
when the authorities failed to meet the needs of the labourers ‘they had resorted to 
discriminating violence in order to enforce their supposed rights and the duties of their 
superiors’. The magistracy appeared to have been cowed into submission but also to 
share in part, what Nassau Senior described as the ‘anarchical doctrines’ of the 
labourers.814 The perceived failure of the county judiciary to effectively put down the 
disturbances of 1830 only contributed to a sense that the magistracy were increasingly 
ineffective. 
                                                
814 P. Dunkley, The Crisis of the Old Poor Law in England 1795-1834 (London: Garland 1982) 98-9. 
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 Research conducted by the commissioners within the counties directly addressed 
what the perceived causes of the disturbances were. The responses from Norfolk and 
Somerset do not present any revelations regarding the origins of disorder, but they do 
point to concerns about the efficiency of the local authorities in terms of law 
enforcement. 
 
Respondents from both counties cited poor wages and a want of employment as the main 
structural causes for the disturbances (fig. 40, above). In Norfolk, this was exacerbated by 
the prevalence of agricultural machinery and the intervention of farmers. Significantly 
though, both counties gave greater weight to the role played by political agitators.  
The blame did not rest solely with the likes of Cobbett and Hunt, but also with pre-
existing political organisations and Beer Shops – establishments that were widely 
associated with the dissemination of seditious material and the formulation of 
insurrectionary plots. Colonel Harvey, visiting convicted machine breakers held in 
Norwich Castle, reported that,   
‘their spirit [was] completely subdued, that they were satisfied with the justice of their 
sentences but it was very apparent that in many instances been misled…he was convinced that 
the outrages never originated with the men, but that they were paid and encouraged by 
others’. 
 
A few respondents also connected the Press with the circulation of subversive ideas and 
information regarding the riots. Certainly in Norfolk it was felt that news of the 
disturbances in Kent had inspired the labourers.815 
Very few of the respondents attributed the riots to an ill-disposed populace. Only 
three respondents – all from Norfolk – attempted to deny that the unrest stemmed from 
genuine distress; the respondent from Stiffkey attributed disorder to idleness. In Bishops 
Hull, Somerset, poverty was acknowledged as a cause, but alongside a ‘pure love of 
mischief’.816 Several answers, particularly from Norfolk cited the breakdown of social 
relationships as a contributing factor. In part this was attributed to the administration of 
                                                
815 See in particular responses from: Brockdish, Brooke, Cockley Cley, West Rainham, Saxlingham, 
Sulthorpe, Shottisham and Worstead in Norfolk; and Crowcombe, Kingston and Yeovil in Somerset; ‘Rural 
Queries’, Appendix B, V. from the Poor Law Commissioners Report 1834. Norwich Mercury, 29 January 
1831. 
816 See responses from Bishops Hull, Somerset and Brooke, Little Massingham, Starston and Stiffkey, 
Norfolk. 
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the poor laws. A churchwarden of West Rainham in Norfolk suggested that ‘too much 
indulgence, on the part of the Magistrates, to the complaints of the Poor… has made him 
depend more on his interest with the Magistrates than on his own exertions; and the 
consequence has proved, dislike to his Master, and destruction to his property.’817 
Predictably, in the answers for Norfolk, farmers were frequently cast as the instigators 
of riots. In responses predominantly from magistrates, clergymen and churchwardens, the 
issue of wages was complicated by demands for a reduction in rents and tithes; and the 
availability of tracts discussing the clergy and their apparent abuses of the tithe system 
augmented bad feeling.818  
On the whole, the role of the magistracy was not openly called into question, but the 
impact of the concessions made during the disturbances was discussed. Rev. Doctor 
James Ward, writing from Coltishall (Norfolk) stated, ‘the general compliance with the 
demands made by them [the labourers], of having their wages and their allowances 
increased, gave the appearance, to them, of justice to their cause, and taught them the use 
of a power which they have not yet forgotten’. William Kemp of Gissing echoed Ward, 
fearing a precedent for action had been set: ‘the Poor have been taught their strength 
when acting in union… and will resort to the same means when they wish another 
rise.’819 In Somerset, similar concerns were expressed that the ‘rioters in general were 
under the impression that their proceedings were sanctioned and encouraged by 
authority.’820 There was however, little evidence that the concessions had lasted. In his 
report to the commissioners on Norfolk and Suffolk, Mr. Henry Stuart confirmed that 
relief was given by many landowners and clergy regarding tithes and rents, ‘but I could 
not learn that the labourer derived any benefit from it’.821 
The apparent strength and volatility of the labouring poor, both during and in 
consequence of the disturbances, raised the issue of effective policing. The respondent 
from Scole (Norfolk) argued that without the Yeomanry Cavalry, and the reluctance of 
the justices to call on the military, the rioters had gained an advantage. From Little 
Massingham, Mr Brereton agreed that the ‘consequences are, increased contempt for 
                                                
817 Response from West Rainham, 319; see also Little Massingham, Thursford and Wymondham. 
818 See Brockdish, Brooke, Gissing, Saxlingham, Shottisham and Starston. 
819 See Coltishall and Gissing, 309 and 314. 
820 See Weston, 408. 
821 H. Stuart, Appendix A, 381; see also responses from Downham Market and Gissing. 
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superiors and authorities, and the necessity for an improved, more active, and united 
Police, to preserve the discipline of the country.’822 
 Policing and the maintenance of order did not feature strongly in the responses 
from county residents. However, in the reports presented to the commission by Stuart (for 
Norfolk) and Captain Chapman (for Somerset), the state of rural law enforcement 
appeared to be in dire need of reform. Stuart stated that Norfolk was bereft of any 
‘organized means…for the enforcement of public order.’ Rural policing was limited to 
parish constables, associations for the protection of property and the magistrates. The 
constables proved unreliable, being ‘frequently swayed by the ties of relationship or 
friendship.’ The associations were limited in scope: they raised subscriptions to fund a 
few extra constables and offered rewards, but they had no significant preventative or 
detective capacity, and were clearly not available to everybody. Stuart did not criticise 
the magistracy; he acknowledged that the Swing disturbances had been ‘suppressed by 
the ordinary means possessed by the local authorities’ and the justices had ‘displayed 
great firmness on the first appearance of disturbance’. Nonetheless, a ‘very general 
feeling was expressed to me [Stuart] of the inadequate protection they afford to persons 
or property.’823 
Stuart also testified to the persistent occurrence of fires in Norfolk. He did not see it 
as the product of any system, or movement, but he was concerned by the failure to detect 
the perpetrators. Arson, it was alleged, had become the principal means of expressing 
discontent and challenging the authorities. He recalled an incident where a clergyman had 
been sent to quell a ‘riot’ in a beer shop; he threatened to take the parties involved before 
the magistrates for punishment and ‘the next week a stack of hay belonging to him was 
burnt.’ The men in the beer shop had made threats but nothing could be proved.824 
Stuart concluded his report in dramatic tones declaring, ‘that a widely extended moral 
depravity prevails, which can only be controlled by the establishment of a more efficient 
and vigilant system of police… to secure that speedy detection of crime which can only 
protect society from falling into an utter state of lawlessness and violence.’825 
                                                
822 See Little Massingham and Scole, 317 and 321. 
823 H. Stuart, Appendix A, 381. 
824 Ibid, 381. 
825 Ibid, 382. 
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The report from Somerset did not make explicit reference to the disturbances of 1830, 
however, similar concerns were voiced regarding the state of law enforcement in the 
county. ‘Nothing’ Captain Chapman stated, ‘can well be more inefficient than the 
existing means of control’. The constables were neither fit for, nor active in their duty; 
the obligations of the role were considered ‘irksome, sometimes difficult, and involving 
much responsibility’ and therefore attended with little care, or carried out only for the 
‘emolument they receive.’ As well as the deficiency in constables, Chapman reported a 
lack of resident magistrates in urban areas such as Frome and therefore ‘the want of some 
efficient police, and some head in cases of riot, is much felt’. A desire for a reformed 
system of policing was widespread in Somerset. However, Chapman found that ‘every 
where there was the same disinclination to incur expense for the purpose.’826 
The careful management of the prosecution of Swing offenders succeeded in 
checking any further outbreaks of collective action, however, it is clear that in all three 
counties, discontent continued although expressed through the more subversive medium 
of incendiarism. The reputation of the county justices in the aftermath of the Swing 
disturbances does not appear to have suffered as much as has been suggested. The 
responses from Norfolk and Somerset to the Poor Law Commissioners did not explicitly 
attack the institution of the magistracy, however, criticisms were voiced regarding the 
danger of concessions made by officials and the inefficiency of the system of policing 
dependent on voluntary service and local connection. Reform, it would seem, was 
welcomed by the majority, but not necessarily at the expense of judicial control.  Indeed, 
Chapman’s report clearly indicated a preference for the establishment of a professional 
police force, but under the control of the county magistrates.827 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
By emphasising the trials of Swing offenders by the county magistracy as calculated acts 
of local government, this chapter has aimed to provide a more nuanced understanding of 
the framing of the prosecutions and their significance for the management of the 
                                                
826 Captain Chapman, Appendix A, 466-7. 
827 Ibid, 467. 
 
 
249 
aftermath of unrest. The suppression of disorder was a complex process, and the precise 
nature of repression was framed by local social and political contexts, and local history, 
as much as by statute law and the demands of central government.  
 In the years immediately preceding the disturbances, there were few incidents of 
protest or incendiarism to alert the authorities to the levels of discontent in their 
communities. Crime however, was a concern and perceived to be an indicator of distress. 
In Somerset, poverty was acknowledged, but not excused, as a motive; and the example 
of the Kenn execution signalled the magistracy’s intolerance to disorder. The Norfolk 
judiciary appeared to be more compassionate to the poor, but their attitude was informed 
by long-term disputes between themselves, their tenants and the labourers. This context 
points to the social tensions and judicial attitudes that would underpin the prosecutions of 
1831. 
Although their management and structuring of the prosecutions varied, some 
attitudes were shared by the judiciary at every level. Of paramount concern – as 
expressed by the Attorney General – was the protection of local government. 
Consequently, the magistrates and judges made potent examples of those who attacked or 
subverted the authorities. In Wiltshire and Norfolk, the judiciary were also keen to 
protect their integrity as legitimate rulers having appeared to capitulate to the labourers’ 
demands by making such widespread concessions. The extent of crowd violence may 
well have been over-emphasised by the courts, as Griffin has suggested.828 In Norfolk, 
the most violent incidents of riot, at Docking and Attleborough, were even considered in 
terms of treason, dismantling any notion of a moral justification for the labourers’ 
actions. Across those counties most affected by Swing, and particularly where central 
government had a hand in the prosecutions, presenting collective action as violent was 
significant in delegitimising the motivations of the crowd.829 
Concern for the maintenance of social order, and social hierarchy, is also evident in 
the judiciary’s ‘xenophobic’ expressions. Keith Snell has pointed to the role of ‘local 
xenophobia’ in checking the development of class-consciousness. Particularly in the 
depressed conditions following the Napoleonic Wars, concerns for limited resources and 
                                                
828 C. J. Griffin, ‘The violent Captain Swing?’ 154; 
829 R. Wells, ‘Mr William Cobbett, Captain Swing, King William IV’, 47. 
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employment opportunities strengthened prejudice and fear of ‘foreign’ interlopers. 
Swing, however, highlighted the possibilities of collective action across parish, 
occupational and even county boundaries.830  In the processes of selection and mode of 
prosecution, not only were radical incendiaries excluded from the legitimacy of the 
labourer’s cause, but notably at the Salisbury Special Commission, it was considered 
‘more inexcusable’ for craftsmen and non-agricultural labourers to be the perpetrators of 
depredations.831 Rather than acknowledge the structural causes of unrest, the authorities 
could blame a foreign element for the destruction of ‘that bond of mutual interest and 
goodwill which ought … to unite the higher and lower classes of the community’.832  
The mass disturbances experienced in Wiltshire apparently warranted mass 
prosecutions in the centrally administered Special Commissions. And examples were 
made of the offenders on an unprecedented scale: two-thirds of those tried were 
convicted, and more than half of those individuals were transported.833 While central 
government signalled its concern for the ample prosecution of offenders by convening the 
court at Salisbury, the total delegation of responsibility for the prosecutions to the Special 
Commission cannot be held up as proof of a lack of confidence in the local judiciary. As 
the evidence presented here has shown, the county magistrates were complicit in the 
prosecutions, by supporting the selection of cases for trial and ensuring their progress 
before the Bench. The level of tumult experienced in the county, and undoubtedly the 
extent of the concessions granted, meant the Wiltshire justices had as much of a vested 
interest in presenting themselves as competent and rigorous governors as the 
administration at Westminster.  
The influence of the magistracy in the prosecutions at higher courts is borne out by 
the organisation of the Norfolk Special Commission. But in contrast to Salisbury, it 
provided little more than an opportunity to stage the execution of Richard Nockolds as a 
classic example of judicial terror. On the whole, in Somerset and Norfolk, the magistrates 
                                                
830 K. Snell, ‘The culture of local xenophobia’, Social History, 28:1 (2003) 23, 26, 28-9. 
831 Hobsbawm and Rudé, Captain Swing, 259. For example see the case of William Hayter, TNA: ASSI 
24/18/3 Special Commission minute book, 4 Jan 1831; Chambers, The Wiltshire Machine Breakers, vol. i, 
138–39. See also discussion of Nockolds above. 
832 Justice Parke addressing the Wiltshire Special Commission, 1 Jan 1831; Chambers, The Wiltshire 
Machine Breakers, vol. i, 101–2. 
833 TNA: ASSI 24/18/3 Special Commission minute book, January 1831; Hobsbawm and Rudé, Captain 
Swing, 259, 262–63. 
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preferred to keep the trials entirely within the purview of local authority at the county 
quarter sessions.  
Although Somerset produced few disturbances, the majority of the county’s 
offenders were tried and convicted, and received robust punishment. Norfolk experienced 
considerable unrest and made carefully selected examples. In structuring these 
prosecutions the magistracy were comparatively lenient: the precedents of the previous 
disturbances of 1816 and 1822 caused the justices to reflect more favourably on the 
Swing rioters. The magistracy also took into consideration the complex relationship 
between landowners, tenants, and labourers – ensuring the interests of the propertied at 
the expense of the poor worker. 
 The stringency of the prosecutions in Somerset and the examples in Norfolk 
appeared to prevent further incidents of collective protest after 1831. But the prosecutions 
did little to heal enduring social divisions. The reports made to the Poor Law 
commissioners showed a continued belief in a ‘foreign’ element fomenting discontent, 
but they also testified to the persistence of social divisions, and in Norfolk at least, the 
challenges to authority manifested in acts of incendiarism. Despite the criticisms voiced 
by Nassau Senior, the respondents from Norfolk and Somerset did not explicitly 
condemn the magistracy as an institution. But criticism of the nature of local government, 
in particular, its foundation on personal connection and voluntary service was implicit. 
The dependency of the poor on the magistracy, the legitimacy derived from officially 
sanctioned concessions, problems of partiality - and at a base level – the sheer manpower 
necessary for effective law enforcement was questioned throughout. These concerns 
resonated with criticisms levelled at the magistracy during the disturbances, and in their 
wake, locally and within parliament. Consequently, calls for reform in the administration 
of local government, and policing were made. While the proposed measures tended 
towards the professionalisation of law enforcement, the position of the magistracy as 
superintendents of local government – from the evidence in Norfolk and Somerset at least 
– was left largely unchallenged.834 
 
  
                                                
834 Above, Rural Queries IV, esp. 381 and 467. 
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Chapter Six 
Conclusions: structures of government, protest and the magistracy 
 
This thesis has addressed calls for more concerted studies of the actions and attitudes of 
the authorities to social protest. It has endeavoured to offer a more nuanced analysis of 
judicial responses to protest, and the nature of social relationships that underpinned them, 
by focusing on the county magistracy and the institutions and structures of power for 
which they were responsible.  
Edward Thompson, Roger Wells, Andrew Charlesworth, and more recently Carl 
Griffin (amongst others), have drawn attention to the period from c.1790-1834 as a 
watershed in English social relationships.835 Popular demands for ‘the right to 
subsistence’ (to borrow Peter Jones’ phrase) precipitated by acute economic crisis, took 
on a new colour in view of political agitation at home and abroad.836 This context altered 
the ‘political space’, or ‘field of force’ in which ‘the crowd might act and might negotiate 
with the authorities.’837 Judicial tolerance for collective, or riotous popular action 
diminished, limiting the ability of the politically and economically dispossessed to 
articulate and seek redress for their grievances. Increasing recourse to the ‘repressive 
agencies’ instigated a realignment of popular interests in opposition to authority, and 
consequently the decline of paternalist governance.838 The impact this reconfiguration of 
political space had on the nature of popular protest has stimulated considerable debate, 
much of which has stemmed from the Wells-Charlesworth dispute regarding the resort to 
‘covert’ rather than ‘overt’ means of resistance. Popular access to judicial mediation 
underscored this apparent dichotomy.839  
                                                
835 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London 1963; this ed. Pelican 1968); R. 
Wells, ‘The Development of the English Rural Proletariat and Social Protest, 1700-1850’ (1979); A. 
Charlesworth, ‘The Development of the English Rural Proletariat and social protest, 1700-1850: a 
comment,’ Journal of Peasant Studies, 8 (1980): 101-11; C. J. Griffin, The Rural War: Captain Swing and 
the Politics of Protest (2012). 
836 P. Jones, ‘Swing, Speenhamland and rural social relations: the moral economy of the English crowd in 
the nineteenth century’, Social History, 32:3 (2007): 274. 
837 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy Reviewed’ in idem. Customs in Common (1991) 261 
838 Idem, ‘The moral economy of the English Crowd in the eighteenth-century’ (1971); R. Wells, ‘The 
Development of the English Rural Proletariat and Social Protest, 1700-1850,’ The Journal of Peasant 
Studies 6 (1979): 115-139. 
839 R. Wells, ibid; A. Charlesworth, ‘The Development of the English Rural Proletariat and social protest, 
1700-1850: a comment,’ esp. 106. 
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This analysis of the changing nature of social protest and the relations that 
underpinned it runs parallel to the changing nature of governance in this period. The 
autonomy of local government and the discretionary capability of the magistracy 
facilitated the negotiation of popular grievances that met both the needs of authority and 
the community at large. The strain placed on local government by war, economic crisis 
and calls for political reform, was brought to the fore in the context of social protest, 
contributing to demands for the reformation of county government in the first decades of 
the nineteenth century.840 The basis for the analysis pursued here therefore, has been a 
consideration of the structures of government and the role they played in shaping the 
political spaces that framed popular interaction with authority. This approach is needed in 
order to understand the complexity of judicial responses to disorder. It also provides a 
lens through which to view constellations of social relationships at this critical juncture. 
 
The arrangement of county government was regionally contingent, and must therefore be 
addressed at a local level. The two case studies of Norfolk and Somerset reveal markedly 
different governmental arrangements, reflecting the counties’ respective productive 
capacities and population distribution. The organisation of justices, and petty and quarter 
sessional divisions in Norfolk structured a system of locally orientated administration. 
Somerset’s juridical and jurisdictional arrangements were more convoluted, exposing the 
difficulties faced by the county magistracy, which were articulated more explicitly in the 
correspondence to the clerk of the peace.841 Both patterns of government were reinforced 
through the manipulation of membership of the commissions of the peace, bolstering the 
system of localised justice in Norfolk and ameliorating under-provisioned districts in 
Somerset. 
The distribution of judicial groupings across the two counties shaped responses to 
social protest and the political spaces available to their communities. The absence or lack 
of resident justices in Somerset prevented a swift response to protest in 1801, prompting 
the magistrates on the ground to employ more conciliatory measures. Conversely, the 
                                                
840 D. Eastwood, Government and Community in the English Provinces, 1700-1850 (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press, 1997), 131-4. 
841 Chapter 2: Mapping the Magistracy; SRO: Q/JCP 1-7, 12 Papers and Correspondence relating to 
Justices and the Commission of the Peace, 1801-1830 
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ordering of the Norfolk magistrates, and their close relationship with the county 
yeomanry, provided the basis for a regional police network in 1795. In the absence of the 
volunteer troops in 1830, however, the local benches of Norfolk concentrated their efforts 
on and within their specific jurisdictions, establishing patterns of response that, while 
locally relevant, jarred with countywide recommendations and created issues of parity in 
neighbouring districts. Other spaces for popular intervention persisted between county 
and borough benches, and when the magistracy in both counties endeavoured to mobilise 
the middling sort to aid the civil force in 1830, the yeomanry and tenantry used the 
opportunity to bargain their assistance for reductions in rents and tithes. 
The move to paternalist conciliation in the absence of armed support resembles 
aspects of the overt/covert polarity debated by Wells and Charlesworth. Indeed the case 
of Frome would tend to support Wells’ original argument further: the declining 
manufactories and increasing reliance on relief from at least the 1790s, and the swift 
suppression of open protest in the 1820s, left the impoverished townsfolk with only 
recourse to threats in 1830, unable to confront the parish authorities or their 
employers.842 But, as Griffin has argued, we must be aware of the ‘terror and bodily 
effects generated by violent gestures, symbols and threats.’843 At Frome and Shepton 
Mallet textile workers appropriated the moniker of Swing. To paraphrase Griffin, it 
provided a trope that united disparate communities. If not the actual connections between 
‘rural’ and ‘urban’ communities, then the ‘shared if differently contoured experience’ of 
poverty allowed Swing to act as a metonym amongst the dispossessed.844 Indeed, from 
the perspective of the authorities, the manifestation of Swing in Somerset, in incendiary 
fires, threatening letters, radical rabble-rousers, and riots on its borders, was enough to 
stimulate them to act. Rather than emphasising the number of disturbances, overt or 
covert, addressing the activity of the authorities highlights the impact the perception of 
unrest had on the administration of the law and the interactions of the authorities with 
their communities. 
                                                
842 Chapters 2.1 and 4. Rural War versus the Spectre of Swing; C. J. Griffin, ‘The Culture of Combination: 
solidarities and collective action before Tolpuddle,’ The Historical Journal 58:2 (2015): 456-7, 462. 
843 C. J. Griffin, ‘The violent captain Swing?’ Past & Present 209 (2010): esp. 179. 
844 Ibid, 164, idem, ‘The culture of combination’, 479. 
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The recourse to paternalist measures was not merely a matter of pragmatism. 
Despite the availability of military support in 1801, the Somerset magistracy were 
reluctant to call upon them without a detailed discussion of the nature and terms of their 
deployment. Even when the grand jury and Crown counsel had settled the matter, judicial 
pressure was still applied to producers to encourage reductions in prices.845 Similar 
persistence in the expediency of concessions was voiced by Lord Lieutenant John 
Wodehouse in 1830. He, with other members of the commission, could not ignore the 
very real problems that existed in their communities.846 How far the continued adherence 
to paternal ideals can be attributed to the social composition of the bench is difficult to 
assess. The extent to which new members altered the character of local government is 
questionable; processes of differentiation based on title, occupation and background 
unravel when interrogated.847 Perhaps what is more pertinent is the persistence of 
particular values associated with the archetypal gentleman justice. Following Eastwood’s 
assessment of the Oxfordshire bench, the aspirations of ‘lesser gentlemen’, men like 
Blake and Poole, and perhaps Hoseason, testify to the continuation of a judicial mentality 
that advocated superintendence of government by the gentry and the exercise of local 
influence.848 
There is certainly evidence that there was broader adherence to notions of 
paternalist governance beyond the gentlemen justice and the labouring poor. At Norwich 
the demands of the city’s manufacturers and craftsmen highlighted the deep-rootedness 
of moral economic values across sectors of the community. This relationship, made 
apparent in Renton’s analysis of market regulation in the 1760s, clearly persisted in 
1800.849 This may well have been influenced by the shared demographic of the Norwich 
bench and its constituents. Nonetheless, the middling-sort must be taken into account as 
part of the ‘field of force’ as King has suggested.850  
                                                
845 Chapter 3 The magistracy and the crisis of paternalism: 3.2 
846 Chapter 4.2.3 A question of concession or repression 
847 Chapter 2.4 The Social Composition of the Magistracy 
848 D. Eastwood, Governing Rural England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 76, 79. 
849 S. Renton, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Middling Sort in the Eighteenth-Century: the case of 
Norwich in 1766 and 1767’ A. Randall and A. Charlesworth (eds) Markets, Market Culture and Popular 
Protest in Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland (Liverpool University Press, 1996) 115-36. Chapters 3.2 
& 3.4 
850 P. King, ‘Edward Thompson’s Contribution to Eighteenth-Century Studies. The Patrician: Plebeian 
Model Re-examined’ Social History, 21:2 (1996): 226. 
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King’s proposed model of triangular social relations is very apparent in this 
context, and had a significant bearing on the political space in which protest played out. 
As King highlighted, this is evident in Thompson’s own analysis of the subsistence crises 
when the judiciary and the poor allied to prevent ‘pernicious middlemen’ frustrating the 
moral economic operation of the market.851 This is born out in many instances in chapter 
three, but there are also clear cases where the middling sort could also ‘triangulate’: using 
the law to assert their own interests. At Wells, for example, in 1795, the town’s 
tradesmen enlisted the support of Rev. John Turner, a county justice, to check the more 
paternalistic sentiments of the city bench. The judiciary and the middling sort might also 
cooperate in their regulation of the poor. Again, King has addressed this in the context of 
the summary courts, but as the evidence from Norfolk shows, the bench sought their 
support for placatory initiatives through well-publicised charges to the grand jury, using 
them to disseminate policy on the ground.852 The triangulation of social relationships was 
more pronounced in 1830. In Norfolk, the impact of the post-war depression on the 
county’s farmers and their hostility to landlords was played out in public debates 
regarding the maintenance of the poor, again in the arena of the grand jury chamber. 
Come the autumn of 1830, this was manifest in a more dramatic fashion, when farmers’ 
allied themselves with the labourers’ cause, on occasion – as was the case at 
Attleborough – in open protest. In both Somerset and Norfolk, the ‘squeezed middle’ 
capitalized on the political space created by plebeian unrest, bargaining their loyalty in 
return for concessions.853 
This complex of relations, which had to be negotiated by the judiciary, frustrated 
the suppression of unrest via conciliatory and coercive means. Indeed, the evidence 
submitted to the Poor Law Commissioners in 1832 regarding the causes of disturbance, 
reflected the conflicting interests of farmers, parish officers and clergymen that impeded 
the operation of local government.854 The space for negotiation framed by the institutions 
of the magistracy was accessible to more than the gentry and the poor; but it is also clear 
that it was failing in the context of economic depression and political crisis. Tending to 
                                                
851 Ibid, 226. 
852 Chapter 3.2 &3.3 
853 Chapter 4.2 
854 Chapter 5.4  
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King’s further point regarding the limits of the paternalist model, the magistracy 
struggled to control their own rituals.855 In this context, judicial paternalism became 
increasingly problematic, and as Douglas Hay has argued, the subject of public debate. 
The end of the eighteenth century, Hay has suggested, brought about ‘immense change in 
the nature of public-order calculations’.856 The efficacy of paternalist governance was 
questioned. Evident throughout discussions presented here, between justices, and the 
county commissions and central government, criticisms of the magistracy’s handling of 
unrest were framed in terms of the dependency it engendered, and, more significantly, the 
potential to embolden the labouring poor.857 The role of the courts, perhaps the last 
weapon in the judicial arsenal with which authority could be secured, is significant. The 
courts were the site of very public contests regarding the probity of concessionary 
measures. It was a forum in which policy lines could be drawn.858 
 Some of the most notable trials in the aftermath of unrest, those presided over by 
centrally appointed judges either at the Assizes or under Special Commission have been 
read as central intervention in the provinces, signalling government’s dissatisfaction with 
the magistracy.859 Certainly the prosecution of Justice George Donisthorpe in 1795 was 
framed to put pay to misplaced paternalist concern, casting his use of discretion as 
conspiratorial and tyrannical. Despite the best efforts of Thomas Erskine, and in spite of 
Kenyon’s paternalist sensibilities, the trial was pursued to the Assizes, to be ‘discussed in 
the face of the public’.860 The trial of Tout and Westcott in 1801, and the Special 
Commissions in the aftermath of Swing, likewise served to meet the ends of justice, as 
far as central government was concerned. However, this perspective ignores the role of 
the local judiciary in the operation of the higher courts. The grand jury at both the 
Assizes and Special Commissions were largely comprised of county justices, who were 
charged with the selection of cases for trial. More than complicit in these central 
                                                
855 P. King, ‘Edward Thompson’s Contribution to Eighteenth-Century Studies. The Patrician: Plebeian 
Model Re-examined’, 222. 
856 D. Hay, ‘The state and the market in 1800: Lord Kenyon and Mr Waddington’ Past & Present (1999): 
158. 
857 Chapter 3.3.2 and Chapter 4.2.3 
858 D. Hay, ‘The state and the market in 1800: Lord Kenyon and Mr Waddington’ 103, 156-7. 
859 R. Wells, ‘The Revolt of the South West, 1800-01: A Study in Englsih Popular Protest’, 50; E. J. 
Hobsbawm and G. Rudé, Captain Swing (Lawrence and Wishart, 1969; this ed. Phoenix Press, 2001) 258. 
860 Chapter 3.4.3; The Times, 9 Aug 1796. 
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interventions, the Wiltshire justices actively sought a Special Commission for the county 
and made a great show of the unity of authority at the opening of the court. Cooperation 
between county and central government was also apparent in the organisation of the 
Special Commission at Winchester.861 The convening of a Special Commission for 
Norfolk in 1831, a fact overlooked by all Swing’s historians thus far, was likewise, at the 
behest of the county bench.862 
Continuity can also be discerned in the framing of cases between the higher courts 
and county quarter sessions. In Wiltshire and Norfolk, the process of selection was 
directed to divest Swing and the grievances it articulated of all legitimacy. The violence 
of crowd actions was emphasised as ‘a perversion of the normal politics of social 
relations’.863 Presiding at Norfolk, Sergeant Frere imputed the actions of the Docking and 
Attleborough rioters to be treasonous; acknowledging their right to seek redress from the 
magistracy Frere was unable to countenance why they should wish to attack the property 
‘of their best friends and employers’.864  The narrative presented via the courts was 
intended to redefine social bounds: the transportation of recidivists, the penalties levied 
against non-agricultural workers, and the characterisation of the most violent acts as ‘un-
English’, allowed the judiciary to make terrifying examples which were distinguished 
from the genuine distress of rural workers. The xenophobic sentiments that permeated 
some of the trials further sought to divide the rural and urban.865 Even the light handling 
of the farmers appears as a calculated measure to end inter-class class collaboration 
between the middle and lower orders, particularly when there was some resistance to the 
bench manifest in the petty jury. Somerset provides a rather different picture, but not one 
marked by any sense of lenity. With relatively few prisoners for trial, the county 
magistracy had scope for comprehensive punishment, making their intolerance to 
disorder – actual or threatened – clear.866 
Although there was little explicit suggestion in the counties’ respondents to the 
Poor Law Commissioners in 1832, that the gentry should be removed from the 
                                                
861 C. J. Griffin, The Rural War: Captain Swing and the Politics of Protest (Manchester University Press, 
2012) 248-59. 
862 Chapter 5.3 
863 C. J. Griffin, ‘The violent Captain Swing?’ 154. 
864 Chapter 5.3; Norfolk Chronicle, 22 Jan 1831. 
865 Chapter 5.3; K. Snell, ‘The culture of local xenophobia’, Social History, 28:1 (2003): 23, 26, 28-9. 
866 Chapter 5.3 
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superintendence of local government, the efficacy of voluntary service and the 
inconsistencies produced by judicial decisions were questioned.867 Despite the strength of 
the courts’ rhetoric and sentencing, the purpose of the trials the preceding year- ‘the 
protection of the local authorities’ - betrayed some of the weakness of county 
government. The trials reflected concern amongst the judiciary to counter the level of 
concessions extracted by force, and to reassert their collective authority after so much 
inconsistency was evident in the immediate responses to unrest. As Justice Hoseason 
complained, ‘all Magistrates should be obliged to Act together, and upon the same 
principle which is strictly to adhere to the Law.’868  
Throughout the period considered here, the elision of judicial and social authority, 
the basis of magisterial power, was becoming increasingly problematic. It facilitated 
negotiation but also created disparity and awkward precedents. The preference for private 
charity evident in both counties, particularly in 1830, indicated a desire to separate 
judicial authority from paternal social control, thereby limiting popular appropriation of 
the law and government as ‘legitimations for protest’.869 This division was achieved in 
part by reforms in local government. Magistrates were not removed entirely from the 
regulation of poor relief under the New Poor Law. They were ex-officio Guardians of the 
poor by virtue of their judicial office. But, as Eastwood has highlighted, the new poor law 
administration had a leveling effect: magistrates now shared power with elected 
Guardians, and both were subject to policy determined by a central board.870 The 
autonomy of the magistracy that created the spaces for paternal negotiation was finally 
checked. 
 
The purpose of this thesis has been to show the utility of addressing social protest from 
the perspective of the authorities, and more particularly, through the operation of 
governmental structures. This approach exposes the complex of social relations that 
underpinned social protest, the structures that shaped it and informed the regionally 
contingent responses of authority. These interactions on the ground, while frequently 
                                                
867 Chapter 5.5 
868 Chapter 4.2.3; HO 52/9 ff. 37-8 letter of Dec. 13th 1830. 
869 E. P. Thompson, ‘Eighteenth-century English society: class struggle without class?’ Social History, 3:2 
(1978): 154. 
870 D. Eastwood, Government and Community, 134 
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triangular in form, also crossed horizontal, occupational communities, and were corralled 
by the vertical structures of government. Particularly in the context of crisis at the turn of 
the nineteenth century, the tensions manifest at every intersection of government were 
exposed by social protest, prompting a redefinition of social relationships through a 
concomitant reformation of local government. 
 This study has been necessarily limited in scope, privileging particular phases of 
unrest to expose the operations of the magistracy in a comparative framework. The 
legacy of social protest in both counties needs to be considered more broadly. Despite 
their best efforts to segregate rural and urban communities in their handling of disorder, 
links persisted between occupational groups in shared grievances, which informed the 
actions of authority. Work has begun on this in the West: Griffin has shown how the 
experience of protest and its suppression across communities and over the longer-term 
informed the development and response to rural trade unionism at Tolpuddle in 1834.871 
The ‘rural war’ in Norfolk begs the same treatment. The protests of 1816 and 1822 
clearly informed the experience of Swing in the county. To gain an even clearer 
understanding of the responses to unrest in 1830, judicial activity in these preceding years 
needs to be analysed more closely. There is likewise scope to pursue this further into the 
nineteenth century to address resistance to the New Poor Law in the county. Within the 
new framework of administration old tensions subsisted. The demands of the poor and 
judicial opposition to the restriction of local discretion held on to the vestiges of 
paternalist governance, but, as Digby has suggested, the more ‘liberal’ attitude of the 
magistracy was ‘swamped’ by the ascendency of the ‘elected farmer-guardians’. This 
social interaction, framed by new governmental structures needs to be unpacked to 
consider the impact it had on the shaping of class relations.872  
The interactions and connections between judicial personnel, and between the 
judicial benches and other seats of local power, particularly the parish vestry, also need to 
be investigated in greater depth. Indicated throughout the discussions here, the interests 
of minor property-holders and ratepayers influenced social dynamics. As Eastwood has 
suggested, constitutional changes in parish government from 1818-19 started the process 
                                                
871 C. J. Griffin, ‘The culture of combination’ op. cit. (2015) 
872 A. Digby, Pauper Palaces (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), chapters 11 and 12, esp. 210, 
214, 224. 
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of the professionalization of local administration. How far this impacted on the authority 
of the magistracy, and their negotiation of social relationships, requires further 
investigation.873  
The proposed extension of the approach employed in this study testifies to its 
utility. Understanding the nature and operation of authority is vital to understanding 
resistance to it. By viewing protest through the structures of government that mediated 
social relationships, the full complexity of this interaction is exposed and a more nuanced 
picture of social conflict is made visible. 
 
 
                                                
873 D. Eastwood, Government and Community, 131. 
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Appendix 1: Population Distribution 
 
 
Map 1 Somerset Population Distribution 1801 
 
Map 2 Somerset Population Distribution 1831 
 
Fig. 1 Somerset Population by Hundred 1801 
 
Fig. 2 Somerset Population by Hundred 1811-1831 
 
Map 3 Norfolk Population Distribution 1801 
 
Map 4 Norfolk Population Distribution 1811-1831 
 
Data source: PP, Census returns for Norfolk and Somerset, 1801-1831 
Map of Somerset Hundreds reproduced with the kind permission of South West Heritage Trust 
(Somerset Archives and Local Studies), http://www1.somerset.gov.uk/archives/ASH/P14hund.htm  
Map of Norfolk Hundreds by Smb1001 made available at 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Norfolk_Hundreds_1830.png, and licenced under 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/  
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1. Somerset Population Distribution 1801 
Map reproduced with kind permission of South West Heritage Trust (Somerset Archives and Local Studies) 
http://www1.somerset.gov.uk/archives/ASH/P14hund.htm Data added by author   
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2. Somerset Population Distribution 1831 	  
Map reproduced with kind permission of South West Heritage Trust (Somerset Archives and Local Studies) 
http://www1.somerset.gov.uk/archives/ASH/P14hund.htm Data added by author   
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Figure 1: Somerset Population 1801: 5,000-10,000+ 
 
Hundred Total Population 
1801 
Bath, City of 32200 
Frome 15474 
Kingsbury East/West 14858 
Willerton and Freemanners 12319 
Chew and Chewton 12318 
Winterstoke 11817 
Whitestone 10996 
Petherton North/South 10038 
Whitley 8731 
Taunton Dean 8580 
Abdick and Bulstone 8058 
Wells Forum 7815 
Keynsham 6946 
Kilmersdon 6731 
Carhampton 6616 
Houndsborough (Berwick and 
Coker) 
6053 
Hartcliffe with Bedminster 5797 
Taunton, Town of/Borough 5794 
Catash 5760 
Bath Forum 5726 
Portbury 5620 
Horethorne 5614 
Wellow 5059 
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Figure 2: Somerset Population Tables: hundreds with population 10,000 + 
 
1811 
Hundred Population Majority Occupation 
Bath City and Bath Forum 43833 Manufacture 
Frome 16598 Manufacture 
Chew and Chewton 13382 Agriculture 
Winterstoke 13355 Agriculture 
Willerton and Freemanners 12429 Agriculture 
Whitestone 11093 Agriculture 
 
1821 
Hundred Population Majority Occupation 
Bath City and Bath Forum 53426 Manufacture 
Frome 20565 Manufacture 
Winterstoke 17119 Agriculture 
Chew and Chewton 16066 Agriculture 
Willerton and Freemanners 14026 Agriculture 
Whitestone 12004 Agriculture 
Hartcliffe with Bedminster 11419 Manufacture 
Whitley 11408 Agriculture 
Taunton Dean 10401 Agriculture 
Wells Forum 10130 Agriculture 
 
1831 
Hundred Population Majority Occupation 
Bath City and Forum 59172 Manufacture 
Taunton and 
Taunton Dean 
22427 Town: Manufacture 
T. Dean: Agriculture 
Frome 19884 Manufacture 
Winterstoke 19511 Agriculture 
Chew and Chewton 17932 Agriculture 
Hartcliffe w. 
Bedminster 
17047 Manufacture 
Willerton and 
Freemanners 
14717 Agriculture 
Whitley 12794 Agriculture 
Whitestone 12412 Agriculture 
Wells Forum 11420 Agriculture 
Abdick and Busltone 11231 Agriculture 
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3. Norfolk Population Distribution 1801 
 
Map of Norfolk Hundreds by Smb1001 available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Norfolk_Hundreds_1830.png, 
licenced under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ Data added by author  
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4. Norfolk Population Distribution 1831 
 
Map of Norfolk Hundreds by Smb1001 available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Norfolk_Hundreds_1830.png, 
licenced under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ Data added by author  
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Figure 3. Norfolk Population 1801 10,000-5,000 
 
Hundred Population 1801 
Norwich 36832 
Great Yarmouth 14845 
Clackclose 11720 
Erpingham South 11487 
Kings Lynn 10096 
Forehoe 9508 
Launditch 9484 
Tunstead 8398 
Eynesford 8175 
Freebridge Lynn 8051 
Mitford 7960 
Depwade 7780 
Greenhoe North 7516 
Holt 7486 
Greenhoe South 7277 
Diss 7072 
Erpingham North 7043 
Earsham 6955 
Freebridge 
Marshland 6534 
Shropham 6487 
Gallow 6305 
Smithdon 5963 
Loddon 5389 
Guiltcross 5317 
Clavering 5116 
Taverham 5111 
Happing 5095 
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Figure 4. Norfolk Population Tables: hundreds with population 10,000 + 
 
1811 
Hundred Population  Majority 
Occupation  
Norwich 37236 Man 
Great Yarmouth 17977 Man 
Clackclose 13311 Agr 
Erpingham South 11612 Agr 
Forehoe 10263 Agr 
Kings Lynn 10259 Man 
 
1821 
Hundred Population  Majority 
Occupation  
Norwich 50288 Man 
Great Yarmouth 18040 NA 
Clackclose 16277 Agr 
Erpingham South 12909 Agr 
Kings Lynn 12253 NA* 
Forehoe 12192 Agr 
Launditch 11483 Agr 
Freebridge Lynn 10537 Agr 
Mitford 10158 Agr 
 
1831 
Hundred Population 1831 Majority Occupation 
1831 
Norwich 61116 Man 
Great Yarmouth 21115 NA 
Clackclose 17663 Agr 
Erpingham South 14898 Agr 
Forehoe 13838 Agr 
Kings Lynn 13370 Man 
Launditch 12639 Agr 
Freebridge Lynn 12227 Agr 
Mitford 11495 Agr 
Freebridge 
Marshland 
11274 Agr 
Eynesford 10957 Agr 
Tunstead 10593 Agr 
Holt 10416 Agr 
Greenhoe North 10411 Agr 
Greenhoe South 10237 Agr 
Erpingham North 10160 Agr 
Depwade 10031 Agr 
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Appendix 2: Distribution of Magistrates by Hundred 
 
 
Maps 1-4: Somerset, 1801-1831 
 
Maps 5-7: Norfolk 1811-1831 
 
 
Data sources: NRO: C/Sda 1/14-18 Commission of the Peace 1798-1830; SRO: Q/JC/119-124, 
Commission of the Peace 1794-1830, TNA: C220/9 8 and 9, books of the Petty Bag Office 
Map of Somerset Hundreds reproduced with the kind permission of South West Heritage Trust 
(Somerset Archives and Local Studies) http://www1.somerset.gov.uk/archives/ASH/P14hund.htm; 
Map of Norfolk Hundreds by Smb1001 made available at 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Norfolk_Hundreds_1830.png, and licenced under 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ 
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1.  
Map reproduced with kind permission of South West Heritage Trust (Somerset Archives and Local Studies) 
http://www1.somerset.gov.uk/archives/ASH/P14hund.htm Data added by author 
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2. 
Map reproduced with kind permission of South West Heritage Trust (Somerset Archives and Local Studies) 
http://www1.somerset.gov.uk/archives/ASH/P14hund.htm Data added by author  
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3. 
Map reproduced with kind permission of South West Heritage Trust (Somerset Archives and Local Studies) 
http://www1.somerset.gov.uk/archives/ASH/P14hund.htm Data added by author 
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4. 
Map reproduced with kind permission of South West Heritage Trust (Somerset Archives and Local Studies) 
http://www1.somerset.gov.uk/archives/ASH/P14hund.htm Data added by author 
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5.  
Map of Norfolk Hundreds by Smb1001 available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Norfolk_Hundreds_1830.png, 
licenced under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ Data added by author 
  
 
 
277 
6. 
Map of Norfolk Hundreds by Smb1001 available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Norfolk_Hundreds_1830.png, 
licenced under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ Data added by author 
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7. 
Map of Norfolk Hundreds by Smb1001 available at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Norfolk_Hundreds_1830.png, 
licenced under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ Data added by author  
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Appendix 3: Justices at Quarter Sessions 
 
 
 
1. Somerset 1790-1831 
 
2. Norfolk 1790-1831 
 
 
 
Source: SRO: Q/SO/16-21; NRO: C/S 1 MF 657-660 
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1. Somerset 1790-1831 
 
Source: SRO: Q/SO/16-21. Five-year sample plus years included in protest analyses. 
Bridgwater 
 Total sessions over sample period = 12 
 Bridgwater sessions only held in summer, generally July 
Taunton 
 Total sessions over sample period = 11 
 Taunton sessions held in October annually 
Wells 
 Total sessions over sample period = 22 
 Wells sessions were biannual, Epiphany and Easter 
 
Bridgwater             
JP ID Name 
No. of 
sessions 
Span 
years 
Also at 
Taunton 
Also 
at 
Wells Local 
227 Parsons, H. 11 36 6 1 TRUE 
56 
Dickinson, 
Wm. 10 36 9 12 FALSE 
47 Combe, R. T. 9 31 9 17 FALSE 
577 Wollen, W. 9 30 0 0 TRUE 
30 Allen, J 6 35 2 2 TRUE 
69 Evered, J. 6 30 3 3 FALSE 
279 Acland, J. 6 26 6 8 TRUE 
477 Templer, G. H. 6 20 0 4 TRUE 
586 Brickdale, M. 6 20 3 6 FALSE 
642 St. Albyn, L. 6 16 4 3 TRUE 
659 Blake, M. 6 16 6 10 FALSE 
754 Poole, T. 6 16 5 10 TRUE 
217 Gale, J. 5 29 6 1 FALSE 
248 Hales, P. 5 26 0 0 FALSE 
254 Elton, A. 5 21 4 10 FALSE 
433 Phelips, J. 5 15 4 7 FALSE 
481 Tynte, C. K. 5 29 3 3 FALSE 
778 Stuckey, V. 5 16 6 8 FALSE 
89 Hanning, Wm. 4 21 7 11 FALSE 
171 Templer, Geo. 4 11 2 4 TRUE 
218 Guerin, J. 4 31 5 4 FALSE 
301 Burland, J. B. 4 11 2 9 FALSE 
499 Warre, J. T. 4 11 3 3 FALSE 
535 Hobbs, T. 4 20 0 2 FALSE 
570 Warre, F. 4 20 7 5 FALSE 
639 Acland, P.P. 4 15 4 2 TRUE 
735 Matthew, J. 4 11 0 4 TRUE 
775 Stone, W. 4 15 6 2 FALSE 
840 Phippen, R. 4 15 3 8 FALSE 
464 Sanford, W. A. 3 35 5 3 FALSE 
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Taunton             
JP ID Name 
No. of 
sessions 
Span 
years 
Also at 
Bridgwater 
Also 
at 
Wells Local 
47 
Combe, R. 
T. 9 31 9 17 TRUE 
56 
Dickinson, 
W. 9 36 10 12 FALSE 
89 Hanning, W. 7 31 4 11 TRUE 
403 Luttrell, J. F. 7 34 0 0 FALSE 
570 Warre, F. 7 11 4 5 TRUE 
217 Gale 6 30 5 1 TRUE 
227 Parsons, H. 6 34 11 1 FALSE 
279 Acland, J. 6 26 6 8 FALSE 
424 Pinney, J. F. 6 16 0 3 FALSE 
472 Tripp, H. 6 31 2 0 TRUE 
659 Blake, M. 6 16 6 10 TRUE 
775 Stone, W. 6 16 4 2 TRUE 
778 Stuckey, V. 6 16 5 8 FALSE 
218 Guerin, J. 5 31 4 3 TRUE 
464 
Sanford, 
W.A. 5 35 3 3 FALSE 
754 Poole, T. 5 16 6 10 FALSE 
254 Elton, A. 4 15 5 10 FALSE 
426 Popham, A. 4 11 0 1 FALSE 
433 Phelips, J. 4 11 5 7 FALSE 
545 
Luxton, L. 
H. 4 10 3 2 TRUE 
639 
Acland, P. 
P. 4 15 4 2 FALSE 
642 St. Albyn, L. 4 16 6 3 FALSE 
666 
Carew, G. 
H. 4 10 0 0 TRUE 
674 Clarke, J. 4 16 0 0 FALSE 
762 
Sanford, E. 
A. 4 11 3 6 TRUE 
808 
Hobhouse, 
H. 4 21 2 7 FALSE 
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Wells             
JP ID Name 
No. 
Sessions 
Span 
years 
Also at 
Bridgwater 
Also at 
Taunton Local 
254 Elton, A. 19 31 5 4 FALSE 
47 Combe, R.T 12 36 9 9 FALSE 
56 
Dickinson, 
W. 12 36 10 9 FALSE 
89 Hanning, W. 11 31 4 7 FALSE 
25 Turner, J. 10 25 0 0 TRUE 
93 Horner, T. S. 10 16 0 0 TRUE 
213 Gould, H. 9 25 2 0 TRUE 
301 Burland, J. B. 9 11 4 2 FALSE 
279 Acland, J. 8 30 6 6 FALSE 
448 Sherston, P. 8 11 0 0 FALSE 
692 
Doveton, J. 
F. 8 21 2 1 TRUE 
800 
Whalley, R. 
T. 8 15 0 0 FALSE 
840 Phippen, R. 8 16 4 3 FALSE 
302 Band, J. 7 11 1 0 TRUE 
412 Morgan, F. B. 7 11 1 2 TRUE 
433 Phelips, J. 7 11 5 4 FALSE 
651 Barrow, J. 7 16 2 2 TRUE 
749 Phillott, J. S. 7 11 1 0 TRUE 
802 Williams, T. 7 21 0 0 FALSE 
808 
Hobhouse, 
H. 7 16 2 4 FALSE 
102 Jolliffe, T.S. 6 11 1 1 FALSE 
328 Drake, F. 6 10 3 2 TRUE 
397 
Langton, W. 
G. 6 20 3 2 FALSE 
586 Brickdale, M. 6 11 6 3 FALSE 
812 Hood, A. 6 11 2 0 FALSE 
822 Bathurst, J. 6 6 3 1 TRUE 
655 
Bennett, J. 
Jnr 5 6 1 1 FALSE 
888 Rous, G. 5 6 0 0 TRUE 
558 
Methuen, J. 
R. 4 6 0 0 TRUE 
870 Lee, J. L 4 2 1 2 FALSE 
659 Blake, M. 10 16 6 6 FALSE 
754 Poole, T. 10 16 6 5 FALSE 
762 
Sanford, E. 
A. 11 6 3 4 FALSE 
778 Stuckey, V. 8 16 5 6 FALSE 
779 Taylor, E. 4 10 3 2 FALSE 
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2. Norfolk Sessions 1790-1831 
 
Source: NRO: C/S 1 MF 657-660 
Holt: 30 Sessions in the sample; twice a year (by adjournment)* 
Little Walsingham: 34 sessions in the sample; twice a year* 
Norwich: 87 sessions in the sample; four times a year* 
Kings Lynn: 47 sessions in the sample; three times a year * 
Swaffham: 16 sessions in sample; met once a year* 
 
 
Holt                 
JP ID Name 
No. 
Sessions 
Span 
years 
Also 
at KL 
Also 
at LW 
Also 
at 
Nor 
Also 
at 
Sw Local 
84 Collyer, C. 20 28 0 18 6 0 FALSE 
329 Girdlestone, Z. 15 30 0 5 1 0 TRUE 
451 
Thomlinson, J. 
W. 13 20 0 2 1 0 TRUE 
330 Gay, J. 11 33 0 5 6 0 TRUE 
60 Astley, J. H. 10 33 0 5 2 0 TRUE 
178 Sandiford, P. 10 23 1 11 3 0 FALSE 
73 Jodrell, H. 9 20 0 0 13 0 TRUE 
186 Norris, R. 9 30 0 13 3 0 TRUE 
324 Elwin, M. 8 10 0 2 25 0 TRUE 
 
 
 
Little 
Walsingham                 
JP ID Name 
No. 
Sessions 
Span 
years 
Also 
at 
Holt 
Also 
at KL 
Also 
at 
Nor 
Also 
at Sw Local 
84 Collyer, C. 18 30 20 0 6 0 FALSE 
186 Norris, R. 13 21 9 0 3 0 TRUE 
171 Hoste, D. 12 33 1 0 0 1 FALSE 
415 
Langton, W. 
H. 12 21 1 0 0 0 TRUE 
178 Sandiford, P. 11 21 10 1 3 0 TRUE 
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Norwich                 
JP ID Name 
No. 
Sessions 
Span 
years 
Also 
at 
Holt 
Also 
at KL 
Also 
at 
LW 
Also 
at Sw Local 
14 Beevor, T. 34 25 0 0 0 0 TRUE 
133 
Plumptre, 
R. 29 25 0 0 0 0 TRUE 
324 Elwin, M. 25 10 8 0 2 0 FALSE 
247 
Fellowes, 
R. 21 28 0 0 0 0 TRUE 
152 Evans, T. B. 18 20 0 0 0 0 TRUE 
208 Postle, J. 18 15 0 0 0 0 TRUE 
0 Suffield, E. 16 16 0 0 0 0 TRUE 
1 Bacon, E. 14 15 1 0 0 0 FALSE 
73 Jodrell, H. 13 20 9 0 0 0 FALSE 
117 Adiar, W. 13 20 0 0 0 0 TRUE 
275 
Beevor, T 
Jnr 13 21 0 0 0 0 TRUE 
321 Dillingham 13 6 0 0 0 0 FALSE 
0 Kerrison, R. 11 10 0 1 0 0 FALSE 
 
 
 
Kings 
Lynn                 
JP ID Name 
No. 
Sessions 
Span 
years 
Also 
at 
Holt 
Also 
at 
LW 
Also 
at Nor 
Also 
at Sw Local 
115 Dering, J. T. 37 39 0 0 0 12 TRUE 
220 
Folkes, W. J. 
H. 24 21 0 1 2 3 TRUE 
25 Rolfe, E. 19 36 0 0 0 1 TRUE 
69 Coldham, J. 19 28 0 0 0 2 TRUE 
366 Rishton, M. F. 19 24 0 4 0 3 TRUE 
11 Folkes, M. B. 18 30 0 0 3 3 TRUE 
335 Hoseason, T. 17 16 0 0 1 2 TRUE 
40 Hamond, A. 16 36 0 1 0 2 TRUE 
70 Styleman, H. 14 26 0 1 0 1 TRUE 
399 Parke, B. 14 10 0 0 0 0 TRUE 
112 Hare, T. 13 28 0 0 1 1 TRUE 
294 Wood, P. S. 12 3 0 0 0 2 TRUE 
99 Plestow, T. B. 11 6 0 0 2 1 TRUE 
373 Tyssen, S. 11 16 0 0 0 6 TRUE 
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Swaffham                 
JP ID Name 
No. 
Sessions 
Span 
years 
Also 
at 
Holt 
Also 
at KL 
Also 
at LW 
Also 
at 
Nor Local 
115 Dering, J. T. 12 39 0 37 0 0 TRUE 
24 Mason, W. 6 15 0 0 0 1 TRUE 
196 Yonge, W. 6 31 0 3 0 0 TRUE 
373 Tyssen, S. 6 16 0 11 0 0 TRUE 
318 Caldwell, R. 5 15 0 7 0 1 TRUE 
66 Parry, Edw. 4 5 0 1 0 0 TRUE 
98 Smith, J. 4 6 0 0 0 1 FALSE 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Map Sources 
 
For Maps 3.1-3.4, pp. 116-9 
 
Source: Mells Manor Muniments: Thomas Horner, papers and correspondence 1795; TNA: 
HO 42/34, 42/36, 42/50, 42/61, 42/51; WO/1/1093; KB 29/462, KB 1/29/1-2; NRO: C/S 1/15 
QS Sessions books; MF/RO 36/1 NCR Case 20a/25 City of Norwich Quarter Sessions Minute 
book 1794-1807; SRO: Q/SO/17 Quarter Sessions order books; DD/AH 59/12; 
DD/MT/19/1/1; Bath Chronicle 1795-1801; Bath Journal 1800-01; The Times, 1795-1801; 
Norfolk Chronicle 1795-1801, Norwich Mercury 1795-1801; Bury and Norwich Post, 1800-
01; Ipswich Journal 1800-01; B. Cozens-Hardy (ed) Mary Hardy’s Diary (Norfolk Record 
Society 1968); S. Poole, “Popular Politics in Bristol, Somerset and Wiltshire, 1791-1805” 
(PhD thesis, University of Bristol 1992), Appendix C. 
 
For Maps 4.1 and 4.2, pp. 182-3 
 
Source: Survey of Correspondence re Norfolk and Somerset TNA: HO 52/9; Somerset (SRO: 
Q/SO/21) and Norfolk (NRO: C/S 1/ Quarter Sessions Minute Books 1830-31; Calendars of 
Prisoners for Assize for Norfolk (MF/RO 36/1) and Somerset 1830-31 (DD/MT/19/1/1); 
Norwich Mercury and Norfolk Chronicle, Bath Chronicle and Bath Journal 1830-31; SRO: 
Q/JCP/7, Correspondence pertaining to the Commission of the Peace in Somerset 1830. 
 
Maps of Norfolk and Somerset by F. S. Weller, originally published in The Comprehensive 
Gazetteer of England and Wales, 1894-5 (London and Edinburgh: William Mackenzie 1894-
5)  
Digital images available from the UK Genealogy Archives: 
http://ukga.org/images/maps/Norfolk.jpg 
http://ukga.org/images/maps/Somerset.jpg 
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